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Abstract
Abstract
Contrary to the international trend of building Critical Incident Reporting 
Systems (CIRS) into national health systems there is no national CIRS in 
Austrian hospitals. In response to this lack of a national policy the Austrian 
Association for Gynaecology and Obstetrics (OEGGG) has started an initiative 
enabling Women Hospitals in Austria to join a voluntary international online 
CIRS. This study critically addresses the problem of preventable error leading 
to patient harm and investigates the contribution that CIRS, arguably one key 
element in the new patient safety movement, may have so that fewer patients 
die. This is necessary as progress in patient safety has been much slower 
than anticipated, despite the patient safety revival around the year 2000, 
increasing attention and numerous initiatives. Moreover there is little 
systematic documentation and contemporary knowledge about the 
implementation, management, and effect of CIRS in health care.
This study critically investigates this gap from a critical ethnographic 
perspective and provides an in-depth account of CIRS in an Austrian context. 
The study uses interviews, a questionnaire, and fieldwork observation over a 
period of two years at one Women Hospital in Vienna. Interviews and 
questionnaire are used to assess the organisation and these data provide 
ground for subsequent critical ethnographic observation. The fieldwork 
observation in the hospital is used to illustrate ways in which this type of 
research can contribute to the growth of knowledge on managerial (non- 
clinical) aspects of patient safety. Observational studies can serve to identify 
latent managerial system vulnerabilities and leverage points that can aid the 
identification, development and implementation of overall system 
improvements. In addition a continuous in-depth literature review is being 
employed.
Findings suggest that the current hospital organisation is ill resourced in 
implementing new patient safety strategies and effectively identifying and 
addressing critical incidents. In particular the study identifies latent managerial 
factors that complicate the performance of health care professionals and 
potentially contribute to adverse outcomes. It suggests that the ‘systems 
approach’ to error in health care currently focuses too much on core medical 
tasks and a principal separation between clinical and non clinical aspects of 
service provision needs to be made. Key contributions emanating from this 
research are a clinical / non-clinical patient safety continuum model, a patient 
safety framework, three phases of CIRS operationalisation, the research 
method employed, as well as the notion that different research ethics in 
different health systems require more careful interpretation of research 
contributions. In addition the continuous literature review reveals that one of 
the key arguments of the new patient safety movement, the high number of 
preventable errors leading to death in health care, is incorrect. This is critical 
as it does not allow channelling limited resources to where they are most 
needed. The study emphasises the need for more research in this subject 
area and more organisational support in health care organisations.
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Abstract
Abstract
Contrary to the international trend of building Critical Incident Reporting 
Systems (CIRS) into national health systems there is no national CIRS in 
Austrian hospitals. In response to this lack of a national policy the Austrian 
Association for Gynaecology and Obstetrics (OEGGG) has started an initiative 
enabling Women Hospitals in Austria to join a voluntary international online 
CIRS. This study critically addresses the problem of preventable error leading 
to patient harm and investigates the contribution that CIRS, arguably one key 
element in the new patient safety movement, may have so that fewer patients 
die. This is necessary as progress in patient safety has been much slower 
than anticipated, despite the patient safety revival around the year 2000, 
increasing attention and numerous initiatives. Moreover there is little 
systematic documentation and contemporary knowledge about the 
implementation, management, and effect of CIRS in health care.
This study critically investigates this gap from a critical ethnographic 
perspective and provides an in-depth account of CIRS in an Austrian context. 
The study uses interviews, a questionnaire, and fieldwork observation over a 
period of two years at one Women Hospital in Vienna. Interviews and 
questionnaire are used to assess the organisation and these data provide 
ground for subsequent critical ethnographic observation. The fieldwork 
observation in the hospital is used to illustrate ways in which this type of 
research can contribute to the growth of knowledge on managerial (non- 
clinical) aspects of patient safety. Observational studies can serve to identify 
latent managerial system vulnerabilities and leverage points that can aid the 
identification, development and implementation of overall system 
improvements. In addition a continuous in-depth literature review is being 
employed.
Findings suggest that the current hospital organisation is ill resourced in 
implementing new patient safety strategies and effectively identifying and 
addressing critical incidents. In particular the study identifies latent managerial 
factors that complicate the performance of health care professionals and 
potentially contribute to adverse outcomes. It suggests that the ‘systems 
approach’ to error in health care currently focuses too much on core medical 
tasks and a principal separation between clinical and non clinical aspects of 
service provision needs to be made. Key contributions emanating from this 
research are a clinical / non-clinical patient safety continuum model, a patient 
safety framework, three phases of CIRS operationalisation, the research 
method employed, as well as the notion that different research ethics in 
different health systems require more careful interpretation of research 
contributions. In addition the continuous literature review reveals that one of 
the key arguments of the new patient safety movement, the high number of 
preventable errors leading to death in health care, is incorrect. This is critical 
as it does not allow channelling limited resources to where they are most 
needed. The study emphasises the need for more research in this subject 
area and more organisational support in health care organisations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Too many people die or are unnecessarily harmed by our health systems. 
Current patient safety and organisation improvement initiatives in health care 
often strongly focus on clinical aspects of service provision. However, how 
health care organisations cope with non-clinical demands that come along with 
these initiatives is an area largely unaddressed in the new patient safety era- 
and organisation and management literature. This thesis aims to narrow this 
gap by deliberately focusing on non-clinical aspects of safety endeavours in 
health care. It critically investigates the endeavours of a Women Hospital in 
Vienna in setting up and running a critical incident reporting system in order to 
find out how CIRS relates to current conceptualisations of organisational error in 
health care, if and how CIRS makes a contribution to patient safety, and to 
explore how CIRS’ strengths and weaknesses may be related to and / or 
consciously controlled by the organisation and management of the hospital. The 
research question around which this thesis is framed may therefore be 
formulated as “What can conceptualisations of organisational error show about 
attempts to implement CIRS; how is CIRS implemented in practice and to what 
effect?”
It is hoped that answering this question will lead to a stronger conceptualisation 
of organisational error that will aid the identification of system vulnerabilities and 
foster the development and implementation of whole system improvements. 
This is expected to result in an original contribution to the patient safety and 
organisation and management discourse. It is hoped that in providing evidence 
of supportive measures or otherwise barriers to CIRS and patient safety this 
thesis will provide a framework that other researchers may want to use for 
structuring their inquiries and on the other hand (management) practitioners 
may find useful in their endeavours of improving safety and critically reflecting
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on organisational development in their organisations. Research findings may 
provide answers as to why progress in patient safety has been so slow, 
especially when CIRS has proofed to be much useful in other complex 
industries. Last but not least this thesis is written with the many people in mind 
which have been unnecessarily harmed by our health systems. By stressing 
what seem to be commonly known but not very well documented and hence 
largely unaddressed organisational and non-clinical mishaps it is hoped that this 
thesis makes a contribution so that fewer patients die or are harmed.
This introduction chapter ‘sets the scene’ with the following section on safety in 
health care and the role that critical incident reporting systems play, section 1.2 
explicitly stating the research-problem, -question, aims and objectives, section 
1.3 introducing the conceptual framework of the thesis, and section 1.4 ‘flow of 
the thesis’ to facilitate the reader in navigating through the thesis.
1.1. Safety in health care
In most developed countries the health care sector represents about 8-15 
percent of economic activity and is therefore one of the largest industry sectors. 
One out of 10 workers is employed in the health care sector. The social, political 
and economic context in which health care organisations have to exist is often a 
hostile, fast changing and pressured environment. The hospital today is a highly 
complex and interactive system, with personnel clustered in over a thousand job 
categories (Koeck, 1998). Work in a hospital represents a mix of technical 
expertise, emotions and individual differences, which makes managing people a 
complex task. Different competencies need to be co-ordinated to deliver a 
service to the patient. Managers and leaders strive to balance competing, 
shifting and irreconcilable demands from a wide range of stakeholders -  and do 
so while under close public scrutiny (Walshe and Smith, 2006).
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Expectations in the provision of health care in hospitals in developed countries 
have been on a steady increase. This is because medical knowledge has 
increased significantly and constantly over the years. There are new treatments 
and the facilities in which health care is provided are modern and equipped with 
state of the art equipment. But not only has medical knowledge increased. Also 
understanding of organisations and complexity of work tasks has increased. 
Organisations have become ‘learning organisations’ (Senge, 2006), employees 
have transformed into ‘knowledge workers’ (Drucker, 2003), and organisations 
employ quality strategies to pursue excellence.
But there is a paradox here. Despite an increased understanding of medicine, 
better health care facilities, increased understanding of organisations, and 
numerous quality improvement programmes, recent years have brought 
increasing attention to error in health care. It appears as if health care 
organisations in developed countries are not as safe as they ought to be and 
there is a growing consensus amongst safety experts that all health care 
systems around the world occasionally unintentionally harm patients whom they 
are seeking to help (Lewis and Fletcher, 2005). The US Institute of Medicine 
(IOM, 2000) estimates that each year between 44.000 and 98.000 Americans 
die as a result of medical errors in the US health system. In the United Kingdom 
there are an estimated 900.000 incidents each year that either harm or nearly 
harm a NHS hospital inpatient (NPSA, 2005b).
While this thesis will give considerable attention to and discuss the reliability of 
those numbers there seems to be a consensus that health care is not as safe 
and reliable as it ought to be (Amalberti et al., 2005). Cook et al (1998:5) 
ascertain that "health care stands in 1998 where nuclear power stood at the end 
of 1979". This statement has since been substantiated in the work of others (for 
example Gaba, 2000; Shojania et al., 2001; DOH, 2004; NPSA, 2005b). Due to 
the (alleged) inattention of the medical professions towards medical error and
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other deficiencies, such as a lag in introducing sophisticated information 
technologies, health care is increasingly and unfavourably compared to other 
complex industries (Shojania et al., 2001; Leape, 1994; IOM, 2000; Helmreich, 
2000; Barach and Small, 2000; Reason, 2000). Other industries have invested 
heavily in quality management and improvement strategies and have made 
remarkable progress in error reduction and safety improvement (QuIC, 2000). 
Accordingly these non-medical complex industries, so called high reliability 
organisations such as aviation, have an exemplary track record of safety 
(Shojania et al., 2001; Pizzi et al., 2001; Leape, 1994).
High reliability organisations are organisations that create safety by anticipating 
and planning for unexpected events and future surprises. They have been 
named prime examples of the system approach (Reason, 2000). These 
organisations invest in anticipating the changing potential for failure regardless 
of past success. They do so because they appreciate that their knowledge is 
imperfect and that the environment in which they operate continues to change 
(Woods, 2000). High reliability organisations do everything possible to avoid 
altogether certain kinds of negative outcomes (Klein et al., 1995). These 
organisations do not claim to be immune to catastrophic accidents but accept 
that catastrophes can happen and do happen, even to the best of organisations, 
(Reason, 2000) and they invest intensively in error avoiding strategies (Klein et 
al., 1995). High reliability organisations expect to make errors, at the same time 
they have a collective preoccupation with the possibility for error, and they train 
their workforce to recognise and recover from them (Reason, 2000).
High reliability industries offer lessons that may be applicable to reducing errors 
in health care. It is generally acknowledged that no one method will cure all 
problems, but that there is a generalisable approach (including the strategies 
discussed below) that is likely to yield favourable outcomes if applied vigorously 
(QuIC, 2000). These characteristics include the following (QuIC, 2000:34):
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•  not tolerating high error rates and setting ambitious targets for error 
reduction initiatives
•  developing tracking mechanisms that expose errors
•  relying on the abundant reports of errors and near misses
•  thoroughly investigating errors and analysing them and the use of various 
tools, including root cause analysis
•  applying to error reduction a systems approach that embraces a wide array 
of human factors, technical, and organisational remedies
•  focusing on systems solutions that do not seek to find individual fault and 
blame
•  changing the organisational culture so that it enhances safety and error 
reduction
•  allocating adequate resources to error prevention initiatives and the 
development of a knowledge base to support them
•  recognising that solutions often come from unexpected sources, ‘out of the 
box’ thinking, and new combinations of disciplines (e.g. human factors 
psychology with aeronautical engineering)
The underlying concept of systems design in high reliability industries, where 
work environments are designed to make it difficult for humans to err and which 
minimize the consequences of error, was not institutionalized in health care 
because it did not present a major focus of hospital medical activities (Leape, 
1994). Recognising this shortcoming has marked a change in the way safety is
seen in health care. Subsequently health care organisations, as yet high risk
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organisations, have come to appreciate a systems perspective to safety. There 
is a growing acceptance that the management of error requires an acceptance 
of error with consideration given to the relationship between individual human 
behaviour and the factors that influence this behaviour (Reason and Hobbs, 
2003). In order to improve safety and to operate in hazardous settings with 
reliability many health care organisations strive to emulate high reliability 
organisations from other industries that have a proven track record of safety 
(Carroll and Rudolph, 2006; Weick et al., 1999). Following Reason’s (2000) 
system approach to human error the correct response to medical error is to 
redesign the system, based on understanding the nature and extent of error, 
changing conditions that induce error, determining behaviours that prevent or 
mitigate error, and training personnel in their use (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
Bundling of efforts to improve safety in health care organisations has become 
commonly known over the past decade or so under the term patient safety.
Patient safety was a fairly new field when the IOM report captured the world’s 
attention in late 1999/early 2000 (AHRQ, 2009) and within the emerging 
framework of patient safety many different patient safety interventions quickly 
sprung up. As a consequence health care organizations wanting to engage in 
patient safety are faced with an array of areas with the potential for 
improvement. In the UK “An Organisation with a Memory” (DOH, 2000), or in 
the US the IOM report To err is human’ (IOM, 2000) presented wide ranging 
recommendations for improving patient safety. In the US these 
recommendations were framed in five principles for the design of safety 
systems in health care organizations (IOM, 2000:166ff):
Principle 1: Provide leadership
•  patient safety as a priority corporate objective
•  patient safety is everyone’s responsibility
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•  clear assignments for and expectation of safety oversight
•  provision of human and financial resources for error analysis and systems 
redesign
•  development of effective mechanisms for identifying and dealing with 
unsafe practitioners
Principle 2: Respect human limits in process design
•  design jobs for safety
•  avoid reliance on memory
•  use constraints and forcing functions
•  avoid reliance on vigilance
•  simplify key processes
•  standardize work processes
Principle 3: Promote effective team functioning
•  train in teams those who are expected to work in teams
•  include patient in safety design and the process of care
Principle 4: Anticipate the unexpected
•  adopt a proactive approach: examine processes of care for threats to 
safety and redesign them before accidents occur
•  design for recovery
•  improve access to accurate and timely information
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Principle 5: Create a learning environment
•  use simulations whenever possible
•  encourage reporting of errors and hazardous conditions
•  ensure no reprisals for reporting of errors
•  develop a working culture in which communication flows freely regardless 
of authority gradient
•  implement mechanisms of feedback and learning from error
The Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, a United States federal 
government group, released the QuIC report (2000), a response to the IOM 
report and directly ordered by the US President, and was built on a four-tiered 
approach (1) to establish a national focus to create leadership, research, tools, 
and protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety (2) to identify and 
learn from medical errors through both mandatory and voluntary reporting 
systems (3) to raise standards and expectations for improvements in safety 
through the actions of oversight organizations, group purchasers, and 
professional groups (4) to implement safe practices at the delivery level (QuIC, 
2000:4). This report alone contained more than 100 actions to be taken by 
several agencies.
Shojania et al. (2001) identified specific safety related topics and practices that 
could be derived from outside health care. These include (Shojania et al., 
2001:25):
•  incident reporting systems
•  root cause analysis
Cha^te^J^Jntroductioi^
•  computerised physician order entry and decision support as a means of 
reducing medication errors
•  automated medication dispensing systems
•  bar coding technology to avoid misidentification errors
•  aviation-style preoperative checklists for anaesthesia equipment
•  promoting a “culture of safety”
•  crew resource management, a model for teamwork training and crisis 
response modelled after training approaches in aviation
•  simulators (of patients or clinical scenarios) as a training tool
•  human factors theory in the design of medical devices and alarms
With all these reports and recommendations some of the basic theoretical 
principles for safer health care had been documented. The reality however was 
that an extensive foundation needed to be built before any meaningful 
improvements could be put into action (AHRQ, 2009). Since the time of the IOM 
report in 1999 increased efforts, attention and resources have been given to 
patient safety (Benning et al., 2011). Health organisation networks have 
launched programmes and individual nations set up national patient safety 
programmes. Progress has been made over the past decade with documented 
evidence bearing witness to the many individuals and organisations who are 
conducting patient safety research and translating it into useful tools and 
strategies for innovation (AHRQ, 2009). Yet, even in the leading countries in 
patient safety such as the United States no one is completely satisfied with the 
extent of the progress.
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While certain areas for improvement have been marked out, amongst them 
patient safety culture change, systems and clinical process redesign, reporting 
systems, health IT, medication safety, physical environment design, or 
simulation and training, more work is needed in demonstrating how practices 
get implemented and integrated into the everyday clinical workflow in order to 
ensure that there is full commitment to providing safe care (AHRQ, 2009). This 
is a challenging task and various authors have described progress in patient 
safety as frustratingly slow (Leape and Berwick, 2005; Benning et al., 2011; 
Leistikow et al., 2011) or even insufficient (Wachter, 2004). It appears as if we 
are at “the end of the beginning” (Wachter, 2004:534) with only modest 
improvement made over the past few years that ‘saw unmistakable progress but 
also reveals troubling gaps’ (Wachter, 2010). Overall patient safety turns out to 
be a very tough nut to crack (Leistikow et al., 2011).
While patient safety is concerned with entire (national) health systems one of 
the recurring themes in endeavours to improve safety is the concept of incident 
reporting. Experience from high reliability industries shows the common use of 
designated incident reporting systems (Waring, 2005). This is based on an 
understanding that errors can serve as a great source of information about a 
system and its systemic vulnerabilities, and can point out multiple directions for 
improvement. Collecting reports on errors and on those events that lead to error 
in a systematic way is one way of learning from experience and creates the 
opportunity to share with others lessons that have been learnt. Incident 
reporting has become a general term for all voluntary patient safety event 
reporting systems. These systems rely on staff who are directly involved in 
events to voluntarily provide detailed information (AHRQ, 2011). Incident 
reporting systems enable front-line staff to communicate their safety concerns 
and experiences of error to those responsible for safety and quality. Thus many 
believe that incident reporting systems are the cornerstone to safe practice 
(IOM, 2000; WHO, 2005a, NPSA, 2005).
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Successful incident reporting systems outside health care have been described 
as being non-punitive, confidential, independent, analytically capable, and 
systems-oriented and responsive in developing solutions (Farley et al., 2008). 
Incident reporting should be one element of a cohesive patient safety 
programme that establishes a patient safety infrastructure, processes and a 
climate that supports the reduction of adverse events (Farley et al., 2008). 
Efforts have been made to create incident reporting systems for medical near 
misses (for example Pateisky 2005; NPSA 2005; DOH, 2004; Shojania et al., 
2001; QuIC, 2000; IOM, 2000; van der Schaaf, 1998; Battles et al., 1998; 
Kaplan et al., 1998; Runciman et al., 1993). Several countries have launched 
national reporting systems in health care, apparently with Denmark and the UK 
being at the forefront and starting in early 2004. Despite activity to install and 
improve incident reporting systems in health care organisations around the 
world little is documented systematically about the management, use, and effect 
of such systems.
When this study commenced in 2005 Austria did not have a pan-Austrian 
quality system (BMG, 2005a) and no nationwide reporting system for medical 
near misses. Against a backdrop of pro-active government involvement in 
patient safety a group of gynaecologists and obstetricians strove to participate 
in and join an existing profession wide reporting system. This thesis will 
investigate patient safety through the lens of incident reporting systems and in 
an Austrian context, thoroughly investigating the introduction of an incident 
reporting system at one hospital department in Vienna.
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1.2. Research problem, question, aim and objectives
1.2.1. Research problem
Although the exact scope of preventable error in health care is subject to debate 
there is consensus amongst safety experts that health care is not as safe as it 
ought to be. One important aspect in creating safer systems, investigating how 
organisational errors unfold and how they may be prevented, is the use of 
designated incident reporting systems. While efforts have been made to create 
incident reporting systems for medical near misses (for example Pateisky 2005; 
NPSA 2005; DOH, 2004; Shojania et al., 2001; QuIC, 2000; IOM, 2000; Schaaf, 
1991; Battles et al., 1998; Kaplan et al., 1998; Runciman et al., 1993) and 
several countries have launched national reporting systems, still very little is 
documented systematically about the management, use, analysis and effect of 
such systems in health care. The literature on CIRS consists largely of 
experiences outside health care.
The success of CIRS outside health care has been attributed to a substantial 
approach to creating a supportive environment to reporting (Billings, 1998; 
Johnson, 2003). Many of the characteristics of good reporting that can be found 
in the patient safety literature are direct quotes to CIRS outside health care and 
not first hand experiences from within the health care industry. These 
characteristics and recommendations are therefore to be seen as implications 
rather than evidence of how CIRS works in health care. There is very little 
contemporary evidence of how incident reporting systems actually work in 
health care. First hand accounts on the implementation of CIRS in hospitals are 
rare, for example what kind of problems hospitals face when trying to apply 
those good characteristics or how problems have been approached and solved. 
In which (organisational) circumstances and environments do CIRS work 
effectively, and which environments make it more difficult for CIRS to work?
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Can the implementation of CIRS fail, how is its success being measured, and 
what are the practical outcomes of using CIRS? Qualitative and ethnographic 
accounts of the implementation and management of CIRS are sparse. This 
presents a gap in the literature on which context influences affect CIRS in 
health care and what this ‘supportive environment to reporting’ may actually 
look like in a health care context.
Regarding the national context of this study very little is known about this 
phenomenon in Austria. It is not known if/how the new patient safety movement 
is perceived by medical professions and authorities in Austria and if/how patient 
safety recommendations will be institutionalised in the Austrian health system. 
When this study commenced in 2005, at the time of the introduction of a new 
‘Health Care Quality Act’ (BMG, 2005a and 2005b), Austria did not have a pan- 
Austrian quality system (BMG, 2005a) and no nationwide reporting system for 
medical near misses. Against this backdrop of pro-active government 
involvement in patient safety, in line with the new patient safety movement, 
Austrian Gynaecologists and Obstetricians voluntarily joined an existing 
international anonymous and voluntary profession wide CIRS. This study takes 
an in-depth look at the implementation of CIRS in one clinic and investigates 
whether current practice at the hospital is commensurate with the idea of critical 
incident reporting and the implications this has on the use of CIRS at the 
hospital.
1.2.2. Research question
This research addresses the question of whether current conceptualisations of 
organisational error are adequate for application in a health care context. It 
investigates what these conceptualisations show about attempts of 
implementing a CIRS in a public health care setting. Do they adequately 
encompass all elements of organisational error in a health care setting, does
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current thinking and action of stakeholders relate to these conceptual 
frameworks? The overall research question may therefore be formulated as:
What can conceptualisations of organisational error, in particular those in 
health care, show about attempts to implement a Critical Incident 
Reporting System (CIRS) in a health care setting?
In order to project these questions onto the present research setting and 
available resources this may be rephrased in a refined research question:
How is a CIRS implemented in a public hospital in Austria and how is it 
perceived by staff?
1.2.3. Aim and objectives
The aim of this research is to:
provide an in-depth account of CIRS at a public Women’s ’ Hospital in an 
Austrian context in order to find out how it relates to current 
conceptualisations of organisational error in health care, if and how it 
makes a contribution to patient safety, and to explore how its strengths 
and weaknesses may be related to and /  or consciously controlled by the 
current organisation and management of the hospital. This should lead to 
a stronger conceptualisation of organisational error in health care, (a 
more generalisable) identification of system vulnerabilities and leverage 
points that can aid or hinder identification, development and 
implementation of system improvements, and make an important 
contribution to the current discourse on patient safety and organisation 
and management in a critical ethnographic tradition.
The objectives of the study are to:
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1. understand the practical nature of organisational error in health care
2. understand the practical nature of CIRS
3. investigate why CIRS has been implemented from a stakeholder 
perspective
4. collect empirical evidence of supportive measures or otherwise barriers to 
CIRS
5. investigate how meaningful it is for staff to use CIRS
6. enrich current conceptualisations of error in health care through 
interpretation of and generalisation from field data
1.3. Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework pertaining to this thesis may be seen as consisting 
of three levels: research perspective (level 1), research phenomenon (level 2), 
and filters (level 3). This conceptual framework is exemplified in figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework
National, cultural poHtical, 
taxonomical, ... factors Filters
Hospital
CIRS
f PhD \
Patient
Safety
Error
Soen ce
Management
Research
Perspective
Ethnography
The hospital setting and clinical domains pose a natural challenge to the non- 
clinical1 observer. Doctors and nurses are highly trained professionals and a
1 c lin ical: T hroughout th is th esis the term s ‘c lin ic a l’ and ‘n o n -c lin ica l’ defer  from  standard d ictionary  
d efin ition s w here the w ord ‘c lin ic a l’ refers to practitioners (o f  m ed icine  or p sy c h o lo g y )  w h o  do  c lin ica l  
w ork instead o f  laboratory experim ents. In this th esis the word ‘c lin ic a l’ refers to the w ork o f  either
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non-clinical observer cannot be expected to rapidly learn enough about the 
domain to confidently understand and document the details of many of the 
activities. A non-clinician does not have the necessary background knowledge 
to recognise standard versus non-standard procedural execution, to infer intent, 
or to identify medical adverse events and near-misses and the potential and 
severity of their impact (Roth et al., 2004). However, at the same time medical 
and nursing professionals, while they have the appropriate clinical background, 
often do not have management skills and knowledge of system factors and 
conceptual frameworks for handling non-clinical, managerial systemic threats to 
safety. The bottom level of the framework (figure 1.1) refers to the ‘research 
perspective’, how the researcher sees the world, decides on, approaches and 
analyses a certain research phenomenon, and what expert knowledge the 
researcher possesses to offer a perspective on this phenomenon. It exemplifies 
the critical ethnography perspective of a student of organisation and 
management (this is elaborated in section 5.2.1 of the methodology chapter) as 
well as the researcher as an individual with management expertise and ‘insight’ 
into the realm of health care (see sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of the methodology 
chapter).
The centrepiece of the framework ‘research phenomenon’ can be found at the 
second level in table 1.1. Patient safety, error science, and CIRS represent the 
core elements of the phenomenon and are, in themselves, inherently complex 
constructs. However, it is at the front line of care, such as at the hospital 
department that has been studied, where all these influences come together 
and result in the quality and safety of care that patients receive. Hence these
m edica l or nursing p rofession a ls. T h is is to m ake a principal d istin ction  to other in d iv id u a ls in the 
hospital w h o  do not have a m ed ica l or nursing background (the term s m edical and nursing resp ectiv e ly  
are o n ly  used w hen  referring to ju st either one o f  these  tw o  groups o f  p ro fessio n s). N o n -c lin ica l in that 
sen se  refers to anyone w ho d o es not have any m ed ica l or nursing k n o w led g e  and w ho m ay or m ay not 
w ork in a hospital (i.e . a secretary w ou ld  be a n o n -clin ica l person, the author o f  this study is a n o n -c lin ica l  
observer).
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three elements are exemplified to overlap, merge, and ‘come to life’ at a 
hospital level and result in an opportunity for investigation in a real world setting 
(PhD). Accounts of this synergy of elements are rare and do not yet provide 
sufficient feedback to trigger change in current hospital activities, business 
functions, or procedures. Much emphasis seems to be on “numbers” and more 
positivistic approaches to handling patient safety.
A number of ‘filters’ had to be introduced to allow applying contributions, 
stemming from various health systems and authors, pertaining the core 
elements patient safety, error science, and CIRS (research phenomenon - level 
2) to the particular research context. This is shown in the top level of figure 1.1 
and includes national, cultural, political, or taxonomical factors. This might best 
be explained by using an example. The JCAHO in 2005 (Chang et al., 2005) 
and the WHO in 2009 (WHO, 2009) have published a proposal for a 
standardised terminology and classification schema for near misses and 
adverse events, a patient safety event taxonomy. As the output language of 
both of these institutions is English and has not (yet) been translated to or 
applied in a German context it cannot easily be applied to the German reporting 
system used in this study. Likewise studies on CIRS in the NHS in the UK are to 
be seen in the context of the endeavours of the NPSA (National Patient Safety 
Agency) and its budgetary possibilities, as well as the hospitals’ inherent 
organisational structure (for example several ‘risk leads’ for an NHS hospital 
trust that uses the National Reporting and Learning System), as compared to 
the lack of a national patient safety agency or national reporting system in 
Austria at the commencement of this study.
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1.4. Flow of the thesis
The layout of this thesis largely follows the conceptual framework set forth 
above in figure 1.1. The thesis has a chapter on each of the three core 
elements pertaining to the research phenomenon: patient safety (chapter 2), 
conceptualisation of error (chapter 3), and incident reporting (chapter 4). This is 
followed by a chapter on research methodology (chapter 5) and two chapters on 
research findings and analysis (chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 8 uses this 
information as a basis for discussion of the results, conclusion and pointing out 
areas for future research.
After this introductory chapter, chapter 2 sets out in section 2.2 by providing 
definitions for the terms ‘patient safety’, ‘error’, and ‘adverse event’ and 
stressing the need for a clear, comprehensive and universally accepted 
definition. Section 2.3 on errors in health care introduces statistical accounts of 
error in health care. Based on the popular Institute of Medicine report it presents 
one of the key arguments of the new patient safety movement, namely that 
preventable errors in health care is a leading cause of death, and subsequently 
reviews generalisations based on the report for the UK, EU, and Austria. The 
reliability of these generalisations is the critically investigated in section 2.4.
Chapter 3 provides background information on organisational error and 
investigates if the call for a systemic approach to safety, as carried forward in 
the patient safety literature, can be substantiated. The chapter sets out in 
section 3.2 with a brief first level categorisation of error (active / latent), an 
explanation of ‘organisational accidents’ in section 3.3, as well as responses 
(person / system) to organisational accidents in section 3.4.
Chapter four starts with providing contextual information on where health care 
aims to go with the contribution of incident reporting, namely safe systems
(4.2.1). It stresses that although the new patient safety literature promotes a
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kind of systems thinking that encourages the use of CIRS this new kind of 
thinking has to come up against another strand of safety initiatives, notably 
evidence based medicine (4.2.2), which might sit much more comfortably with 
clinicians who are supposed to use it. The chapter then introduces the purpose
(4.3.1), the characteristics of good (4.3.2), and the barriers (4.3.3) to incident 
reporting.
Chapter 5 on research methodology sets out in section 5.2 discussing critical 
realism as the fundamental philosophical underpinning that informs the 
methodological choices and design of the study, and explains how the research 
topic was found in an amalgamation of philosophical stance and the 
researcher’s personal and professional background. Section 5.3 discusses the 
research methodology employed in this thesis, as well as the scope of the study 
and issues pertaining to research ethics and confidentiality. The first (qualitative) 
part of this study employed semi-structured interviews and a self administered 
questionnaire (section 5.4) and the second (ethnographic) part of the study 
used fieldwork observation (section 5.5).
Section 6.2 in chapter 6 provides contextual information pertaining quality 
management in hospitals in Austria in general and CIRS in the Vienna City 
Hospital Association in particular. Section 6.3 discusses observations at the 
CIRS training session at the department. Section 6.4 presents findings from 
interviews, which aimed to identify the medical lead- and the nursing lead- 
perspective on the CIRS implementation. Section 6.5 presents findings from the 
self-administered questionnaire that sought to capture the general safety 
attitude and perception of CIRS from front line staff.
Chapter 7 starts with information on the reporting frequency to CIRS over the 
period of the study (section 7.2). Subsequent sections introduce findings of the 
fieldwork observation according to the four themes ‘possible CIRS reports’
(section 7.3), ‘barriers to reporting’ (section 7.4), ‘organisational issues’ (section
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7.5), and ‘practical implications’ (section 7.6). These findings are followed by 
information on the CIRS feedback meeting and a discussion of some of the 
consequences of the project in section 7.7.
This final chapter presents the conclusion to this research. Section 8.2 on 
patient safety and incident reporting in Austria discusses the findings emanating 
from this research and conclusions drawn. Section 8.3 presents a summary of 
the contribution to knowledge. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this study 
before section 8.5 points out areas for future research. This chapter closes with 
some reflections in section 8.6.
These chapters are complemented by nine appendices, which have been used 
in those instances where additional information may be insightful but where 
placing it into the main text might have distracted the flow of the thesis.
A note on the use of literature: The reader will notice that extensive reference is 
made to patient safety literature from the US and the UK and comparatively little 
about patient safety in Austria. Although from the researcher’s point of view (as 
an Austrian) this is regrettable it nevertheless is inevitable and presents a true 
reflection of the lack of available literature on patient safety and CIRS in Austria.
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CHAPTER 2: PATIENT SAFETY
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of what 
the apparent key safety problem in the delivery of modern health care is. The 
critical analysis of popular claims reveals problems with their trustworthiness. 
On one hand this constellation should give the reader insight into what kind of 
picture those at the forefront of health care are likely to have of patient safety, 
i.e. what kind of perception and attitude the researcher can expect from the 
health care organisation. On the other hand digging below the surface of these 
claims and showing the complexity of the underlying problem this chapter gives 
a first taste of the challenges the researcher is likely to face in his investigation 
of practitioners, managers, policy makers and fellow researchers.
2.1. Introduction
It was the best of times, 
it was the worst of times, 
it was the age of wisdom, 
it was the age of foolishness, 
it was the epoch of belief, 
it was the epoch of incredulity, 
it was the season of Light, 
it was the season of Darkness, 
it was the spring of hope, 
it was the winter of despair,
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we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct 
to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way— in short, the period was so 
far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its 
being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.
(Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, 1859)
Charles Dickens (1812-1870), one of England’s most popular novelists, wrote 
the classic novel “A Tale of Two Cities” (1859) to describe events before and 
during the French Revolution in Paris. He compared it with the many 
unflattering parallels of social life in London at the same time. More than 150 
years later the opening lines of his classic novel have become a widely used 
analogy for describing the contrasts and paradoxes surrounding the delivery of 
health care services around the world (see for example Cook et al., 1998). 
Because in many ways it is also ‘the best of times and the worst of times’ for 
health care.
Cook et al. (1998) bring it to the point:
“On the one hand, splendid new knowledge, more finely honed 
skills, and technical advances bring sophisticated treatments to 
larger and more fragile populations of people than ever before. On 
the other hand, media and the public attention is focused on 
‘celebrated’ medical accidents-chemotherapy overdoses, wrong 
limb surgeries, catastrophic missed diagnoses. Stunning success 
and appalling failure are arrayed in contrast to each other. It is in 
this setting that discussions about patient safety are now taking 
place.” (Cook et al., 1998: vii)
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The growing interest and prominence of patient safety is evident by a growing 
body of literature. At a glance patient safety may be seen as unfolding in three 
eras: before, around, and after the year 2000. All major original studies on the 
occurrence of error fall into the first era (before 2000). These studies differ in 
scope and methods and received moderate to low attention from the public and 
media. The second era, around 2000, saw the inception of national patient 
safety agencies in the United States in 1997 and in England in 2001. This era is 
also coined by the landmark publications To Err is Human’ from the United 
States IOM (IOM, 2000) and the Department of Health report ‘An Organisation 
with a memory’ (DOH, 2000) in England. This era is characteristic for the outcry, 
previously unseen to such an extent, of the public on the high occurrence of 
error in health care. The third era, after 2000, saw an increasing interest in 
patient safety, together with the introduction of one of the earliest and to date 
the world’s biggest CIRS in health care, the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) for adverse events in England in 2004 and a continuously 
growing body of literature (publications from eras two and three will be referred 
to in this thesis as the ‘new patient safety movement’ literature). It suggests that 
errors are much more common in health care than previously assumed.
This chapter sets out in section 2.2 by providing definitions for the terms ‘patient 
safety’, ‘error’, and ‘adverse event’ and stressing the need for a clear, 
comprehensive and universally accepted definition. Section 2.3 on errors in 
health care introduces statistical accounts of error in health care. Based on the 
popular Institute of Medicine report it presents one of the key arguments of the 
new patient safety movement, namely that preventable errors in health care is a 
leading cause of death, and subsequently reviews generalisations based on the 
report for the UK, EU, and Austria. The reliability of these generalisations is the 
critically investigated in section 2.4.
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2.2. Definition
Several authors have aimed to define patient safety and to place it into some 
kind of framework. Gaba (2000) for example notes that patient safety can be 
seen as the equivalent of operational safety in other industries. It is different 
from occupational safety of employees, which deals with things such as needle- 
sticks and back injuries. It is also different from the more complex goals of 
‘quality’ or of achieving ‘good clinical outcomes’ (Gaba, 2000). Gaba (2000) and 
Cooper et al. (2000) describe patient safety as the avoidance, prevention, and 
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the processes of 
health care. These include errors, deviations, and accidents. Battles and Lilford 
(2003:ii3) define patient safety as
“to reduce the risk of injury or harm to patients from the structure 
and process of care. This can be accomplished by eliminating or 
minimising unintended risks and hazards associated with the 
structure and process of care. A vision for patient safety would be 
‘zero health care associated injuries or harm’”.
Another definition is brought forward by the IOM (2000). They (IOM, 2000) 
define patient safety as
“Freedom from accidental injury; ensuring patient safety involves 
the establishment of operational systems and processes that 
minimize the likelihood of errors and maximizes the likelihood of 
intercepting them when they occur. ”
The growing body of literature on patient safety makes apparent the need for a 
unified terminology if health care providers, policy makers, and researchers are 
to collaboratively improve patient safety. Grober and Bohnen (2005), two 
medical doctors, stress this in their contribution "Defining medical error" (Grober
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and Bohnen, 2005:39) by calling for "a clear, comprehensive and universally 
accepted definition of medical error that explicitly includes the key domains of 
error causation and captures the faulty processes that cause errors, irrespective 
of outcome".
The IOM (2000) provides a definition for error and adverse event, which is 
based on Reason (1990) and Brennan et al. (1991):
“An error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a 
wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning).” (IOM, 
2000:28)
“An adverse event is an injury caused by medical management 
rather than the underlying condition of the patient. An adverse 
event attributable to error is a ‘preventable adverse event’. 
Negligent adverse events represent a subset of preventable 
adverse events that satisfy legal criteria used in determining 
negligence (i.e., whether the care provided failed to meet the 
standard of care reasonably expected of an average physician 
qualified to take care of the patient in question).” (IOM, 2000:28)
According to the above definitions the following categorisation can be made. 
Figure 2.1 shows the categorisation and relationship between the different 
terms. From all errors that happen in all episodes of care:
•  some errors do not result in adverse events (near misses).
•  not all adverse events involve error
•  all preventable adverse events involve error
•  all negligent adverse events are preventable
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Figure 2.1: Venn diagram of IOM terminology
All episodes of care
All errors
All adverse events
Preventable 
adverse events
Negligent 
adverse events
Source: Gray (2003)
2.3. Errors in health care
Patient safety has the important role of ensuring that patients are not 
unnecessarily harmed when they consult health care services. Unfortunately 
errors do occur and the history of errors in health care is probably as long as 
the history of medicine itself. Lewis and Fletcher (2005) have noted that all 
health care systems around the world occasionally unintentionally harm patients 
whom they are seeking to help. Some patients even die as a direct result of 
errors that occur in the treatment they receive, and not because of their 
underlying health condition (for example Brennan et al., 1991; Thomas et al, 
1999; IOM, 2000; BMJ, 2000; DOH, 2000; Aylin et al. 2004 ).
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The increasing prominence of patient safety in health care is fuelled by a 
growing body of literature that shows a high incidence of error in health care 
organisations (for example Brennan et al., 1991; Leape, et al., 1999; Wilson et 
al., 1995; Wilson et al., 1999; Thomas et al., 1999; IOM, 2000; DOH, 2000; BMJ, 
2000) and raises concerns about the safety of modern health care delivery. The 
amount of research on patient safety is greater than ever before (Lilford et al., 
2006; Stelfox et al., 2006). The publication of the US IOM report “To err is 
Human” (IOM, 2000) and the UK Department of Health report “An organisation 
with a memory” (DOH, 2000), together with the establishment of national patient 
safety agencies in both countries (the National Patient Safety Foundation 
(NPSF) in the US, and the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in England), 
have increased awareness of medical errors and adverse events in health care. 
But how big a problem is medical error? How often do medical errors occur, and 
more importantly, how many injuries and deaths could be avoided if optimum 
care was provided? This is an important question as the alleged scope of the 
problem is one of the pillars and driving force of the patient safety movement.
A review of the literature shows that a number of large scale, multi-institutional 
analyses on the occurrence of error in health care have been conducted and 
that statistics on the frequency of errors and adverse events in health care have 
existed for a long time. Studies are usually classified into overall error and 
adverse event rates in hospitals; speciality specific studies in hospitals; 
medication related studies; general practice studies; and cost of error studies. 
These studies differ in scope and methods. However, most studies use 
structured implicit review instruments (Gray, 2003) and many of these studies 
are on patients experiencing medication related errors (Gray, 2003; IOM, 2000; 
Brennan, 2000). Most studies focus on hospital settings and very little is known 
about the occurrence of errors outside hospital settings (Leape, 2000; Brennan, 
2000; Gray, 2003).
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The IOM report (2000) and a study by UK health economist Gray (2003) both 
provide extensive reviews of studies of error in health care. Together they list 
about one hundred studies on the occurrence of error in health care. Providing 
a full review of all those studies is beyond the scope of this research. The 
following is therefore a selective overview of major studies, with particular 
attention being given those statistical accounts on which the IOM report To Err 
is Human’ (IOM, 2000) is based upon. This is for the following three reasons.
First, the three most extensive investigations on medical error are the Harvard 
Medical Practice Study (HMPS) by Brennan et al. (1991), the Utah and 
Colorado Study (UCS) by Thomas et al. (2000), and the study of health care in 
Australia (Wilson et al., 1995) (for example Grober and Bohnen, 2005). The 
IOM report is based on two of them (HMPS; UCS) and makes reference to the 
other one.
Secondly, although studies on the occurrence of medical error have existed for 
a long time, for example Barr (1955), Moser (1956), Schimmel (1964), Mills 
(1977), Steel et al. (1981), or Brennan et al. (1991) (see also the next section 
2.3.1 on statistical accounts of error), it is the IOM report (IOM, 2000) that 
caught everyone’s attention. Authors (Stelfox et al., 2006) have found the 
dramatic increase in patient safety publications, from 59 to 164 articles per
100.000 articles (see also later in section 2.3.3 and figure 2.3), to be in direct 
correlation with the publication of the IOM report (IOM, 2000). It is referred to as 
a landmark publication in the patient safety movement. In addition, one of the 
studies on which the report is based, (Brennan et al., 1991), is the highest cited 
patient safety paper, with an average of 64 citations per year (Lilford et al., 
2006).
Thirdly, as can also be seen later in section 2.3.3 and figure 2.3, the biggest 
increase in publications after the IOM report (IOM, 2000), occurred in editorials,
letters, reviews and guidelines; not so much in reports of original research
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(Stelfox et al., 2006). Review of the literature makes apparent that many 
authors appear to trust these numbers without questioning them and/or testing 
their reliability. It is often not mentioned that these numbers are ‘only’ 
extrapolations and many do not mention any of the limitations associated with 
the methods used in either the original studies (HMPS; UCS) and/or the 
extrapolation study (To Err is Human). As a consequence to date the IOM 
remains the main reference to the scope of the problem of error in health care 
on a representable scale. Data and methods from the report have been used to 
make extrapolations in other countries, including the UK. Amongst others the 
European Union Network for Patient Safety, the World Health Organisation, as 
well as government reports in Austria rely on data presented in the IOM report.
The following overview gives insight into the kinds of methods that have been 
used in those studies. After introducing these basic statistical accounts of error 
in health care this chapter will investigate how this data has been interpreted in 
the IOM report, making it such a prominent claim that every given year 100.000 
die in the US due to preventable medical errors, and determines the reliability of 
those extrapolations.
2.3.1. Statistical accounts of error in health care
Accounts of the occurrence of adverse events and errors in health care are 
manifest in the literature from as early as 1955. Barr (1955) described them as 
"the price we pay for modern diagnosis and therapy". Moser (1956) referred to 
them as "diseases of medical progress" (Moser, 1956). Schimmel (1964) 
observed that the occurrence of occasional reactions had become an 
“accustomed and almost predictable hazard rather than improper medical care” 
(1964:100). With time came the understanding that medical progress doesn’t 
come for free. While medical progress brings dramatic advances in methods of 
diagnosis and treatment, it is usually accompanied by adverse reactions 
(Schimmel, 1964).
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While Moser’s (1956) study provided data on adverse outcomes, these reports 
usually included unusual reactions, or very severe ones. There were however 
no data on the overall occurrence of incidents, the ones that lead to minor or no 
complications. Therefore, in 1964, as chief resident at Yale University Hospital, 
Department of Internal Medicine, Schimmel (1964) initiated a study “The 
hazards of hospitalization” that would become the first study to quantify the 
occurrence of errors and adverse events in hospitals. The aim of the study was 
to conduct "an assessment of all untoward reactions, regardless of severity...to 
determine their total incidence and to indicate the cumulative risk assumed by 
the patient exposed to the many drugs and procedures used in his care" 
(Schimmel, 1964:100). Over eight months his team assessed 1.014 patients 
that were admitted to hospital one or more times, a total of 1.252 admissions. In 
198 patients they recorded 240 episodes of ‘noxious responses’ to medical care. 
Noxious responses were described as untoward events, complications, and 
mishaps that resulted from acceptable diagnostic or therapeutic measures 
deliberately instituted in the hospital (Schimmel, 1964). Of 198 patients these 
noxious responses resulted in prolonged hospitalisation of 105 patients. Thus, 
20 per cent of the patients admitted to the medical wards experienced one or 
more untoward episode and 10 percent had a prolonged or unresolved episode. 
The severity of these 240 episodes was minor in 110, moderate in 82 and major 
in 48 patients. Of those 48 major episodes 16 were fatal.
Schimmel’s findings are important as he noticed a direct correlation between 
length of stay and the risk of encountering such an episode. Patients with 
noxious events had a mean total of hospitalisation of 28.7 days, while other 
patients only stayed an average of 11.4 days in the hospital. Furthermore, he 
detected an entire spectrum of nosocomial2 disorders, even in the cases where
2nosocom ia l: “pertain ing to or orig inating in a h o sp ita l” ; source: D orland's M ed ica l D iction ary; a v a ilab le  
at h ttp ://w w w .m erck so u rce.co m ; last accessed  1 1 .0 8 .2 0 1 0
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patients were not severely harmed. He stressed that physicians with an interest 
in patient safety need to understand this spectrum of nosocomial disorders, but 
that in practice not all physicians do. His study emphasised that modern 
medicine introduces potent procedures that cannot always be used harmlessly. 
With each new drug or procedure come new potential hazards, which are not 
immediately apparent. They may only be discovered over time or after harm is 
done (Schimmel, 1964).
It also became apparent in the study (Schimmel, 1964) that patients who 
suffered from adverse episodes were no different to other patients, except that 
they had spent more time on the wards. They had similar clinical patterns, mean 
age and had been readmitted to the hospital at the same frequency. This 
underlined how important it is to identify adverse events. It rejects the 
assumption that adverse events only happen to terminally ill/end of life patients, 
who would have died anyway. Schimmel (1964) made clear that in his study it 
was not a patient’s underlying condition that somehow furthers the occurrence 
of an adverse event.
Mills, in 1977, conducted a study for the California Medical Association. This 
was a detailed analysis of hospital records of two Californian hospitals in order 
to estimate the number of events which had the potential to give rise to litigation. 
Steel et al. (1981) reviewed data of 815 consecutive patients over a five-month 
period, with patient data coming from an American university hospital in 1979. 
They found that 36 percent of all patients were suffering from iatrogenic 
illnesses, nine percent of which resulted in a life threatening incident or 
produced considerable disability. In two percent of the cases it is believed that 
the contributing iatrogenic factors were so severe that they played a major 
reason in the patients’ death (IOM, 2000; Gray, 2003).
The first HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991) which applied methods used by Mills in
1977, but to a much larger sample, was conducted in the State of New York in
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1984, and remains the biggest study of its kind. Figure 2.2 gives an overview of 
the review process. Brennan et al. (1991) used data from 51 randomly selected 
hospitals in the State of New York. From the original random sample of 31.429 
records 30.195 records were reviewed. From those, 7.817 were positive to the 
screening criteria, and 7.743 of those were reviewed. The results in the study 
are thus based on 30.121 records, of which 22.378 were negative screens and 
7.743 were reviewed by physicians (Brennan et al., 1991).
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Figure 2.2: HMPS 1 review process
6 4 6 b  wi th out 
adverse events
3 0  I 9 b  located  
on first review
22  3 / 8  negative for 
screening criteria
/ / 4 3  reviewed  
by physicians
/ 8  I /  positive for 
screening criteria
3 I 4 2 9  in 
or iginal sam ple
Source: Brennan et al. (1991)
The initial findings were then extrapolated to the New York State level. The 
result was that adverse events, prolonged hospitalisation and/or disability at the 
time of discharge occurred in 3.7 percent of hospitalisations. Of these, 58 
percent were attributable to errors, and 27.6 percent were due to negligence. 
The majority of these adverse events resulted in disability lasting less than six 
months, but 13.6 percent resulted in death and 2.6 percent caused permanently 
disabling injuries. Drug complications were the most common type of adverse
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events (19 percent), followed by wound infections (14 percent); 13 percent were 
due to technical complications (Brennan et al., 1991; Leape et al., 1991).
Using these extrapolations it was estimated that among the 2.672 million 
hospital discharges from New York hospitals in 1984 there were likely to be 
98.609 adverse events and 27.179 negligent adverse events each year across 
the state of New York. Therefore it was concluded that a substantial amount of 
injury results from medical management and many injuries are the results of 
substandard care (Brennan et al., 1991).
The “Quality in Australian Health Care Study” (Wilson et al., 1995) and the 
“UCS” (Thomas et al., 2000) are two other large studies that employed the 
methods of the HMPS (two stage medical record review). First, in the Australian 
study, a total of 14.655 patient records from 28 hospitals in New South Wales 
and South Australia were reviewed. Wilson et al. (1995) found adverse events 
to occur in 16.6 percent of admissions; 51 percent of adverse events were 
thought to be preventable. Adverse events were classified as resulting in minor 
events from which patients recovered within 12 months (77.1 percent), 
permanent disability (13.7 percent), and contributing to patient death (4.9 
percent) (Gray, 2003).
The UCS by Thomas et al. (2000) used a random sample of 15.000 patient 
records from a representative sample of hospitals in Utah and Colorado (United 
States) from 1992. Adverse events occurred in 2.9 percent of patients, of which 
in Utah 54 percent were thought to be preventable and 32.6 percent attributable 
to negligence. In Colorado 56 percent of adverse events were seen as 
preventable and 27.4 percent due to negligence. Overall, death occurred in 6.6 
percent of adverse events, 6.9 percent of preventable adverse events and 8.8 
percent of negligent adverse events. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the 
sample size and adverse event rate of the studies included in the above 
literature review.
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Table 2.1: Overview of “adverse event” occurrence in cited studies3
Author Sample Size “Adverse Event” Occurrence
Schimmel (1964) 1.014 23.7 %
Steel (1981) 815 36 %
Brennan et al. (1991) 30.121 3.7 %
Wilson et al. (1995) 14.655 16.6%
Thomas et al. (2000) 15.000 2.9 %
This review of statistical accounts on error suggests that error is a somewhat 
natural companion of medical progress. The delivery of health care services 
brings with it unwanted consequences and dangers. However, despite 
publications on the occurrence of error in health care, it seems that the subject 
did not get the attention it deserved4 (AHQR, 2001; Shortell and Singer, 2008). 
This did not change until the publication of the IOM report (2000) “To err is 
Human” in late 1999.
2.3.2. Errors in health care a leading cause of death?
The US IOM is the health arm of the US National Academy of Sciences and is 
an independent non-profit organisation that works outside of government to 
provide unbiased and authoritative advice to decision makers and the public 
(IOM, 2011). It was their report “To err is human” in late 1999 that awakened 
much of the health care system to the challenge of reducing the number of
3 T he term adverse even t is put under quotation m arks becau se , as sec tio n  4 .5 .6  w ill sh ow , the term  has 
not one un iversa lly  accepted  use. S tu dies m ay have lab elled  d iffering ev en ts as “adverse  e v en t” .
4 T here w ere no constructive d ev e lo p m en ts and im provem ents to reduce the occurren ce o f  error, as 
happened in other h igh risk industries. Errors w ere o f  course  m entioned  in the m edia  and this w ill be  
discu ssed  later in this chapter (section  4 .6 ).
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adverse events (Brennan, 2000; Stelfox et al., 2006). Although not collecting 
any primary data the authors of the IOM report managed to extrapolate from 
and present existing data in a way that caught the attention of the masses. Data 
from the HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991; discussed in section 2.3.1) and of the, at 
the time yet unpublished, UCS (Thomas et al., 2000; also discussed in section 
2.3.1) were extrapolated to the 33,6 million hospital admissions to United States 
hospitals in 1997. These extrapolations resulted in the message that between
44.000 and 98.000 people die every year in American hospitals as a result of 
preventable errors, and not because of an underlying health condition (IOM, 
2000).
Following the publication of the IOM report (IOM, 2000) in late 1999, Hayward 
and Hofer (2001) recall TV and newspaper headlines stating that more people 
are killed in American hospitals every six months than died in the entire Vietnam 
War, which lasted 20 years. Others, for example Gaba (2000), have compared 
these numbers to the equivalent of three fully loaded jumbo jets crashing every 
day or two with no survivors. In comparison, in 1984, the year from which the 
patient records for these extrapolations were drawn, a total of 52 people died in 
8 accidents in commercial aviation (Gaba, 2000 citing the National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2000). Even when using the lower estimates of 
the IOM report (IOM, 2000) of 44.000 annual deaths attributable to preventable 
adverse events, this ranked as the seventh leading cause of death in the United 
States. Therefore, according to these publications, more people die from 
preventable adverse events in health care than in car crashes (43.458), from 
breast cancer (42.297) or from AIDS (16.516) (IOM, 2000)5.
5G aba (2 0 0 0 ) and H ayw ard and H ofer (2 0 0 1 )  are qu otin g  IO M  (2 0 0 0 )  num bers and note that these  
num bers are subject to debate. N everth e less , they are cited  here becau se  o f  the ex em p lary  com p a riso n s  
they provided  on the assum p tion  that the IO M  num bers w ere correct. There are m any e x a m p les  o f  other  
authors (for exam ple  S te lfo x  et al., 2 0 06; A lberti, 2 0 0 1 ; Arah and K lazinga , 2 0 0 4 ; A h lu w a lia  and M arriott
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Apart from the personal sufferings, occurrences of errors to this extent also 
create immense costs for the health system. Thomas et al. (1999) and the IOM 
(IOM, 2000) calculated that the total costs of these errors, incorporating health 
care costs, disability, lost income and lost household production, are between 
37.6 and 50 billion USD for adverse events and between 17 and 29 billion USD 
for preventable adverse events. Another study by Bates et al. (1997), that was 
cited in the IOM report found that two percent of hospital inpatients suffered 
from preventable adverse drug events and that this resulted in extra costs of 
4.700 USD per patient, or 2.8 billion USD for a 700 bed teaching hospital.
2.3.3. Generalisations from IOM report
Stelfox et al. (2006) conducted a study to investigate the impact of the To  Err is 
Human’ report (IOM, 2000) on patient safety publications. They (Stelfox et al., 
2006) found an increase in patient safety publications from 59 to 164 articles 
per 100,000 MEDLINE6 publications (from January 1st, 1995 until January 1st,
2005) following the release of the report. Figure 2.3 shows patient safety 
publications before and after the release of the IOM report To Err is Human’ 
(IOM, 2000). The biggest increase became evident in the ‘editorials, letters, 
reviews, guidelines and other items’ section (Stelfox et al., 2006).
(2 0 0 5 )  to nam e ju st a few ), and the rem ainder o f  the chapter w ill sh o w  this in m ore detail, w h o  c ite  IO M  
num bers w ithou t q u estion in g  the reports accuracy.
6 M edline: (M ed ica l L iterature A n a ly s is  and R etrieval S y stem ) is a b ib liograp h ic  database o f  life  sc ien ce s  
and b iom ed ica l inform ation . It in c lu d es b ib liographic  inform ation for articles from  a cad em ic  journals  
co v er in g  m ed icin e , nursing, pharm acy, dentistry, veterinary m ed icin e , and health care. T he database  
inc lu des m ore than 18 m illion  records, and dates back to 1950. 88 percent o f  records are in E n g lish .
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Figure 2.3: Patient Safety Publications before and after the IOM report “To Err is 
Human”
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Source: Stelfox et al. (2006)
Due to its popularity the IOM report is frequently cited and used as a basis for 
extrapolations in other countries. The critical approach in this study has led to 
an investigation of the apparent bona fide that IOM numbers experience 
throughout the patient safety literature. This section will briefly review the 
influence IOM data had on patient safety in the (1) UK, (2) the EU, and (3) 
Austria before the next section 2.4 will discuss the reliability of these studies.
(1) Several publications suggest that there is no representative original data on 
the occurrence of preventable adverse events in the UK (for example Vincent, 
2001; email conversation with Vincent, 2010; Lilford et al., 2006; Sari et al.,
2006) and that extrapolations are currently based on IOM data. For example the 
DOH (2000) made extrapolation based on the IOM report and concluded that an 
estimated 850.000 incidents each year either harm or nearly harm an NHS
hospital inpatient in England (DOH, 2000; NPSA, 2005), resulting in 40.000
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deaths each year (Aylin et al., 2004). Based on IOM data several publications, 
for example a special edition from the British Medical Journal entirely devoted to 
patient safety (BMJ, 2000) and others (for example DOH, 2000; Leape, 2000) 
suggest that preventable errors in medicine have become an infamous and 
leading cause of death. IOM data and methods are thus perceived as 
trustworthy and reliable in the UK.
(2) EU involvement in patient safety policy dates back to the year 2002 at the 
World Health Assembly resolution, which led to recommendations by the High 
Level Group on Health Services and Medical Care in 2005 (EC, 2008b). 
Although patient safety is identified as a key area for action in the Commission’s 
Health Strategy White Paper (EC, 2007) the EU does not come up with original 
data on error occurrence in health care but base their estimations for the entire 
EU on three studies which are all based on the IOM report, “An Organisation 
with a Memory” from the UK, the 2008 ENEAS study in Spain (Aranaz-Andres 
et al., 20087), and a 2008 study from France by Michel et al. (2008s), as well 
as a couple of “interviews with key stakeholders” (EC, 2008a:4), for which no 
further information is provided. The European Commission (EC, 2008a) 
published that “between 6.7 and 15 million hospital admissions and over 37 
million consultations in the primary care setting result in an adverse event for 
the patient as a result of receiving that healthcare” (EC, 2008b:v). They further 
calculate that health care associated infections affect an average of five percent 
of hospital inpatients. In total they estimate that every year 4.1 million hospital 
patients suffer from health care associated infections, resulting in 37.000 deaths 
each year from these infections (EC, 2008b).
7 T he EC 2 0 0 8 b  paper m entions a 2 0 0 6  Spanish  ‘E N E A S ' study w ithout g iv in g  any references; the 
Spanish  E N E A S  study h o w ev er  w as published  in 2 0 0 8  by A ranaz-A ndres et al. (2 0 0 8 ).
8 T he EC paper 2 0 0 8 b  m en tion s a French study by M ich el in 2 0 0 7  w ithout g iv in g  any referen ce. F in d in gs  
o f  a national study in France w ere published  in 2 0 0 8  by M ich e l et al. (2 0 0 8 )
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(3) This review found that the literature in general suffers from in-depth 
accounts of patient safety and CIRS in Austria. Back in 1998 the Supreme Audit 
Institution of Austria (Rechnungshof, 1998), since then and until submission of 
the present study there has been no further report on the WKAV by the 
Supreme Audit Institution of Austria or another independent body, criticised the 
lack of a standardised or unitary approach to quality management, with a lack of 
differentiation between quality assurance and quality management and a lack of 
reference towards an entire hospital or specific areas of medical expertise in the 
hospital. The report especially criticized a lack of documentary evidence and 
reports accompanying any such efforts. The quality endeavours were therefore 
not possible to be traced down and WKAV hospitals did/do not fulfil the 
requirements of the Viennese hospital act of creating the conditions for 
comparative analysis and assessment of quality assurance between hospitals 
(Rechnungshof, 1998).
In this light it might not come as a big surprise not to find much information on 
the health system in Austria in general and the documentation of quality 
endeavours and the safety of patients in particular. How often adverse events 
occur in general in Austria cannot be said with any certainty due to a lack of 
systematic data collection and interpretation. Those publications that refer to an 
adverse event rate cite numbers suggested by the IOM (2000), may it be 
reports in the local media, statements from politicians, or books on patient 
safety (for example Langbein, 2009; Pateisky, 2005). Langbein (2009), an 
uncoverer-journalist in Austria, based on the German APS study (2007) -  which 
ultimately is derived from the IOM -  that 4 percent of hospital inpatients suffer 
from preventable adverse events, 1 percent from medical malpractice, and that 
0.1 percent of all cases result in preventable deaths he calculates that in 2.5 
million hospital inpatients in Austria 100.000 patients suffer from preventable 
adverse events, 25.000 from medical malpractice, and that every year 2.500 
hospital inpatients die in Austria as a result.
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There is some debate about whether the numbers of adverse events leading to 
death have been over- or underestimated in the patient safety literature and the 
IOM report. While the IOM (2000) states that the actual number of adverse 
events leading to death (half of which they deem to be ‘preventable’) is likely to 
be even higher than their own estimation of 44.000 to up to 98.000 deaths per 
year, some authors argue that these numbers are more likely to be 
overestimations. Therefore the following section approaches this issue by 
investigating details of major patient safety studies on which the IOM report and 
subsequent publications in the international patient safety literature are based. 
For example, how were patients selected for studies, what was the screening 
criteria and sampling method? How much attention was paid to methodological 
issues and how much information did authors provide on these issues? For 
instance, many of these studies are retrospective record reviews. What are the 
limitations of using this method? Have causal relationships been made, and if 
so, was this appropriate? And how accurate are these studies in general?
2.4. Reliability of current extrapolations
Reference to IOM numbers can be found in literally all major patient safety 
publications, including the UK DOH, EU, WHO, and BMG Austria. However, a 
handful of authors also raised doubts about the reliability of the report, 
especially around the estimates of number of deaths (for example McDonald et 
al., 2000; Sox and Woloshin, 2000; Hayward and Hofer, 2001; Gray, 2003) and 
the subjectivity involved when judging adverse events and errors in health care 
as being preventable or not (Brennan, 2000; Hayward and Hofer, 2001; Grober 
and Bohnen, 2005). It has been argued that the IOM report employed studies 
that were either flawed or not designed for extrapolation purposes (McDonald et
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al., 2000)9. Critics of the IOM report (IOM, 2000) agree that more emphasis 
should have been given to the original studies on which the To  Err is Human’ 
report (IOM, 2000) is based. The next section will portray these studies in light 
of their limitations, with special consideration of screening and sampling 
methods, limitations of retrospective record reviews, causal relationships, 
preventability of adverse events, immediate and short term survival of patients, 
reproducibility, terminology, and accuracy.
2.4.1. Screening and sampling methods
An important issue pertaining patient safety studies is screening and sampling 
methods, on what basis patient files have been included in a study. Naturally 
different studies use different screening criteria and this can make it difficult to 
compare them with each other. The sampling method used for the HMPS was 
criticised for inflating the proportion of adverse events leading to death 
(McDonald et al., 2000). Screening criteria were applied to the initial 31.429 
records to find a subgroup of 7.743 eligible cases. The screening criteria 
included death, returned admission to intensive care, and excessive length of 
hospital stay. The sampling method ensured that all ‘deaths’ were included, but 
not necessarily all adverse events (McDonald et al., 2000).
9 M cD o n a ld  et al. (2 0 0 0 )  are referring to a study by  P h illip s et al. (1 9 9 8 ) Increase in U S  m ed ication -error  
deaths betw een  1983 and 1993; L ancet; 3 5 1 :6 4 3 -6 4 4
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Table 2.2: Harvard medical Practice Screening Criteria 
Prior hospitalization with 1 y (6 mo if older than 65 y)
Subsequent admission to any hospital, after this discharge
Prior failure or unfavorable results of medical management
Hospital-incurred trauma
Adverse drug reaction in hospital
Transfer from general care to special care unit
Transfer to another acute-care hospital
Unplanned return to operating room during this admission
Treatment or operation for damaged organ subsequent to invasive procedure
Acute Ml, CVA, or PE during or following invasive procedure
Neurologic deficit at discharge
Death
Temperature >38.3°C (110°F) on day of or prior to discharge 
Cardiac/respiratory arrest
Obstetrical mishap/complication of abortion or labor-delivery, or Apgar score <6 at 
5 minutes
Other undesirable outcomes
Correspondence indicating litigation
Hospital stay >90th percentile for diagnosis related group in patients <70 y, or 
95th percentile in those aged ^ 7 0  y
*MI indicated myocardial infarction; CVA, cerebrovascular accident; and PE, 
pulmonary embolism. Table adapted with permission from Hiatt HH, Barnes BA, 
Brennan TA, et al. A study of medical injury and medical malpractice. N Engl J Med. 
1989;321:480-484. Copyright © 1989 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights 
reserved.
Source: Hiatt et al. (1989) cited in Leape (2000)
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While trying to defend his study (Leape is the second author of the HMPS)10 
Leape (2000) actually uncovered another methodological flaw. Namely, patients 
only had to meet one of the screening criteria, including death. It is not known if 
patients who died met a screening criterion other than death. What would have 
been really significant is the death rate for patients who met a screening 
criterion other than death. Unfortunately these data were not collected (Leape, 
2000).
According to Leape (2000) the screening criterion was not so as to inflate the 
number of deaths. Providing more details about the study he insists that 
terminally ill patients were excluded from the study. However, he (Leape, 2000) 
does so by referring to unpublished data from the HMPS that is only available to 
him. If the information Leape (2000) provides is correct then the subset group of 
negligent cases consisted of two groups: 14 percent were severely ill and the 
adverse event “ tipped the balance” (Leape, 2000:96); for the other 86 percent 
error was perceived as the major factor leading to a patient’s death. This is 
important methodological information because it is important for interpretation of 
data. It only seems credible to make further calculations using the 86 percent 
rate (McDonald et al., 2000). As this information was not included in the original 
publication it is likely that interpretations of the data did not take account of this 
limitation.
2.4.2. Limitations of retrospective record reviews
Many important events occur in a patient’s journey through the health system 
and not all events are recognised or recorded in the patient record. Accordingly 
Brennan et al. (1991) or Weingart et al. (2000) contend that retrospective record
10 Brennan, T., Leape, L., Laird, N., Herbert, L. et al. (1991) Incidence of adverse events and 
negligence in hospitalized patients: Results of the Harvard medical practice study I; New England 
Journal of Medics; 324; 6; 370-376
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reviews tend to underestimate occurrence of events rather than overestimate 
them. Moreover some effects of (mis)treatment only become evident once the 
patient has left an institution. As authors of the HMPS notice (Brennan et al., 
1991) an additional six percent of hospital-caused adverse events were 
discovered after discharge of patients. However, these data were not included 
in the study because they were “an unknown fracture of all such events (Leape, 
2000:97). The statement that retrospective record reviews are likely to result in 
under-estimation of adverse event rates is also supported when comparing 
them with prospective studies of adverse event rates. Prospective studies, for 
example by Bates et al. (1993), Bates et al. (1995), Classen et al. (1991), or 
Andrews et al. (1997) found much higher occurrence of adverse events (Leape, 
2000).
However, another weakness of retrospective reviews, the one of hindsight bias, 
favours the view that the numbers are more likely to be overestimations. It has 
become evident that knowledge of the outcome of an event biases peoples’ 
judgment about the processes that led to that outcome, even when judges have 
been warned and are aware that knowledge of the outcome may influence their 
ability to make assessments. Once people know about the outcome it is easy to 
oversimplify the situation practitioners had to face when they made an error. 
This is illustrated in figure 2.4. In error science the hindsight bias effect has 
become a well reproduced research finding which is of important relevance to 
accident analysis and reactions to failure (Woods et al., 1994; Cook et al., 1998). 
In that respect hindsight bias is a great obstacle to seeing the more complicated 
story that lies beyond a “simple” human error (Cook et al., 1998). Considering 
the effect of hindsight bias it is possible that the number of deaths attributable to 
adverse events found in the HMPS are also overestimations (Leape, 2000).
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Figure 2.4: Hindsight and foresight bias
HINDSIGHT BIAS
Copyright© 1997 by Richard I. Cook, MD
Before the 
Accident
After the 
Acciden^
Source: Cook (1997)
In favour of all those who claim that current numbers are underestimations it 
has to be noted that the HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991) and all other large studies 
on the extent of errors in health care so far are limited to hospital environments 
(for example Leape, 2000). Leape (2000) stresses that more than half of all 
surgical procedures in the United States, which are tens of millions, occur 
outside hospitals and that nothing is known about the occurrence of adverse 
events in those settings. Leape (2000) argues that even if complication and 
death rates were considerably lower than in hospitals, the absolute number 
would be substantially higher than the numbers presented in To  Err is Human’. 
As yet however these are just speculations.
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2.4.3. Causal relationships
McDonald et al. (2000) argue that data from the HMPS (198411) and the UCS 
(199212) were not designed for describing causal relationships. Limitations of 
both of these studies were not brought forward in the IOM report. For example, 
while the HMPS included information such as “lead to death” and “died at least 
in part because of adverse event” authors of the UCS only reported a proportion 
of patients that died in the adverse event group, but did not provide information 
on the cause of patients’ deaths.
McDonald et al. (2000), who otherwise praise the report for its call to better 
understand causes of error, and for its call to develop safe systems that 
incorporate computerised and other mechanical supporting elements, criticise 
the “unstated corollary...that eliminating preventable adverse events also will 
eliminate deaths?’ (McDonald et al., 2000:93). They (ibid) argue that most 
people who enter a hospital already have a high disease burden and high death 
risks. Indeed, the HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991) does not include any information 
about the baseline risk of death in these patients, or about deaths in a control 
group. This puts the lOM’s interpretation (IOM, 2000) of the HMPS’s adverse 
event rate of 13.6 percent leading to death (Brennan et al., 1991) under a 
different light. The IOM (IOM, 2000) suggests that 13.6 percent of patients who 
experienced adverse events died as a result of these adverse events. And that 
they would not have died if all adverse events could have been avoided. 
However, clinical experience shows that this is not true (McDonald et al., 2000). 
Considering the original data (Brennan et al., 1991), as it does not include
11 this is referring to the year from  w h ich  data that w as used in the study and not the pu b lica tion  o f  the 
study itse lf
12 this is referring to the year from  w h ich  data that w as used  in the study and not the p u b lica tion  o f  the  
study itse lf
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information about preventability of deaths and risk of death, such a conclusion 
should be considered highly suspect.
2.4.4. Preventability of adverse events
The HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991) and the UCS (Thomas et al., 2000) relied on 
implicit judgements of physicians. Efforts were made to reduce subjectivity by 
training reviewers and using highly structured data collection instruments, 
duplicate review, and review and resolution of disagreements. However, there is 
still a risk that some physicians over- or under-interpret the occurrence of error. 
In Leape’s (2000) view [bearing in mind that he is second author of the HMPS 
(Brennan, Leape, Laird et al., 1991) and is therefore trying to defend the 
reliability of the study] this is not a problem as errors of this sort probably 
levelled themselves out (Leape, 2000).
However, Brennan (the first author of the HMPS) had always warned about 
extrapolations on the basis of their study (Brennan et al., 1991; Brennan, 2000; 
McDonald et al., 2000; Hayward and Hofer, 2001). To clarify some of the issues 
surrounding the discussion of the preventability of injuries and deaths in the 
IOM report Brennan (2000) commented that physician reviewers of the HMPS 
were not 100 percent convinced that all deaths attributable to adverse events 
could have been prevented if care was optimal. Therefore the original study 
(Brennan et al., 1991) did not judge on the likelihood of preventability of deaths 
if optimum care had been provided.
In the HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991) and the UCS (Thomas et al., 2000) 
reviewers did not include judgements of whether or not injuries were actually 
caused by errors. Even if they had it would have been difficult to classify an 
event as preventable or not, and to judge if it could be attributable to error. 
These judgements would always be highly subjective. Brennan (2000) explains 
that in an example: surgeons know that post operative haemorrhage can occur
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in a number of cases. It is also known that the occurrence rate decreases with 
good surgical care. However, even with the best surgical techniques and 
precautionary measures, haemorrhages can still occur. In the HMPS reviewers 
classified post operative haemorrhages as preventable if they occurred after 
what would be considered as a simple procedure; even if there was no apparent 
blunder or slip by the surgeon. However, the IOM report (IOM, 2000) interpreted 
these cases as medical errors. This may seem inappropriate to some observers 
(Brennan, 2000).
That preventability often seems to be in the eye of the reviewer (Hayward and 
Hofer, 2001) also becomes clear when pondering about what authors mean 
when stating that deaths are preventable. Preventability is often closely linked 
to expenditures. For example, all allergic drug reactions could be prevented if 
every patient was tested for drug allergies upon admission. However, this is not 
cost effective and no health insurer would bear the extra costs (Brennan, 2000). 
Nevertheless, authors can still call for a stop of these ‘preventable’ events.
The following two short examples, provided in the National Patient Safety 
Agency report ‘Building a memory: preventing harm, reducing risks and 
improving patient safety’ (NPSA, 2005), illustrate how difficult it is for reviewers 
to decide whether a patient was actually harmed by the health care treatment, 
or if an event occurred because of his underlying health condition.
“An older patient has cancer and a chest infection. Probably 
because of the antibiotics used to treat the chest infection, he 
develops a Candida (fungal) infection which makes his mouth 
sore and tender. He eats very little over the following week, and 
his discharge is delayed by concerns about his weight loss and 
weakness. It is difficult to judge whether the Candida infection, 
and consequent eating problems, could have been avoided.” 
(NPSA, 2005:35)
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“A small child is rushed to an emergency department with very 
severe head injuries after a road traffic accident. She is already 
receiving cardiopulmonary resuscitation as her heart and 
breathing stopped during the ambulance journey. During attempts 
to resuscitate her, she is mistakenly given an adult dose of a drug. 
Attempts to restart her heart fail. It is difficult to judge whether the 
medication error contributed to the death of this child.” (NPSA, 
2005:35)
2.4.5. Immediate and short term survival of patients experiencing 
adverse events
Hayward and Hofer (2001) examined the reliability of physician reviewer ratings 
on medical error and the probability of immediate and short-term survival in 
deaths described as preventable if care had been optimal. They conducted a 
retrospective implicit medical record review using data from seven ‘Department 
of Veterans Affairs13’ medical centres from 1995. Fourteen board certified 
internists were trained to review charts. This training established that reviewers 
understood the review instrument. Review of actual study charts only started 
once training results had shown that disagreements between reviewers were 
based on different opinions and not on misunderstandings or chart information 
being overlooked. Reviewers did not know the intention behind the study. They 
never reviewed the same chart twice or reviewed charts of patients they had 
been caring for. Results from previous reviews were blinded. End of life ‘comfort 
care’ patients were excluded from the study and markers previously found to be
13 T he U n ited  States D epartm ent o f  Veterans A ffa irs (V A ) is a governm ent-run m ilitary veteran ben efit 
sy stem  w h ich  runs hundreds o f  hosp ita ls across the U n ited  States. T hey  have a reputation for b e in g  a 
leader in im p lem en tin g  n ew  sa fe  p o lic ie s  and practices (L eape and B erw ick , 2 0 0 5 ).
-51 -
Chapter 2: Patient Safety
associated with high rates of preventable deaths were over-sampled (Hayward 
and Hofer, 2001).
After screening criteria was applied to about 125.000 hospital admissions the 
final sample consisted of 383 reviews of 111 active-care-in-hospital deaths. 
Reviewers were asked questions about the timeliness of diagnostic evaluations, 
overall quality of care, if the patient’s death would have been preventable by 
better quality of care, as well as a percentage estimation of preventability of 
death if care had been optimal. In addition reviewers were asked to rate the 
probability of survival over three months or more if care had been optimal and 
resulting in a good physical and good cognitive state of the patient, meaning 
that the patient would have a reasonable quality of life and meaningful social 
functioning (Hayward and Hofer, 2001).
The initial results of the study were similar to previous studies. 22 percent of 
deaths were rated as at least possibly preventable and six percent as probably 
or definitely preventable through optimum care. However, after adjusting results 
for variability and skewness of reviewers’ ratings, and considering a three 
month prognosis, this rate dropped to 0.5 percent. This means that the actual 
number of patients who would be still alive three months after the incident is 
much lower than implications from previous studies have suggested. Therefore, 
previous interpretations of these studies may be considered unreliable or 
misleading when causal relationships were established between errors and 
patient outcomes (Hayward and Hofer, 2001) (see also section 2.4.3 on causal 
relationships).
2.4.6. Reproducibility
Sox and Woloshin (2000) found the IOM extrapolations highly subjective and 
argue that the reliability and reproducibility of both estimates, 44.000 and 
98.000, are unknown. Citing the IOM report (IOM, 2000:1):
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“Two large studies, one conducted in Colorado and Utah and the 
other in New York, found that adverse events occurred in 2.9 and 
3.7 percent of hospitalizations, respectively (Brennan et al., 1991;
Leape et al., 1991; Thomas et al., 2000 forthcoming). In Colorado 
and Utah hospitals, 6.6 percent of adverse events lead to death, 
as compared with 13.6 percent in New York hospitals. In both of 
these studies, over half of these adverse events resulted from 
medical errors and could have been prevented. When 
extrapolated to the over 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospitals 
in 1997, the results of the study in Colorado and Utah imply that at 
least 44,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical 
errors (AMA, 1999; Thomas et al., 2000 forthcoming; Thomas et 
al, 1999). The results of the New York study suggest the number 
may be as high as 98,000 (AMA, 1999; Brennan et al., 1991;
Leape eta!., 1991).”
Looking at the above citation, the IOM reports that adverse events “occurred in 
2.9 and 3.7 percent of hospitalizations”. Critics have found these calculations to 
be reliable. It has been noted (Sox and Woloshin, 2000) that authors of the 
original studies had made every effort to avoid misclassification of events and 
that these studies can be seen as role-models for studies involving subjective 
statements. However there is less agreement about further interpretations of 
these studies. The IOM report (IOM, 2000) did not provide information on how it 
calculated the number of deaths due to preventable errors. The report (IOM, 
2000) did only refer to the HMPS (Brennan et al., 1991) and the UCS (Thomas 
et al., 2000). However, the numbers presented in the IOM report (IOM, 2000) 
cannot be found in any of these two, or any other major study cited by the IOM 
(Sox and Woloshin, 2000).
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Sox and Woloshin (2000) tried to reconstruct how authors of the IOM report 
(IOM, 2000) reached those numbers. They (Sox and Woloshin, 2000) created a 
formula to estimate the number of deaths as a result of medical error (figure 
2.5). To determine the number of people who die as a result of medical errors 
one needs to know the total number of admissions, the proportion of those with 
an adverse event, of those which are preventable, of those that lead to death. 
The following section will investigate which of this information was available to 
the authors of the IOM report (IOM, 2000) according to references they give, 
and in what context such information has to be seen.
Figure 2.5: Formula to estimate the number of deaths as a result of medical errors
Number of peop;e Total number Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of
who die as a result =  of admissions X admissions with an X adverse events X pfevenrab’e
of medical errors m ine U.S. adverse event that are preventable adverse events
that lead to death
Source: Sox and Woloshin (2000)
Critics (for example Hayward and Hofer, 2001; Sox and Woloshin, 2000; 
Brennan, 2000) have found that the statement that “over half of these adverse 
events resulted from medical errors and could have been prevented” is not 
substantiated. Neither of the original studies (Brennan et al., 1991; Thomas et 
al., 2000) tried to estimate the number of preventable adverse events, nor did 
they define what a preventable adverse event or medial error was. Two of the 
original authors later attempted to determine preventability of these cases 
(Leape et al., 1993), and found 69.6 percent of events to be preventable, 6 
percent as potentially preventable and 24.4 percent as not being preventable. 
However, these studies were criticised for being methodologically flawed (Sox 
and Woloshin, 2000), inter alia because they did not calculate inter-rater 
reliability of reviewers’ judgements.
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Thomas et al. (1999) also reviewed the Colorado and Utah cases. However, 
this review, which stated that “about half of events were preventable”, was, 
according to Sox and Woloshin (2000) and Sari et al. (2007a), not based on a 
review of the original cases, but only on summaries of cases. Sox and Woloshin 
(2000) further criticised them for not using duplicate reviews, and not including 
information on how reviewers concluded if an adverse event contributed or 
caused a patient’s death. It may also be questionable because all reviews were 
done by only three physicians. This procedure was also criticised by Brennan, 
one of the authors of the original study (Brennan, 2000).
How the IOM concluded the number of deaths per year to be in a range from
44.000 to 98.000 remains a mystery. Sox and Woloshin (2000) tried to 
reconstruct the lOM’s calculation. Leape et al. (1993) extrapolated 13.451 
adverse events that were associated with death in the State of New York in 
1984 to the United States population, stating that 198,000 adverse events led to 
death in 1984. They (ibid) judged that 78 percent of those adverse events that 
were a proximal cause of death were preventable. However, a preventable 
adverse event does not necessarily mean a preventable death, since many of 
those patients would have died even if the adverse event had not occurred (Sox 
and Woloshin, 2000; McDonald et al., 2000). Leape et al. (1993) then estimated 
that about half of the deaths caused by iatrogenic adverse events were 
preventable, without explaining how they decided which of those adverse 
events lead to a death that would not have occurred otherwise (Sox and 
Woloshin, 2000). Therefore investigators of the studies are left to speculate. 
Accordingly, Sox and Woloshin (2000) assume that the high end number of
98.000 deaths per year as published in the IOM report (2000) are ‘about half of 
the 198.000 adverse event leading to death in 1984, which is 99.000 -  close to 
the number cited by the IOM. This number is also similar to the total number of 
adverse events (98.609) in New York hospitals in 1984, as extrapolations from
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Brennan et al. (1991) have shown (see section 4.3). Is it possible that authors of 
the IOM report (IOM, 2000) may have confused those numbers?
Gray (2003) provides another explanation of how the higher bound estimate of
98.000 deaths could have been achieved. He (ibid) calculated the annual total 
of United States hospital admissions in 1997 (33.6 million) multiplied through by 
(overall adverse event rate x proportion attributable to error x proportion of 
events attributable to error resulting in death). For the HMPS (Brennan et al., 
1991) this gives following equation:
Annual total of U.S. hospital admissions in 1997 (33.6 million) 
multiplied through by [overall adverse event rate (3.7 percent) x 
proportion attributable to error (58 percent) x proportion of events 
attributable to error resulting in death (13.6 percent)], resulting in
98,000 deaths per year.
However, although resulting in the correct number, the data used for the 
calculation itself is questionable in two ways. First, the proportion of adverse 
events resulting in death was calculated as 13.6 percent. According to Brennan 
et al. (1991) and Gray (2003) this was actually the rate for all adverse events 
rather than adverse events due to error. Secondly, in contrast to Sox and 
Woloshin’s (2000) formula, this calculation does not consider ‘preventability’ of 
events.
As for the lower bound estimation of 44.000 deaths per year (IOM, 2000), Sox 
and Woloshin (2000) could not find out how these number had been obtained. 
In the original paper Thomas et al. (2000) extrapolated data from the Utah and 
Colorado sample to the entire population of the United States (see section 4.3). 
These extrapolations resulted in a different number: 64.809 deaths in patients 
with adverse events and 24.979 deaths in patients with adverse events due to 
negligence in 1992. However, the article did not give an estimate of the number
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of preventable adverse events. Hence, the study does not explain how the IOM 
could have calculated the lower bound of deaths caused by preventable error 
(Sox and Woloshin, 2000).
Using Gray’s (2003) formula for reconstructing the lower bound estimate, using 
Utah and Colorado data, the annual total of United States hospital admissions 
in 1997 (33.6 million) multiplied through by (overall adverse event rate x 
proportion attributable to error x proportion of events attributable to error 
resulting in death), the calculation is as follows:
Annual total of U.S. hospital admissions in 1997 (33.6 million) 
multiplied through by [overall adverse event rate (2.9 percent) x 
proportion attributable to error (53.3 percent) x proportion of 
events attributable to error resulting in death (6.9 percent)], 
resulting in 35.835 deaths per year.
This does not reconcile with the IOM lower bound estimation of 44.000 deaths 
per year. Gray (2003) assumes that authors of the IOM report accidentally 
transposed the overall adverse event rates of the two studies, giving the HMPS 
a 2.9 percent rate and the UCS a 3.7 percent rate, and then used the 3.7 
percent rate for both calculations. Accordingly, the lower estimate calculation, 
based on the Utah and Colorado data (Thomas et al., 2000) is as follows:
The total of U.S. hospital admissions in 1997 (33.6 million) 
multiplied through by [overall adverse event rate (3.7 percent) x 
proportion attributable to error (53.3 percent) x proportion of 
events attributable to error resulting in death (6.6 percent)].
Using these data, and in this way, the calculation would have an additional flaw, 
since “they also used the 6.6% death rate for all adverse events rather than 
6.9% for preventable adverse events” (Gray, 2003:6), resulting in a total of
-57-
Chapter 2: Patient Safety
43.733 deaths, which can be rounded up to 44,000 deaths per year. Therefore, 
the IOM numbers (IOM, 2000) are not well substantiated (Sox and Woloshin, 
2000; Hayward and Hofer, 2001; McDonald et al., 2000).
2.4.7. Terminology
The literature review indicates a wide variance in the definitions of the 
vocabulary used in patient safety. The lack of an agreed definition limits the 
contribution of patient safety research. Without a uniform definition of these 
terms researchers are unable to select an appropriate definition for a given 
context and develop valid measures of and/or compare and interpret empirical 
results. Patient safety researchers (for example Brennan, 2000; Sox and 
Woloshin, 2000; Hayward and Hofer, 2001) have contended that these 
problems are pervasive and important.
Brennan (2000), first author of the HMPS on which the IOM extrapolations were 
based, criticises the unwary use of the term “error” in the literature, including 
interpretation of his own study in the IOM report (IOM, 2000). Many studies, 
including the two studies on which the IOM extrapolations (IOM, 2000) were 
based upon, do not clearly differentiate between errors, adverse events, 
preventable adverse events, and negligent adverse events. Brennan 
(2000:1123) argues that: “The combination of the strikingly large numbers of 
errors cited by the report and the connotations of the word ‘error’ create an 
impression that is not warranted by the scientific work underlying the IOM 
report.”
Although the IOM (IOM, 2000) suggests a definition for “error” in its report (see 
section 2.2 on definition), this does not change the fact that studies in patient 
safety (and on which the To Err is Human’ report is based on) did not use such 
a uniform definition of the term error. In the absence of a uniform definition of 
error one study may count a delay in diagnosis as a medical error. If that patient
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later dies, because of any other reason, and using the HMPS criteria (Brennan 
et al., 1991; see figure 2.1), he would then, through meeting the screening 
criterion ‘death’, be included in a sample. Another study using different 
screening criteria may have excluded such an event from its sample.
The use of multiple and overlapping definitions in the patient safety literature 
hinders data synthesis, analysis, collaborative work and evaluation of the 
impact of changes in the delivery of health care (Grober and Bohnen, 2005). 
This makes it inadvisable to add up numbers from different studies into one total 
rate of ‘medical error’. It also makes it difficult to compare error rates from the 
published literature, especially if studies do not include detailed information on 
methods used and any limitations they may have. Studies that have done so 
may be misleading, unreliable or invalid, and as yet this problem has not been 
adequately addressed.
2.4.8. Accuracy
Limitations of other studies that were used to back up the To  Err is Human’ 
report (IOM, 2000), especially a lack of control groups, were not mentioned in 
the report. Furthermore, a study on medication errors that claimed that 7.000 
people died in 1993 (Phillips et al., 1998) was included in the report. However, 
Phillips et al. (1998) apparently miscalculated deaths attributable to medication 
error and those that were due to drug abuse (Rooney, 1998). Therefore, this 
study should have not been included in the IOM report (McDonald, 2000). On 
top of that the report (IOM, 2000:248), to give one example, cites Phillips et al’s. 
study as “Phillips et al., 1974, Increase in U.S. Medication-error deaths between 
1983 and 1993”, giving the wrong reference14. Errors can happen and mistakes
14 T he correct reference w ou ld  have been: P h illip s et al. (1 9 9 8 )  Increase in U S  m ed ication -error deaths  
b etw een  1983 and 1993; T he L ancet, Vol. 351
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are allowed but a report on errors might be expected to have taken extra care 
and not to add to the confusion by making preventable errors itself.
Co-incidentally the German Coalition for Patient Safety (APS, 2006) in their 
quantitative report on the scope of the problem medical error seems to mock up 
on this very study by Phillips et al. 1998. Although a lot of credit is owed to the 
German Coalition for Patient Safety for their engagement and contribution to 
patient safety they also are not immune to error. Their 2006 quantitative report 
on the extent of medical error (APS, 2006) appears to include large samples 
that lack sufficient information and might have been misinterpreted. Quite a 
substantial amount of APS study (2006) includes for example Phillips et al. 
(1998) investigation of increase in US medication-error deaths over a ten year 
period (1983-1993). While Phillips et al. (1998) point out the problem of a shift 
to outpatient treatment. In 1983 physicians had more control over the drug 
intake of their patients while by 1993 much of the drugs were taken with the 
patient, not medical personnel, exercising quality control. Therefore they blame 
a shift in the location of medication consumption from clinical to domestic 
settings for the steep increase in fatal medication errors and not medical 
personnel per se. However, in APS study (2006) the increase in deaths of 
Phillip et al’s study is listed as ‘preventable adverse event leading to death’, 
which in the eyes of the author of the thesis is a misinterpretation of data 
gathered in Phillip et al’s study. Moreover, the APS study (2006) also includes 
those studies that have been criticised above for inclusion in the IOM report and 
for as a basis for further extrapolations. Another noticeable shortcoming of the 
APS study is that they base their calculations on 151 studies worldwide on the 
occurrence of adverse events which they list in table 3 of their study (APS, 
2006:41-55). This list makes four references to Phillips et al. (1998) and 
includes very large samples of 1,195.000, 504.000, 182.375, and 86.000 deaths 
with preventable adverse event rates ranging from 0.1 percent to 0.8 percent, 
making up a substantial amount of their own “world’s biggest sample”. However,
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in their list of references only appears “Phillips 1998: D. P. Phillips, N. 
Christenfeld, L. M. Glynn: Increase in US medication-error deaths between 
1983 and 1993, Lancet 351 (9103), 1998, S. 643-644” which is a two page 
publication that does not contain any of those numbers cited. It is not clear 
where they got those numbers from.
Calling their own review the largest study on a global basis so far on the 
occurrence of error in health care (APS, 2006) conclusions at which they arrive 
should be thoroughly tested and not just blindly trusted. It might lie in the nature 
of those quantitative studies to look for breadth at the expense of depth. 
However, it should be questioned how meaningful reviews are that mix reports 
from various different health care settings, different methodologies, different 
national contexts (25 different countries), and different sample sizes and without 
investigating the accuracy of the data used.
2.5. Conclusion
There will always be areas for improvement in organisations. Whether or not 
they are implemented is often a matter of cost and benefit. For patient safety 
interventions such as CIRS to be effective they need to be founded on a 
rigorous and systematic evidence base, representing a blend of theories and 
approaches that fit particular circumstances and cultures (Fillingham, 2005). A 
good part of this “evidence base” in patient safety consists of statements on 
allegedly high numbers of preventable errors in health care and suggests they 
are a leading cause of death. Although there is agreement that the exact 
number can never be known an estimation of the size of the problem has been 
built up as one of the pillars of the new patient safety movement. This high rate 
manifests a stance for patient safety, and allows and justifies allocation of funds. 
It has been argued that the currency of patient safety can only be measured in
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terms of prevented harm and saved lives (WHO, 2005a). Subsequently an 
estimation of the scope of the problem also serves as a (necessary) measure 
for success and improvement.
Figures used in the international patient safety literature are based mainly on 
the US IOM report. Based on the most extensive studies on error in health care 
it is recognised as a landmark publication in patient safety. Findings from the 
report have been reproduced widely in key publications, both on a national level 
in the UK and Austria, and internationally in the EU and WHO. The chapter 
focused on the work underlying the IOM report and extrapolations from the 
report. It gave particular attention to screening and sampling methods, 
limitations of retrospective record reviews, causal relationships, preventability of 
adverse events, immediate and short term survival of patients experiencing 
adverse events, reproducibility of numbers, terminology, and accuracy of 
studies. This pointed to a number of important issues which authors have not 
always factored into their calculations. Preventing an adverse event does not 
automatically mean that death will also be prevented. The kind of data that are 
available (for example original patient records as compared to summaries of 
events), subjectivity of reviewers, hindsight bias, and how these can be 
mitigated, as well as causal relations between events and outcome, have great 
influence on the reliability of a study. Often it is not clear if harm to a patient was 
actually caused by an adverse event or not. This however was not considered 
in the IOM report or in many of the extrapolations following it.
The IOM report To Err is Human’ has taken error studies out of their context. 
Accordingly the allegedly high error rates presented by IOM are not well 
substantiated. Likewise extrapolations derived from the IOM report, either 
directly through quoting from the report or indirectly through using its methods, 
such as 37 million adverse events in the EU, 37.000 deaths due to health care 
acquired infections in the EU, and 2.500 annual deaths due to medical
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malpractice in Austria, are also incorrect. That the numbers against which 
improvement should be measured are not well substantiated, regardless if the 
actual numbers are lower or higher, means that this pillar of patient safety 
stands on very loose ground. It is often argued that one of the key issues in 
patient safety is a shift from a “blame and shame culture” to a “reporting-” or 
“learning culture” on the hospital wards. However this review shows that the 
“blame and shame culture” may as well be inherent in the patient safety 
literature itself. Headline messages of unsubstantiated high error rates may be 
questionable in light of an effort to narrow the trench between medical staff and 
management.
Although the resources of a conventional PhD thesis are not adequate to 
determine a reliable figure on the occurrence of error the findings presented 
here may put patient safety under a different light and instigate a more critical 
view towards it. The critical stance in this thesis has been valuable in 
approaching one of the key arguments in the patient safety literature. Especially 
considering the involvement of a consultancy in this project (i.e. for CIRS 
training sessions) other philosophical approaches might have made it easier to, 
likewise, jump on the ‘blame train’ and (mis)use the sensational number of 
preventable errors. Those responsible for patient safety should make every 
effort to ensure that scarce resources are used where they are most needed 
and to best effect. It is suggested that this includes determining a correct 
estimate of the occurrence of adverse events in health care.
Before closing this chapter it is important to stress that not everything in the 
IOM report is unreliable and bad. The report contains a very important second 
message on how to improve health care services and this, regardless of how 
often errors occur, can only be welcomed. The next chapter on the 
conceptualisation of error in health care will provide the basis for understanding 
improvements in patient safety using CIRS.
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALISATION OF 
ERROR IN HEALTH CARE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a perspective 
of error from the error sciences and outside the realm of health care. It 
shows that other high risk industries are more advanced in dealing with 
error and that there are lessons to be learnt. Different 
conceptualisations of error provide possible explanations for current, 
often less successful, scenarios of dealing with error in health care. It 
opens up the perspective of safer health care in the future. Experiences 
from outside health care show that reaching this goal is the result of a 
whole system approach to improvement, and one that comes with 
substantial human and financial demands.
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter showed that although it is not clear how often 
preventable errors in the health system actually harm patients 
organisational errors in health care are a real phenomenon. This 
chapter aims to provide a background understanding of organisational 
error, how it might be tackled, and investigates if the call for a systemic 
approach to safety, as carried forward in the patient safety literature, 
can be substantiated. After this short introduction the chapter sets out in 
section 3.2 with a brief first level categorisation of error (active / latent), 
an explanation of ‘organisational accidents’ in section 3.3, as well as 
responses (person / system) to organisational accidents in section 3.4.
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3.2. Categorisation of error
A principal distinction can be made between active and latent errors. 
Active errors occur at the human-system interface. In healthcare this is 
where frontline operators are in direct contact with the patient. The 
effects of active errors are felt almost immediately and they are often 
referred to as human errors (Reason, 1990 and 2000; Battles, 2001; 
Cook et al., 1998; Leape, 1994). Individuals who commit these errors 
are at the “sharp end” (for example Reason, 2000; Cook et al., 1998).
Latent errors on the other hand occur out of the direct control of 
frontline operators. Prevention of these errors is beyond the capabilities 
of the operator and in some way he has been set up to make an error 
(Leape, 1994). Latent errors are delayed consequences of technical 
and organisational actions and decisions; they include for example poor 
design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance, bad management 
decisions and poorly structured organisations. Latent errors can also 
create pathologic situations which result in working conditions that 
“invite” errors (Reason, 1990). For example high workloads with tight 
schedules or lack of training that emphasises recognising hazards can 
lead to a great variety of errors (Leape, 1994). Latent errors are 
“accidents waiting to happen”. Latent errors occur at the “blunt end” 
(Leape, 1994; Battles, 2001).
3.3. Organisational accidents
In error sciences a system is seen as a set of interdependent elements 
interacting to achieve a common aim. When large systems fail it is due
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to multiple faults that occur together in an unanticipated interaction 
(Perrow, 1984) creating a chain of events in which the faults grow and 
evolve (Gaba et al., 1987). Those incidents where errors result in major 
catastrophes have been termed ‘organisational accidents’ by 
psychologist and accident expert James Reason (1990). Building on 
earlier work about ‘systemic influences’ in the aetiology of major 
accidents by Turner (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997 -  originally published in 
1978) and Perrow (1984) Reason et al. (2006:9) describe organisational 
accidents as “the concurrent failure of several defences, facilitated, and 
in some way prepared, by sub-optimal features of the organisation 
design”. Recent examples of organisational errors are the capsize of 
the ‘Costa Concordia’ cruise ship on the Italian coast in 2012 and the 
‘Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill’ in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.
A body of knowledge on the contribution of humans to safety and failure 
has emerged mostly from areas outside medicine, for example in 
transportation and aviation, or the chemical and nuclear industry. Clues 
have been drawn from various disciplines, including human factors 
research, human performance, cognitive psychology, social psychology 
and organisational behaviour (for example Cook et al., 1998; Leape, 
1994; Helmreich, 2000; Reason, 1990). This intense cross-disciplinary 
investigation led to a new understanding of risk and safety that goes 
beyond the individual and acknowledges technological and 
organizational factors as equally important factors that contribute to 
error.
Errors of many individuals (active errors) converge and interact with 
system weaknesses (latent conditions), increasing the likelihood that 
individual errors will do harm (Reason, 1990; Chassin and Becher,
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2002). Also supposedly trivial incidents do have the potential to lead to 
organisational accidents when they are coupled together in an 
unfortunate way. The error science literature provides many ostensible 
examples of latent conditions. To name but two an underlying latent 
error in the Titanic disaster in 1912 was that the number of lifeboats 
was regulated according to the tonnage of the ship and not the number 
of passengers, as a result there was an insufficient number lifeboats 
(Battles, 2001). Another example is the Challenger disaster in 1986, 
where the space shuttle disintegrated 73 seconds into its flight. The 
remarkable finding of the investigation was that a brittle O-Ring was the 
ultimate cause of the accident (Rogers Commission, 1986).
However, one single individual error can never cause an organisational 
accident. Organisational accidents happen to complex, (and also) 
modern organisations, and not to individuals. How individual errors 
(whether active or latent) may or may not lead to an adverse outcome is 
illustrated in figure 3.1 and figure 3.2. In the Swiss cheese model the 
slices of cheese represent the defence mechanisms of an organisation. 
High risk systems usually have many of those defence mechanisms. 
Some of them come in the form of alarms, physical barriers or 
automatic shutdowns and are engineered. Other defences can rely on 
people on the sharp end, like surgeons or pilots; others yet depend on 
procedures and administrative controls. In an ideal world these slices of 
Swiss cheese would be intact. But every step in a process has the 
potential for failure. There are always weaknesses, which are 
represented through the holes in the cheese. These holes are the active 
failures and latent conditions of an organisation. Unlike in the cheese 
though, these failures and conditions, or holes, are continually opening, 
closing, shifting and showing up in different locations (Reason, 2000).
67
Chapter 3: Con ceptualisation o f E rro r in Health Care
Figure 3.1: Swiss Cheese model: averted system failure15
Some holes due 
to active teilures
SUCCESSIVE LAYERS OF DEFENSES
HAZARDS
Other holes due 
to latent conditions
The presence of holes in any one slice does not normally cause a bad 
outcome (see figure 3.1). A hazard may be able to pass through a hole 
in one layer, but in the next layer the holes would be in a different place 
and the problem should be averted. A tragedy can only happen if holes 
in many slices momentarily line up and allow ‘a trajectory of accident 
opportunity-bringing hazards into damaging contact with victims’ (see 
figure 3.2). It is believed that more defensive layers and fewer and 
smaller holes make a system safer (Reason, 2000).
15 source: h ttp ://p a tien tsa fe ty ed .d u h s.d u k e.ed u /m o d u le_ e /sw iss_ ch eese .h tm l; last a ccessed
1 4 .0 9 .2 0 1 0
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Figure 3.2: Swiss cheese model of system failure16
Some holes due 
to actwe twlures
Other holes due 
to latent conditions
SUCCE88IVE LAYERS OF DEFEN8E8
This knowledge is only recently and slowly being applied to health care. 
When patients are harmed in the care delivery system as a result of the 
services they receive it “only” happens to one patient at a time. Fatal 
outcomes are spread over time and a greater number of locations than 
in other industries. History shows that those accidents that remain in the 
public’s perception for a long time have a higher chance of being 
adequately analysed, which often reveals underlying systemic errors 
that go beyond blaming an individual. In health care however public 
attention often turns elsewhere and a thorough investigation does not 
come through. The accident is then often blamed on an individual. This 
partly explains how health care could remain quiet and indeed inactive
16 source: h ttp ://p a tien tsa fe ty ed .d u h s.d u k e.ed u /m o d u le_ e /sw iss_ ch eese .h tm l; last a c ce sse d
1 4 .0 9 .2 0 1 0
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for so long about error prevention and patient safety (Chassin and 
Becher, 2002). Therefore in-depth accounts of organisational error are 
much rarer in health care. For example not one example can be found 
in the literature dating from the last century.
However, with the increasing interest and attention given to patient 
safety this is slowly changing. Although the author has no knowledge of 
accounts from the Austrian health system Chassin and Becher (2002) 
and NPSA (2005a) set excellent examples of “organisational accidents” 
in a health care context showing the convergence of active errors with 
system weaknesses. System weaknesses in health care may be things 
such as imperfect communication. Especially in hospitals imperfect 
communication may be fostered by what Chassin and Becher (2002) 
call the ‘information system disease’, where a number of unconnected 
home-grown information mini-systems co-exist and information on a 
patient is not readily available to all staff. A department may have 
multiple brands for a certain type of instrument, all with different 
physical appearance as well as functionality. The AHRQ (2012) reports 
of emergency teams unable to administer a potentially life-saving shock 
because the defibrillator pads and the defibrillator itself could not be 
physically connected. The CIRS that will be investigated in this study 
aims to identify latent conditions such as the aforementioned for the 
particular hospital department.
Other than in the literature review in chapter two, where claims about 
high numbers of preventable errors leading to death in health care had 
to be rejected, the literature investigated for this chapter well 
substantiates the systemic nature of error in health care. The next 
section will look at responses to organisational accidents.
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3.4. Responding to organisational accidents
The error sciences literature differentiates between two kinds of 
responses once an organisational accident has occurred. Pointing to an 
individual (person approach) or to a faulty system (system approach) 
(DOH, 2004; Reason, 2000). In the person approach the investigation 
focuses on the wrongdoing of the person, his forgetfulness, inattention, 
poor motivation, carelessness and the like. Consequently 
countermeasures to error also focus on the person, trying to make the 
individual error free, for example in retraining, reminding, or also 
through threatening, naming, blaming and shaming an individual (DOH, 
2004). In contrast the system approach concentrates on conditions 
under which individuals work and tries to build defences to avert errors 
or mitigate their effects. The systems approach accepts that humans 
are fallible. Errors are expected to happen even in the best 
organisations (Reason, 2000). Figure 3.3 compares these two 
approaches with each other before the next two sections elaborate on 
the person and the system approach respectively.
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Figure 3.3: The person and the system approach compared
THE PERSON 
APPROACH
CAUSES OF ERROR REACTION TO ERROR
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APPROACH
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Distraction
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Disciplinary action 
Threat of litigation 
Retraining 
Naming, blaming and 
shamingNurses 
Physicians 
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workplace e.g. time 
pressure, understaffing, 
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System is reviewed so 
that if an error occurs its 
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limit the incidence of 
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rather than isolated
Source: DOH (2004:27)
3.4.1. Person approach
As the name suggests the person is the focus of attention in the person 
approach to error. In the person approach it is believed that unsafe acts 
are primarily the result of aberrant mental processes. It therefore 
focuses on the active errors of individuals, blames them for 
forgetfulness, inattention or moral weaknesses, poor motivation,
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carelessness, negligence and recklessness (Reason, 2000). Indeed, 
analyses that focus on individuals will always reveal wrongdoing of 
individuals. One example, a study by Chassin and Becher on events 
leading to the operation of a wrong patient (Chassin and Becher, 2002), 
revealed that at least 17 individual errors had been made.
Errors of individuals are more or less obvious. They do not require a 
thorough investigation and one may arrive at conclusions without 
consulting any particular error detecting and analysing tools. If the bad 
apple, the culprit, is found consequences can be taken. These 
‘countermeasures’ in the person approach are then directed mainly at 
human behaviour and how to control the unwanted variability that 
comes with it. Often this includes disciplinary measures, threat of 
litigation, naming, blaming and shaming (DOH, 2000; Reason, 2000). 
Findings in psychology suggest that it is emotionally more satisfying to 
blame individuals than to dig deeper into the system (Reason, 2000). 
The consequence is a belief that bad things happen to bad people, and 
that separating individuals from the system they belong to will improve 
safety (Reason, 2000).
Hospitals have been described as bureaucratic organisations (Albrecht 
et al., 2000; Mintzberg, 1988; Drucker, 1999 and 2003). Bureaucratic 
organisations in turn are often associated with ‘the person approach’. 
Traditionally errors in health care have been associated with a person 
approach (AHRQ, 2008 and 2011; Reason, 2000) and hospitals in 
particular have been mentioned in connection with a ‘blame and shame’ 
mentality (Waring, 2007; DOH, 2000). This may be for at least two 
reasons: first, the way health care personnel themselves perceive and 
handle error, and secondly the way the media handles error.
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Hospitals usually respond to errors as if they were anomalies, blame 
one individual, and promise that “anything like that will never happen 
again” (Wu, 2000). Therefore, in stark contrast to other high risk 
organisations, health care organisations have long been characterised 
by a perfection myth where the provision of error free services is 
assumed possible just by relying on peoples’ attentiveness, attitude and 
concentration (Reason, 2000; AHQR, 2011). A number of sociological 
studies have shown that the way doctors give meaning to error, how 
errors are perceived, interpreted and understood is formed within the 
lived experience of medical practice and formed by shared cultural 
norms, attitudes and beliefs into which members are socialised (Paget, 
2004; Waring, 2007). Authors (for example Coburn and Willis, 2000; 
Waring, 2007) note that this is linked to the inherent complexity and 
uncertainty of medicine (Fox, 2000; Rosenthal, 1995), professional 
training (Bosk, 1979), normalising and rationalising wrongdoing (Mizrahi, 
1984), and the exclusivity and credibility of clinicians (Freidson, 1975; 
Rosenthal, 1995). This, what is sometimes referred to as the “perfection 
myth”, seems to be somewhat justified by doctors themselves when 
swearing the Hippocratic Oath not to harm patients at the beginning of 
their career. When errors become apparent, for example when a patient 
is harmed, the person approach is a common and easy way of dealing 
with the problem. This leads to an ‘analysis’ of the case in a way that 
will inevitably identify personal failure (albeit conditioned by a systems 
failure) which is often also followed by consequences on an individual 
‘personal’ level.
Even when errors are discussed, for example at morbidity and mortality 
conferences, this is often purely to discuss medical facts rather than 
feelings of the patient, members of the care team (Wu, 2000; Rosenthal,
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1995), or underlying conditions. Physicians often respond to their own 
mistakes with anger, denial, or covering up. Being aware of the danger 
and consequences of facing a malpractice suit they may act cold and 
defensively, or blame other members of the team. Deeply wounded it is 
not uncommon that even some of the most reflective and sensitive staff 
loose their nerve, suffer from burn-out, and seek solace in alcohol or 
drugs (Wu, 2000).
At the same time hospitals lack of constructive mechanisms for 
physicians and to “recover” from any wrong they may have done, 
whether their error actually resulted in harm or not. An environment that 
does not leave space for (non-punitive) discussion of probable errors, 
but puts additional pressure on medical and nursing personnel in falsely 
expecting them to work error-free is counter productive to creating a 
culture that has the potential of identifying errors that are hidden deep 
within the system (Wu, 2000). Wu (2000) concludes that there is no 
space for error in modern medicine. Patients have an understandable 
desire for their doctors to be infallible, but developments of various 
kinds have set up a myth of infallibility that cannot be met.
Newspapers frequently report about medical errors in health care and 
public attention quickly focuses on pursuing the person approach and 
blaming one individual (AHRQ, 2011; DOH, 2000; IOM, 2000). 
‘Celebrated’ newspaper stories usually end once one individual is found 
to blame and there is no further investigation of the case (Cook et al., 
1998; Dentzer, 2000). These celebrated stories do not reflect or 
address the deeper rooted problems of medical error (for example 
AHRQ, 2005a and b; NPSA, 2005; IOM, 2000; Pateisky, 2005). While 
there are exceptions to the blame and shame game that many news
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agencies play journalists live from analysing complex chains of events 
and from writing about it in a sensational way. In doing so journalists 
often seem to not get the balance right and it seems that not many of 
them are aware of the implications, for example the reinforcing of 
medical professionals’ fears about legal liability in connection with 
greater error disclosure (Brennan, 2000; Dentzer, 2000).
A different kind of constructive and more investigative journalism can 
help give voice to people who otherwise would have not been heard 
and fulfil an uncovering role in society that can create public and 
political pressure to change things. To mind come the undercover 
investigation “Midwifes Undercover” from the BBC documentary series 
“Panorama” (BBC, 2007a) and the BBC documentary “Can Gerry 
Robinson fix the NHS” (BBC, 2007b). However, these examples are an 
exception to the rule.
Intense public interest in medical accidents also bears potential 
disadvantages. While it can leverage political will combined with 
economic investment, at the same time it gives rise to calls for quick 
action or visible evidence of progress (Cook et al., 1998). This may be 
counterproductive to safety when unproductive, counterproductive or 
inefficient programs are imposed on professionals in a “quick-fix” kind of 
manner to promote political or economic interests (Leape, 1994; 
Berwick, 2000). In systems thinking these quick fixes get special 
attention, as quick fixes have the inherent risk of being “fixes that 
backfire” (for example Senge et al., 2005; Senge, 2006).
In summary the person approach restricts organisational learning 
because it not only neglects latent factors that produce error but also 
because it fosters a culture of blame where individuals are often held
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responsible and reprimanded for active errors that are actually 
conditioned by the wider system (Waring, 2007). An alternative 
response to organisational accidents, the system approach, will be 
discussed in the next section.
3.4.2. System approach
In the system approach stories move away from blaming one individual 
to investigating system weaknesses. The systems approach rejects the 
perfection myth that “if we try hard enough we will not make any errors” 
(usually associated with a bureaucratic culture), or the punishment myth 
that “if we punish people when they make errors they will make fewer of 
them” (usually associated with a pathologic culture) (NPSA, 2005c). 
“Human beings make mistakes because the systems, tasks and 
processes they work in are poorly designed” (Leape, 1994). It is not so 
important who made an error but to identify which factors in the system 
made it so easy for an individual to err. Systemic vulnerabilities are 
seen as the result of multiple and combined interacting factors in 
complex systems. In the eye of a systems analyst these are more 
interesting than human errors because they can point out a way to more 
effective learning and whole system improvements. In this way human 
error serves as a starting point of an investigation, not as the end of it. It 
thus allows uncovering systemic vulnerabilities that are hidden behind 
human error (Cook et al., 1998) and it encourages clinicians to look 
past individual error and to recognise the underlying threat of latent 
conditions (Waring, 2007). The system approach is based on the belief 
that changing the system will improve safety. This approach is usually 
associated with a learning culture and is considered a key component 
of a safety culture (DOH, 2000; Waring, 2007; Waterson, 2009).
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However, very little is known about whether the type of ‘systems 
thinking’ as promoted by the patient safety movement is informing how 
doctors think about the threats to patient safety (Waring, 2007) and if 
clinical professions are reaching out or being reached by experts in 
other fields to challenge and change their way of thinking (Rosenthal, 
1999), even in those countries that run substantive national patient 
safety programs such as in the UK. Investigations on this issue so far, 
such as Waring’s (2007), looked at this in a particular policy context, i.e. 
a governing body in charge of patient safety suggested or imposed a 
kind of ‘systems thinking’ on clinicians. In the UK this happened 
primarily as a consequence of major inquiries, such as the Bristol 
Inquiry (Kennedy, 2001) and the Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 2005), which 
resulted in a much greater exposure to a type of ‘systems thinking’ as 
advocated in policy (Waring, 2007). The present study differs in that 
respect, as the there is no nationwide CIRS in Austria and the CIRS 
investigated in this study was instigated and controlled by clinicians 
themselves -  as a response to a lack of a policy in Austria.
3.5. Conclusion
Organisational accidents can happen to all organisations, even very 
safe ones, and follow a common basic scheme. Different organisations 
and industries perceive and subsequently respond to errors in different 
ways -  in the person or in the system approach. Under the person 
approach a scapegoat is quickly identified, blamed and shamed. It can 
be easier, more satisfying and convenient to point the finger at and 
blame an individual. The systems approach acknowledges that humans
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are fallible and do err. Therefore the focus is not on improving human 
performance but on designing safe systems and environments in which 
humans work. In this way inevitable human errors can be intercepted 
and prevented from causing harm. Traditionally errors in health care 
have been associated with a person approach, and this may be due to 
the way errors in health care are communicated through the media, and 
also through the way health care professionals themselves deal with 
error.
Despite the complexity behind organisational error and evidence, 
mainly from analyses in industries outside of health care, suggesting 
that systemic failures need to be treated systematically, health care 
organisations have been criticised for relying too heavily on “infallible 
individuals”. As a consequence health care staff often work in systems 
that are devoid of many of the safety measures that have already 
become standard in high reliability industries. Without safe systems 
health care staff are ‘set up’ to make errors. This is not congruent with 
the medical profession’s ethical principle ‘not to harm’ people but might 
be a reflection of the bureaucratic culture in health care organisations. 
However, it has been argued that it is exactly this culture that restricts 
organisational learning because it neglects latent factors that produce 
error and fosters a culture of blame where individuals are held 
responsible for active errors that are actually conditioned by the wider 
system.
Although this chapter has focused on the key aspects of organisational 
error the substantial literature reviewed for this chapter substantiates 
the systemic nature of error in health care and confirms the applicability 
of the system approach used in error science to health care. The
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literature presents a red line of the concept of organisational error 
across different industries, including health care, with the only 
difference that health care seems to be lagging behind in its application. 
Under the new patient safety movement health care organisations with 
an interest in safety increasingly aim to develop a system approach to 
safety as exemplified in high reliability industries and promote the kind 
of systems thinking set forth in this chapter. This means that the 
management of error requires an acceptance of error with consideration 
given to the relationship between individual human behaviour and the 
factors that influence this behaviour (Reason and Hobbs, 2003). This 
commonly involves the introduction of designated incident reporting 
systems that enable front-line staff to communicate their safety 
concerns and experiences of error to those responsible for safety and 
quality (Waring, 2005). In health care efforts are being made to create 
incident reporting systems for medical near misses (for example 
Pateisky 2005; NPSA 2005; Battles et al., 1998; Kaplan et al., 1998; 
Runciman et al., 1993; Gambino and Mallon, 1991).
The review in this chapter suggests that the investigation in this study 
will need to be sufficiently flexible and broad in order to identify and 
cover a range of systemic issues that may influence CIRS or impact 
safety. The concept of incident reporting will be introduced in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: INCIDENT REPORTING
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of 
safe systems -  the ultimate goal of patient safety initiatives. It discusses various 
approaches to safety and critically analyses the role of CIRS in safety. The 
chapter elaborates how an organisation should ideally approach CIRS and 
presents a framework against which the CIRS project in the study hospital can 
be measured.
4.1. Introduction
The new patient safety movement is built on a systems approach to error. 
Hence, patient safety is concerned with redesigning the system of service 
provision. Chapter three discussed the person and the system approach to error 
and concluded that in order to improve safety health care needs to move from a 
patient or condition specific based view to a systems based view (Shortell and 
Singer, 2008). There is now growing consensus amongst experts that the health 
care industry as a whole needs to rethink its actions and that there is a need to 
redesign the system of health care delivery in order to provide safe services.
Discussing the entirety of how to make the health care system safe and then 
transposing it on to the Austrian health care system would exceed the scope of 
this study. The scope of this study only leaves room for a discussion of a 
fraction of these elements and the focus here will be on critical incident 
reporting systems. This is for the following reasons. Critical incident reporting 
systems (CIRS) are common practice in high reliability industries and contribute 
to their exemplary safety records. Health care institutions have started to use 
CIRS and some countries have launched national incident reporting systems
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(the biggest one is the UK National Reporting and Learning System). Although 
CIRS is considered key in improving safety it is under-utilised in health care 
systems (Mahajan, 2010). At the commencement (as well as conclusion) of this 
study Austria did not have a nationwide incident reporting system. Nevertheless 
an initiative for incident reporting was about to be launched by the Austrian 
Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics, thus providing a platform for this 
investigation (and therefore largely in a non-policy context). Although critical 
incident reporting systems appear to be a popular, some even argue a key, 
element in the new patient safety movement, little is known about the 
management of such systems. This presents an opportunity for research.
This chapter starts with providing contextual information on where health care 
aims to go with the contribution of incident reporting, namely safe systems 
(4.2.1). This section stresses that although the new patient safety literature 
promotes a kind of systems thinking that encourages the use of CIRS this new 
kind of thinking has to come up against another strand of safety initiatives, 
notably evidence based medicine (4.2.2), which might sit much more 
comfortably with clinicians who are supposed to use it. The chapter then 
introduces the purpose (4.3.1), the characteristics of good (4.3.2), and the 
barriers (4.3.3) to incident reporting. The chapter draws conclusions in section 
4.4.
4.2. A context for change?
Investigation of organisational accidents in high risk industries suggests that 
errors happen to all organisations and all humans, regardless of how hard they 
try. The analysis of organisational accidents has lead to a body of knowledge on 
the contribution of humans and ‘systems’ to safety and failure. CIRS play an 
important role in providing information about system behaviour and allow the
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detection of unsafe conditions and acts before they cause harm. This serves as 
a basis for improving safety before major accidents occur. The following section 
will first introduce the concept of safe system design as proposed in the recent 
patient safety literature and will then bring this in relation with the current 
prominent procedures of safety improvement, especially evidence based 
medicine.
4.2.1. Safe systems
Extensive investigations of organisational accidents and information drawn from 
incident reporting systems outside health care have greatly influenced the way 
these industries operate today. High reliability organisations, notably in aviation, 
transportation, and nuclear power generation have learnt lessons from past 
accidents and designed safety into their systems to counteract the problem of 
human error and to minimise the occurrence of system failure or mitigate its 
outcomes. High reliability industries deal with a high number of errors but at the 
same time they have a high number of systemic defences that prevents errors 
from causing harm. An example of a high reliability industry is aviation, and just 
a glance in an airliner cockpit reveals the extensive feedback that is provided to 
pilots by means of monitoring instruments (Leape, 1994). This should not imply 
that nothing goes wrong in such systems. Research on cockpit crews for 
example shows that human errors and instrument malfunctions occur on 
average every four minutes during a transatlantic flight (Perrow, 1984; Leape, 
1994). The difference to other industries is that events are promptly recognized 
and corrected before they have any untoward effects (Leape, 1994). Moreover, 
buffers and redundancies are built into the system. Critical instruments exist in 
duplicate or triplicate so that failure does not result in loss of the function (Leape, 
1994). Unusual incidents are often reported in anonymous reporting systems. 
These reports are then analysed and fed back into the system, often through
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industry wide design changes, for example a modification of a certain type of 
aircraft.
Positive effects of safe design, consciously or unconsciously, affect peoples 
every day life. Not only when taking a transatlantic flight, also in much more 
common situations like driving a car. Built in ‘forcing functions’ don’t allow the 
user to act until a certain precondition has been met (Leape, 1994). For 
example is it impossible to release the parking gear of a car unless the break 
pedal is depressed. One might also say that the design of a cash machine is, 
from a safety aspect, superior to many hospital facilities. These machines force 
the customer to take back his card before any money is given out, thus 
preventing the user from taking the money and forgetting the card. In 
comparison to other high risk industries relatively little has been done in that 
respect in the health care industry. Safe systems have become the norm in 
many high risk areas but they have not (yet) become standard in health care 
organisations (for example AHRQ, 2008; Emanuel et al., 2008a and b; DOH, 
2000; IOM, 2000). Staff still have to rely heavily on their memory or on imperfect 
communication. When a doctor orders a drug for a patient there is no alert 
telling him that the patient is allergic to that drug. When tube fittings for 
anaesthesia in an operation theatre fit into both openings for carbon dioxide and 
oxygen and have been connected incorrectly there is very little chance for a 
doctor to find out that something is going wrong.
From his own experience in working in hospitals the author of this thesis can 
say that there are examples in health care where redundancies have been built 
into systems and work already for a long time. One example is the 
uninterruptible power supply in operating theatres. In case of a power failure the 
hospitals’ own secondary power supply (mostly diesel aggregates that can 
independently supply electricity for the entire hospital and for several days). For 
an operating theatre this level of safety is still not sufficient. A failure of
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instruments for even just a second could have fatal effects. Therefore these 
machines are additionally supplied with batteries that cover for the time until 
power supply is restored. However this example is only one a few isolated 
areas in health care where this works well. High reliability organizations are 
different in that they operate safely as an entire system, in all parts of the 
system, not merely in isolated parts.
Another important element of safe systems design is standardization of 
processes. Using the example of aviation again, this is an area that is highly 
standardized. For example, before each takeoff pilot and co-pilot have to go 
through a routine pre-flight checklist that also includes apparently simple items, 
such as if the plane’s door has been shut. People may argue that no sensible 
pilot would start takeoff before the door has been shut. However, experience 
shows that people, however trained, experienced or skilled they may be, 
sometimes react irrational when under stress or under influence of other 
possible contributing factors. A safe system doesn’t leave any space for error, 
including simple ones like taking off with an open door, and is designed in a way 
to make it extremely difficult for individuals to err. In addition training, 
examination, and certification in high reliability organizations is highly developed 
and enforced. Pilots need to take a proficiency test every six months on a flight 
simulator. Data from those proficiency tests are directly concerned with 
procedures to enhance safety (Leape, 1994). In many health care organisations 
the mere thought of having experienced surgeons operate on a dummy twice a 
year for safety and education purposes is perceived as ridiculous (Pateisky, 
2008 personal communication), let alone simulation projects in health care are 
much less advanced than in aviation.
These components of safe systems have been institutionalized in aviation. 
There are independent agencies with government-mandated responsibilities for 
regulating and prescribing safety procedures, monitoring them, and a safety
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board to investigate every accident (Leape, 1994). These procedures of safe 
systems, for example checklists, can also be used in health care organisations, 
and they are in use in certain areas and institutions. But again, the overall 
problem is that this has not yet become the standard procedure and a 
requirement for all hospitals, and the organisation of hospitals in general seems 
to allow this to prevail. Accordingly organisations with an interest in safety can 
apply such methods, but they don’t have to, and some might not even know 
about it.
It has been argued that the health care industry is different to other industries in 
terms of place of professions, role of patients and the nature of the health care 
process. Hospitals in particular have been described as having similarities with 
marketplaces, a place of unmanaged and undocumented processes where no 
one person acts as the “process manager” (Walshe and Smith, 2006). However, 
various safety experts (such as Leape, 1994; Reason, 2000; BMJ, 2000; 
Helmreich, 2000; IOM, 2000; Waring, 2005; Walshe, 2003; Pateisky, 2004) 
argue that from an error science perspective they actually have a lot in common 
and that hence the health care industry can learn a lot from other high-risk 
industries. But they (ibid) also stress that the health care industry as a whole 
lags behind in understanding its systems of delivery and in building preventative 
measures to detect, prevent, or mitigate effects of errors, and that the whole 
system of delivery needs to be redesigned.
This idea of systems redesign is not entirely new. Already in 1998 Ronald 
Coase, a British economist and winner of the Nobel Prize, suggested that if care 
was to be of higher quality and lower cost, it needed to organise the structures 
and processes involved better (Koeck, 1998). Koeck (1998) stressed that it is 
the organisation of the health care organisation that has to improve and 
criticises how little existing knowledge was put into practice. From a 
management perspective this is probably best epitomised in his statement that
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“a student of management and organisation theory could only be stunned by 
how little the efforts to improve quality (in health care) have learnt from current 
thinking in management theory and from the experience of other industries" 
(Koeck, 1998:1268). Why change in this regard hasn’t come across much 
earlier might be explained by looking at other ways of safety improvement. To 
provide a richer context and to understand the environment in which CIRS is 
expected to prosper this is shortly discussed in the next section on evidence 
based medicine.
4.2.2. Evidence based medicine
Why ‘systems change’ in health care is apparently difficult (Christian et al., 2006; 
Waring, 2007; Wachter, 2010; Leistikow, 2011) might become more apparent 
when looking into popular improvement mechanisms in health care, notably the 
concept of evidence based medicine. Evidence based medicine aims to apply 
best available evidence gained through the scientific method to clinical decision 
making (Timmermans and Mauck, 2005) from a stance that many aspects of 
health care depend on individual factors. Although its traces go back to ancient 
times it has only become a generally accepted concept across the several 
health care domains in the 20th century. The term as such, evidence based 
medicine, first appeared in the medical literature in 1992 in a paper by the 
Evidence-based Medical Working Group.
A review of the literature makes apparent that several recommendations for the 
improvement of safety in health care exist. The U.S Agency for Health Care 
Research and Quality for example reviewed 79 practices and ranked them in 
terms of strength of evidence supporting more widespread implementation. 
These revealed that, contrary to the current excitement in the patient safety 
movement to adapt practices from outside the realm of health care, evidence 
provided by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality suggests
that more clinical practices for the improvement of patient safety are potentially
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ready for implementation17 (Shojania et al., 2001). The top eleven patient safety
practices, where most evidence is available, were identified as (Shojania et al.,
2001:6) (numbering occurs here purely as an orderly mean and is not to be
understood as a ranking):
1. Appropriate use of prophylaxis to prevent venous thromboembolism in 
patients at risk;
2. Use of perioperative beta-blockers in appropriate patients to prevent 
perioperative morbidity and mortality;
3. Use of maximum sterile barriers while placing central intravenous catheters 
to prevent infections;
4. Appropriate use of antibiotic prophylaxis in surgical patients to prevent 
postoperative infections;
5. Asking that patients recall and restate what they have been told during the 
informed consent process;
6. Continuous aspiration of subglottic secretions (CASS) to prevent ventilator- 
associated pneumonia;
7. Use of pressure relieving bedding materials to prevent pressure ulcers;
8. Use of real-time ultrasound guidance during central line insertion to prevent 
complications;
9. Patient self-management for warfarin (Coumadin™) to achieve appropriate 
outpatient anticoagulation and prevent complications;
17 this w as ju st about a year after the m ajor pu b lications IO M  report and U K  ‘A n  O rgan isation  w ith a 
m em o ry ’ w h ich  su g g ested  ‘less  traditional app roach es’ to sa fety  im provem ent
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10. Appropriate provision of nutrition, with a particular emphasis on early 
enteral nutrition in critically ill and surgical patients; and
11. Use of antibiotic-impregnated central venous catheters to prevent catheter- 
related infections.
Accordingly the same report presents the most beneficial opportunities for
research on patient safety in those clinical areas. The top twelve opportunities
for research were identified as (Shojania et al., 2001:7):
1. improved perioperative 18 glucose control to decrease perioperative 
infections;
2. localising specific surgeries and procedures to high volume centres;
3. use of supplemental perioperative oxygen to decrease perioperative 
infections;
4. changes in nursing staffing to decrease overall hospitality morbidity and 
mortality;
5. use of silver alloy-coated urinary catheters to prevent urinary tract 
infections;
6. computerised physician order entry with computerised decision support 
systems to decrease medication errors and adverse events primarily due to 
drug ordering process;
7. limitations placed on antibiotic use to prevent hospital-acquired infections 
due to antibiotic-resistant organisms;
18 peri-operative =  the tim e period d escrib in g  the duration o f  a patient's surgical procedure; periop erative  
genera lly  refers to the three ph ases o f  surgery, preoperative (b efore), intraoperative (during), and  
p ostoperative  (after); this co m m o n ly  in c lu d es ward adm ission , anaesth esia , surgery, and recovery
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8. appropriate use of antibiotic prophylaxis in surgical patients to prevent 
perioperative infections;
9. appropriate use of prophylaxis to prevent venous thromboembolism19 in 
patients at risk;
10. appropriate provision of nutrition, with a particular emphasis on early 
enteral nutrition20 in critically ill and post-surgical patients;
11. use of analgesics in the patient with an acutely painful abdomen without 
compromising diagnostic accuracy; and
12. improved hand-washing compliance (via education / behaviours change; 
sink technology and placement; or use of antimicrobial washing 
substances).
The above recommendations are clearly important to improvements in safety. 
However, they represent a view on patient safety through the lens of evidence 
based medicine. This does not mean that practices drawn from outside 
medicine have no validity in patient safety. Rather, as is suggested by Shojania 
et al. (2001), the above evidence is simply a reflection of the significant 
resources provided from governments and industries to promote clinical 
research. In this respect the introduction of methods from outside industries, 
such as the use of CIRS, presents a major leap in patient safety. For many of 
the new patient safety initiatives, and in contrast to evidence based medicine 
practices, there is little experience and assessment of how they might work in a 
health care context. They need to be tested and proofed useful in health care. 
The fact that there is little evidence (Landrigan et al., 2010; Vincent, 2010; 
Vincent et al., 2008) has been named as one of the reasons why progress in
19 T hrom bop hleb itis is the sw e llin g  (in flam m ation ) o f  a ve in  cau sed  by a b lood  c lo t
20 enteral nutrition =  feed in g  through a feed in g  tube
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the new patient safety movement is so frustratingly slow (Leistikow et al., 2011; 
Wachter, 2010; Wachter, 2004). Policy makers have a lot of work to do in order 
to transpose this new kind of patient safety thinking into the minds of 
practitioners in health care organisations and provide evidence, or otherwise 
conclusive arguments, that applying these methods in health care indeed 
improves safety (Landrigan et al., 2010; Vincent, 2010; Vincent et al., 2008; 
Waring, 2007).
This adds to the discussion about whether certain endeavours to improve safety 
are attributable to and fall into the realm of patient safety, medical knowledge, 
or best practice. Moreover the above ‘opportunities for research’ also point to a 
cross-clinical-professional nature of many of those activities, as well as an 
overlap of clinical and organisational events. For example recommendations on 
limiting antibiotic use in order to prevent occurrence of antibiotic-resistant 
organisms (opportunity 7 in the above list) will require interaction between 
attending (and according to shift altering) physicians. Considering that 
physicians are primarily not pharmaceutical experts and often unaware of drug- 
drug interactions and/or side effects, or overlaps of effects, when patients 
receive high numbers of several different drugs, a successful implementation of 
this recommendation would further require acquaintance of a clinical 
pharmacologist on the ward. However, most hospitals, despite cost-effect 
benefits, do not (yet?) employ clinical pharmacologists (Barolin, 2006), and only 
little is known about how clinical pharmacologists would be perceived and 
accepted by physicians on the ward.
Other recommendations, for example the use of silver-alloy coated urinary 
catheters to prevent urinary tract infections (opportunity 5 in the above list), at 
first appear to be non-clinical management decisions. However, considering the 
extra cost, even though cost-benefit may amortize those initial costs, could 
again cause conflict with physicians, when funds/resources are taken from them
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(Shojania et al., 2001). Nevertheless, it becomes clear through the above list 
that some suggestions are more “clinical” than others, and therefore that 
implementation of some of those recommendations will depend more on the 
support of clinicians than others.
Last but not least, the recommendation on improved hand-washing compliance 
(opportunity 12 in the above list) is a reminder how difficult diffusion of 
innovation in health care and implementation of best practices can be. 
Established medical practice, in the West often synonymous with the scientific 
methods, is difficult to change, even when empirical evidence clearly indicates 
the need for change. History provides numerous examples, whether in England 
around the work of Sir Thomas Percival (1740-1804), whose work on internal 
regulation of hospital practice and a professional code of conduct was first 
rejected, but became instrumental later during the founding of the American 
Medical Association in 1847 (Haakonssen, 1997; AMA, 2011; Darr, 2007); in 
the United States William Halsted (1852-1922) reported of the benefits of 
disinfecting surgical instruments. There was so much resistance from his 
colleagues that he even was forced to perform surgery in a tent outside the 
main hospital building (Holleb, 1986; Darr, 2007).
Because the present study takes place in Austria, Vienna it may be mentioned 
here that opportunity 12 on hand washing actually originated in Vienna. Faced 
with the problem of an often fatal bacterial infection among newly delivered 
women the Viennese doctor Ignaz Semmelweis found in 1847 that washing of 
hands and instruments in carbolic acid (a solution of chlorinated lime) stopped 
spreading of the puerperal fever (childbed fever). He instructed doctors on his 
ward to wash their hands after they had participated in autopsies and before 
examining the next patient on the clinical round. Although this rather simple but 
effective procedure virtually eliminated puerperal fever on his ward overnight, 
and Semmelweis even used mortality statistics to back up his findings, his
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medical colleagues rejected his findings and eventually ridiculed him out of 
Vienna (Young, 1988; Darr, 2007). Semmelweis later published a book 
describing his findings. However, it was not until 1862, when a French 
bacteriologist demonstrated the germ theory of disease, that the findings were 
finally accepted (Best and Neuhauser, 2004; Darr, 2007). As the 
recommendation in the list above (opportunity 12), which is from the year 2001, 
as well as many other, more recent, programs on hand-washing procedures in 
hospitals demonstrate, even today Semmelweis’ findings are still not being fully 
applied, and 150 years after Semmelweis newly (re)discovered as one of the 
top opportunities for research in improving safety in health care.
4.2.3. Discussion
High reliability organisations, in comparison to most health care organisations, 
are much more experienced with a system approach to error. They use well 
defined methods and tools for the detection, prevention and mitigation of errors. 
Learning from accidents and near misses is a long established practice and a 
cornerstone to safety and improvement in high reliability organisations outside 
health care (Vincent, 2003; ICS, 2006). In aviation for example incidents and 
accidents are exhaustively investigated. Lessons learned are disseminated 
widely, and important changes are made mandatory by regulatory authorities 
(Vincent, 2003). More than three decades ago the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System was launched to collect, analyse and respond to voluntarily submitted 
aviation safety incident reports (ICS, 2006). In health care this is different. This 
became apparent at the US NPSF workshop in 1997, which is regarded by 
many as the starting point for the patient safety movement in the US. People 
had to rely on a number of ‘celebrated’ newspaper articles cases from 
newspaper articles. This is considerably different to safety discussions in other 
domains. For example in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
aviation accidents are followed by independent investigations of the sequence
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of events and contributors to the outcome. Hence system analyses, and the 
subsequent support for patient and staff, should be an absolute priority in any 
risk-management and safety strategy, including those in health care (Vincent, 
2003). However, health care organisations have been criticised for not giving 
adequate attention to systemic and thoughtful investigation of incidents and the 
learning and organisational change that can follow (Vincent, 2003). Progress 
has been made since, but applying the system approach in health care proofs a 
challenging task with still many worrying gaps (Wachter, 2010; Vincent et al., 
2008). In particular CIRS are still under-utilised in health care systems (Mahajan, 
2010).
This section aimed to provide a stronger context of where health care currently 
stands in terms of safe systems design and where it ought to go. In has done so 
with the use of a few simple examples but without giving reference to statistical 
comparisons of the average rate of exposure to catastrophe in health care and 
other industries, such as Amalberti et al. (2005), because in light of chapter 2 of 
this thesis such explicit referrals in quantitative terms seem inappropriate / 
unreliable. The concept of evidence based medicine has been added to 
demonstrate that, in a world of limited resources, the new patient safety strand 
of pursuing a system approach is not the only one. If it is to be successful it will 
also have to stand up against other strands of improvement that themselves 
have fought a long battle in order to gain acceptance. The next section will 
introduce the concept of critical incident reporting systems.
4.3. Incident Reporting
The principles of safe systems design can be summarised as: to make wrong 
actions more difficult, to make incorrect actions correct, and to make it easier to 
discover errors (NPSA, 2005b). Key to all these three principles for change and
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improvement is acquiring information about the behaviour of a system. 
Experiences in high reliability industries have shown that the systematic 
collection of critical incidents, as for example the US Aviation Safety Reporting 
System demonstrates since its inception in 1976 (ICS, 2006), constitutes an 
important part of a safety and learning culture (Kaufmann et al., 2002). It has 
been argued that this is one of the weak spots of health systems and that it is a 
lack of reliable information on safety and quality of care that is hindering 
improvement in safety (Landrigan et al., 2010; Vincent, 2010; Vincent et al. 
2008). Because high reliability industries benefit from well developed reporting 
systems, in regards to limiting human, environmental and financial threats (ICS, 
2006), the establishment of local and national reporting systems has also 
become a principal approach to patient safety in the UK, the US, and many 
other countries (Mahajan, 2010; Vincent, 2010). Reporting systems provide a 
medium for sharing lessons learned and opportunities for improvement and can 
prevent the reoccurrence of same or similar events in the future (CPSI, 2007).
The idea of collecting data itself is not new. Codman (1869-1940) already 
recognised the interactions of different factors - clinical care, technology, and 
methods - in the early 1900s and established a practice called “outcomes 
management” or “end-result idea” in health care. In his own words “the end- 
result idea merely demands that the results shall be constantly analysed and 
possible methods of improvement constantly considered. Bad results may be 
due to incorrect diagnoses, to lack of equipment, to errors of care, or judgement, 
or of skill. The end-result idea implies that the hospital should be conscious of 
its shortcomings, and constantly on the watch to improve its equipment and 
method.” (Codman, 1924:34 cited in Darr, 2007:37)
Codman was the first physician to hold mortality and morbidity conferences, 
where cases are discussed openly amongst a care team for the purpose of 
learning about the care received by a patient and whether or not that care
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contributed to a good result (Darr, 2007). Mortality and morbidity conferences 
are now standard practice in hospitals. A core element of all his endeavours 
was to learn from previous mistakes so that services may be improved for future 
patients. However, Codman’s idea of learning from mistakes received similar 
rejection as did Percival, Halsted, or Semmelweis works and, in order to 
perform safely, he was forced to open his own hospital. His proposal to 
publicise end results of care was too startling and intimidating for clinicians and 
hospital staff as they feared embarrassment as well as political and economical 
consequences for their hospitals (Darr, 2007) The end result system broke the 
unwritten rules for tolerance and no open criticism considered necessary in the 
surgical world (Reverby, 1981), and threatened to turn the surgical auditor into a 
‘policeman’ rather than a ‘teacher’ (McColl, 1976).
In light of the relatively recent instigation of the NPSA and the National 
Reporting and Learning System in the UK it comes somewhat as a surprise to 
find that a formal guidance on incident reporting in health care was already 
issued by the Ministry of Health in 1955 (HM, 1955). However, this guidance did 
not develop into a universally accepted process within the NHS for identifying 
and reporting critical incidents (ICS, 2006). There were other ‘systems’ or 
procedures that captured incidents as a by-product, such as the Confidential 
Enquiries into Perioperative deaths and Maternal Mortality, Audit Commission 
reports and the NHS complaints procedure, but it was not their primary aim (ICS, 
2006).
In response to the alleged unacceptable high rates of medical injuries and 
preventable deaths and in order to make health care safer around the world the 
World Health Organization (WHO) launched a global effort in 2004, the World 
Alliance for Patient Safety (WAPS), to create or adapt and launch incident 
reporting systems for medical near misses (for example CPSI, 2007; ICS, 2006; 
Pateisky 2005; NPSA 2005; Battles et al., 1998; Kaplan et al., 1998). In the UK
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it was the inception of the National Reporting and Learning System in 2004, an 
anonymous mandatory reporting system, which saw a first systematic approach 
to collecting data on critical incidents and near misses. Despite this progress 
the general documentation of health care processes and the lack of attention 
given to measurement of safety still present one of the biggest problems in 
providing safe health services (Vincent, personal email conversation 2011). 
While the new patient safety movement aims to tackle this problem, in contrast 
to international developments to introduce CIRS on national levels Austria does 
not have a national incident reporting system for near misses. In response to 
what could be seen as a lack of government initiative the Austrian Society for 
Gynaecology and Obstetrics launched a program that enables Women hospitals 
in Austria to participate in the international anonymous voluntary online 
reporting system CIRSmedical. The purpose of Critical Incident Reporting 
Systems will be explained in more detail in the next section.
4.3.1. The purpose of reporting systems
In order to counteract the apparent failure of health care systems to learn from 
their mistakes, to advise other organisations when a mishap occurs, or to share 
with others what lessons have been learnt in dealing with errors so that the 
same mistakes do not reccur repeatedly in many settings and continue to 
expose patients to unnecessary risk, health care organisations have started to 
use incident reporting systems (WHO, 2005a). Some believe that effective 
reporting is the cornerstone of safe practice (WHO, 2005a). Importantly 
however CIRS are not systems for the measurement of safety (Vincent, 2010). 
There is agreement however that frequent use of CIRS is an indication of a 
prevalent safety culture (for example AHRQ, 2011; CPSI, 2007; NPSA, 2005; 
DOH, 2001; IOM 2000)
Critical incident reporting systems invite reporting of unspecified safety incidents
with the aim of learning lessons and feeding back the findings into the system
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(Vincent, 2010). Hence the goal of incident reporting systems is not to merely 
count errors, also because it has been found that reporting systems do not 
effectively detect adverse events (Vincent et al., 2008), but to acquire 
information that leads to understanding the error-root and contributing factors 
(IOM, 2000). In a comparison of different detection methods Sari et al. (2006) 
found that reporting systems detected only about six percent of adverse events 
as compared to systematic record reviews. Reporting systems are thus seen as 
a valuable component of a safety system, but essentially they are systems for 
warning and communication inside an organisation. If employed on large scale 
they might be valuable in detecting rare events that are not easily detected by 
other means.
There are different kinds of reporting systems, with a principal difference that 
they are either voluntary or mandatory, and either confidential or completely 
anonymous. Systems that place more emphasis on accountability are usually 
mandatory reporting systems. In mandatory reporting systems reports are 
compelled by law, policy/regulation, or other formal means (CPSI, 2007). Often 
they are run by governmental or regulatory bodies that have the authority to 
investigate specific cases and to issue penalties and fines for wrongdoing. 
Some reporting systems may include penalty clauses for failure of compliance 
with the regulations. The state of Florida for example can fine hospitals up to 
250.000 USD for violations of the mandatory reporting system in place (Williams 
et al., 2003). Nakajima et al. (2005) report of Japanese hospitals that are 
penalised in form of a reduction of government funding of approximately 1 USD 
per patient per hospital day when found to violate the reporting agreement. The 
purpose of these mandatory systems is to ensure that the most serious 
incidents are reported, investigated and followed up. In addition, in order to 
avoid penalties and fines, they provide an incentive for organisations to invest in 
safety (IOM, 2000). Findings from Williams et al. (2003) and Nakajima et al.
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(2005) suggest that these (financially) punitive measures have helped to 
improve compliance with reporting requirements.
The purpose of voluntary reporting systems on the other hand has been 
described to be more focused on general safety improvement. Voluntary 
reporting systems, as the one investigated in this study, focus on events that 
caused no or almost no harm (IOM, 2000). This is based various concepts, 
mainly derived from Heinrich’s ratio in 1941 (for example NPSA, 2005, see 
figure 4.1) which asserts that there is a fixed ratio between major 
(organisational) accidents, minor incidents, and no harm incidents. For every 
one major accident there may be ten incidents that cause severe harm, 100 
incidents that cause minor to moderate harm, and 1000 incidents that were 
prevented and/or caused no harm (NPSA, 2005). This means that systemic 
changes may be initiated on the basis of no harm or prevented events, without 
the need for an accident that actually caused harm. The focus is therefore 
moved away from low frequency and high consequence events to the analysis 
of high frequency and prevented, near miss or medium to moderate harm 
events (Johnson, 2003). Although these kind of reporting systems are a passive 
form of surveillance for near misses and are different to more active methods 
such as retrospective chart reviews or direct observations (AHRQ, 2011) they 
present an additional proactive approach to safety. Events are shared freely 
and without compulsion from external authorities (CPSI, 2007).
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Figure 4.1: Heinrich’s ratio
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Anonymous reporting systems do not include any identifiable details of the 
patient, reporter, or reporting institution. Therefore information contained in 
anonymous reporting systems is often less complete than in confidential 
reporting systems (CIPS, 2007). Confidential reporting systems on the other 
hand do include identifiable details of those involved in an incident, but this data 
is kept confidential. The advantage of confidential reporting systems is that the 
analysing institution can contact the reporter for follow up and clarification of the 
incident. Therefore information contained in confidential reporting systems is 
often more complete than in anonymous reporting systems. This also allows 
pinpointed feedback to the reporter. Once it is determined that sufficient detail 
on an incident has been supplied the identifying details are stripped from the 
report (CIPS, 2007).
Incidents reported in any of the above described types of reporting systems 
may include errors, injuries, non-harmful errors, equipment malfunctions or
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process failures (WHO, 2005b). Mostly however they focus on incidents that 
were prevented, for example when a doctor writes a drug on his treatment chart 
but a nurse notices that the patient was allergic to it and contacted the doctor, 
or where an incident happened but caused no harm, such as when a drug had 
mistakenly been given to the wrong patient but caused no adverse effects 
(NPSA, 2005). When different drugs are held in bottles with identical tops and 
are stored next to each other and one is in a hurry it is possible to accidentally 
swap two bottles around (NPSA, 2005). This can lead to classic ‘look a like’ or 
‘sound a like’ incidents. Under normal conditions a concentrated member of the 
clinical team would not mix those up. But in a hurry look a like drugs with 
overpowering branding and poor information layout can lead to medication 
errors (NPSA, 2005).
An example is provided in the below figure 4.2, which shows two almost 
identical looking infusion bags. The picture on the left is water for injections; the 
picture on the right is lignocaine, a common local anaesthetic with an anti- 
arrhythmic effect. Although the content and effect of these two infusion bags is 
very different they have the same packaging, same labelling and small font. 
This makes it easy for someone in a hurry to pick up and administer the wrong 
one. If something like this is detected by a clinician it would still be very difficult 
to initiate effective changes, such as a change in design of the packaging. If 
however this is reported in a CIRS and is found to be a problem affecting a 
number of organisations then the analysing body, in the UK for example the 
NPSA, can then work at a national level to exert influence on pharmaceutical 
companies. This can result in effective ways to preventing problems, in this 
case a redesign of the packaging, and makes it harder to individuals to err 
(NPSA, 2005).
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Figure 4.2: Two similar looking infusion bags:
the picture on the left is water for injections, the picture on the right is lignocaine, a 
common local anaesthetic with an anti-arrhythmic effect;
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CIRS can lead to several ways of learning and improvement safety. It can 
generate far reaching alerts regarding when significant new hazards are found, 
for example complications in the use of a new drug. In such a case even a small 
number of reports can provide experts with sufficient data to recognise a new 
hazard and issue an alert. Medication alerts are usually reported in separate 
medication reporting systems. Results of investigations can be disseminated 
through the CIRS feedback function so that not every organisation has to make 
and learn from one and the same mistake. Data from large datasets can also be 
classified and statistical correlations can generate insights into the overall 
system of care (WHO, 2005b).
The next section will discuss some of the characteristics of good incident 
reporting systems.
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4.3.2. Characteristics of good incident reporting systems
The WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety (2005a) and the Council of Europe 
(2006), as well as speciality agencies, such as the UK Intensive Care Unit (ICS, 
2006), the NPSA (2005), the US AHRQ (2011), the IOM (2000) and the QuIC 
(2000), and the German Coalition for Patient Safety (2006 and 2007) published 
guidelines for adverse event reporting and learning systems. Most of those 
recommendations are based on experience from outside health care (for 
example Barach and Small, 2000) and more recent publications, such as the 
WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety (2005a) and the Council of Europe
(2006) are largely based on and summarise those earlier reports without 
providing any additional insight from the still relatively new medical reporting 
systems. These recommendations are summarised below. A notable exception, 
introducing new insight from health care reporting systems, is the work of Evans 
et al. (2006 and 2007) and this will conclude this section.
Based on findings from the Aviation Safety Reporting System, it became clear 
that for a CIRS to be successful there must be first, a demonstrated, widely 
agreed upon and tangible need for more and better information. Secondly, a 
highly respected body, independent from the influences of other stakeholders in 
the ‘system’, must be in place to collect, analyse data and disseminate findings 
(Billings, 1998). These are two key principles that must be met (Billings, 1998; 
CPSI, 2007). Furthermore experience from reporting systems outside health 
care shows that there are certain characteristics that make up good reporting 
systems. Importantly they focus on near misses, provide incentives for voluntary 
reporting, ensure confidentiality and emphasise a system approach to error 
analysis (Barach and Small, 2000). The WHO (2005a) describes the ultimate 
measure for CIRS as to whether the information yielded through CIRS is 
appropriately used to improve safety. Therefore successful reporting systems 
have also been described as analysis and feedback systems. Although
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reporting itself is believed to have a positive learning effect on the reporter the 
analysis and feedback of reports are key elements. Successful systems should 
therefore show both, a highly visible ability to properly analyse cases, and 
recommend changes to those who have the authority to implement them (QuIC, 
2000). Providing feedback, ‘closing the feedback loop’, is important. Reporters 
need to be provided with timely and usable feedback, as well as indications on 
how they may use the feedback (QuIC, 2000). Reporting systems without 
adequate resources for analysis and follow up action are not useful. They may 
even be counterproductive in that it weakens support for constructive responses 
and is viewed as a waste of time (IOM, 2000).
Barach and Small (2000), who conducted a study of 25 non health care adverse 
event reporting systems, contend that for reporting systems to be successful 
there must be a perceived incentive for professionals to report and that those 
incentives must outweigh any perceived barriers to reporting. Reporting 
systems must demonstrate an ability to prevent, detect, and mitigate the effect 
of undesirable combinations of design, performance, and circumstances that 
lead to adverse events (CPSI, 2007). Accountability should be balanced with 
transparency and protection for reporters, and the reporting community should 
be actively involved with the oversight of the system (Barach and Small, 2000; 
CPSI, 2007). In a wider sense this also applies to the future generation of 
potential reporters and thus it is consistently argued that successful reporting 
systems in the future also depend on a reformation of the current education 
system, training and educating scholars in the various health care professions 
in the use of CIRS (for example Beverly, 2001).
Based on publications from the AHRQ (2011), the APS (2007), the ICS (2006); 
the WHO (2005a), Runciman (2003), Leape (2002), , Gaynes et al. (2001), the 
QuIC (2000), Barach and Small (2000), Cohen (2000a and 2000b) and Billings 
(1998) characteristics of ideal reporting systems may be summarised as:
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•  Perceived need: a demonstrated, widely agreed upon and tangible need for 
more and better information
•  Leadership Support: active leadership support throughout all levels
•  Training and Incentives: Provision of training for those with reporting 
responsibilities; provision of free software and generic data to aid internal 
analysis; incentives must outweigh any perceived barriers to reporting
•  Testing: Pilot testing and prototyping of the system takes place before large 
scale roll-out occurs
•  Confidential: Institutions must have a supportive environment for event 
reporting that protects the privacy of staff who report occurrences; reports 
are confidential and identifying information has been removed; identities of 
patient, reporter and institution are never revealed
•  Non-punitive: Reports are used for prevention, not punishment; reporters 
are free from fear of retaliation against themselves or punishment of others 
as a result of reporting, this therefore requires an
•  Independent body: The system is independent of any authority with power 
to punish the reporter
•  Disambiguate: The intent and goal of the reporting system are clear to all 
interested parties; the system uses common, agreed standards and 
terminology; a single, clinically useful classification for things that go wrong
•  Open: Reports are accepted from all interested parties and should be 
received from a broad range of personnel
•  Easy: Reporting is easy to do and captures rich detail
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•  Expert Analysis: Reports are analysed by technically expert peers, from 
multiple perspectives; these experts understand the clinical circumstances 
and are trained to recognise underlying system causes; this should be a 
highly respected body, independent from the influences of other 
stakeholders in the ‘system’
•  Timely feedback: Reports are analysed promptly, prioritised at local, 
national and international level, and recommendations are rapidly 
disseminated to those who need to know, especially when serious hazards 
are identified; reporters and larger interested communities receive timely 
feedback; summaries of reported events must be disseminated in a timely 
fashion
•  Responsive: A structured mechanism must be in place for reviewing 
reports and developing action plans; the report receiving agency must be 
capable of disseminating recommendations and must demonstrate an 
ability to prevent, detect, and mitigate the effect of undesirable 
combinations of design, performance, and circumstances that lead to 
adverse events; mechanisms for setting priorities at local, national and 
international levels; participating organisations commit to implementing 
recommendations whenever possible
•  Systems oriented: Recommendations focus on changes in systems, 
processes, or products, rather than being targeted at individual 
performance; mechanisms for involving and informing all stakeholders
In 2007 Evans et al. studied the reporting habits in ten intervention and ten 
control units in hospitals in Australia (Evans et al., 2007). They found additional 
characteristics, or confirmed recommendations from the above list, of those 
units with an improved incident reporting frequency, thus providing rare
Chapter 4: Incident Reporting
evidence -  not merely recommendations based on a non health care context - 
of how reporting systems in health care might actually succeed. Because the 
above described characteristics of good reporting systems are mainly derived 
from non health care reporting systems Evans et al. findings are presented 
separately. These features are (Evans et al., 2007:175):
•  Medical line managers attended root cause analysis training specifically 
designed to teach systems approach in error management
•  the initial education captured the majority of doctors
•  departmental education sessions were held at least every ten weeks, with 
discussion of incidents conducted for at least 20 minutes
•  feedback provided clinically relevant incidents for discussion
•  posters and manuals were clearly displayed in clinical areas, describing 
what types of incidents staff should report
•  proficient call centre nurses captured reports in a timely manner
•  online reporting was not offered
Probably the most striking difference in the above findings from Evans et al.
(2007) is the last item in the list, namely that online reporting was not offered.
This is interesting because review of the literature clearly points to a move
toward online incident reporting. However, Evans et al’s finding is similar to 
Schuerer et al. (2006) who found a nineteen-fold increase in reporting in 
surgical intensive care units when they moved from an online reporting system 
to a paper based system, using a brief card with checkboxes and text fields. 
Experience shows that useful reporting systems require adequate technology. It
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may well be that where this is not possible, for example due to financial
restraints, a paper based system is better than a technically inadequate online
system.
Last but not least it is important what kind of data is collected in the reporting 
system and there is agreement that any CIRS should consist of a minimum data 
set. This should ensure a basic analysis as well as, to some extent, comparison 
of data between different reporting systems. Usually this basic data set should 
contain the following information (CPSI, 2007:21 citing Lipley, 2001:11):
•  What happened (description, severity of actual or potential harm, people 
and equipment involved)
•  Where it happened (location/specialty)
•  When it happened (date/time)
•  How it happened (immediate causes)
•  Why it happened (underlying causes)
•  What action taken or proposed (immediate and longer term)
•  Impact of event (harm to the organization, patient, other)
•  Factors that did, or could have, minimized impact
In addition to this minimum data set through standardised data input fields 
reporting systems may contain a free text passage where the reporter can
describe the event in his own words and in the detail he feels is necessary. It
has been argued that the advantage of a system that only allows the input of 
structured data, such as check boxes or drop down menus), is that data can be
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entered more quickly and is easier to analyse. However, users have also 
expressed a preference for a system with a free text passage because it gives 
the reporter more freedom in providing contextual information, hence a richer 
account of what happened (Holzmueller et al., 2005; CPSI, 2007). The free text 
however demands from the user the ability to structure the event, whereas the 
structured form already provides structure and consistency for the content of 
reports (CPSI, 2007).
The next section will discuss barriers to incident reporting.
4.3.3. Barriers to incident reporting
Reporting systems are considered a key component of patient safety efforts. It 
may be argued that not appreciating any one of the above characteristics when 
implementing a CIRS may inhibit success of the system. This section will 
discuss those barriers that are commonly associated with CIRS in health care.
It has been argued that all health care reporting systems, whether officially 
mandatory or voluntary, are essentially voluntary -  because they require the 
cooperation of staff to bring the information forward. Hence reporting systems 
depend upon the voluntary reporting of users (Billings, 1998). Various 
contributors have marked out several cultural, legal, regulatory, and financial 
barriers as inflicting reporting of adverse events and underreporting presents a 
significant concern in any CIRS (Billings, 1998). A study by Barach and Small in 
2000 reported that underreporting of adverse events in the US was between 50 
and 96 percent. More recent evidence from studies comparing incident 
reporting with other adverse event detection techniques suggests that this still 
presents a considerable problem in any CIRS and that many incidents are not 
reported (Evans et al., 2007). Health care providers may not use a CIRS for a 
number of reasons. This section discusses some of the most important barriers 
to incident reporting.
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Similarly to the last section a lot of the literature on barriers in CIRS stems from 
findings in non health care industries. Notably Billings (1998), based on his 
experience in aviation reporting systems, contends that underreporting may 
occur in three ways: (1) an event is not noticed (2) an event is noticed but it is 
not clear whether or not reporting is required (3) an event is noticed but 
deliberately not reported. Key to the acceptance of a CIRS seems to create an 
understanding amongst staff, what error scientists and patient safety experts 
refer to as a safety culture, that CIRS is one part of an improvement process 
and not a mechanism to identify negligence or assign blame (Emmanuel et al., 
2008). But this is a delicate issue as an inherent ambivalence of reporting 
systems is that data gained through the system can be used either for 
recognising leverage points for improvement or to hold an individual 
accountable for something (IOM, 2000). The IOM noted in 2000 that the vast 
majority of errors are not reported, and they are not reported because personnel 
fear they will be punished (IOM, 2000). Six years later the Council of Europe
(2006) reports seven barriers to the use of CIRS, four of which (the following 
points 1 until 4) are still directly related to staff fearing some kind of ill-effect as 
a result of reporting in CIRS. Staff might not use CIRS because of a (Council of 
Europe, 2006):
1. fear of blame, resulting from a lack of open and fair culture
2. fear of the reports being used out of context by the media and others
3. breaches of confidentiality or anonymity leading to ineffective separation of 
incident reporting systems from disciplinary and regulatory bodies
4. lack of legal protection against using the information for purposes other 
than learning
5. lack of feedback as to what has changed as a result of the report
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6. lack of time to report
7. lack of support from the management of the organisation
This fear might create an attitude to only report what is realty necessary. 
Studies show that staff are more likely to report events that actually caused 
harm, not equally valuable near miss, no harm, or prevented events (Lawton 
and Parker, 2002; Firth-Cozens, 2002). Lawton and Parker also found 
differences in reporting behaviour in three different contexts: compliance with a 
protocol, violation of a protocol, and improvisation where no protocol existed. In 
compliance with protocols reporting was more common than in instances where 
no protocols existed or they were not being adhered to. This stresses the 
importance of protocols for medical practice. A lack of protocols furthers the 
difficulties a member of staff might have in identifying whether or not an event is 
reportable, and, in case it is perceived reportable, how to classify or code the 
event.
The study by Lawton and Parker (2002) also showed that although a bad 
outcome usually increased the likelihood of the event being reported this was 
not the case in those instances where staff had to improvise because no 
protocols were in place. The willingness to report about those events where one 
had to improvise was drastically lower, even in events that lead to a poor or bad 
outcome (Lawton and Parker, 2002). Lawton and Parker (2002) argue that this 
may be related to the ‘use of clinical judgement’, where doctors, when there is 
no protocol in place, have ‘professional freedom’ to decide what is best for the 
patient. Furthermore it may be related to the earlier discussed upcoming 
practice of evidence based medicine, in which ‘violation’ of a practice is often 
intentional and therefore also considered more culpable (Lawton and Parker, 
2002; Lawton, 1998).
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Protocols may also be important for designers of CIRS who are faced with the 
challenge of creating an input mask that allows clear classification of events. 
Johnson (2003) criticised that many CIRS in health care suffer both in terms of 
their engineering and usability. One system for example forced users to enter 
the date of an incident, using drop down menus entitled date, month, and year. 
Users were also forced to specify a single time at which the incident occurred. 
This created difficulties as many didn’t know what time to enter in case an event 
had occurred repeatedly. For example if a repeated misadministration of a drug 
is detected what date should be reported; the date when the incident first 
occurred, or the date on which it was identified (Johnson, 2003)7 Other user 
related factors may include that electronic CIRS typically have large logos 
announcing that the user is making a submission to CIRS which can be very off 
putting for staff when using shared facilities on a busy ward (Johnson, 2003).
Firth-Cozens (2002) and Lawton and Parker (2002) further related the 
importance of existing protocols to the fact that nurses, who are governed by 
protocols much stronger than doctors, were much more likely to using the 
system. Several studies suggest that nurses are more likely to report than 
doctors, and that junior doctors are more likely to report than senior doctors 
(Vincent et al., 1999; Evans et al., 2006). A national survey of adverse event 
reporting practices in United States hospitals by Farley et al. (2008) reported 
that in 86 percent of the 1.652 surveyed hospitals physicians did not report at all 
or only reported very little. It should be considered though that the study was 
based on asking risk managers in telephone and email interviews, not acquiring 
information directly from incident report data. In addition the authors of the study 
(Farley et al, 2008) note that participation of physicians in CIRS might be higher 
because they may have asked nursing staff to report the incident for them. This 
confirms earlier findings, for example by Lawton and Parker (2002), which found 
that health care professionals, especially doctors, are reluctant to report 
adverse events, especially to superiors.
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Another study by Evans et al. (2006) of six Australian hospitals and in diverse 
medical settings, surveying 186 doctors and 587 nurses, identified 19 self­
perceived barriers to reporting. The top four answers were “I never get any 
feedback on what action is taken”, that “the incident form takes too long to fill 
out and I just don’t have the time”, “the incident was too trivial” , “when the ward 
is busy I forget to make a report” . Those top four answers received about 50 
percent agreement from both doctors and nurses. Other identified barriers 
included not knowing whose responsibility it is to report, feeling that reporting 
was meaningless, fear of litigation, confidentiality and anonymity breaches. 
While there was a general agreement amongst respondents that events should 
be reported more clarification was needed on what should be reported, the 
reporting process should be simplified, and timely feedback should be given 
(Evans et al., 2006).
An earlier study by Vincent et al. (1999), which largely served as a basis for 
Evan’s study (2006), found similar reasons for not reporting, high workload, a 
belief that reporting was not necessary, and fears that junior staff might be 
blamed. The study in 1999 already recommended clarifying what should be 
reported, simplifying reporting methods, better informing staff about the nature 
and purposes of reporting, providing timely feedback, and having designated 
staff for reporting as busyness presented one of the main reasons for not 
reporting (Vincent et al., 1999). Still, in 2008 Shojania reports about the 
“frustrating case of incident reporting systems” where staff were initially 
enthusiastic about reporting and over a period of two months or so reported a 
number of important events - ‘important medications not administered’, 
‘inattention to orders for stat blood work’, and the like. However, as one intern 
remarked: “Last month we submitted a bunch of incident reports, but nobody 
seemed to care, so we stopped bothering’’ (Shojania, 2008:400). As a 
consequence staff became inattentive and lost interest in CIRS. They were less 
likely to take the time to report and administrators of the system consequentially
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regarded CIRS as not producing any useful data (Shojania, 2008). Not only that 
(the concept of) CIRS doesn’t seem to learn from its own failures the above 
example may also lead to misinterpretation of statistical data. The system 
statistics for the unit first showed an upward tick in the frequency of various 
events in the beginning (when staff for enthusiastic) and then a return to 
baseline (when staff stopped bothering reporting because of a lack of feedback). 
However this did not, as some might presume, reflect any change in risk to 
patients (Shojania, 2008).
Another important barrier related to the design of a CIRS is terminology, a topic 
that, as earlier sections in Chapters 2 and 3 have demonstrated, presents a 
challenge throughout patient safety. The WHO (2005b) has commissioned the 
development of an international taxonomy for patient safety in order to promote 
greater standardisation of terminology and classification. Similarly, the United 
States Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
has been working on a patient safety event taxonomy to standardise 
terminology and classify schemata for near misses and adverse events. The 
JCAHO taxonomy suggests clustering of terms into the five groups: impact, type, 
domain, cause, and prevention and mitigation. These five groups have 21 sub­
classifications, which in turn are then subdivided into more than 200 coded 
categories and an indefinite number of uncoded text fields containing narrative 
information (Chang et al., 2005). While CIRS in English have at least the 
possibility to comply with an international taxonomy this is different in German 
speaking countries. Neither the JCAHO nor the WHO have German as an 
output language. It is not clear at the moment what effect this will have on 
patient safety developments in German speaking countries, such as Austria, 
and how operators of incident reporting systems that are run in German will 
address this problem of a lack of a standard terminology. The JCAHO 
classification implies that classifying of events is a highly structured process and 
therefore will need a strategic overhead. Currently it is not foreseeable which
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body in any of the German speaking countries might take on this substantial 
task.
Last but not least it should be mentioned that running CIRS, also in the 
increasingly common online way, is not cheap, although this nevertheless 
seems to be the perception in many health care organisations. More than a 
decade ago Billings (1998) already stressed that “these systems cannot be run 
with a couple of clerks and a keypunch operator”. At current it is unclear how 
expensive it actually is to run a CIRS in health care. A review by the CPSI (2007) 
shows that very little information has been published about the costs associated 
with the development, implementation and maintenance of CIRS in health care.
Estimations in the UK believe that incident reporting and subsequent system 
wide changes will result in savings of two billion GBP per year in the NHS, and 
an additional 400 million GBP savings per year in regards to settled negligence 
claims (CPSI, 2007). One of the few figures that have been mentioned in regard 
to actual costs of CIRS in health care is also from the UK. The NHS NPSA 
operates with a budget of 37 million GBP (NPSA, 2005), of which an estimated 
five million GBP were allocated for the development and operation of the NRLS 
for the first three years (Williams and Osborn, 2006). However, if compared to 
aviation - the aviation safety reporting system spends about three million USD 
per year to analyse approximately 30.000 reports, equating to about 100 USD 
per case -  the NHS would have to spend 50 million GBP in order to achieve a 
similar level of analysis for the 850.000 adverse events that the DOH (2000) 
believes occur each year within the NHS (Johnson, 2003). A lack of adequate 
funding is problematical because it may well allow the initial collection of 
incidents but results in the collecting body then being overwhelmed in analysis 
of events. Aviation reporting systems use a number of specialists for system 
engineering, software development, storage and information retrieval from large 
data sets in order to find patterns of common events. Because health care
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reporting systems have done relatively little in this respect it may be argued that 
they are relatively unprepared in handling the amount of data that is expected to 
come through (Johnson, 2003).
4.4. Conclusion
Incident reporting systems take a valuable role in improving safety in various 
industries. Good incident reporting systems enable organisations to build safe 
systems based on near misses and prevented events, without the “need” for a 
catastrophe to learn from. Within the new patient safety movement incident 
reporting systems find increasing attention and are expected to make a key 
contribution to safer health care.
This chapter set out by providing contextual information on CIRS, describing the 
concept of safe systems design and comparing it to the current state of many 
health care organisations. Especially the concept of evidence based medicine is 
on the incline and, while not contrary to patient safety, embodies a kind of 
intervention that is more embedded in the ‘clinical dimension’. This kind of 
thinking, based on the scientific method, may find more compliance in frontline 
operators than some of the new patient safety movement initiatives, like CIRS, 
that are largely based on findings outside medicine. Hence the introduction of 
CIRS might not be as straightforward a task as some of the new patient safety 
literature implies it is. That it is however ‘worth it’ was described in the next 
section on the purpose of CIRS. The chapter then moved on to discuss 
characteristics of good CIRS -  in essence reporting needs to be safe, simple, 
and worthwhile. Many of the above recommendations and characteristics on 
good incident reporting systems are based on experiences outside health care, 
a fact that does not always come across very clearly in the new patient safety 
literature. However, this means that, with the exception of Evans et al.’s work
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(2007), many of these characteristics of good reporting are to be seen as 
implications rather than evidence of how systems in health care might work.
As a consequence, and despite the increasingly prominent role of CIRS in 
health care, there is very little contemporary evidence of how incident reporting 
systems actually work in health care. First hand accounts on the implementation 
of CIRS in hospitals are rare, for example what kind of problems hospitals face 
when trying to apply those good characteristics or how problems have been 
approached and solved. In which (organisational) circumstances and 
environments does CIRS foster, which environments make it more difficult for 
CIRS to work. Can the implementation of CIRS fail, how is its success being 
measured, and what are the practical outcomes of using CIRS? Answers to 
these questions are as yet curiously elusive, at the same time expectations into 
CIRS are, it seems unrealistically, high.
In light of this chapter addressing these questions seems relevant to the 
success of CIRS, and ultimately to the safety of patients. Leape’s (2002) and 
Billings’ (1998 and 2003) arguments seem to epitomise that in stating that 
excellent reporting systems (i.e. existing CIRS in aviation) do not suffer from the 
barriers to reporting as described in this chapter, but that this is due to a 
substantial approach to creating a supportive environment to reporting. 
Although it need be considered that different countries are at different stages in 
their patient safety endeavours and level of experience with CIRS the literature 
points to a reoccurring common theme of barriers to reporting, and it appears 
that these may have not always been adequately considered and addressed in 
those health care organisations that set out to use CIRS. The lack of literature 
accounts on the implementation of CIRS may be a further indication that this is 
a problem that has not yet been substantially addressed.
Apart from this international context no literature could be found on the use of 
CIRS in Austrian health care institutions. This study will approach this gap in the
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literature by studying the implementation of CIRS in a public hospital in Vienna. 
The review in this chapter has informed the research question, aim and 
objectives in regard to basic elements of CIRS, “a few golden rules”, on which 
the observation of CIRS should focus at the outset. Furthermore CIRS presents 
a complex issue with many unanswered questions regarding its application in a 
health care context. This suggests it will provide a substantial ground for an in- 
depth investigation of supportive or inhibitive measures. These however may 
not be always clearly declared as CIRS issues but may be hidden in daily 
clinical work or other non-clinical issues which are perceived more important by 
staff than CIRS. As a consequence the investigation will have to be sufficiently 
broad at the outset and cling onto relevant issues identified throughout the 
research process.
As a closing note it should be emphasised that even if all the above barriers 
were overcome and ideal reporting systems designed and used reporting will 
always be perceived more purposeful when known threats to safety, whether 
identified through CIRS or any other technique, are actually removed from the 
system. Charles Billings (1998), developer of the aviation reporting system and 
former Chief Scientist at NASA Ames, stresses that:
“...there are enough reports o f mishaps with potassium chloride, lidocaine, 
vincristine and other drugs and devices to have made it very clear that a 
problem with these exists. The information that these events occur is already 
present. We may well ask what it is that keeps us from making progress on 
safety, given that we already know about the existence o f these problems. What 
is added by more formal, elaborate (and expensive) incident reporting?” 
(Billings, 1998)
Even more so CIRS needs to be seen as one element of a wider systems 
approach to improving safety in health care. A CIRS alone will not improve
safety to the extent that is envisaged by national governments. CIRS can make
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a useful contribution to safety but more research is needed on the 
implementation and use of CIRS to further its development in the still relatively 
new context of health care. This will hopefully enable the “health care CIRS 
community” to lead by example, demonstrating how they have learned from 
their own mistakes.
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to give insight into the philosophical and 
methodological considerations that have led to the conviction that this is the 
best way for approaching the research problem and providing reliable and 
insightful answers to the research question.
5.1. Introduction
This study is an in-depth qualitative exploration of an empirical setting from a 
critical ethnography stance. The aim in this chapter is to consider how the 
research question can be answered and to explain why this approach has been 
adopted. The chapter sets out in section 5.2 on research philosophy. It 
discusses critical realism as the fundamental philosophical underpinning that 
informs the methodological choices and design of the study, and explains how 
the research topic was found in an amalgamation of philosophical stance and 
the researcher’s personal and professional background. Section 5.3 discusses 
the research methodology employed in this thesis, the overall composition by 
which data collection and analysis will be conducted. This includes a discussion 
of qualitative research and critical ethnography, as well as the scope of the 
study and issues pertaining to research ethics and confidentiality. The first 
(qualitative) part of this study employed semi-structured interviews and a self 
administered questionnaire. This is discussed in section 5.4. The second 
(ethnographic) part of the study used observation and this is discussed in detail 
throughout section 5.5. Finally section 5.6 discusses claims on data validity and 
analysis. This chapter is complemented by the ethical approval from Sheffield 
Hallam University (Appendix A) and the study site hospital (Appendix B).
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5.2. Research Philosophy
Researchers are in a long standing debate over how to best conduct research. 
What all “researchers” have in common, whether they are aware of it or not 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000), is that their research is inextricably embedded in 
commitments to particular values, worldviews or paradigms, and research 
philosophies (Guba and Lincoln, 1998). Within each philosophy of research are 
several methodologies, each drawing on a number of methods for data 
collection and interpretation (Dick, 1993). Accordingly the various research 
methods or techniques available to the researcher are not valid in themselves 
but they operate only in a given set of assumptions about truth (Hughes, 1990). 
Employing one research method means at the same time engaging in a certain 
conception of the world that allows those instruments to be used for their 
intended purposes (ibid, 1990). In this section the author’s intention is to give a 
rationale for his personal research philosophy, not effectively debating which 
one philosophy is best. The author therein follows Guba and Lincoln’s (1998) 
contention that no construction of research is incontrovertibly right and that the 
researcher must rely on its persuasiveness and utility.
The following section introduces critical realism as the philosophy that has most 
informed this research. Subsequent sections will relate this to finding the 
research topic as well as the personal and professional background of the 
researcher, which, as will be discussed later, are an important element in regard 
to validation of ethnographic research.
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5.2.1. Ontological and Epistemological Commitment: Critical 
Realism
A research process begins with the researcher’s philosophical considerations 
and assumptions in deciding to undertake qualitative research (Creswell, 2007). 
Each inquirer brings with him his own worldview, paradigm, or set of beliefs, 
and these inform the conduct and writing of the study (Creswell, 2007). Johnson 
and Duberley (2000:9) emphasise this:
"... how we come to ask particular questions, how we assess the relevance and  
value o f different research methodologies so that we can investigate those 
questions, how we evaluate the outputs o f research, a ll express and vary 
according to our underlying epistemological commitments" (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000:1).
The qualitative inquirer’s philosophical assumptions consist of a stance toward 
the nature of reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what he knows, i.e. 
the relationship between the researcher and that being researched 
(epistemology), the role of values (axiology), the language of research (rhetoric) 
(Creswell, 2003), and the methods used in course of the research (Creswell, 
2007 and 2003; Guba and Lincoln, 1988). These considerations largely reflect 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) metatheoretical21 assumptions about the nature of 
social science (see figure 5.1). Based on considerations regarding ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology these assumptions enable a 
“systematic analysis o f the overarching structures o f thought within a 
substantive domain so as to specify the conditions under which particular 
theoretical perspectives are deemed appropriate” (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000:77).
21 ‘m etath eroy’: beyond , ab ove , before  or after (m eta) theory (Johnson and D uberley , 2 0 0 0 )
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Figure 5.1: Burell and Morgan’s metatheoretical assumptions 
about the nature of social science
ONTOLOGY
Realism Nominalism
- in essence, social and - reality is simply a product of our
organizational reality exist minds -  a projection of our
independently of human consciousness and cognition with no
consciousness and cognitions independent status
EPISTEMOLOGY
Positivism Anti-positivism
- it is possible to observe the - there are no neutral grounds for
empirical world in a neutral manner knowledge since all observation is
though the accumulation of objective value- and theory-laden
sense-data
______________________  HUMAN NATURE______________________
Determinism Voluntarism
- sees human behaviour as - human action arises out of the
determined by the situation -  as culturally derived meanings they
necessary responses to external have deployed during sense-making 
stimuli
METHODOLOGY
Nomothetic Ideographic
- located in the unity of the sciences - attempts to uncover the internal 
and applies protocols and logics that underpin human action by 
procedures derived from the natural deploying methods that access 
sciences cultures
Source: Johnson and Duberley (2000:78)
Critical realism emphasises the importance of a mind-independent reality. At the 
same time critical realism acknowledges that (knowledge of) reality is never
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direct but mediated through individual and cultural perception (Page, 2003). 
Thus critical realists claim there is only one reality but there may be multiple 
interpretations of it (Fleetwood, 2005). According to Habermas (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000) the goal of critical sciences in general is to facilitate the 
process of self-reflection, to empower the individual by developing his 
emancipatory interest and by giving him more control. The unconscious is made 
conscious and enables self-conscious decision-making. Page (2003:73) puts it 
like this:
“Critical realism can be said to emphasize the recovery o f some form o f 
ontology, an interest in interdisciplinarity (or perhaps more accurately 
transdisciplinarity—moving from one discipline to another), an interest in 
wholism, that is, having a total understanding o f reality and our perception o f 
reality, an interest in evolution and the evolutionary origins o f human knowledge, 
an interest in unity o f method for the social and natural sciences, an 
acknowledgment o f the provisional or incomplete status o f our current state o f 
knowledge, and an acknowledgment o f the cultural context o f human 
knowledge .”
Critical realism occupies the intellectual space between positivism, with an 
ontology of observable events, and postmodernism (and poststructuralism), 
which is often characterised by a strong social constructionist ontology 
(Fleetwood, 2005). Critical realists believe that social phenomena can be 
understood, although often only with great difficulty. However, this does not 
mean that these phenomena can always be meaningfully “measured”. Hence, in 
order to understand social phenomena critical realists predominantly employ 
qualitative methods and distant themselves from prediction, quantification and 
measurement common to positivist approaches (ibid, 2005).
Critical realism seeks to free itself from the shortcomings of positivism and
relativism. Although truth is important critical realists are first and foremost
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concerned with issues of ontology (Dobson, 1999). Johnson and Duberley
(2000:154, based on Bhaskar, 1978) summarise the key commitments of critical
realism.
•  As the term implies, critical realists emphasize a metaphysical ontology
which states that social and natural reality consist of intransitive entities
which exist independently of our human knowledge.
•  Those entities may not be observable and different people may apprehend 
different (i.e. transitive) realities according to the varying paradigmatic, 
metaphorical or discursive conventions deployed through their human 
agency.
•  The perceived epistemic role of human agency means that critical realism 
rejects the possibility of a theory-neutral observational language and a 
correspondence theory of truth.
•  Critical realists do not see science as being merely a prestigious artefact of
conventionally derived self-directed and self-deferential paradigms, or
discourses, or language games and so on -  instead and despite the pivotal 
role of its ‘collective unconsciousness’ science is construed as being 
something other than science itself.
•  The model of science propagated by positivism has little bearing upon 
actual scientific practice save for the manner in which scientists will often 
explain themselves and their activities to each other.
•  Critical realism entails an epistemological defence of causal explanation -  
causation is not solely expressed through a constant conjunction of events 
as in positivism. Rather critical realists identify causation by also exploring 
the mechanisms of cause and effect which underlie regular events, 
mechanisms which Hume claimed were observable but which critical
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realists claim can be shown to be real through their deployment of what 
Bhaskar calls ‘retroductive’ argument.
The aforementioned key commitments of critical realism are illustrated in figure
5.2.
Figure 5.2: Bhaskar’s synthesis of critical realism
Thesis
Epistemological
realism
Synthesis Antithesis
Metaphysical
realism
Epistemological
relativism
Empirical
realism
Critical
realism
Metaphysical
relativism
Superidealism
Source: Johnson and Duberley (2000:153)
Based on the above considerations of critical realism and based on Creswell’s 
(2003) and Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) assumptions about the nature of 
science (see figure 5.1) this research will proceed from an ontologically 
objectivist (Realism) and an epistemologically subjectivist (Anti-Positivism) 
perspective. Using Bhaskar’s (1989, in Johnson and Duberley 2000) synthesis, 
and as figure 5.2 illustrates, this synthesis of a positivist objectivist ontology and 
a postmodernist subjectivist epistemology results in critical realism. This critical 
philosophical commitment as developed by Bhaskar (1986) under the term 
“critical realism” informs this critical ethnography and the methodological 
choices to be made in section 5.3.
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5.2.2. Focusing on a research topic
Traditional ways of deciding on a focus in research are usually rooted in the 
academic discipline and emerge from a literature review, coupled with 
methodological and theoretical concerns. This requires the researcher to have a 
thorough understanding and be up to date with literature, to possess detailed 
background knowledge of the relevant discipline, to be technically proficient, 
and to have at hand adequate time and resources (Robson, 2002). Focusing on 
a research topic during the opening stages of a thesis may be influenced by a 
number of other issues. Neuman (1994) suggests issues such as personal 
values and choosing topics that are of current interest and more likely to be 
funded. Sometimes ideas come out of discussions with colleagues, others come 
from direct experiences and observations, which may include prior research or 
practical experience of the researcher (for example Robson, 2002; Lofland and 
Lofland, 1995).
Less traditional ways may lead to what Robson (2002) calls ‘real world 
research’. Such research arises from a desire of wanting to solve a problem of 
practice, or a concern for change and improvement in a certain real world 
context. In those instances researchers may already know a lot about a topic 
prior to commencing the research. In this respect Kirby and McKenna (1989) 
point out the central role of researchers in the research process, because 
inevitably they bring with them their own thoughts, aspirations, feelings, 
ethnicity, race, class, family background and occupation.
Some research traditions are more open to acknowledging those influences 
than others. Some traditions have connoted personal attributes with research 
bias, as something that is difficult and best avoided (Maxwell, 2005). However, 
the above notion of interest and personal attributes is not to be confused with 
having a closed and pre-judged view of the nature of a phenomenon to be 
researched and the kind of outcomes to be found (Robson, 2002). There is
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growing acceptance, in particular amongst social sciences researchers, of the 
potential value and benefits that researchers’ personal attributes may have on 
research projects when their assumptions and values are carefully examined 
(Maxwell, 2005; Robson, 2002; Kirby and McKenna, 1989).
It has been argued (for example Walker, 1985; Robson, 2002) that in less 
traditional designs the literature and discipline do not serve so much as a 
starting point for research, but that they provide a necessary background 
resource that informs the research. This distinction seems important as it 
implies to impact the power relationship between researcher and researched, 
because the agenda is not set in isolation, but in “partnership” with a variety of 
stakeholders.
Nevertheless, when focusing on a research topic the research is under a set of 
influences, and he has to develop an understanding where these influences 
come from and what they mean. As Strauss (1987) notes, insights, hunches, or 
generative questions about a phenomenon to be studied come from prior 
experience with a phenomenon, whether personal, more “professionally” from 
actual exploratory research, or from theoretical sensitivity because of the 
researcher’s knowledge of technical literature.
Therefore the following paragraphs provide axiological information (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1988) on how the inquirer might have been influenced in focusing on a 
topic. These are important considerations in regards to reflexivity throughout 
this research (see section 5.6.2 reflexivity in note taking and analysis) as 
“scientists, in order to understand themselves as scientists, first have to become 
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and historians o f themselves” (Zolo, 
1990:162, cited in Johnson and Duberley, 2000:177)
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5.2.3. Researcher’s personal background
The researcher comes from a medical family and literally grew up side by side 
with patients who visited his parents’ General Practitioner and Dentist Clinic. 
Impressions were manifold and varied, playing piano for patients in the waiting 
room during early childhood, selling handmade “ice-cream” to dauntless 
patients, and later occasionally helping out as a dental assistant or at the front 
desk. Health and health management topics were a popular topic at the family 
table and with many befriended medics of the family. Therefore, and of course 
apart from having the painful experience of being a patient himself, the author is 
in general familiar with (at least some) clinical settings and the behaviour and 
language of both medical staff and patients. The author was also coined by an 
experience where a close family member got into a life-threatening situation, 
arguably caused by a preventable error in health care. It is therefore inevitable 
that the author brings with him an array of impressions on how medicine and 
the organisation of health care does work and could work.
In a very general sense the author’s view may be summarised as that despite 
the goodwill and effort of clinical staff, errors, especially related to the 
organisation of work, do happen and that many of these could be prevented. It 
may well be that small changes in the organisation of health care make a 
positive impact on the overall service experience of both patients and staff. 
Conversely supposedly trivial events may result in considerable threats 
opposing the individual clinicians’ good intentions. While the above claims need 
to be seen as a reflection of the author’s own, personal, subjective and 
unsubstantiated impressions they were backed up in informal talks with medics 
who often shared the author’s view, accompanied it with a long sigh and 
regarding it as a matter of course.
From those personal impressions stems an interest to study health care
organisations from a management perspective.
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5.2.4. Researcher’s professional background
The author has previously undertaken academic research in hospitals. He also 
has experience as a management apprentice in hospitals as well as working 
(mostly, but not exclusively in management) in various other settings. It would 
be fair to say that the author was strongly influenced by the work of the Centre 
for Facilities Management at Salford University, UK during his time as a 
postgraduate student there. In that regard facilities management is not to be 
understood as it may be in its ‘classical’ sense of managing facilities but as a 
distinct discourse and management discipline that is predominantly concerned 
with the creation of ‘the right social and physical environment’ in organisations 
(for example Alexander, 1996 and 2003; Alexander et al., 2004; Weicht and 
Alexander, 2004). Characteristic to this approach is the notion of the ‘internal 
customer’ and a differentiation between two kinds of activities (for example 
Becker, 1990; Barrett, 1995); those activities that can be attributed more to the 
core identity of an organisation, for example an insurance company selling 
insurances, and those activities that primarily support the core activities, for 
example managing the car fleet and developing the company dress code to 
enable the insurance seller to reach the customer and to appear in appropriate 
clothing. This concept can be transposed to health care organisations (see for 
example earlier work by the author in 2004). For instance a facilities 
management organisation can set up and provide a hospital devoid of patients 
and clinical staff, which can then be populated with its “core personnel”, its 
natural inhabitants of clinical staff and patients, with continuous support of the 
facilities management staff.
However, it cannot be denied that while facilities management consists of a lot 
of (great) ideas (Duffy, 2000; Price, 2002) it nevertheless does not have a 
strong philosophical underpinning (Grimshaw, 2004) and the above view of a 
facilities management organisation, although proofed to work in practice, has
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not become very popular. As a consequence the initial concern for ‘user needs’ 
and benefits of a ‘better fit’ that is supposed to link (facilities) management via 
productivity to strategic planning is in danger of being lost (Fenker, 2004; 
Grimshaw, 2004), and the discourse remains to be largely driven by the 
pragmatist perspective of the (property and building) industry. Naturally different 
perceptions and conceptualisations of what facilities management is are also 
inherent at universities.
5.3. Research Methodology
5.3.1. Qualitative Research
Qualitative research has had a long tradition in the social sciences (Pope and 
Mays, 2000), especially in anthropology, history and political science. Over the 
last two decades more and more researchers from the basic disciplines and 
applied fields, including organizational studies and health care, have shifted to a 
more qualitative paradigm (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Smith (1992, cited in 
Miles and Huberman 1994:1) observes that the terms ethnography, field 
methods, qualitative inquiry, participant observation, case study, naturalistic 
methods, and responsive evaluation have become almost synonymous. The 
qualitative approach is well suited for understanding phenomena within their 
context, to uncover links among concepts and behaviours, and to generate and 
refine theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 1994; Crabtree 
and Miller 1999; Morse 1999; Bradley et al., 2007).
Also in health services research the qualitative approach is increasingly 
common (Shortell, 1999; Sofaer, 1999; Bradley et al., 2007). This has led to the 
study of issues ranging from the diffusion of innovation (IOM, 2000) and general 
quality improvement (Bradley et al., 2005; Crosson et al., 2005; Bradley et al.,
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2007) to physician-patient relationship (Flocke et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 
2003) and culture change in health care (Marshall et al 2003). It also seems that 
qualitative research can reap new findings about CIRS, especially given the 
lack of documentation and the many contextual elements to be considered in its 
implementation and operation. The qualitative part of this research used semi­
structured interviews and a questionnaire, and these investigations prepared 
grounds for a subsequent ethnographic study.
5.3.2. Ethnography
Ethnography can take place in a wide array of social settings. It involves 
extensive fieldwork, for example direct observation of the activities of the group 
being studied, communications and interactions with the people being studied, 
and opportunities for informal and formal interviews (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; 
Jorgensen, 1989, Lofland, 1971 in Moustakas 1994, p1). Van Maanen et al. 
(1982:103-4, cited in Moustakas 1994:2) observed that:
“The result o f ethnographic inquiry is cultural description. It is, however, a 
description o f the sort that-can emerge only from a lengthy period o f intimate 
study and residence in a given social setting. It calls for the language spoken in 
that setting, first-hand participation in some o f the activities that take place there, 
and, most critically, a deep reliance on intensive work with a few informants 
drawn from the setting.”
According to Moustakas (1994) ethnography involves an initial engagement of 
exploring, planning and getting ready to conduct the study. This includes 
obtaining permission for observation and participation, exploring the ‘geography’ 
of the setting, and developing a plan for the scheduling of visits. This has mostly 
been achieved in the (first) qualitative part of the study. The ethnographic 
researcher usually comes to know a culture or group through immersion and 
engagement in the field. This involves extensive fieldwork using methods such
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as observation of the activities of the group being studied, communications and 
interactions with the people, and informal and formal interviews (Bogdan and 
Taylor, 1975; Jorgensen, 1989, Lofland, 1971, Moustakas 1994). 
Ethnographers spend substantial time in the fieid (Burgess, 1984).
Similarly Geertz (1973) argues that at the heart of ethnography is the immersion 
into everyday life of the subject under study in order to understand how people 
give social meaning to events, and how this meaning reflects wider social 
discourses and cultures (McDonald et al., 2005). Studying behaviour in 
everyday, rather than experimental, settings (McDonald et al., 2005) will lead to 
good and rich data that can lead to a “thick description” of the phenomenon 
under investigation (Geertz, 1973; Maanen and Kolb, 1982). McCall and 
Simmons describe ethnography as a technique that includes “some amount o f 
genuinely social interaction in the field with the subjects o f the study, some 
direct observation o f relevant events, some formal and a great deal o f informal 
interviewing, some systematic counting, some collection o f documents and  
artefacts; an open-endedness in the direction the study takes” (McCall and 
Simmons, 1969:1 cited in Fielding, 2008:157).
As with other research methodologies and methods there is some discussion 
and disagreement about what counts and what doesn’t count as ethnography 
(Hammersley, 1990). However, Hammersely (1990) suggests that ethnographic 
research usually has one of the following features:
•  people’s behaviour is studied in everyday context (not in experimental 
conditions)
•  data are gathered from multiple sources, with the bulk of information 
usually coming from observation and relatively informal conversations
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•  data are gathered in an unstructured manner (not unsystematic though), 
not following a detailed plan set up at the beginning; initially data are 
collected in as raw a form and on as wide a front as possible, therefore
•  research focuses on a single setting and on a small scale, and
•  analysis of data involves interpretation, verbal descriptions and 
explanations
There are different forms of ethnography and this study uses critical 
ethnography as described by Thomas (1993). Critical ethnography is a way of 
applying a subversive worldview to the conventional logic of cultural inquiry. 
Critical ethnography is a style of analysis and discourse embedded within 
conventional ethnography, however it does offer a more straight forward style of 
thinking about relationships among knowledge, society, and political action 
(Thomas, 1993). While ethnography often pursues the question “what is this?” 
critical ethnography emerges when members of a culture become reflective and 
ask “what could this be?”. This reflective process consist of choosing between 
conceptual alternatives and making value laden judgements of meaning and 
method to challenge research, policy, and other forms of human activity 
(Thomas and O’Maolchatha, 1989). In critical ethnography special attention is 
given to sustaining a critical perspective and in resisting domestication. The 
central premise is that one can be both scientific and critical. Ethnographic 
description offers a powerful means of critiquing culture and the role of research 
within it (Thomas, 1993). In other words critical ethnography is conventional 
ethnography with a purpose. The researcher gives voice to and empowers the 
subjects under study; the purpose is to go beyond mere description of 
phenomena, invoking social consciousness and societal change, and to using 
knowledge for social change. In this respect critical ethnography is 
simultaneously hermeneutic and emancipatory (Thomson, 1993).
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Critical ethnography is emancipatory in its separation from constraining modes 
of thinking or acting that limit perception of and action toward realising 
alternative possibilities. Hence it is different from conventional ethnographers 
who recognise an impossibility or even undesirability of research that is free of 
normative and other biases and therefore believes in the “repression of biases”. 
Critical ethnographers use their work to aid emancipatory goals or to negate 
repressive influences that lead to social domination (Thomson, 1993). The 
survival of any society requires repression of some acts. However, not all 
constraints are equally necessary or beneficial for social harmony and growth. , 
As Schroyer (1975) writes, unnecessary social dominion exists when 
constraints are built into cultural and social life in ways that promote inequality 
and give individuals unfair (dis)advantage of social elements of life. It is the 
hermeneutic element in critical ethnography, the science of understanding -  or 
as some say the prevention of misunderstanding -  to not just simply stating a 
cultural context, but to integrate descriptions of cultural parts into an analysis of 
the whole that raises the critical implications of the descriptions (Thomas, 1993). 
Critical ethnographers thus seek “something more”, and attempt to connect the 
“meanings of the meanings” to broader structures of social power and control 
(Pfohl and Gordon, 1986).
Perhaps ethnography is situated best to provide the tools for digging below 
mundane surface appearances of social existence or phenomena and to display 
a multiplicity of alternate meanings (Thomson, 1993). It is argued therefore that 
ethnography has the potential to understand the social meaning given to objects, 
actions, and events, and at the same time to understand how these meanings 
reflect, reiterate and renegotiate wider social discourses and cultures. Meaning 
is not static but contextualised, negotiated and sustained with relative socio­
cultural and historical settings (McDonald et al., 2005). “How people perceive, 
interpret and make sense o f something is shaped by the norms, practices and  
knowiedge(s) within which they emerge” (McDonald et al., 2005:14). As the
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ethnographic encounter requires the researcher to become part of the natural 
setting, learning the ‘language’ in use with its own jargon and dialect and 
special meanings given to familiar words (Fielding, 2008) he will develop a 
‘modicum of understanding’ (Fielding, 2008) which then allows the compilation 
of fieldnotes. Inspecting and reflecting upon these fieldnotes allows the 
researcher to begin identifying and discerning patterns of rules which govern 
behaviour in the setting (Fielding, 2008).
Critical realism has been described as a relatively “young” philosophy without a 
certain methodology or research design ascribed to it (for example in Hartmann, 
2006). Ethnography has found supporters in the critical realist realm (Robson, 
2002; Bryman, 2004) and seems well suited in addressing the research 
question in a setting where different conceptualisations of error, the professional 
perspective and the new patient safety movement perspective, engage on one 
and the same phenomenon. The operationalisation of the above elements in the 
ethnographic part of the study is described in detail throughout section 5.5.
5.3.3. Scope of study
The scope of the study was determined in the preliminary phase of this 
research, which is described mostly in section 6.2 and 6.3 of this thesis, as the 
in-depth study of one hospital department. In this preliminary phase the 
researcher accompanied Expert 1 on his visits to four Women’s’ Hospitals in 
Vienna (plus one outside Vienna) and undertook a number of unstructured 
interviews with department leaders and informal chats with other hospital staff. 
This phase of the research helped in familiarising with the wider project and 
possible research environments and deciding on the scope of the study. At first, 
especially give the promising access to all five visited hospitals, a comparative 
approach was considered, possibly investigating how different reporting 
frequencies may correspond to different reporting (department) environments.
However as all of these five hospitals had the same low reporting rate it was
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considered that rather than following a broader comparative approach, an in- 
depth investigation of a single hospital would reap better results and make a 
more valuable overall contribution to knowledge. Another important 
consideration towards a single site approach was that in-depth ethnographic 
accounts are extremely rare on this subject.
Analysis of the preliminary observation and interviews did not reveal any major 
differences between those four departments; they appeared to be fairly similar 
and were all potentially ‘good’ study sites. The informally observed departments 
were all fairly similar in size, structure, and in the services they offered, i.e. all 
five were typical gynaecology and obstetric departments and one of a number 
of speciality departments at a public hospital. The departments were led by a 
medic and his deputy, a head nurse and his deputy, with extended leadership 
including several senior consultants and charge nurses for particular areas. The 
study site was chosen because access could be negotiated and members of 
staff claimed a particular interest in being studied. In addition Expert 1, who had 
initiated contact, held a good relationship with the leadership team of this 
department. This constituted a research setting that would ensure continuous 
access to the site which, considering the single site approach, the inductive 
nature of the study, and the sensitivity of the subject under investigation, was an 
important prerequisite to the study.
5.3.4. Research ethics and confidentiality
Given the sensitive nature of the subject, medical error, ethical approval was 
sought from the University where this thesis is being submitted. Once the study 
site had been selected ethical issues were addressed in writing with the 
participating hospital department and the hospital’s collegial leadership in order 
to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of all participants. The researcher 
met with the hospital's deputy medical director in Vienna to inform him about the
intentions of the study and get approval for the study. This also included some
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medical tests (lounge X-Ray) the researcher had to undertake. The study was 
conducted observing all rules of medical confidentiality and stands in fulfillment 
of the required ethical regulations of both the study site hospital and Sheffield 
Hallam University. A copy of the (anonymised) ethical approval from Sheffield 
Hallam University can be found in Appendix A and a copy of the (anonymised) 
ethical approval from the study site hospital in Vienna, Austria can be found in 
Appendix B.
A key element in all stages of data collection was to provide respondents and 
participants the opportunity to remain confidential. This was to unburden their 
participation in the study. The confidentiality of assessment data was stressed 
to all respondents and participants before each data collection phase. For the 
presentation of the thesis all respondents have been anonymised, i.e. they 
appear in the text as respondents 1,2,..n and are all referred to in the masculine. 
Most of the professionals observed were medical doctors or nurses. For ease of 
use in distinguishing between doctors and nurses respondents were marked in 
the tables as for example “respondent d1” in case of a doctor, or “respondent 
n7” in case of a nurse. The few other professions, for example an operating 
department practitioner, were left without prefix, i.e. appear for example as 
“respondent 18”. Obstetric nurses, although they officially do not belong to the 
nursing profession anymore since the year 2000, and although in German they 
carry a distinguishable name that doesn’t contain the word nursing, have still 
been marked as for example “respondent n14”, because they are still very 
similar to other observed nurses in regards to the organisation of their work and 
their interaction (and work schedules) with other staff in the department.
In addition information about the study site was kept to a necessary minimum 
that would not allow identification of the study site. At the same time it was still 
carefully considered that omission of data would not alter possible 
interpretations of the presented research findings. Research of this kind
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requires adequate attention of ethical issues and, rather than presenting it in 
one separate section, was addressed throughout the study, for example in 
regard to observation, note taking, and anonymising respondent and patient 
data. Furthermore a considerable difference was found between ethical 
requirements for studies in the Austrian and the UK health systems. The 
implications this may have on research more generally is addressed in the 
conclusions in chapter 8.
5.4. Research methods 1
This thesis addresses the implementation and perception of CIRS from a critical 
ethnograhper perspective. Critical enthnography constitutes an approach to 
CIRS that advocates engagement in the field, observation of the unfolding of 
naturally occurring events and the researcher’s reflection on phenomena. This 
section presents the research methods consistent with the author’s 
philosophical stance and those methods that are likely to lead to the realisation 
of the research objective. The qualitative part of the study (research methods 1) 
used semi-structured interviews and a self-administered questionnaire, and the 
subsequent ethnography (research methods 2) used fieldwork observation.
5.4.1. Semi-structured interviews
The interview is a common occurrence in social life and there are many different 
types of interview available to the researcher. Because of the ability of interview 
techniques to obtain rich and complete data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) it was 
decided that evidence should be collected using the interview technique, in 
particular the method of semi-structured interview.
The ambition at this stage (outset) of the research was to understand from the
department leaders’ perspective why CIRS is was being implemented, as well
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as to get a better understanding of the context in which CIRS was about to be 
used by staff. It was decided that the semi-structured technique would better fit 
the nature of events in hospitals than a highly structured approach to 
interviewing. Furthermore the semi structured interview technique allows the 
interviewee to include narratives and any other information they feel might be 
important. Considering the inductive nature of the study it was necessary to give 
respondents the opportunity to raise issues they felt important. Therefore the 
interview guide and approach was sufficiently flexible and open to enable 
participants to talk freely in their own language and terms, giving the 
interviewees the opportunity to put forward and develop narrative accounts of 
their work, descriptions of what they saw as important in regards to patient 
safety and incident reporting, and to elaborate explanatory models of how these 
events are to be brought about.
An interview guiding sheet was prepared based on the literature, informal 
conversations with the patient safety expert who initiated the project, and 
informal talks with other medics who were not participants of the study but who 
had a general interest in patient safety and incident reporting. Key issues were 
identified around the implementation of CIRS and the wider managerial context. 
This was an iterative process until the basic set of questions was determined. In 
a next step the interview guiding sheet was piloted with befriended medics as 
well as the deputy head of the department, in a meeting where other 
arrangements were made for the study, to check for clarity and unambiguous 
wording of the questions. Using the results of the pilot the interview guiding 
sheet was refined so that it focused more closely on the key issues. The final 
interview guiding sheet consisted of 30 questions. A copy of this is attached in 
the appendix C.
In order to get the department leaders’, a doctor with his deputy representing 
the medical lead and a nurse with her deputy representing the nursing lead,
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view on the CIRS implementation in their department two interviews were 
conducted. One with the head of the department (respondent d1) and one with 
the head nurse (respondent n7). Because responses between the pilot interview 
held with the deputy head of department (respondent 62) and the actual 
interview with the head of department (respondent d1) largely matched, and 
there was frequent contact with respondent 62 as the main contact person in 
the department, it was decided that no additional formal interview needed to be 
made with respondent 62.
Tape recording of semi-structured interviews was tested during preliminary 
interviews. However tape recording was not found to be useful as the interviews 
were repeatedly interrupted by phone calls, other members of staff, patients, or 
because the interviewee’s attendance was urgently required elsewhere. Starting 
and stopping a tape seemed to further inhibit the flow of the interview. 
Sometimes interviews had to progress while walking along the corridor or while 
changing clothes for the operation theatre. Inevitably other staff and also 
patients would have been recorded without having their informed consent. 
Considering these circumstances recording would have been unpractical and 
may even be considered unethical. Therefore audio recordings were only used 
in more foreseeable environments and situations, for example in meetings. 
Notes were taken using prepared space on the interview guiding sheet and a 
sketchbook. Due to the nature of work in hospitals sufficient time was planned 
for the interviews. During the pilot study for example the interviewee had to rush 
to the operating theatre and the entire interview had to be held over a period of 
four hours. However, in the actual interviews there were less substantial 
interruptions and interviews could be completed within about 30 minutes.
Interview data were then transcribed and analysed using ethnographic coding. 
Because of the small number of interviews it became apparent rather quickly 
that the medical lead and his deputy agreed mostly in their answers and that
141
Chapter 5: Research Methodology
they were actively leading the project. On the other hand the nursing lead was 
informed but didn’t play any proactive role in the project. With these interviews 
the leaders’ positions regarding CIRS were known and this allowed it to be 
compared with the views of front line staff. Therefore many of the interview 
questions were then incorporated in the self-administered questionnaire (see 
section 5.4.2). This is described in the next section.
5.4.2. Self-administered questionnaire
This study intended to verify information gathered from leadership with front line 
staff and to get a broader perspective on the CIRS project. Self-administered 
questionnaires and structured interviews are very similar methods of social 
science research and therefore self-administered questionnaires seemed a 
good method of acquiring comparable data from staff. The main difference 
between the two research tools is that in the questionnaire no interviewer is 
present, which can be of advantage considering the sensitivity of the subject. It 
was not clear if staff would have agreed to being interviewed and the 
anonymised self administered questionnaire gave staff the opportunity to 
comment on the project out of complete anonymity (even towards the 
independent researcher). This should provide the researcher with a ‘complete’ 
impression of how the project is received by frontline staff, without the 
interference of a gatekeeper or of the researcher himself in selecting 
respondents. In addition, considering the number of front line staff (70+), the 
choice of using a questionnaire was a necessary one considering the available 
resources. Basic design principles, such as described in Newell (2008), Thietart 
(2001), or Bryman (2004), were acknowledged and incorporated in the design 
of the questionnaire.
Key issues and potential questions were identified from the preliminary research 
phase which included a literature review, expert interview, unstructured and
informal conversations with staff, as well as observation of CIRS introduction
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sessions at other hospitals. After deciding which questions to include a draft 
questionnaire was developed. Health care staff helped with the wording of 
questions. The questionnaire was pre-tested on a small scale as suggested for 
example in Thietart (2001). Using the results of the test the questionnaire was 
refined so that it focused more closely on the key issues. The finalised 
questionnaire consisted of 40 questions, 31 of which were multiple choice and 
nine of which were open-ended questions. The questionnaire took about 20 
minutes to complete.
The sample size was determined to include all potential CIRS users in the 
department. Following the CIRS introduction session at the department the 
researcher was introduced by Expert 1 and the department’s leadership team 
as an independent doctoral researcher. The researcher was given the 
opportunity to introduce the study and the purpose and technicalities of the 
questionnaire. Each respondent was notified that filling in the questionnaire was 
voluntary, the deadline for completion, and where to return it (a locked collection 
drop box in the secretaries’ office). Directly following the CIRSmedical 
introduction session the questionnaire was distributed to staff in person. Where 
this was not possible, i.e. when staff members did not attend the introduction 
session, the questionnaire was delivered through their respective group leaders 
in one of the next scheduled meetings, such as the shift-handover meeting later 
that day or the next morning meeting. In total 75 questionnaires were given out, 
38 of which were returned (51% return rate). The questionnaire is attached in 
appendix D.
The questionnaire data was important in deciding the next steps of the study. 
Results showed for example that front-line staff were generally interested in 
CIRS and welcomed the project. It was not, as could have been assumed 
considering the low reporting frequency in CIRS, that staff directly opposed 
CIRS. It also became apparent that many staff who filled in the questionnaires
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stated that they either had not heard about or did not have sufficient information 
for using CIRS. Hence, the questionnaire results brought forward additional and 
deeper rooted questions. For example, who was right, the department lead, who 
stated that all staff knew about CIRS and information was provided, or fron-line 
staff, who stated they had not been (sufficiently) informed? Did front-line staff fill 
provide honest answers? For example, did they really welcome CIRS and were 
there possibly any other, so far hidden reasons for them not to use it, or did they 
just provide false answers to “please” the department lead with an anonymous 
high agreement rate with CIRS and to quickly get rid of an additional and 
unnecessary (administrative) burden? Results from the questionnaire made 
apparent that it didn’t provide all the answers and questionnaire data requested 
more insight. The questions that came up appeared they could not be 
approached in a questionnaire format but needed a tool that allowed more time, 
closer engagement with people and environment, and that was sufficiently 
flexible to follow “leads” that may open up as the research progressed. 
Reflecting upon this the research evolved into an ethnographic study. 
Accordingly the decision was made to follow up he quests from interview and 
questionnaire data by using using fieldwork observation. This is described in the 
next section.
5.5. Research methods 2: Fieldwork Observation
Since the research aim is to gain in-depth understanding of how a CIRS is 
implemented in a public hospital in Austria and how it is perceived by staff in a 
given setting, to collect empirical evidence of supportive measures to the project 
(objective 4) and to investigate how meaningful it is for staff to use CIRS 
(objective 5) it was necessary to observe staff within their natural environment. 
Therefore, and after analysis of interviews and the self administered 
questionnaire, the researcher began fieldwork observation at the department for
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gynaecology and obstetrics of the study site hospital. Like any observational 
study the aim was to gather firsthand information about social processes in a 
‘naturally occurring’ context (Silverman, 2006). The focus was upon what staff 
actually did in the clinic and what significance CIRS had in their everyday work.
When conducting research the inquirer may be seen as having multiple 
identities, from a student of organisation and management, to a researcher, 
researcher-as-subject (Arnaud, 2002; Foucault, 1970), interviewer, observer, 
and interpreter, and since withdrawing from the field as an author, creator, and 
narrator of the research text. As such the author subscribes to the view that 
there are multiple selves within an inquirer (Clarke, 2008) and a need to 
“respect the fundamental system of thought of the individuals under study, that 
researchers should fully assume a role of “bringing to light”. (Arnaud, 2002:13).
One of the concerns (traditionally) raised in regards to ethnographic methods is 
the effect of the researcher on the research environment, something Becker 
and Geer called “reactivity” (McDonald et al., 2005). However, over recent years 
commentators have suggested that rather than trying to adopt an unobtrusive 
approach researchers should consider the extent of impact they may have had 
on a situation when analysing data (McDonald et al., 2005). Therefore this 
section considers various aspects of the ‘researcher-research-field’ relationship, 
during, before and following the observation. These consider: the introduction of 
the researcher at the department and to various groups of staff; the selection of 
respondents who would meet the study criteria; duration and time of 
observation; and a description of how observation took place, when and when 
not to observe, as well as continuity in observation. Furthermore this section 
includes a discussion about the role of the researcher as (an almost) complete 
observer, issues surrounding the credibility of the researcher, as well as a 
discussion on the possibilities and dangers of the observer taking on the role of 
a researcher consultant.
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5.5.1. Introduction at department
The researcher was first introduced to the department leaders through Expert 1 
who functioned as a gate-keeper. As described later in section 6.2 the 
researcher was then introduced to attendees during the CIRS introduction 
session where he explained the aims and objectives of the research. On 
subsequent occasions, for example in order to arrange observation dates with 
staff who had not attended the introduction session, the researcher was 
introduced to front line staff through leading personnel or other key people from 
within the department.
On most occasions the deputy head of department (respondent d2) acted as a 
gatekeeper and initiated contact with front line staff. In general the acceptance 
of the researcher by members of staff was good. However, and only naturally, 
some were more cooperative than others. When staff were cooperative and 
apparently happy to be observed the gatekeeper’s involvement was kept to a 
minimum. Sometimes the researcher was just equipped with a name and a 
location and went to the ward himself in order to arrange a time for the 
observation directly with the doctor or nurse. On other occasions the 
gatekeeper’s involvement was more necessary. When someone was apparently 
reluctant to be observed (or just extremely busy) the gatekeeper helped to 
ensure that a meeting between the researcher and the person to be observed 
was actually taking place and in a time consistent with the overall project and 
observation. However the final decision about whether someone was to be 
observed or not was left with the very person to be observed, not with the 
gatekeeper.
5.5.2. Selection of respondents
A meeting was organised with the head of department (respondent d1) and the 
deputy head of department (respondent d2, the researcher’s main contact
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person in the department) to set forth the basic concept of the observation. 
They gave their consent and a record of the agreement was made. A copy was 
sent to the directorate of the hospital. Once directorate consent was acquired 
respondents were selected.
The selection of the respondents was dependent on several factors, including:
•  meeting the study requirement (see below)
•  getting agreement from management
•  briefing the potential observant about the study
•  having an oral agreement with the potential observant to be shadowed for 
one day
•  having written ethical clearance
•  conducting observation on normal duty, potential respondents were asked 
to choose a day that would reflect a common day in their profession
In general the steps involved in the process could be summarised as follows. 
First the researcher would tell the deputy head of department which group or 
profession he wanted to observe next. The deputy then briefed the researcher 
about that group and made suggestions who to approach from within that group, 
and where and when they could be reached. Subsequently the researcher met 
with the person to be observed and briefed him about the study and what the 
observation would be like. When the person agreed to be shadowed for one day 
a date was arranged for observation.
In order to be eligible for observation respondents had to meet the study criteria. 
For the observation part of the study this was mostly related to objectives
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3. to investigate why CIRS has been implemented from a stakeholder 
perspective;
4. to collect empirical evidence of supportive measures to the project22; and
5. to investigate how meaningful it is for staff to use CIRS.
As CIRS is a “system for everyone” in the department it was important to get the 
opinion of everyone in the department. Therefore the researcher investigated 
who actually belonged to the department, differentiating between and excluding 
people from other departments who would just “visit” the department. 
Respondents should be selected so that they presented ‘as complete as 
possible’ view of the department. This meant including respondents from all 
ranks, leadership and front line staff, and from all kinds of shifts, i.e. day shifts, 
night shifts, weekend shifts and so on. This resulted in selection of 14 
respondents. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the respondents. Not listed in 
this table are observation days that were focused on topics/meetings and were 
not targeted at certain professions (OD15, OD 16, OD18, OD19, OD20) as well 
as meetings with people external to the department (OD17 with the hospital’s 
risk manager, and OD21 with Expert 1).
Table 5.1: Overview of respondents and their functions
Observation Day 
(OD)
respondent (d = 
doctor, n = nurse)
area/function
OD 1 #d2 deputy head of 
department (medic)
OD 2 #n7 head nurse
OD 3 #n9 deputy head nurse 
and charge nurse 
gynaecology ward B
OD 4 #d2; #d8 deputy head of
22 see  section  1.2.3 for a full listin g  o f  research ob jec tiv es
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department; senior 
physician
OD 5 #n11; #n12 nurses obstetric ward
OD 6 #13 head secretary
OD 7 various ward secretary
OD 8 #n14 head obstetric nurse 
maternity room
OD 9 #n10 charge nurse 
gynaecology ward
OD 10 #n15 charge nurse nursery
OD 11 #n16 nurse on gynaecology 
ward
OD 12 various ward secretary
OD 13 #d17 senior physician
OD 14 #n18 operation theatre 
nurse
Although observation was agreed with and targeted at people as shown in table 
5.1 the observation itself was not limited to that one person. The observed 
person interacts with colleagues and patients, and these are naturally observed 
and recorded. Some areas, for example the nursery, are very small and “quiet” 
and although the targeted person was the charge nurse of the nursery the 
researcher communicated all day with the three or so other staff in the nursery. 
Obviously the observation was also not limited to a certain area and the 
researcher followed the respondent wherever he went, whether that meant 
visiting a patient on the ward, meeting with other nurses, physicians, head of 
department, people external to the department, or going to the cafeteria.
5.5.3. Duration and time of observation
The aim was to cover the complete work-day experience of the worker. The 
observer should experience the day in exactly (as much as possible) the way
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the person to be observed would do. Hence, rather than following official 
timetables the observation started and ended whenever the person came in the 
clinic or left it. In general the researcher would meet the person to be observed 
regarding to their profession specific schedule and location. Medical doctors 
would be met in the morning meeting at 7:45am. Nursing staff would be met at 
the hand-over of the shift at 6:45am. Operation theatre staff would be met at the 
beginning of their shift at 6:00am. However, because of the reasons explained 
above, when the observation would actually start was totally dependent on the 
person observed. The researcher wanted to acknowledge that different 
individuals have different ways for interpreting their time-schedule. And they 
would have their individual ways of acquiring information. Accordingly the study 
design was flexible to allow shadowing not only individuals, but indeed the 
individuality of their doing.
This was the case for example when observing the deputy head of the 
department (respondent d2). Officially his shift started at 7:45am. However, as 
was found out during the briefing session, he would be in the clinic already at 
6:45am to attend the hand-over meeting of the nursing staff. As he said: “This is 
probably the most useful meeting for me to get information about my patients. 
Not in the morning meeting with the medical doctors.” (respondent d2) 
Accordingly the observation session with respondent d2 also started at 6:45am.
Table 5.2 below illustrates the types of shifts and times of observation. Not 
listed in this table are observation days that were focused on topics/meetings 
and were not targeted at certain professions (OD15, OD 16, OD18, OD19, 
OD20), as well as meetings with people external to the department (OD17 with 
the hospitals risk manager, and OD21 with Expert 1).
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Table 5.2: Overview of respondents, types of shifts, and times when they observed
Observation Day 
(OD)
respondent (d = 
doctor, n = nurse) 
/type of shift
time
OD 1 #d2 / dayshift 08:00 -13:25 (15:29)
OD 2 #n7 / dayshift 07 :45 -15 :06
OD 3 #n9 / dayshift 06 :45 -15 :09
OD 4 #d2; #d8 / nightshift 06:45 -  next day 
08:30
OD 5 #n11; #n12 / 
weekend
06 :45 -19 :00
OD 6 #13 / dayshift 06 :30 -15 :00
OD 7 various / dayshift 07 :00 -15 :00
OD 8 #n14 / day and 
evening shift
07 :00 -22 :00
OD 9 #n10 / dayshift 06 :45 -15 :40
OD 10 #n15 / dayshift 06 :45 -15 :00
OD 11 #n16 /dayshift long 0 6 :4 5 - 19:15
OD 12 various 07 :45 -12 :00
OD 13 #d17 / dayshift 07 :45 -12 :45
OD 14 #n18 / dayshift 0 6 :3 0 - 13:30
5.5.4. Observation and different observation environments
Observation of clinical staff at the department can be distinguished between two 
main groups:
•  Observation involving clinical staff only; and
•  Observation involving patients
151
Chapter 5: Research Methodology
The observer was present in the consulting room at a side angle to both doctors 
and patient. Patients’ consent for the researcher’s presence was obtained by 
the senior doctor for single consultations. Given the presumed sensitivity of the 
occasion, tape-recording was not attempted. Instead, detailed handwritten 
notes were kept, using a sketchbook. In other areas (for example in the 
outpatient department when a patient comes in for a baby screening), the 
researcher was already in the room with the clinician(s) and patients were 
called in for consultation. Table 5.3 provides an overview of those different 
settings.
Table 5.3: Environments in which observations took place
Involving clinicians only Involving patients
• Morning meeting • Admissions
• Midday meeting • Outpatient Department
• Handover shift • Consultation Room
• Profession specific 
internal meeting
• Rounds
• Cross professional 
meeting
- X-Ray review
- Oncology conference
• Required /ordered visits 
to the patients room
• Information sessions with 
external consultant
• Operating Theatre
• Risk meetings • Presentations (e.g. to 
future mothers an d 
fathers, birth 
preparation,...)
• Informal gathering: 
Common room, tea 
kitchen, Cafeteria
• Gym
• Secretary • Maternity Room
The observer was equipped with an honorary contract, was wearing a white 
coat, and therefore appeared to patients as part of the hospital team.
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Accordingly there was no need to explain to every single patient why the 
observer was present. Furthermore it is not unusual in public hospitals in 
Austria that medics are accompanied by others, for example social workers, a 
trainee, a medical student or a junior doctor.
In addition, given that the outpatient department was very busy and many 
patients were seen for very short periods of time, on those occasions it would 
have been rather cumbersome to acquire consent from every single patient (in 
general patients also seemed to be more interested in getting medical 
consultation than being bothered about whether or not a researcher was 
present). The vantage point of the management of the clinic was that possible 
benefits of the research would outdo any potential disadvantage to a patient 
(they could not think of any). Therefore general consent for observation in the 
outpatient department was given by the management of the clinic. The same 
applied to other areas where patients were seen for short periods and where 
the researcher was “just one of many people in the room”. This was the case for 
example when the researcher attended medical rounds.
Another methodical question at the beginning (and also during) the observation, 
and one that only concerned the researcher, was how structured and how 
directly focused on CIRS the observation should be. The aim of the observation 
was to be as objective and independent as possible and not to take any more 
influence on the scene than absolutely necessary. Medical error is a sensitive 
issue and the researcher had many warnings about possible resentment staff 
may have in being observed. The researcher did not want to give staff the 
feeling that he was only waiting for an error to happen and then, following the 
alleged ‘blame culture’ in hospitals, to point a finger at individuals.
Accordingly the observation was accompanied by an attitude of ‘not to scare 
people off’. There was an inherent danger that if one professional refused
observation that others would follow (loyalty within a group or department is
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bigger than towards an external researcher who will exit the field soon again). 
Such an effect would be threatening to the entire research project, as gaining 
rich insight into the department, with all its individual groups, identities, 
characteristics and activities, is largely dependent on individuals’ willingness to 
be observed. Likewise the researcher did not want to influence staff in a 
‘positive’ way, that they would use CIRS ‘for’ the researcher. The observation 
should capture what people, independent of the researcher, would do with CIRS 
in their day to day activities and the researcher did not prompt or ask staff ‘to do 
something with CIRS’.
5.5.5. When and when not to observe
Whether or not the researcher’s attendance was appropriate in a given situation 
was the final decision of the observed member of staff. For example on one 
occasion the observer was asked by the deputy head of department to wait 
outside the consultation room because the patient was a foreign woman in her 
mid-fifties. Due to the patient’s cultural and religious background it would have 
been inappropriate for the researcher, or indeed any other male, to observe the 
consultation. Another such occasion was when forensic evidence was taken off 
a 16 year old female patient that had been gang-raped. Some parts of the 
consultation were taken in an extra room. In order to give the patient as much 
privacy and dignity as possible the senior doctor conducted the required tests 
alone, while other members of the team (together with the researcher) waited 
outside.
In addition to scheduled observation days the researcher was invited to join any 
of the scheduled meetings without prior notice and could just ‘hang around’ at 
the department. These occasions were also used for respondent validation. All 
of this was facilitated by the fact that the researcher was wearing a doctor’s coat, 
was given a personal locker to store his belongings, and was allowed to use the
department’s secretary office and canteen.
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5.5.6. Continuity in observation
As can be seen from the above examples occasions where the observer was 
excluded from a situation had nothing to do with the observed person trying to 
“hide something” from the researcher. They are probably even a manifestation 
of the acceptance of the researcher as part of the team. As such he is expected 
to comply with the unwritten rules of the team and to do what is sensible. There 
was one other occasion where observation was interrupted. This was when 
respondent d17 (a senior doctor and smoker) wanted to go for a cigarette in his 
“secret place” and just wished to be left in peace with his cigarette (the observer 
already knew of this secret place from another observation where he was not 
asked to leave; when respondent d17 returned from his cigarette and the 
observer already knew where he had been this was commented on by the 
respondent with a sympathetic laugh).
On those few occasions when the observation was interrupted the observation 
re-commenced at the nearest possible time. This was more about protecting the 
patient than disguising what the observant did, and usually the observed person 
was willing to talk about what happened during those few moments. That the 
observed person always had the power to ask the researcher to leave also 
ensured, at least in theory, that he could anonymously and unobservedly use 
CIRS.
Although it was challenging the researcher tried his best to keep up with the 
observed person and to record every minute of the shift. This included (literally) 
running around the building, chasing patients and colleagues, and quickly 
changing into operation theatre clothes a number of times. Strictly following the 
observed person also meant not to eat or drink for extended periods of time. 
Although that came rather unexpected and was at times unpleasant it gave the 
researcher additional information on “what is going on” and how an alleged
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interest in CIRS might have to be seen in relation to other, more basic needs of 
staff.
5.5.7. The researcher as complete observer
A lot of the discussion surrounding the role of the ethnographer in observation is 
concerned with the extent of participation of the researcher in a situation. One 
widely used scheme to differentiate a degree of participation is Gold’s (1985) 
classification of participant observer roles. It presents a continuum from 
complete participant, to participant as observer, to observer as participant, to 
complete observer (Bryman, 2004) (see figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3: Gold’s classification of participant observer roles
Involvement <----------------------------------------------------------------- ► Detachment
Complete Participant-as- Observer-as- Complete
participant observer participant observer
Source: Bryman (2004:301)
While authors have argued at lengths which type of observation is most useful, 
in the present study the very nature of the phenomena and area under 
investigation determined the degree of participation to a large extent. Several 
facts had to be taken into account:
•  The researcher is not a clinician
•  The researcher is a male and patients are exclusively female
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•  Consultations concern a patient’s most intimate physical and psychological 
parts; this means that on some occasions even members of the clinical 
team become “observers” and are not actively involved
•  The researcher aims to document phenomena as it appears without directly 
influencing it
Thus the role of (an almost) complete observer seems justifiable for this 
research. This also seems to go in hand with Geest and Finkler’s (2004) 
observation that researchers, when doing fieldwork in hospitals, can basically 
take on three roles: those of joining staff, patients or visitors. They (ibid, 2004) 
observed that most researchers present the point of view from a professional’s 
perspective and join staff. They might do so in putting on a white coat “to be 
regarded as ‘one of them’” (for example Frisby, 1998; Pool, 2000; or Geest and 
Finkler, 2004). Thus, in this present research the observer, through putting on 
the white coat in many respects became ‘one of them’, at the same time not 
actively taking part in any of the activities and “merely” remaining in the role as 
complete observer.
The credibility of the researcher as complete observer as well as the potentials 
and dangers of taking on a role of a consultant researcher are aspects that are 
related to the above discussion. They are discussed in the next paragraphs.
5.5.8. Credibility of the observer
During the observation when shadowing staff the researcher became part of a 
multidisciplinary team. To a large extent staff at the department were aware of 
the research and the role of the researcher. However, due to the amount of time 
spent in the setting and the teaching nature of the hospital, which meant that 
the department often had outsiders as visitors, it seems likely that general 
hospital staff were not unduly conscious of the observer.
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The presence of the researcher was, with very few exceptions, accepted in that 
he was fulfilling his role in his discipline of research. It seemed therefore not 
necessary to legitimise the presence of the researcher any further, as stressed 
for example in Robson’s (2002) or Bryman’s (2004) discussion on the role of the 
researcher as complete observer. Accordingly “actions of showing some 
credibility” were held to a minimum. One example of such an occasion was 
when the head of department was desperately looking for an up to date 
operation theatre timetable and the researcher, who was the only one around 
who had one, gladly handed it over.
During the observation the researcher’s credibility was mostly unchallenged. 
Where the researcher was challenged or staff tried to avoid being observed this 
is mentioned as it appears in the text.
5.5.9. The researcher as consultant
One issue that became apparent during the observation was that, probably due 
to the lack of government policies on CIRS and lack of a national CIRS, the 
researcher arguably had more knowledge of CIRS than the people observed. 
On various occasions the researcher was asked to provide information on CIRS. 
For example even the head of department acquired the password for CIRS 
through the researcher. Some staff referred to the researcher as “Mr. CIRS” (a 
group of surgical nurses who, through the head surgical nurse, had successfully 
avoided being directly observed; they were still observed however when the 
researcher was in the operating theatre “officially” observing one of the other 
personnel), implying that he had a personal interest that staff would use CIRS 
and that he was acting as some kind of ‘CIRS policeman’.
To avoid drifting into the role of a consultant the researcher kept faithful to the 
aim of the research in documenting phenomena, not actively changing them. It 
seems important from the researcher’s perspective that problems in health care
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are documented in order to bring attention to them and not to offer a “quick fix” 
and go into describing “solutions”. The literature on observations also contains 
warnings about a researcher taking on the role of a “research consultant”. Wolff 
(2004) warns the researcher who promises a “real” and direct contribution to the 
field under investigation. While in some cases there is a need “to buy-in access” 
Wolff (2004:96) suggests that in most cases the biggest advantage for hospital 
staff would be “an interruption of their boring every day routine, a possibility to 
share worries and claims with someone or to do something good”.
If gatekeepers offer the researcher to take on a consultant role or that of a 
critical evaluator there are many dangers. Not only that fulfilling such a role 
could ask too much of the researcher, he sees a diffusion of the researcher’s 
roles in meeting individual interests and the (new) demands of the professional 
field. The lay researcher should be able to use his naivety (may it be pretended 
or real) methodologically as long and as much as possible, which could be 
difficult as in a consultant role he also has to show at least some degree of 
expertise to be taken sincere by the field (Wolff, 2004; Robson, 2002).
The next section of this chapter will discuss validity claims and issues of 
analysis of the thesis.
5.6. Data Validity and Analysis
Using research designs that are largely based on methods generating 
qualitative data have become increasingly respectable and acceptable across 
the realm of social research (Robson, 2002). However all field work done by a 
single field-worker still invites the question “Why should we believe it?” (Maxwell, 
2002 citing Bosk, 1979:193). Therefore data need to be analysed and 
researchers need to prove that results are valid.
159
Chapter 5: Research Methodology
The literature suggests many ways for validating and analysing qualitative data. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) for example propose 
two primary criteria for assessing qualitative studies: trustworthiness and 
authenticity. Trustworthiness refers to the credibility (internal validity), 
transferability (external validity), dependability (reliability) and confirmability 
(objectivity) of qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). Thus trustworthiness is oriented more towards methods common in 
quantitative research (Bryman, 2004). Authenticity criteria on the other hand, 
provoking but less influential, are more controversial and mark a way towards 
validity independent from quantitative research (Bryman, 2004).
Manifestations of both trustworthiness and authenticity criteria can be found 
throughout the study although these cannot always be separated clearly in the 
presentation. Therefore this section starts with describing one of the key 
activities during the research, namely note taking. It then moves on to discuss 
issues of reflexivity (5.6.2), internal validity (5.6.3), external reliability and 
validity (5.6.4), analysing qualitative data (5.6.5), and analysis and translation 
(5.6.6).
5.6.1. Taking notes
Robson (2002) points out that one of the main threats to providing a valid 
description of a qualitative encounter is inaccuracy or incompleteness of data. 
Accordingly taking notes is one of the essential elements during and after the 
observation. Note taking largely followed directions found in Patton (1990), for 
example taking descriptive field notes and gathering a variety of information 
from different perspectives, including direct quotations from respondents. Data 
were cross validated and triangulated, clearly differentiating between field notes 
and the researcher’s own interpretations. The researcher was involved as much 
as possible in the field, at the same time aware and sensitive to the research
environment and the researched. In writing up the report the researcher’s own
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experiences, feelings and thoughts were included as they represent an 
important element of the empirical account. In total 15 professions were 
observed. Detailed and descriptive records of observations, conversations and 
interpretations in the field were made using a sketchbook research diary. 
Detailed and descriptive records of observations, conversations and 
interpretations in the field were made using a standard A4 sketchbook which the 
researcher always carried with him. The researcher took as many notes as 
possible in order to allow interpretation of data as close to reality as possible. 
These notes included personal impressions, direct quotes, information on 
context in which the information was taken, i.e. detailed information about date, 
time (to ten second intervals), location, description of the physical environment 
in which the observation took place, the number and profession of those 
present, the kind of interaction they had with the observed person (e.g. if they 
were on the commanding or receiving end), whether the event was planned or 
unplanned, number and cause of people interrupting a situation, number of 
contact and duration of contact with patients, and if the patient had been seen 
before during this shift (continuous patient numbering), contact with superiors; 
furthermore diagrams were made, time-schedules and other possibly relevant 
documents collected and noted, sketches of locations made, use of computer or 
other technical equipment noted, number and duration of phone calls, any 
experienced complications or problems, as well as further contextual notes to 
aid the researcher’s understanding of the context, i.e. explanations of technical 
terms and abbreviations commonly used in conversations (for example LNR for 
‘last normal period’).
At the end of each observation shift the field researcher systematically reviewed 
the observational records made during that shift, rewrote them in electronic 
format and archived and listed collected documents. Reflections, interpretations 
and methodological decisions were also made during this process and were 
also recorded in the personal reflective research diary. These reflections helped
161
making preparations for the next observation shift. Preparations included getting 
hold of all protocols pertaining to the activities to be undertaken in the 
department that day first thing in the morning from the chief secretary. These 
items included things like the staff list and the operation theatre timetable for the 
observation day. This helped to understand how a day was originally planned 
and allowed, for example, to recognise spontaneous changes as such. Other 
preparations were more curious. For example hospital staff (usually doctors) 
often asked to borrow the researcher’s pen, then wondered off with it before the 
researcher could realise it, or started operating on the patient. The researcher 
at times ran danger of being left without a pen, leaving him unable to take any 
notes. As a consequence several pens were carried during the observation, 
some for “lending out” while one “master pen” was kept that would never be 
given away. The researcher also learned to equip himself with essential things 
such as muesli bars in order to endure long periods of observation without a 
break.
This accumulated to more than 130 hours of observation and collection and 
review of around 40 documentary files (for example job descriptions, guidelines, 
welcome brochures for new staff, work schedules, minutes, critical incident 
video, etc.). Notes that were taken during the observation in handwriting as well 
as mental notes from the observation that could not be documented on the spot 
were transcribed using a word processor. This accumulated to about 50.000 
words of raw observational data.
Audio recording was not attempted during fieldwork observation. However 
personal notes and comments were sometimes spoken into the dictaphone 
rather than recorded in writing on those occasions where it was appropriate and 
a fast alternative to writing notes down. This accumulated to about 30 audio 
mp3 recordings. Although not all of these recordings were transcribed in full the 
audio files, with their background noises, cuts, sighs, notions of exhaustion etc.
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provided a useful and important tool during the analysis as they have the ability 
to take the researcher back into a situation, even more realistically than a 
written document could do.
5.6.2. Reflexivity
As has been stated above in section 5.2 on research philosophy any researcher 
will interpret findings within a framework which reflects his own beliefs, values, 
biases, experiences, presence in a situation and methods used (Bryman, 2004; 
McDonald et al., 2005; Pink, 2001). Therefore it is important for the researcher 
to reflect on his experiences and interpretations of data in his research diary, 
something that has become known as reflexivity (Hammond, 1964; Bell and 
Newby, 1977; Bell and Roberts, 1984; Van Maanen, 1988) in social sciences 
research. As early accounts of reflexivity (for example Hammond, 1964) show 
reflexivity largely predates postmodernity, although the postmodern influence 
has put greater attention on the role of the researcher as part of the 
construction of knowledge (Bryman, 2004). Therefore in addition to the detailed 
and descriptive observations recorded in the sketchbook the author of this study 
maintained a personal reflective research diary in which he recorded his 
reflections on the process, asked whether there might have been other possible 
interpretations of the data, as well as questioning the methodology being used 
for any inadequacies.
Critical introspection was important to this research during data collection and 
analysis as taken for granted assumptions, statements, observations, as well as 
personal thoughts, were continuously questioned, challenged and rethought. 
Although it is accepted that such a perspective might be more commonly 
associated with Habermas’ understanding of critical theory, it resounds his more 
general notion (in Johnson and Duberley, 2000) that the goal of critical sciences
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should be facilitation of processes of self-reflection and developing one’s 
emancipatory interest.
Ahern (1999) argues that to “put aside personal feelings and preconceptions 
(1999:408)” is not as question of how “objective” one is, but how reflexive one 
is -  as it is impossible for researchers to set aside things about which they are 
not aware. Reflexivity was oriented towards Ahern’s (1999) ten tips for reflexive 
bracketing. Various other contributors (for example Fielding, 2008; Robson, 
2002; Lofland and Lofland, 1984; Bruyn, 1966) have stressed the importance 
for researchers to be self-critical. These were also considered and data were 
tested for error and bias using several tactics. These included Lofland and 
Lofland’s seven ways of evaluating the quality of observation (as described in 
Fielding, 2008:166), Bruyn’s six criteria of subjective adequacy after writing 
each set of fieldnotes (as described in Fielding 2008:166-167), as well as 
Robson’s (2002) characteristics for good flexible research designs and general 
skills for flexible design investigators.
Reflexivity was also facilitated by the opportunities given to / created by the 
researcher. For example the researcher was given a personal locker to store his 
belongings and a doctor’s coat to mark him as being “one of the team”. He was 
also shown where to dispose of and get a new coat if needed, without having to 
ask anyone. The researcher was given the amenities of using the secretaries’ 
office (which included free use of copy machines, telephone and computer), 
canteen, social rooms, cafeteria, and even shower rooms at any time (24/7). 
The researcher was also invited to join any of the scheduled meetings without 
prior notice or to “just hang around” the department whenever he wanted. Good 
examples of these are observation day 7 and observation day 12 where the 
researcher spent a few hours in the wards’ secretary, as this was the 
department’s hot spot where people from all ranks would (for example) meet, 
bump into each other, ask for information, leave notes, use a computer or had
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informal talks. On many of these occasions the researcher would get involved in 
ad-hoc conversations with all different kind of members of staff and this greatly 
contributed to the breadth of perspective in the observation. These occasions 
were also used to double check data and interpretations of and thus contributed 
to respondent validation.
5.6.3. Internal Validity
Using more than one method can have substantial advantages and reduce 
‘inappropriate certainty’ (Robson, 2002). Following Yin’s (2003) and Remenyi’s 
(1998) notion of six sources of evidence this study made use of various sources 
including documents, archival records, interviews, observations and physical 
artefacts. This use of multiple sources permitted triangulation of data.
Data source triangulation was necessary to adequately address the latter part of 
the research question “...how is it [CIRS] perceived by staff” and in particular 
objective 3 of the thesis, “to investigate why CIRS has been implemented from 
a stakeholder perspective”. Stakeholders investigated included the department 
leadership, front line staff, people external to the department but from within the 
hospital, as well as experts from outside the hospital. Therefore information was 
sought from a variety of groups or sources.
Methodological triangulation was used in using different data collection tools. 
These were predominantly interviews, questionnaire and observation. However 
the latter also included the collection and review of archival records and 
documentary data from the hospital. For example apart from “operative items” 
to facilitate observation, such as work schedules, also staff profiles were 
reviewed in order to broaden the researcher’s understanding of who worked in 
the department and to identify any further respondents. Also the staff intranet
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has been searched for patient safety relevant information and information 
pertaining to CIRS.
5.6.4. External reliability and validity
Fielding (2008:164) acknowledges that “making critical assessments of the 
reality of some unknown area of social life places a heavy responsibility on 
ethnographers”. Ethnography is a method of discovery and ethnographers must 
make sense of something that will remain unknown to most of their readers 
(Fielding, 2008). This makes it unlikely that readers have any direct way of 
validating the researcher’s claims. The “subjective ethnographer”, while making 
public his descriptions and conclusions about a phenomenon, arrives at them 
through introspective knowledge (Fielding, 2008). LeCompte and Goetz (1982) 
recognise that social settings and the circumstances of an initial study cannot 
be “frozen” to allow replication in the same way as it may be achieved in 
laboratory experiments. However, they (ibid, 1982) suggest that ethnographers 
can adopt similar social roles as adopted by the original researcher. It is 
therefore important to include details in the ethnographic account on how data 
were collected so that, when a researcher communicates characteristics of the 
observation to colleagues, they too would become members of the group 
(Fielding, 2008), and what they hear and see would be comparable to what the 
original researcher had observed (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982). This is usually 
referred to as external reliability (Bryman, 2004). It is similar to the concept of 
external validity, how generalisable findings are across social settings. Attempts 
have been made in this thesis to provide sufficient detail on the personal and 
professional background of the researcher (see sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4), 
information on the relationship with gatekeepers and the documentation of 
observations.
Generalisations about the present study are arguably limited due to its single
site approach. However, as chapter 6 will show, findings of the preliminary
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research in five hospitals and when focusing the research to one hospital did 
not make apparent any major differences in those departments. It may be 
argued both ways, that narrowing down the study from five hospitals to one, did 
or did not affect the external validity of the study. While more sites present a 
larger scope the similarity between the five observed departments and the fact 
that underreporting was present in all five departments may also be interpreted 
as that narrowing down the study, while adding richness to the account, did not 
significantly affect (decrease) its external validity. Future research may address 
this issue further.
5.6.5. Analysing Qualitative Data
It is the promise of ethnographic methods that immersion into everyday life of 
the subject will provide rich data. Data collected in this immersion process 
needs to be analysed. Usually this happens in an iterative process in which 
“cultural ideas that arise during active involvement ‘in the field’ are transformed, 
translated, or represented in a written document” in order to generate 
conclusions about what is happening and why (Thorne, 2000). Geertz (1973), 
an early influential proponent of interpretative ethnography, sees the defining 
element of ethnographic work not so much in the research methods employed 
in a study but emphasises the underlying intellectual effort of the study which he 
calls "thick description".
A “thick description” (Geertz, 1973; Van Maanen, 1982) does not come about 
merely by engaging with people but through connecting data to existing theories. 
In building a thick description both background and detail are important. The 
researcher strives to explain people's pattern of life by describing the patterns of 
meaning that inform their actions. In this way they become accessible and 
logical for the researcher (and the researcher’s audience). These patterns of 
meanings are another expression for "culture". In ethnography cultural
frameworks are discovered through analysis of structure and content. This
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creates a basis for explaining a particular social phenomenon. In this respect a 
thick description is both an 'analytical1 and 'theoretical' description of social 
process and systems of meaning (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005). However, as 
Hammersley (1992:12) points out, "these descriptions must remain close to the 
concrete reality of particular events, but at the same time reveal general 
features of human social life". In addition Geertz (1973) emphasises that 
cultures can never be finally mapped out. They will always be partial and 
incomplete guesses at explanations (Atkinson et al., 2001; Silverman 2006).
It appears that authors, although using divergent terms such as codes/variables, 
categories/patterns, themes/factors, have identified steps that are common to 
most qualitative data analyses (for example Miles and Huberman, 1994; Green 
et al., 2007; Pope et al., 2000; Bradley et al., 2007). Green et al. (2007) suggest 
that data analysis involves four key steps: immersion in the collected data; 
coding; creating categories; and identification of themes. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) found similarities in the analytic practices of different qualitative research 
types, they are (1994:9):
•  Affixing codes to a set of field notes drawn from observation or interviews
•  Noting reflections or other remarks in the margins
•  Sorting and sifting through these materials to identify similar phrases, 
relationships between variables, patterns, themes, distinct differences 
between subgroups, and common sequences
•  Isolating these patterns and processes, commonalities, and differences, 
and taking them out to the field in the next wave of data collection
•  Gradually elaborating a small set of generalizations that cover the 
consistencies discerned in the database
•  Confronting those generalisations with a formalised body of knowledge in 
the form of constructs or theories
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As the coding process presents the first major step of data fragmentation it will 
be given a little more attention here. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is this 
first stage of data fragmentation that is the most difficult and can leave 
researchers puzzled for a long time, not knowing where to start. Arguably it is 
this element of the resaearch process, overcoming this first hurdle of coding 
from fieldnotes, where a researcher really becomes an ethnographer -  rather 
than a mere observer. Authors, for example McDonald et al (2005) or Fielding 
(2008) characterise the ethnographer as someone who can perceive, interpret, 
and make sense of something that is shaped by norms, practices and 
knowledges (McDonald et al., 2005) and as someone who will develop a 
modicum of understanding through learning the language in use and in 
becoming part of the natural setting. However, the literature provides little 
guidance on how a researcher may develop such a modicum of understanding, 
especially in environments that are new to him. It may not come as a surprise 
that in the present study the researcher was at first ‘overwhelmed’ with the 
amount of fieldnotes and transcripts, and the literature provided little answers as 
to how to overcome this challenge. The above described four key steps of data 
fragmentation (for example Green et al. 2007) served as a framework for 
developing a data fragmentation model that gives more detailed attention to the 
coding process. The below presented figure 5.4, which has been amended from 
Green et al. (2007), splits the coding process into two individual processes, 
descriptive coding and conceptual coding. Hence the final model consists of five 
key steps: (1) immersion into original data, (2) descriptive coding, (3) 
conceptual coding, (4) creating of categories, and (5) identifying of themes. This 
is illustrated in figure 5.4.
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The novelty in this model is the notion of two different kinds of codes, 
descriptive codes and conceptual codes. Descriptive codes on one hand allow 
the researcher as novice to develop an understanding of the daily routines, the 
right sequences and duration of events, and the general research environment. 
These descriptive codes may be complemented by other descriptors such as 
time-task protocols. Descriptive codes allow the researcher to understand what 
is going on. Not only do they provide an important prerequisite for the next 
steps of data analysis but they also provide the researcher with a viable 
opportunity of engagement and familiarisation with the data. Conceptual codes 
on the other hand should provide answers to why things are happening. While 
descriptive codes are rather ,sterile’ the contextual codes can already have a 
more particular research focus. They can also serve to add meaning to 
descriptive codes. Contextual codes may relate to a group of descriptive codes, 
but this is not a necessity. Contextual codes may then be merged into 
categories, which in a final stage leads to the identification of themes.
During and after the observation the researcher was constantly sorting and 
sifting through material to identify relationships, similarities or distinct 
differences, looking for reoccurring instances, issues that could be either related 
to the field (ongoing observation), existing fieldnote transcripts or the literature. 
This search for ‘codes’ that could be affixed to new occurrences or existing sets 
of fieldnotes was an iterative process that included validating respondent 
information, reading and re-reading fieldnote transcripts, reflecting, and making 
new observations. Overall there were four stages of data fragmentation, 
descriptive coding (first stage, small, 134 ‘descriptive codes’), contextual coding 
(second stage, small, 71 ‘contextual codes’), emerging categories (third stage, 
medium, 14 categories), and emerging themes (final stage, large, 4 themes). 
This is illustrated in figure 5.5 on codes, categories and themes and the 
individual sections are explained in more detail below..
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Descriptive codes: The first stage of data fragmentation resulted, over time, in 
134 ‘descriptive codes’. As a first stage these 134 codes were descriptive rather 
than interpretive to allow loose grouping and re-grouping as analysis and data 
collection went on. These descriptive codes were for example ‘CIRS codes’, 
such as ‘critical’, ‘unwanted’, ‘CIRS missed opportunity’; or ‘meeting’, 
‘unplanned meeting’, ‘scheduled meeting’, ‘nurse meeting’, ‘team meeting’, 
‘morning meeting’, ‘post meeting’, ‘shift handover’, ‘round’, ‘late in meeting’ and 
so on -  which suggested to group these codes under a common theme ‘CIRS’ 
or ‘meeting’ respectively. Other loose groups consisted of codes referring to, for 
example, other forms of communication as in ‘staff communication through file’,
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‘staff interact admin’, ‘staff interact nurse’, ‘staff interact doctor’, ‘telephone’, 
telephone out’, ‘dictaphone’, ‘documents’, ‘sign’, ‘admin’, ‘interrupt’, ‘new staff. 
Other loose groups referred to non clinical work (with codes such as ‘food’, 
‘facilities’, ‘space’, ‘I.T.’), structural and hierarchical codes (such as ‘hierarchy’, 
‘leadership’, ‘collegiality’, ‘command’, ‘shifted responsibility’, ‘known problem not 
solved’), patient related codes (for example ‘patient consultation’, ‘patient 
contact’, ‘patient care’, patient contact ad hoc’, ‘new patient’, ‘mobility’, 
‘discharge’), more emotional codes (such as ‘end of life decision’, psychological 
emotional stress’, ‘stress’, ‘psychiatric service’), privacy and ethics (for example 
‘privacy’, ‘ethics’, ‘privileged treatment’), social codes (for example ‘’coffee 
break’, ‘smoke’, ‘private chat’, ‘gossip’), cultural codes (for example ‘culture’, 
‘change’, ‘conflict’, ‘dissatisfaction’, ‘attitude’, ‘trust’), research environment 
descriptive codes (for example ‘department environment’, ‘hospital 
environment’), or researcher related codes (such as ‘research design’, ‘sketch’, 
‘free observation’, ‘resistance’). In addition to these codes additional descriptors 
aided making sense of data, for example a detailed time-task protocol that was 
maintained throughout the study and that provided detail on duration of events, 
sometimes down to ten-second intervals. Descriptive codes were only loosely 
grouped and not distinctively named until a second stage of data fragmentation.
This first stage of data fragmentation allowed the ‘researcher as novice’ or 
‘outsider’ to understand ‘what was going on’ and in what sequence. However in 
order to understand ‘why’ things were happening the way they did required a 
further stage of data fragmentation that went deeper, adding ‘meaning’ to codes, 
relating them to each other, and in particular trying to relate them stronger to 
CIRS.
Contextual codes: In order to relate codes stronger to CIRS a keyword search 
was made in fieldwork transcripts, comments and reflexive notes for the term 
‘CIRS’ (also abbreviations and alterations of) using the ‘find option’ (Ctrl+F) in
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MS Word. The keyword ‘CIRS’ appeared 106 times in the fieldnotes and 
another 175 times in the comments and reflexive notes, a total of 281 times. 
This allowed identification of overlaps between CIRS descriptors and other 
events. Events that were not strongly related to CIRS were dropped, although 
on occasions a relation only became apparent later on in the process and the 
code was ‘reactivated’ and possibly renamed. Using this technique and 
repeatedly going through the material eventually led to 71 ‘contextual codes’. 
These codes were more interpretive than the foregone descriptive codes and 
(with exceptions) connected a number of descriptive codes and events, different 
observation days and different personnel with each other, and they had a 
stronger connection to CIRS. Contextual codes were usually termed using a 
short phrase (not a single word as in the previous descriptive codes) to allow 
the researcher recalling what exactly they meant (without always having to look 
at the text) and in order to differentiate them from or relate them to each other. 
Contextual codes were for example ‘wrong patient instruction’ (T32), ‘wrong 
patient birth date through telephone’ (T46), ‘patient file transfer’ (T40), 
bypassing of regulations (T25), ‘knowledge of password’ (T10), ‘willingness to 
report’ (T23), ‘availability of computers to report’ (T67), ‘light management in 
operation theatre’ (T17), ‘ordering drugs using in-house computer network’ 
(T61).
Categories: This process of differentiating and relating contextual codes with 
each other led to the emergence of 14 categories (the bullet points are a 
reference to the ‘themes’ that will be introduced in the next section ‘themes’):
1. Clinical issues, communication issues, documentation issues, other issues
2. little awareness of and information about CIRS as barriers to reporting (little 
awareness), low priority of CIRS as a barrier to reporting (low priority), 
other barriers to reporting
3. facilities, IT, processes, culture
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4. integration of existing documentation, integration of staff, integration of 
organisational issues
Themes: In a similar process to the building of categories from contextual 
codes, differentiating and relating them with each other, the above mentioned 
14 categories then led to the emergence of four themes:
1. possible reports to CIRS (these will be discussed in more detail in the 
finding chapter in section 7.4)
2. barriers to reporting (these will be discussed in more detail in the finding 
chapter in section 7.5)
3. organisational issues with the potential of compromising safety at the 
department (organisational threats) (these will be discussed in more detail 
in the finding chapter in section 7.6)
4. practical implications for the use of CIRS at the department (these will be 
discussed in more detail in the finding chapter in section 7.7)
The above fragmentation of ethnographic data serves as a framework for the 
development of a patient safety framework. This will be presented in chapter 7, 
and the discussion in chapter 7 is focused upon the above identified categories 
and themes.
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5.6.6. Analysis and Translation
As the clinic where this study was conduced is in Austria one major element in 
conducting this study was the translation of data into English. A principal 
question was whether to translate data before or after analysis. The downside 
when analysing data before translation is that it inhibits, to a certain degree, the 
feedback process with supervisors and colleagues. For example a list of 
preliminary codes or text cannot easily be forwarded for feedback. Another 
issue inherent in qualitative research, and in particular ethnography, is the 
question when analysis and interpretation is ‘complete’, hence when ‘results’ 
should be translated for review. As a consequence analysis and translation of 
results is never as clear cut as it might first seem. The following paragraphs 
detail some of the issues that came up in the analysis and translation process.
In this study it was aimed to overcome these problems, sometimes through ‘trial 
and error’, but eventually finding a middle way with interview and questionnaire 
data first analysed in German and most of the observational data analysed in 
English. This allowed the ‘development’ of early ‘translation unbiased’ hunches 
and a general familiarity with the topic in its natural language before allowing it 
to evolve, adding the observational data in English, into the present work.
Interview data and questionnaire data were first analysed in German and then 
translated into English. When feedback asked for additional insight the original 
German data were consulted. This was done to ‘protect’ data from researcher 
manipulation as the translation process unavoidably is linked with data- 
manipulation and -loss of some kind. For example in the analysis of the self­
administered questionnaire a translation prior to analysis would bear the danger 
of translating exactly same German words into different English words, thus 
artificially and falsely creating a possibility for new codes (this does however not 
rule out another issue, when respondents might have used the same word but
meant different things, and ‘vice versa’). Answers to open questions in the self-
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administered questionnaire were also found to bear more information than the 
mere words that were used in giving an answer. For example it was apparent 
that a few questionnaires used exactly the same formulations in the open 
questions. As was found later in the observation it is possible that this was a 
group of nurses sitting together over afternoon coffee and filling in 
questionnaires together. Such a scenario leaves space for speculations. It may 
be that filling in questionnaires was “led” by one particular individual, who 
“invited” peers to give non-diverging answers in order to demonstrate (false) 
solidarity on the topic. Another possibility is that the work climate in a particular 
group is exceptionally good and therefore nothing would speak against filling in 
a questionnaire together. While these interpretations point to different cultures 
and subcultures amongst different work groups in the department it leaves 
unanswered if those unwritten codes of conduct on how to fill in a questionnaire 
and what kind of answers to provide would also be applied to reporting critical 
incidents. The way self-administered questionnaires were filled in at least points 
to such a possibility.
Another issue concerned with language in the open answers was the fact that 
some responses were written using poor grammar and spelling mistakes. The 
question was if this represents important information and should therefore be 
transposed into English (and how?) or if such information should be regarded 
as unimportant and be left out altogether? Taking the example of the poor 
German in the written responses it turned out later in the analysis that they 
indeed revealed something about the respondent. For instance, poor written 
German is an indication that it is highly unlikely for the respondent to be a 
medical doctor. It is also unlikely that the respondent is from the operation 
theatre, which is considered a high reliability environment with highly trained 
staff, where spelling mistakes are not be tolerated due to their enormous 
potential for contribution to disastrous outcomes. It may be concluded therefore 
that spelling mistakes of this extent (which were not mere “typos”) are more
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likely to be found amongst nurses or support workers who work in environments 
with lower reliability, for example on the ward which has many foreign workers.
Indeed, such information can be useful to verify statements that were made by 
staff and to give meaning to some of the actions of staff. For example during the 
observation of the head nurse the researcher wondered about the time she 
spent collecting dirty laundry, packing and labelling them so they could be sent 
to the laundry. Although the head nurse, when asked by the researcher why not 
one of the nurses would do this, answered: “well, they can’t do it because they 
can’t write German" (respondent n7) the researcher could just not believe that. 
How was this message to be understood? Was it merely defaming foreign 
nurses because of a personal dislike against foreigners (the department 
employs quite a few nurses and support workers from Eastern European 
countries and from the former Yugoslavia - this is not unusual for a hospital in 
Vienna) and to be seen as a pejorative comment, or was there something (more 
changeable) behind this? The experience with the poor German on 
questionnaires verified the head nurse’s comment that it was indeed a language 
issue, an honest and true reflection of his daily experience at his workplace, and 
not just a personal comment. This had effect on the iterative coding process. 
Without the information from the open answers in the self-administered 
questionnaire the event where he collected and labelled laundry might have 
been coded ‘work that someone else can do’. With the information in mind the 
more appropriate code was to be ‘language’, shifting the attention from what 
might be a ‘personal and attitudinal problem’ to a societal and cultural issue of 
the correct use of German.
Caution also had to be taken when translating technical terms from German into 
English and vice versa. While the English literature employs the term ‘safety 
culture’ the German equivalent would be ‘Fehlerkultur’, which literally translated 
means ‘error culture’. It may therefore be argued that in the English language
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there is a more positive connotation with the term, i.e. the word safety, 
something that is desirable by all, while in German there is more of a negative 
connotation by using the word ‘error’, which is something people want to avoid 
or have nothing to do with. The term ‘Fehlerkultur - error culture’ still dominates 
the German literature on patient safety, while the German word 
‘Sicherheitskultur -  safety culture’ seems to slowly gain popularity. Throughout 
this thesis the term safety culture was used, regardless of which term was used 
in German. However, future observations might reveal a connection between 
change in language (use of safety culture rather than error culture) in 
departments and attitude towards reporting.
Analysing the observational data in English was also facilitated as this 
happened through marginal notes in the word processed notes document. 
Affixing codes to a set of field notes was a task mostly independent from the 
observed and therefore this could be done straight away in English. Direct 
quotations were translated, trying to keep the originality alive, for example in the 
use of slang or rather rude expressions. Again, it is believed that all translation 
processes (also those from originally English information to how it appears in 
English in a final report by the researcher) is inherently coupled with some sort 
of ‘researcher bias’ or loss of information. To keep this to a minimum the 
German quotes were kept at hand and doubled checked in their original form 
when a particular quote was being used.
Overall the translation process highlighted the fact that the new patient safety 
movement is driven by English speaking countries (US, UK, Australia, Canada) 
and that this is reflected in the literature, as the bulk of patient safety literature is 
in English. Working with English data somehow facilitates relating information 
with the existing body of knowledge. Many English patient safety terms do not 
(yet?) exist in German, something that also became apparent in the fieldwork, 
when patient safety knowledgeable staff used known English terms rather than
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German terms. This relates to the issue of a standardised taxonomy. The 
problems associated with this, for example the WHO’s development of such a 
taxonomy that will not come forth in German because it is not an official WHO 
language, have already been discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.3.3).
The above mentioned issues are not only relevant in regard to translation but to 
the validity of the interpretation process in general. It emphasises how important 
it is to take comprehensive notes on how information was interpreted, coded 
and categorised. It stresses how important it is to retain copies of original notes 
to be able to return to the original data and to be able to recall the context in 
which information was taken. This was aided by making further marginal notes 
on a copy of the original document. Originals were kept in original form and at 
hand during the analysis process so they could be returned to when necessary.
5.7. Summary
This chapter began with a discussion of the epistemological and ontological 
commitments that this study is based on. The chapter discussed how a 
research topic may be chosen and provided details on the researcher’s 
personal and professional background. The chapter then moved on to look at 
the research strategy aimed at answering the research question. A qualitative 
approach using a combination of interview, questionnaire and observation data 
was deemed appropriate. The individual methods were introduced in light of the 
research experience and claims on data validity and analysis made.
The following chapters outline the results of putting this research strategy into 
practice. Chapter 6 goes into the field and presents contextual information on 
the OEGGG project as well as analysis of the study's results pertaining to 
leadership interviews and a staff questionnaire. Chapter 7 presents the results
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of the fieldwork observation at the department. Chapter 8 uses this information 
as a basis for discussion of the results, conclusion and pointing out areas for 
future research.
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND 
FINDINGS I
The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into the CIRS project at the 
hospital. It shows how reflecting upon the results in this chapter the study 
evolved into an ethnographic study.
6.1. Introduction
This chapter is the first of two chapters on research findings. Following this 
introduction section 6.2 provides contextual information pertaining quality 
management in hospitals in Austria in general and CIRS in the Vienna City 
Hospital Association in particular. Section 6.3 discusses observations at the 
CIRS training session at the department. Section 6.4 presents findings from 
interviews, which aimed to identify the medical lead- and the nursing lead- 
perspective on the CIRS implementation at the department. Section 6.5 
presents findings from the self-administered questionnaire that sought to 
capture the general safety attitude and perception of CIRS from front line staff. 
Appendix G presents more details from the questionnaire findings.
6.2. Research context
Information pertaining CIRS in Austria was and is to date curiously elusive. As a 
member of the European Union and the WHO Austria principally subscribes to 
recommendations issued by those organisations. This includes the promotion 
and/or development of a reporting system for patient safety incidents (for
example Council of Europe, 2006, 2008a and 2009; WHO, 2002 and 2005a). At
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the same time however these recommendations stress that ‘the problem of 
patient safety’, hence the development and implementation of patient safety 
strategies, is primarily the responsibility of Member States (Council of Europe, 
2008a). In Austria the Austrian Health Care Quality Act (BMG, 2005a and 
2005b) ascertained that no pan-Austrian quality system was in place and that 
provisions on quality and/or quality assurance were isolated and scattered 
throughout the Austrian health care system (BMG, 2005b). At the same time it 
circumscribed (or one might say justified) the absence of a ‘systemic quality 
management system/model’ as “supporting the providers’ flexibility in their 
quality work and to allow unobstructed competition”. Although one of the 
objectives of the Health Care Quality Act was to intensify quality work and to 
implement a quality system (BMG, 2005b) progress has been slow and brought 
only few tangible results. For example the report stressed in 2005 that 
nationwide Austrian quality reporting (in a general sense, not to be confused 
with reporting of critical incidents which presents only one element in this) was 
to be established, with the objective of preparing an annual, comprehensive 
quality report, and that such a report was ‘currently being installed’. However, 
the publication of the first quality report did not come forth until May 2011 (see 
report BMG, 2011b) and until after completion of fieldwork for the present study. 
This shortly circumscribes the context in which this study set out to investigate 
CIRS in Austria.
Similarly to the above described overall situation pertaining to a systemic 
approach to quality in the Austrian health care system was the situation 
regarding CIRS in Austria. Unlike other countries, for example the UK with the 
NHS NPSA which has an operating budget of 37 million GBP (NPSA, 2005), of 
which an estimated five million GBP were allocated for the development and 
operation of the NRLS for the first three years (Williams and Osborn, 2006), 
Austria did not, until July 2007, have a Federal Institute for Quality in the Health 
Care System (BIQG) and still does not have a national reporting system.
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Moreover health care institutions are not legally required to report incidents that 
did not harm patients or to implement a CIRS. While it was a ‘known secret’ 
amongst health care professionals that were consulted at the outset of the study 
that the WKAV was ‘developing’ a CIRS there was no documentation about any 
possible progress or the direction in which WKAV was heading (see the above 
issue of forthcoming reports that took years to be published; or a blank BIQG 
website stating that information will soon be available, which to the knowledge 
of the author did not happen until very recently). While the research was already 
in progress the European Union Network for Patient Safety was launched in 
2008. They stated that Austria has two CIRS already in place, one of which was 
described as the WKAV CIRS system “Working with CIRS”, a governmental run 
voluntary and confidential near miss reporting system, launched in 2006, on a 
regional level for hospitals of the Vienna City Hospital Association (i.e. WKAV), 
for all health care workers, with no public disclosure of individual reports 
(EUNetPas, 2011). However, EUNetPas obtained their information through the 
means of a three page self-evaluation questionnaire and information should 
thus be handled with care. The CIRS that EUNetPas was referring to was the 
‘secret CIRS’ staff had been talking about. This ‘secret CIRS’ was a pilot phase 
CIRS and, again referring to the self evaluation questionnaire, being adopted at 
26 of a total of 63 high risk wards, with an expected roll out completion in 2013. 
It thus represents only a fraction of the entirety of WKAV which is one of the 
biggest health care institutions in the world and consists of 12 hospitals (one of 
which, the Vienna General Hospital, is the largest hospital in Europe and the 
second largest hospital in the World), eleven geriatric centres, and two 
residential care facilities for the elderly, and employs over 30.000 staff. While 
government officials continue to stress that ‘we [Austrians] have a CIRS’ the 
investigation shows that public hospitals in Vienna in general do not have 
access to a CIRS and that only a small number of departments had been 
officially enrolled in a pilot phase. A first (contrary to the announcement made in
2005 not very substantial) report on results of this pilot CIRS from May 2011
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(BMG, 2011a) shows little acceptance of CIRS and suggests that there is a long 
way to go, both in the BIQG organising, running, monitoring, and disseminating 
results of a CIRS and in hospital staff using CIRS. The report does not conclude 
if the CIRS project will be continued or not.
Hence, information on quality in the Austrian Health Care System and the 
Vienna City Hospital Association, in particular in regards to CIRS, is scattered 
and inconclusive. Most importantly, from a researcher’s point of view, only very 
little is documented about quality management in WKAV and this makes it 
difficult to verify and formulate a (research) problem that is worth addressing. 
From a practical practitioner perspective hospitals in Austria did not have the 
chance to partake in a nationwide CIRS, neither were there any instructions or 
recommendations on what stance a health care organisation should take 
towards quality and CIRS, which stands in stark contrast to the international 
patient safety development in other countries. It was under these conditions that 
the Austrian Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics (OEGGG) initiated the 
OEGGG CIRS project to enable all Women Hospitals in Austria to participate in 
an existing international voluntary and anonymous CIRS.
It is not clear neither is it documented how this puzzling situation pertaining 
quality and CIRS in public hospitals in Austria impacts health care organisations 
and what the implications may be at the ‘sharp end’. What is the perception of 
CIRS at the frontline and what benefit do staff expect when voluntarily partaking 
in a CIRS. What possible alternative ways do staff find in their endeavours to 
providing safe(r) services? This present study aims to contribute to closing this 
gap through providing an in-depth account of the OEGGG CIRS project at a 
public Women Hospital in Vienna.
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6.3. CIRS training session
The training sessions by Expert 1 at participating hospitals invariably followed a 
common scheme and were delivered in a consistent way. After a ‘compact 
morning meeting’ Expert 1 was introduced by the head of department to the rest 
of staff. Expert 1 then had about 20 (at a maximum 30) minutes to deliver his 
presentation, which included a question and answer session. Also at the study 
site the training session was part of the daily morning meeting. The meeting 
was attended by medical staff and the charge nurses, in total 32 people. 
Notably the deputy head of the department and researcher’s main contact at the 
department (respondent d2) who had previously informally promoted CIRS at 
the department, in particular the OEGGG project, decided not to partake in this 
training session. He did not want to give staff the impression that this was “his 
project” and that he, as a superior, would from now on “monitor” how staff 
responded to it (respondent d2). The head of department (respondent d1) 
quickly lead through the morning meeting before he turned the attention to the 
OEGGG CIRS initiative and introduced Expert 1 and briefly the researcher as 
an independent social scientist who would accompany the project as an 
observer. The head of department (respondent d1) emphasised that the 
OEGGG CIRS initiative was not connected to the Vienna City Hospital 
Association (WKAV) in any way but that Expert 1 had been invited directly from 
the department as an independent patient safety expert who, based on his own 
experience at another department for gynaecology and obstetrics in a public 
hospital in Vienna and his expertise as a consultant, will be able to support the 
department in providing safe care.
Respondent d1 also stressed that the work at the department was already good 
and safe but that never enough could be done for the safety of patients. This 
was to be seen as an additional and proactive way for ensuring safety at the 
department. He elaborated that the international trend clearly pointed towards
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the use of CIRS. However, he warned that for CIRS to be meaningful it needed 
to meet certain criteria, in particular in regards to voluntariness, anonymisation 
of patient, reporter and the reporting institution, and external data maintenance. 
In line with the OEGGG round letter he argued that, as the WKAV did not offer 
this ‘meaningful context’, the OEGGG project had been consulted. He 
encouraged staff to use the system as one of the available alternatives in 
handling critical incidents (respondent d1).
The presentations were delivered using Microsoft Power Point, video clips, and 
examples of safe systems design in aviation and its applicability in health care. 
The content of the presentation focused on encouraging staff to think differently 
about safety and risk in their work. In particular attendees were encouraged not 
to see “errors” and problems as individual in nature but the product of complex 
organisational and inter-personal relationships. An elementary part of the 
presentation was to describe how CIRSmedical works and to discuss the issue 
of confidentiality and protection of reporters. The core concept and purpose of 
incident reporting in medicine was described with making comparisons to 
aviation. The delivery of the presentation was slick and practiced and Expert 1 
showed good familiarity with the material. However, the delivery and discussion 
was clearly time constrained and on many occasions felt rushed to ensure that 
all of the core information was delivered, but within the given timeframe in a 
somewhat summary fashion. For example the actual CIRSmedical website was 
not opened and hence the online reporting form not discussed in a “real-life” 
context.
Staff seemed generally interested in CIRS and participated in the question and 
answer session. Compared with four other departments where CIRS training 
sessions by Expert 1 had been observed at the outset of the study the most 
questions or comments, a total of 14, were asked/given in the study site 
department. The comparatively high number of responses may have been due
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to the endeavours of the deputy of the head of department, respondent d2, who 
had tried to raise awareness about CIRS beforehand, mentioning and talking 
about it at the department. The questions and comments from the study site are 
summarised in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Questions and comments at the training session at the study site
Questions 1. will personal feedback be provided
2. how will feedback be provided
3. are reports clustered into categories (i.e. for search 
and statistical analysis)
4. does the use of CIRS show any improvement in other 
countries
5. there are only three other people in the department 
who could make a particular mistake, how can this be 
anonymised
6. would it be possible to have an external CIRS trustee
Comments 7. there is not enough money for an external CIRS 
trustee
8. the CIRS trustee is the weak point in the system
9. the idea of an internal CIRS trustee turns to whole idea 
of anonymity upside down
10. we should not only report incidents in CIRS but 
discuss them in the department
11. if I was to use CIRS I could as well just talk about it in 
the department, which was countered in the next 
comment
12. through CIRS young staff would have a channel to 
voice their problems, which they don’t do now
13. we should start reporting simple things
14. patient safety and quality related issues like CIRS 
should already be taught to medical students at I 
University
The discussion focused on feedback (questions 1-4), anonymity (questions 5 
and 10-13), and the CIRS trustee (questions 6-9). The given timeframe did not 
allow a thorough discussion of all these issues but Expert 1 did his best to 
address questions as well as possible. While some questions were more
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straightforward to answer, for example that personal feedback is not provided in 
an anonymous CIRS (question 1), that the kind of feedback provided also 
depends on the reports submitted (question 2) and that the minimum data set 
entry form already categorises reports to some extent (question 3), others were, 
as the discussion in chapter 4 already suggests, more difficult to answer 
(question 4). In regards to question 4 Expert 1 referred to general system 
improvements in health care and (due to a lack of clear evidence in health care) 
to CIRS only in relation to experiences in aviation.
One participant raised the concern that in his job there were only two other 
people who could make a certain mistake, how could such an event be 
anonymised (question 5)? This question brought out a very real and practical 
problem in the use of CIRS. While in theory a high number of reports from many 
different hospitals and from different geographical regions should obscure 
where a report comes from in practice this is dependent on a high number of 
reports and presupposes that staff trust the system enough to and do submit 
many reports. That CIRS are known to have low reporting rates in the beginning 
does not work in favour for this particular problem and the respondent did not 
seem convinced. Comment 13, to start reporting with simple things, came as a 
logical suggestion to approach this problem and to familiarise with CIRS and to 
establish trust. Some saw the anonymity of CIRS as a chance for giving voice to 
junior staff (comment 12), while others suggested to discuss incidents also 
more openly in the department (comments 10 and 11).
One of the prerequisites for CIRS to become operational at the department was 
to elect an internal CIRS trustee during the training session. The earlier 
presented figure E.1 in appendix E (background info on the OEGGG CIRS 
project) shows that this role is a key element of the OEGGG CIRS. The idea is 
that an individual is elected from within the department with the function to 
double check, and if necessary, further de-identify reports before they are put
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on the system. It appeared that staff were critical towards the idea of an internal 
trustee and some quickly marked this out as the weak spot in the system that 
turned the whole issue of anonymity upside down (question 6, comments 8 and 
9). As a result no internal CIRS trustee was elected in this meeting. As this was 
a necessary precondition for CIRS to become operational Expert 1 suggested to 
become their external CIRS trustee for the start-up period, anticipating that over 
time there will be growing acceptance of CIRS and hence also a willingness 
amongst staff to take on this role, and this was welcomed by everyone. With 
this agreement the discussion closed.
Following the discussion the researcher was given the opportunity to briefly 
introduce his study and to distribute questionnaires (see more detail in the 
methodology chapter in section 5.4.2). Staff were given two weeks to submit 
responses. During this time interviews were held with the department leadership 
to determine their view of CIRS. This is presented in the next section, before 
turning to the results of the questionnaire.
6.4. Leaders’ Perspective (Interview)
Based on experiences in the preliminary phase of the research as described 
throughout section 6.2 and the literature review a guiding sheet for semi­
structured interviews with the department leaders was prepared. The head of 
department (respondent d1) is a practicing gynaecologist and obstetrician and 
has been in this position at the department for a number of years. The head 
nurse (respondent n7) had been in the hospital for over 40 years, working at 
several different departments in the hospital, and was looking forward to his 
retirement over the next couple of years. The head of department together with 
his deputy (respondent d2), who has also been at the department for some time, 
were the project initiators for CIRSmedical at the department. The head nurse
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(respondent n7) was informed about and supporting the project, however, his 
involvement was not as proactive as from the medical lead.
6.4.1. Introduction
While awaiting the return of questionnaires two formal semi-structured 
interviews were held with the leadership of the department: one with the head of 
department (respondent d1) and one with the head nurse (respondent n7). In 
addition information was obtained from the deputy head of department 
(respondent d2) when testing the interview guiding sheet and the questionnaire, 
and from the frequent informal conversations with him as the researcher’s main 
contact person at the department. However, this was not counted as a formal 
interview. The interview guiding sheet can be found in appendix C.
6.4.2. Interview Objectives
Interviews were targeted at objectives
3. to investigate why CIRS has been implemented from a stakeholder 
perspective; and
4. to collect empirical evidence of supportive measures or otherwise barriers 
to CIRS.
The context of the implementation was different to other countries in that it did 
not follow a new national policy on reporting, such as in the UK, but that the 
department proactively implemented CIRS as a response to a lack of a new 
policy on CIRS. The intention of the interviews was therefore to get the 
department leaders’ perspective on the implementation of CIRS at the 
department. What are the leaders’ motives to join the network; their 
expectations; how did they think to overcome the (known) barriers to incident 
reporting; what financial considerations had been made; how good was their
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own knowledge of CIRSmedical and possible alternative CIRS in health care; 
did staff have any experience with reporting procedures and quality 
improvement initiatives prior to this one -  in short: to find out the leaders 
strategy to successfully implement CIRSmedical in the department.
This can be summarised as follows:
1. Why: why is CIRS implemented, is it imposed on staff by management or is 
it staffs’ wish
2. Knowledge: managements knowledge about CIRSmedical and other CIRS
3. Experience & training: do staff have any experience with CIRS and other 
quality improvement initiatives
4. Benefits: what are the expected benefits from using CIRSmedical
5. Progress report: leaders estimation of the overall process and staffs’ ability 
to change
6. Barriers: are leaders aware of some of the known problems in using CIRS 
and how do they hope to overcome these in their own department
7. Accountability: is anyone in particular in the department responsible for the 
implementation
8. Assessment: will there be any assessment of the project
6.4.3. Medical lead perspective
The CIRSmedical initiative at the study site hospital has its roots in the 
enthusiasm of the head of department (respondent d1) and his deputy 
(respondent d2), and the professional and personal relationship to Expert 1. 
The ‘story’ started with a joint skiing-holiday between Expert 1 and the deputy 
head of department (respondent d2) and a visit of both department leaders 
(respondent d1 and d2) and Expert 1 at a Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
Conference in Basel, Switzerland (where CIRSmedical was developed) in late
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2004. According to the deputy head of department their post-skiing and post­
conference conversations turned to talking about patient safety and CIRS. The 
department leaders had become increasingly interested in CIRS and it was 
“only a matter of time to formally invite Expert 1 to the clinic and to try applying 
some of these patient safety techniques at the department” (respondents d1 
and d2). The department had been showing interest in CIRS for some time and 
wanted to be amongst the first departments in Austria to join the OEGGG 
project. An earlier (about 18 months ago) approach to implement CIRS was 
turned down by the Vienna City Hospital Association (WKAV) due to a lack of 
funds (they decided to promote the development of their own system). However, 
under the benefited conditions of the OEGGG project the hospital’s collegial 
leadership had signalled to agreeing to pay the annual administration fee (of 
350 Euros).
The head of department and his deputy initiated the OEGGG project at the 
department and invited Expert 1. They initially informed staff and the hospital’s 
collegial leadership about CIRSmedical and the benefits for an independent 
reporting system, hoping that word-of-mouth would increase acceptance and 
interest at the department. They also conversed with their peers in other 
Women Hospitals to see how they pursued patient safety, how the acceptance 
was within the department, and how it was received by the hospitals’ collegial 
leadership. The OEGGG round letter was the final kick-off signal and an 
opportunity to join under benefited conditions (fee waver). The project is entirely 
independent of the hospital’s collegial leadership. It has been approved from the 
hospital board but they are not involved in it in any way.
The head of department (respondent d1) opted for the product CIRSmedical as 
it is the only system he (currently) knows of and he trusts the expertise of his 
colleagues, both his deputy (respondent d2) and the (external) Expert 1, and 
the OEGGG recommendation. The head of department stated that there was
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“no alternative” and that CIRSmedical seemed to him “a good system” 
(respondent d1) although he had to admit that he himself had actually never 
used a CIRS. When asked about his experiences with critical incidents and 
errors he admitted that he had both caused and observed them. Reflecting on 
them he thinks that he would have reported at least some of them had a CIRS 
been in place. His knowledge about CIRS is limited but he doesn’t see that as 
critical as he isn’t the “CIRS Master” . CIRS is something for everyone at the 
department.
The head of department described the culture in his department as “pretty 
good” , with an atmosphere among staff where most errors can be discussed, 
with a staff that is change friendly, and willing and able to learn. He believes 
that severe errors are reported (through already existing channels). The general 
problem to be tackled with CIRS is to reduce less severe errors and incidents 
which he believes are not always reported in his department. On one hand out 
of a fundamental fear of staff towards superiors and respective consequences, 
on the other hand due to a general desire to protect the alleged “irreproachable 
reputation of the medical profession” (respondent d1). He did not know whether 
any particular staff had training or expertise on CIRS before they came to this 
department but thought the possibilities of that being rather small. No training 
had been offered at the department.
He continuously encourages staff to talk openly about incidents and errors 
directly with him, or if staff prefer to talk with someone else about it with 
someone other than him. ‘It’s not that I need to know every little detail about 
who did what and what might have gone wrong but it is important that staff talk 
about it and find a constructive way of dealing with it. If this can be further 
shared in a CIRS that would be even better’ (respondent 1). Therefore he sees 
it as his responsibility to offer such a system to his staff and appreciates the 
possibility of anonymous reporting. He feels it is important to raise awareness
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amongst staff about the etymology of organisational accidents and from an error 
science perspective the implementation of CIRSmedical “just makes sense”. 
The main purpose in implementing CIRS is to foster learning.
What could create problems in his opinion is a lack of trust in the system. He 
also points out that less severe incidents could be interpreted by potential 
reporters as “not important enough to report”. Reporting could also be too 
cumbersome in that too much work effort would be needed or it was just too 
difficult to write a report. Less educated staff may have problems with the free 
text passage, to formulate an experience in a clear and precise manner. 
According to the head of department there are enough PC stations, which also 
provide the required privacy for reporting. He expects staff to submit two to five 
reports every week.
The head of department pointed out the “alleged simplicity” of the system and 
explained the pyramid learning system to spread knowledge about how to use 
CIRSmedical. The pyramid system, as the name suggests, works like a pyramid, 
with Expert 1 and the deputy head of department (respondent d2) on top. One 
of them explains the reporting process to two members of staff, who then 
explain it to another two, who explain it to the next two and so on. A group of 
three people (one teacher, two novices) should allow enough time for questions. 
Explaining CIRSmedical to someone else also helps in a way that the “teacher" 
has the opportunity to prove if he really understood how CIRSmedical works, 
after the motto “you only understand what you are able to explain” . Apart from 
the pyramid system there is no other training planned and there will be no 
acclaimed project champion in the department. This is also linked to the budget 
which, at first, is limited to the annual administration cost (of 350 Euros per year 
payable to OEGGG). He himself is not and will not be the “CIRS-Master” and no 
other person in the department had been installed as a project champion.
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If the endeavour taken for CIRSmedical is sufficient time will show. There are 
no defined parameters to measure a success with CIRSmedical, as 
CIRSmedical ‘cannot be measured with hard and heavy parameters’. Time will 
show what it does for the department and possible success can be expressed 
through personal experience of staff with the system or probably to some 
extend also with the number of reports coming in. The ambition or goal is to 
reduce minor mistakes and no harm events should occur less often.
The department leader’s view (respondent d1) may be summarised as:
1. Why: CIRS makes sense; it is in line with recent developments in patient 
safety and promoted by the OEGGG; department wanted to implement 
CIRS for a while; staff need and want CIRS in their department; it was a 
democratic decision to implement CIRSmedical and presents staff with an 
additional way of dealing with error; the project is independent, the hospital 
leadership has approved it but is not involved
2. Knowledge: Leader’s knowledge on CIRSmedical is limited, which he
doesn’t see as being critical as it is not his role to be the CIRS master
3. Experience & training: Experience of staff with CIRS and any other of the
new patient safety movement tools is limited; no training had been offered 
or conducted at the department and no training is planned other than 
through the pyramid system and word of mouth; the system is ‘easy to use’
4. Benefits: Minor errors and critical incidents are expected to occur less often
with the help of CIRSmedical; staff can, in addition to conversing more
formally at the department, share incidents on CIRS
5. Progress report: Staff is change friendly and will adopt to CIRSmedical,
with 2-5 reports being submitted per week; no formal progress report
planned as CIRS ‘cant be measured’
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6. Barriers: Expected problems are lack of trust in the system, general fear of 
staff towards superiors; a general desire to keep up the alleged 
“irreproachable reputation of the medical profession” and one’s own 
performance; too much work effort for reporting; problems in formulating 
the free text passage for less educated staff; difficulty in 
estimating/understanding the importance of minor incidents and therefore 
underreporting (but still 2-5 reports weekly)
7. Accountability: No project champion in the department; CIRS will be 
promoted through the pyramid system with Expert 1 or the deputy head of 
department at the top and word of mouth; its simple to use
8. Assessment: No formal assessment of the project; time will show success 
or failure
6.4.4. Nursing lead perspective
Interview number two with the head nurse (respondent n7) was an entirely 
different experience. As it turned out that the OEGGG project at the department 
was initiated by two medics, the head of department (respondent d1) and the 
deputy head of department (respondent d2), and that the head nurse was 
informed about the project and supported it, but was not proactively involved he 
provided a more critical and almost ‘outsider perspective’ on the implementation 
of CIRS at the department. Interviewing the head nurse was also important as it 
brought in the entire nursing perspective. Nurses are naturally different to 
doctors; for example their job at the department is their only job and they spend 
more time there (they do not rush off to their private practices at lunch time). 
The nursing job is heavy labour and not always as well respected as the work of 
doctors. When the head nurse started working at this hospital 40 years ago
‘doctors were Gods and nurses were n o th in g A lot has changed since and
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especially at this department all staff are encouraged by the head of department 
(respondent d1) to actively partake in discussions and to speak out. However, 
there is sometimes friction between the two professions when doctors do not 
share all the information with nurses, or when doctors expect nurses to run after 
them in order to comply with regulations for example regarding the prescription 
or administration of drugs, or obtaining signatures for patient records.
The head nurse had first heard about CIRS in one of the department’s (doctors’) 
morning meetings a couple of months ago where the idea was introduced by 
the medical lead and generally well perceived by the attending medical staff and 
with enthusiasm. The medical lead encouraged staff to ‘ponder about it’, ‘if it 
was something for our department’. However, the head nurse had 
underestimated the importance of CIRS, given the attention it was given now, 
and was somewhat taken by surprise by the implementation, already ‘having 
forgotten what that [CIRS] was all about’ (respondent n7). CIRS is something 
that is currently not offered or promoted by the Vienna City Hospital Association 
(WKAV) and therefore it is implemented independently at the department. 
However, it is something desirable but not something that would be necessary. 
Although he has no experience whatsoever with CIRS he knows about the 
complexity of such implementations. He made the painstaking experience of 
implementing the IT system which finally took 15(!) years to be implemented. 
The Vienna City Hospital Association (WKAV), which this hospital belongs to, is 
‘an organisation whose mills grind very slowly’. Considering his own upcoming 
retirement over the next years he was not keen on getting actively involved in 
CIRS, although stressing that he was not against it or planning to inhibit it in any 
way.
The head nurse emphasised that ‘quality’ (the term quality rather than safety 
was often used by respondents) at the department was high and that already a 
lot was being done. Compared to the medical lead the head nurse could also
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point to a number of individuals in speciality subgroups in the department who 
were his contact people regarding quality. However this was not due to special 
qualification or training staff had received but that they were the leaders of 
respective subgroups and thus ultimately ‘responsible’ for quality in their area. 
Asked about a main contact person for quality and safety, such as a risk 
manager, he could name an individual from the directorate (i.e. the hospital’s 
risk manager) but at the same time stressed that ‘this isn’t really a contact 
person, we really don’t have anything to do with him’ (respondent n7). Like the 
medical lead the head nurse stated that staff had no knowledge of or had 
received any training in CIRS or error science. Apart from the half-hour training 
session with Expert 1, the pyramid system, and word of mouth no further 
training or promotion of the project was planned. At the time of the interview 
frontline staff [they were not present at the training session] didn’t know 
anything about CIRS and didn’t even know when this is about to start (it had 
already started with the training session).
Knowing about the complexity of implementations his expectations in CIRS 
were limited. He saw it as something that would require substantial effort and as 
he was not proactively involved in it could not tell how much would be done in 
that respect. He gave an example from a problematical situation long time ago 
where a CIRS might have helped finding out about a problem. However, he 
himself was not sure if he had or would use CIRS for reporting concerns. He 
also expected that in the first month almost no reports would be submitted. In 
general the proposed start up time of three months in which Expert 1 would act 
as the CIRS trustee was seen as being too short and he would estimate that at 
least double that time (six months) would be needed. The pyramid system and 
word of mouth could work in some areas but not all. He mentioned the situation 
of a high number of part time staff, some of which he didn’t even see for a 
month. In general the one training session was not enough and front line staff at
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the moment did not know anything about CIRS. More information and meetings 
or talks between staff would be necessary.
He also verified that although CIRS was initiated by the medical lead they were 
not ‘leading’ it. There was no ‘CIRS Master’ at the department and 
‘accountability was hanging in the air’. However he had a few individuals in 
mind at the department who could at least ‘officially’ be appointed as leaders. 
This however wouldn’t mean that they were actually qualified to do so. Due to 
his limited knowledge of CIRS he also wouldn’t know how to assess the project 
and answered more philosophically with the question ‘how do you measure 
success?’. However he assumed that success may be measured to some 
extent through the number of reports submitted on CIRS.
The head nurse’s view (respondent n7) may be summarised as:
1. Why: initiated by medical lead; the Vienna City Hospital Association does 
not offer CIRS and therefore CIRS is being implemented independently at 
the department; CIRS wasn’t perceived by him as something so important; 
the CIRS implementation is desirable but not a necessity
2. Knowledge: no knowledge about and experience with CIRS; his experience 
is that such implementations take very long and knowing about the 
complexity of these things and considering his upcoming retirement he is, 
although not against CIRS, not putting any heart sweat in it
3. Experience & training: nursing staff did not have any training; nobody from 
the nursing staff knows more about CIRS than he does; no training or 
promotion of CIRS planned other than trough the pyramid system and word 
of mouth
4. Benefits: limited expectations, nurses should communicate their problems 
in CIRS but if this is about to result in improvements it will require proper
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evaluation and workup; at the moment front line staff know nothing about 
CIRS
5. Progress report: no formal progress report planned but there should be a 
report and feedback; first month no reports expected but staff ‘not against 
it’
6. Barriers: a start up phase of three months with Expert 1 is too short; 
evaluation, workup and feedback will be necessary; fear of blame; doctors 
do not want to admit when they made mistakes; implementations always 
take very long, the mills of the Vienna City Hospital Association grind very 
slowly; more information necessary; staff need pressure otherwise there 
will be no result
7. Accountability: No project champion in the department; the accountability 
‘hangs in the air’ although certain medical subgroup leaders could in his 
opinion potentially take the lead
8. Assessment: difficult to measure success; probably through the number of 
incoming reports
6.4.5. Discussion
Interviews with medical and nursing lead showed that the OEGGG CIRS project 
at the department was initiated from the medical side. The OEGGG CIRS was 
being implemented at the department because the Vienna City Hospital 
Association (WKAV) did not offer a CIRS. The OEGGG CIRS was implemented 
independently from the rest of the hospital. As a non WKAV project the OEGGG 
CIRS was a no, or a low, budget project with only the annual administration fee 
of 350 Euros being budgeted for. However this was not explicitly voiced by
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either of the two interviewees to be a problem. Nevertheless their perception of 
the project differed in several other ways. The medical side saw CIRS in a very 
positive light and with great enthusiasm. CIRS was ‘easy to use’, didn’t require 
a lot of resources and was expected to be carried by staff who would perceive it 
as an additional opportunity for meaningful engagement with error. CIRS was 
perceived by the medical lead as something ‘external’, a system that already 
existed and that needed very little additional input from within the department. 
According to the medical lead communication at the department was already 
very good and CIRS just an additional opportunity for sharing incidents 
anonymous and with a wider group; incidents which -  so the implication -  had 
already been discussed within the department. In that way the department as a 
whole could both contribute to and benefit from lessons learned across the 
entire network of participating hospitals. There was clearly some excitement 
amongst the medical lead to becoming one of the first Women Hospitals in 
Austria to use CIRS.
The nursing lead on the other hand was a little more reserved and didn’t 
resemble the medical leads’ excitement of becoming one of the first hospitals in 
Austria to use CIRS. CIRS had been initiated from the medical lead and the 
head nurse was not proactively involved in it. The head nurse also expressed 
that he would not get involved too much in CIRS until his upcoming retirement. 
This suggests that he saw the implementation as something quite complex and 
substantial as his retirement was still about two years ahead. This fits in with his 
other comments which suggested he saw CIRS more as developing into an 
‘internal system’ that needed incorporating into the existing organisation and 
that this would take time. To his knowledge there was no active resentment at 
the department against CIRS but he expected that nurses would perceive CIRS 
as additional workload. If it was to have any effect more information and training 
would be required and feedback to the reports would be essential. His
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experience was also that staff ‘needed to be pushed a little’, otherwise there 
would be no results.
In summary there was a perception amongst the medical lead that CIRS will be 
rather easy while amongst the nursing lead the perception was that if it was to 
have any effect it would require additional resources and time. Strikingly both 
the head of department (respondent d1) and the head nurse (respondent n7) 
did not base their statements on experience with CIRS. They had no experience 
with CIRS and appeared to know fairly little about the concept. They also had 
not, not even once, logged on to CIRSmedical -  not before, during, or after the 
training session. It was the researcher, who had already acquired a username 
and password from the deputy head of department (respondent d2), who 
passed on login details to the head of department following the interview. 
Together with the researcher the head of department took his very first look at 
CIRSmedical (this was already after the official implementation and training 
session at the department). His first experience with CIRS was that he did not 
understand some of the requests on the input form and he was surprised that 
he could only choose one option in the multiple choice menu. Furthermore, 
when looking at the existing reports he wondered why nobody had commented 
on them. He then wrote a comment himself but wondered why it didn’t appear 
on the system immediately. This shows just how much he had relied on and 
trusted Expert 1 and his deputy (respondent d2). His first experience with CIRS 
as a user was probably quite different to how he might have first anticipated it 
(and had already promoted and recommended to his staff).
The following section presents findings from the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was targeted at front line staff and aimed to verify information 
from the interviews and to get a perspective on CIRS directly from the sharp 
end.
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6.5. Staff perspective (Questionnaire)
After obtaining the department leaders’ view on the implementation of CIRS at 
the department this part of the study aimed at getting a first hand and 
anonymous view of the very people that are expected to use CIRS. These 
frontline staff principally consist of medical and nursing staff who work in one of 
the following areas at the department: obstetric ward, labour room, nursery, 
gynaecology and oncology ward, operation theatre, as well as an outpatient 
department which includes the gynaecology, pregnancy, and hormone 
ambulance. In total the department employs around 100 staff.
6.5.1. Introduction
Based on the literature and the early familiarisation with the project (see 
appendix E), in particular observation at the CIRS training sessions and 
informal talks with potential CIRS users, a staff self-administered questionnaire 
was developed. The questionnaire consists of 40 questions, 31 of which are 
multiple choice and nine of which are open ended questions. Completing the 
questionnaire takes about 20 minutes. In total 75 questionnaires were 
distributed. According to the gatekeeper respondent d2, the head nurse 
respondent n7, as well as the chief secretary respondent 13 this covered all 
potential CIRS users, with the remaining staff being auxiliary staff who ‘would 
not be able to fill in such a questionnaire’ (for example a cleaner whose German 
skills are not sufficient). The return rate was 51 percent, with 38 questionnaires 
being returned to the researcher. The questionnaire can be found in appendix D.
6.5.2. Questionnaire objectives
Observing training sessions at various other departments had already shown 
that staff were generally interested in CIRS but that this one training session did 
not provide sufficient time for voicing and addressing numerous issues staff
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may have regarding patient safety in general and CIRS in particular. In order to 
get a general and anonymous overview of how staff made or made not sense of 
CIRS at this point in time, the very beginning of CIRS use at the study site, a 
self-administered staff questionnaire was distributed to all potential CIRS users. 
The questionnaire aimed to capture how staff made sense of the environment in 
which CIRS was expected to flourish and how they perceived CIRS.
The questionnaire was targeted at objectives:
3. to investigate why CIRS has been implemented from a stakeholder 
perspective
4. to collect empirical evidence of supportive measures or otherwise barriers 
to CIRS; and
5. to investigate how meaningful it is for staff to use CIRS
The thesis so far suggested that patient safety is concerned with the entire 
health care ‘system’ and likewise that CIRS needs to be seen as one element of 
a wider patient safety concept. Given that this questionnaire was distributed at 
the beginning of CIRS-use at the department it encompassed a wide range of 
topics. This should allow identifying those areas that are of particular concern to 
staff at this department. Due to the general approach of the questionnaire a 
detailed categorisation of questions did not seem useful as it bore the danger of 
‘over-classifying’ the questionnaire and ending up with a category for each 
barrier and question. Therefore only a principal distinction was made between 
more general safety attitude questions (‘safety attitude questions’ 1-15)  and 
those more related to the implementation and use of CIRS (‘CIRS’ questions 
16-40).
In addition, as questionnaire and semi-structured interviews are very similar 
research tools (for example Robson, 2002), the questionnaire was designed in
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a way to allow comparison between the two. 21 of the 30 questions from 
leadership interviews were incorporated into the 40-question staff questionnaire. 
With a few exceptions (C.17-C.19, which were targeted more at personal 
perceptions) these questions allowed direct verification and/or comparison with 
information provided by leadership in interviews. With the benefit of hindsight 
from interview data the analysis also allowed to validate/compare additional 
questions, such as question C.22 “Do you have access to a computer in order 
to use CIRSmedical?” or question C.28 “Do you wish to have ongoing support 
for using CIRSmedical?”. For the mere purpose of presentation these answers 
to questions are clustered into paragraphs and do not follow the exact 
sequence of the questionnaire.
6.5.3. Findings
After the initial observations and talks as well as interviews with the medical and 
nursing lead (section 6.4) this section provided a broader and anonymous view 
from frontline staff on their attitude to safety and perception of the OEGGG 
CIRSmedical project. Findings from the questionnaire suggest that staff 
perceive quality management as something important, yet not something 
systematic at the department with an overhead to turn to for support. Staff could 
not reach out for support as 60 percent didn’t know who to turn to regarding 
quality issues in the department. Likewise they were not being efficiently 
reached by the hospital risk manager as 37 percent of staff did not even know 
that the hospital had a risk manager.
The overall stand towards quality management was that it is something every 
individual is responsible for. This was also manifest in that quality concerns 
were not always shared with the rest of staff and if, those issues were 
preferably discussed in the small work group (about three other people). This 
might be related to the way incidents are currently being dealt with at the
department. Respondents pointed to a lack of reaction on critical issues that
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were already known in the department. Incidents that had been identified were 
often no followed up, the root cause not identified and thus a reoccurrence not 
inhibited. Furthermore some staff had experienced negative feedback when 
voicing their concerns openly and constructively. Even if this was mostly in an ‘it 
doesn’t concern me’ kind of attitude and not in an open ‘blame and shame’ 
approach it nevertheless caused frustration in the person that had shared the 
incident. It is also possible that a lack of reaction to known discrepancies at the 
department may have discouraged staff from sharing new incidents because it 
would be meaningless if no action followed; something that will also apply to 
CIRS. That critical incidents had been discussed in the department but did not 
trigger any constructive reaction also points to a lack of a systematic approach 
to error management.
The OEGG CIRS project might therefore be seen as a new element in the 
department’s (unsystematic) endeavours in improving quality of services. But 
how does the implementation happen and how is CIRS perceived by staff? The 
results of the questionnaire show an overwhelmingly positive attitude towards 
CIRS. Although not everyone had been aware of the upcoming implementation 
and some people had still not even heard about CIRS, the idea of implementing 
it at the department was positively received. Importantly staff did not fear that 
the implementation was a kind of control organ superimposed on them. The fact 
that not everyone was aware of the project does not comply fully with the 
medical lead stating that CIRS was ‘a wish from staff, but it does corresponded 
with the statement of the head nurse that, to his knowledge, at least nobody of 
the nurses was against it and that there was some enthusiasm about it.
The idea of a CIRS also seemed relevant considering that about half of the 
respondents had experienced critical incidents in their work. However there was 
also a group of staff who stated they had never observed or witnessed a critical 
incident. According to the patient safety literature this is highly unlikely and
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stems from staff being unaware of incidents. That staff do not recognise (all) 
such incidents as critical incidents that are worth reporting may be related to the 
fact that almost all staff (92 percent) haven’t had any error management 
relevant training or otherwise experience with a CIRS. This also became 
manifest in answers concerning possible barriers to reporting. These answers 
did not point so much to a problem of the safety culture (i.e. attitude to safety) 
but to a lack of knowledge about how CIRS works, what and how to report, or 
how safe it really was in terms of anonymity to use CIRS. About half of the 
respondents said they did not have enough information about and trust in the 
system for using it. Likewise they did not trust the CIRS trustee, which was a 
reminder of the concerns raised about the role of a CIRS trustee during the 
CIRS training session. At the same time many staff stated that principally they 
had no problem sharing reports anonymously with a third party, suggesting 
again that this was rather a matter of being adequately informed and not pure 
resistance. The majority of staff also explicitly stated that they wished ongoing 
support with the project. Considering these facts it seems important that 
adequate training is being organised for staff in order to overcome these 
barriers to reporting.
Once staff trust the system and know what and how to report CIRS will need to 
reap some benefits for them. Staff did not formulate a specific kind of feedback 
they would expect but it was apparent that they expected some kind of visible 
action following the reports and that this action should ideally result in a 
reduction of errors at the department and a better and safer work environment.
In summary the idea of having a CIRS at the department was well perceived 
although staff had some concerns regarding the anonymity of the system. Given 
the lack of training they had received staff were found to have little knowledge 
about systematic error management and CIRS and in the need for adequate 
training. The experiences with critical incidents at the department suggests that
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CIRS can be relevant to staff but that due to a lack of response to already 
identified problems staff may be discouraged to report new incidents in CIRS. 
Therefore attending to known problems may be another key factor in the 
success of failure of the CIRS project. So far CIRS is seen as one of many 
improvement projects and not as a panacea that could potentially help to 
communicate a number of other (and pending) quality issues. More than half of 
the staff did not give an estimate of how many reports will be submitted, with the 
rest expecting 1-5 reports coming in per week. Findings in the questionnaire 
suggest that a number of issues, from anonymity, to training, or things such as 
access to computers, will need addressing before people seriously consider 
using CIRS. Once these barriers are overcome a lot will be dependent on what 
kind of feedback is being provided and if CIRS can establish itself as a unique 
and useful patient safety tool or if it will continue to be perceived as just another 
management trend.
Interestingly, like in the leadership interviews, staff did not base their 
estimations on any experience with CIRS as at the time of the questionnaire 
only one respondent had already been to the CIRSmedical online reporting form.
6.6. Summary
CIRS at the department was initiated by the medical lead and through their 
personal contacts with Expert 1. It was driven by the medical lead with the 
nursing lead taking no proactive part in the project. The head of department, 
who himself had little knowledge about CIRS and had never used or visited the 
CIRSmedical website, took the stance that CIRS was useful, and as it didn’t 
need any additional resources and was ‘easy to use’ should be offered to staff 
at the department as an additional way for communicating incidents. There was 
an expectation that CIRS would run by itself, with no need for a CIRS master or
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training other than the training session by Expert 1 and sharing how the system 
works through word of mouth. There was also no need to systematically 
analyse or monitor the project -  staff would benefit from the system through a 
learning effect just by using it if they wanted to.
Findings from the questionnaire can probably be epitomised in two statements: 
first, staff had a generally positive attitude towards CIRS, and secondly staff had 
very little experience and knowledge in error management and CIRS. 
Observation at the training session and answers from the questionnaire suggest 
that frontline staff are in need of additional training and required more guidance 
in CIRS. Many questions regarding CIRS were still unanswered, either due to a 
lack of time during the CIRS training session, or due to a lack of a CIRS master 
or a quality delegate to turn to in the department. To close with the words of the 
head of department: time will show if CIRS will be a success at the department 
or not.
The next chapter will present findings from the fieldwork observation of CIRS in 
use at the department.
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CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
ANALYSIS II (FIELDWORK OBSERVATION)
7.1. Introduction
This chapter introduces the findings from the fieldwork observation at the 
department. These findings represent the last stage of data collection, after 
observation of the training session, interviews with the department leadership 
about the strategy for CIRS, and the questionnaire with front line staff about 
their safety attitude and initial perception of the project. This chapter considers 
‘CIRS in use’ at the department. The observation took place 18 months after the 
formal introduction of CIRSmedical at the department (training session), at a 
time when it was already apparent that staff were using the system very little. 
Staff from different ranks at the department were observed over a period of five 
months in 14 non-consecutive observation days, which are referred to as 
‘Observation Days’ or OD1,2,3 etc. Staff are referred to in the same way as in 
previous sections, i.e. respondent d1 (for a doctor) or respondent n7 (for a 
nurse). Patients are referred to with capital letters (for example patient K). This 
relates to the consecutive listing of patients during one observation day, for 
example ‘patient K on OD2’ is not the same person as a ‘patient K on OD7’, and 
the text might not mention a patient J beforehand. Incidents are described as 
‘not being reported’ in those instances where no similar anonymous report could 
be found in the entries on the CIRSmedical website.23
After this introduction section 7.2 provides information on the reporting 
frequency to CIRS over the period of the study. The remainder of this chapter is
23 M ore inform ation on the m eth o d o lo g ica l in tricacies o f  the fie ld w ork  observation  can be found in the  
m eth o d o lo g y  chapter throughout section  5 .5 .
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then mainly structured around the patient safety framework, illustrated below in 
figure 7.1, which was developed from the qualitative analysis of ethnographic 
data as described in the methodology chapter in section 5.6.5. The patient 
safety framework consists of four themes and fourteen categories. The 
individual sections of the patient safety framework are explained in subsequent 
sections. Sections 7.3 to 7.6 introduce findings of the fieldwork observation 
according to the four themes ‘possible CIRS reports’ (section 7.3. with the sub­
categories ‘clinical issues’, ‘communication issues’, ‘documentation issues’, and 
‘other issues’), ‘barriers to reporting’ (section 7.4. with the sub-categories ‘little 
awareness’, ‘low priority’, and ‘other barriers’), ‘organisational issues’ (section
7.5. with the sub-categories ‘facilities’, ‘I.T.’, ‘processes’, and ‘culture’), and 
‘practical implications’ (section 7.6. with the sub-categories ‘documentation’, 
‘integration of staff’, and ‘integration of organisational reports’). These findings 
are complemented with a section on ‘results’ (section 7.7), providing information 
on the CIRS feedback meeting held by Expert 1 at the department and 
elaborating some of the consequences of the project, before closing in a 
discussion in section 7.8.
Figure 7.1: Patient safety framework
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7.2. Reporting frequency
An important indication whether or not CIRS is accepted at the department is 
how frequently CIRS is being used. Despite the early enthusiasm of many of the 
stakeholders involved, the OEGGG project being a voluntary and proactive 
move towards safety, it became apparent that CIRS was used infrequently and 
less than Expert 1 and staff at the department had anticipated. Expert 1, who 
was receiving incoming reports as the CIRS trustee, stated that only a handful 
of reports had been coming in. This information was verified by the researcher 
in visiting regularly the CIRS website which gave insight into the pool of reports 
from all participating hospitals. After three months there were a total of 57 
reports for all of the (at that time five) participating hospitals on the system. Until 
the start of fieldwork observation all hospitals together had reported a total of 
215 reports onto the system. However, the majority of reports came from one 
hospital that had invested in additional consultation from Expert 1. The other 
hospitals reported infrequently and were considered by Expert 1 as 
underreporting. In addition it was also observed that the ‘comment function’ on 
the CIRS website, supposed to be a lively exchange amongst health care 
professionals on specific incidents, was little used. To anticipate from the CIRS 
feedback session by Expert 1, which was held towards the end of the fieldwork 
observation period and upon leaving the field, the study site department had 
reported a total of 48 reports over a period of 22 months. The findings from the 
feedback meeting are presented later in section 7.7.
Because of the low reporting frequency a more in-depth fieldwork observation 
was necessary and this was targeted mostly at objectives
4. to collect empirical evidence of supportive measures or otherwise barriers 
to CIRS; and
5. to investigate how meaningful it is for staff to use CIRS.
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Those issues relevant to safety and CIRS that became apparent during the 
fieldwork observation are presented next.
7.3. Possible reports to CIRSmedical
7.3.1. Clinical issues
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with clinical core issues at the department.
T34 incorrect sample taking: On OD14 the theatre nurse (respondent n43) 
takes samples that were taken during the operation to the central laboratory 
(another department in the same hospital). The laboratory worker marks out two 
errors: (1) the sampling method was incorrect (not the tissue itself should be 
brought but only a liquid in which the tissue was put for a couple of seconds) 
and (2) the wrong form was used for documenting this type of sample. The 
theatre nurse (respondent n43) says that this type of sample is taken only every 
other year. Both the theatre nurse and the laboratory worker could have 
reported the incident on CIRS but this was not something they considered. 
However, the theatre nurse (respondent n43) said he will communicate this 
internally amongst his theatre nursing colleagues. He also mentions “a (theatre) 
book where I can document this” (respondent n43).
Comment: As the hospital as a whole does not run a CIRS the laboratory 
worker has actually no access to a CIRS. The theatre nurse wants to share the 
incident but this only happens internally amongst fellow theatre nurses and in 
an informal way. He had heard something about CIRS once but then he just has 
so little information about and knowledge of CIRS in general and the OEGGG 
project more specifically that this incident (like others presumably) is not
perceived as a possible CIRS report. Furthermore it is up to his perception of
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the usefulness or severity of the incident to document this incident in the 
‘theatre book’, which is a documentation map for theatre nurses. This however 
is also more of an ‘informal’ way of documentation, there is no requirement to 
have such a book for theatre nurses itself, nor are there any guidelines or 
procedures what, when, and how to document incidents in the book.
T36 pain after C-section: On OD9 the charge nurse from the obstetric ward 
(respondent n9) mentions that since about three weeks patients who had a C- 
section suffer from and complain about pain in their right shoulder. In the 
discussion in the morning meeting a causal connection is made between 
shoulder pain and a new positioning method for patients with C-sections, which 
had only been introduced about three weeks ago. The head of department 
wants to follow this up.
Comment: The incident is shared internally but not put on CIRS. Considering 
that this new positioning method is also used in other Women hospitals this 
incident could be shared through CIRS to alert others. A search may also be 
conducted to see whether other Women hospitals had similar problems with the 
new positioning method and how they approached the problem.
T37 medical strip and spray dressing: In the morning meeting on OD13 
respondent d38 (a senior physician) starts a discussion on whether post 
operative medical strips or spray dressings should be used. He observed that 
nurses on the gynaecology ward sometimes take them off too early (to check 
the wound) which sometimes causes irritations and which may increase the risk 
of post operative wound infections. When discussing what the standard 
procedure at the department is it turns out that there are actually two different 
procedures in use, one on the gynaecology ward and one on the obstetric ward. 
Patients from the gynaecology ward get a medical strip in the operation theatre. 
After two to three days this strip is replaced by another and watertight medical
strip, which allows the patient to take a shower. Patients from the obstetric ward
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get a spray dressing in the operation theatre. This spray dressing is more 
expensive but it does not need to be changed, it is more convenient for the 
patient (less painful and the patient can shower right away), at the same time it 
reduces the risk of post operative infections. The head of department suggests 
using the spray on both wards: “Can anyone tell me what the difference is 
between a cut on a gynaecology and an obstetric patient? Let’s do that [the 
spray] with all patients and on the entire department - the pain-free hospital. Do 
we need to write anything? No... you will communicate that in your morning 
meetings anyway."(respondent d1)
Comment: This incident is but one manifestation of a common practice in the 
department to communicate things internally (also in meetings) but without 
issuing statements or documenting it. There are also no minutes taken of 
morning meetings. Better documentation may facilitate dissemination of this 
new procedure and help ensuring it actually becomes the ‘standard procedure’. 
Documenting when it was introduced may also allow for causal connections 
between use of spray for all patients and (possible) improved outcomes, such 
as a lower post operative infection rate, shorter patient stays, increased patient 
satisfaction, and ultimately lower costs (no wound infection treatment required).
T32 wrong patient instruction: On OD1 head of department and his deputy 
(respondents d1 and d2) go to see patient K on the ward in a four-bed room. 
After caring for patient K and before leaving the room the head of department 
exchanges a few words with two other patients (patients B and L). He finds out 
that patient L was wrongly instructed to withhold her urine. Certain procedures 
require the patient not to urinate for a period of time. In this case however this 
was the wrong instruction and caused unnecessary discomfort to the patient. 
The head of department allows patient L to see the bathroom. Once outside the 
four-bed room the head of department calls all nearby nurses quickly together 
to a spontaneous group meeting on the ward and addresses them (without
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blaming anyone directly): "Whoever told the patient not to urinate, this is wrong 
and utter nonsense; please pass this on to all the others so it can be avoided in 
the future; for patients with this clinical pattern withholding urine is very painful 
and inhibits the healing process", (respondent d1)
Comment: This no harm event caused unnecessary discomfort to the patient. 
The head of department, who by chance found out about it, was not interested 
in blaming anyone but in the comfort and safety of the patient, that correct 
treatment and care are provided and that everyone knows about it so it would 
not happen again. This may have further been anonymously shared on CIRS. 
However, nobody in that small group mentioned it as a possible CIRS report 
and it went unreported.
T56 Hepatitis C patient: The husband of a high risk (Hepatitis C) patient who 
was together with the patient in the operation theatre during her C-section 
leaves the theatre area still wearing his operation theatre clothes and slippers. 
He then enters the delivery room area to go to see the bathroom, changes his 
clothes there, ‘disposes’ them into one of the open lockers and leaves (to go for 
a cigarette). One minute later one of the theatre nurses comes looking for him 
because of a possible infection risk through the (Hepatitis C blood) 
contaminated theatre clothes he was wearing. As the husband has already left 
the theatre nurse returns to the operation theatre and does not follow the 
incident up any further.
Comment: Hepatitis C is transmitted over blood, including dry blood. Although 
little is known about how long exactly the infection risk is active it is believed 
that contact with contaminated blood to up to one week presents an infection
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risk. It is possible that contaminated material (theatre clothes) might spread and 
create a safety hazard. This incident was not reported.24
T9 surgeons late for operation: On OD14 an operation that is scheduled to be 
led by two senior surgeons starts with just one as the other one is late. 
Surgeons who are late for the operation cause substantial problems for the rest 
of the team as the entire operation plan for the (half-) day needs to be altered. 
“Unfortunately he is always late. I mean, I don’t care when he comes, but then 
you can’t write the operation plan like this. At the start of the day we always 
waste time and then together with the emergencies this all adds up” 
(respondents n43 and n44).
Comment: The researcher observed that operations started without all staff 
being present on more than one occasion, also with other doctors, but 
especially with this particular senior physician. This was further verified in 
conversations with other staff from various ranks. While other members of the 
surgical team were ‘not particularly happy’ about it they at least seemed to 
accept this behaviour: 7 have mentioned it once but what else can I do? He is a 
doctor and they can just afford to do that and know they can get away with it. 
(respondent n43). Apart from possible negative outcomes in case of an 
emergency the fact that operations start before everyone is present shows how 
difficult it would be under the prevailing culture to implement recommended 
safety standard procedures, such as preoperative safety briefings. Already 
standard in hospitals that are at the forefront of patient safety surgical teams 
hold preoperative meetings where, in order to create a climate of improved 
communication, collaboration, teamwork, and situational awareness, the 
surgical team reviews together and before an operation starts pertinent 
information about the patient and the pending procedure using standardised
24 the researcher inform ed the head obstetric nurse w h o then ca lled  a cleaner to get rid o f  the c lo th es  and 
clean  up the area
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checklists. Research shows that surgical teams that have preoperative safety 
briefings better work together, communicate well, can quickly detect and more 
easily avoid errors, and make a substantial contribution to safety (DeFontes and 
Surbida, 2004).
The observation does not suggest that operations at the study site always 
started without everyone being there. However, when it happened there was an 
attitude of accepting it and finding a way around it. Nobody had the time to 
investigate the root cause of the problem or the ‘guts’ to either bring the entire 
operation to a halt, waiting until the surgical team was complete, or to report the 
colleague. A deeper rooted problem is that there actually is (unbelievable as it 
may sound) no written procedure on the conditions for starting an operation. 
The lack of standard procedures allows operations to begin without all members 
of the surgical team being present. Furthermore, in connection to CIRS, 
research has found that breaching of procedures increases reporting (see 
chapter 4). Accordingly where there are no procedures to be broken this will not 
be reported. If preoperative safety briefings were to be introduced at the 
department they needed to be made compulsory. A prerequisite would be a 
procedure under which conditions an operation is allowed to begin. Otherwise a 
preoperative meeting might be bypassed from staff that are late.
T57 vacuum birth under suboptimal conditions: On OD10 in the nursery nurses 
and the external paediatrician whisper secretly about a colleague (a doctor) who 
had performed a vacuum birth despite the fact that the child’s umbilical cord 
was twice wrapped around the child. The newborn child has some marks on his 
head which are caused by this type of delivery. They discuss the risks of this 
certain procedure (one of many procedures) in this particular situation and they 
appear to agree that this was probably the fastest but not the safest method.
Comment: Although these nurses together with the paediatrician whisper about
the incident no comment or feedback is provided to the doctor that performed
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the vacuum birth, neither is there a noticeable intention to do so at another point 
in time. They also discuss the work of another colleague (a doctor) who uses an, 
as they argue, ‘outdated method’ for deliveries. CIRS may have been used in 
this instance to make an anonymous and non-blaming report. Apart from the 
general willingness or unwillingness of staff to report this incident in CIRS there 
are at least two factors that may inhibit reporting in this particular situation. First, 
the department does not have its own paediatrician and paediatricians only 
come in from another nearby hospital as needed. It is unlikely that this 
paediatrician knows about the CIRS project at the department (considering the 
power relations it is more likely that in this instance the doctor would have 
reported about the other doctor, rather than a nurse about the doctor, even 
anonymously). Secondly, the CIRSmedical website states that reporters should 
only report incidents that they themselves have caused or observed (no 3rd 
hand reports). The nurses and paediatrician in this case may understand their 
position as ‘not directly involved’ and be discouraged from reporting. Another 
operational question relates to the time of the incident. What time should be 
reported on the form, the time the incident occurred or when it was first detected?
7.3.2. Communication issues
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with communication issues at the department.
T45 patient not handed over (reported): On OD4 one of the senior physicians 
(respondent d8) criticises that two patients were not handed over to him. He 
was in the undesirable situation of suddenly standing in front of two patients he 
didn’t know. He then had to inquire from the ward nurse about them. It turned 
out that a junior doctor from the previous shift had been in charge of these two 
patients, had ‘forgotten’ to hand them over, and had already gone home.
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Comment: Respondent d8, an avid supporter of CIRS, submits two reports into 
CIRS (one for each patient).
T47 patient information for transfer patient too vague: On OD4 a patient is 
transferred from another hospital with a clinical report that reads “globolaere 
Neoplasie”.
Comment: The senior physician (respondent d2) finds this information too 
vague as this can refer to a great spectrum of symptoms, from simple pimples 
to severe health issues. This is not detailed enough a report and not an 
adequate for a transfer patient. Respondent d2 calls the hospital that sent the 
patient to inquire about him. This results in loss of time, delayed treatment, and 
patient dissatisfaction as he has to provide information on his medical history 
again.
T43 same patient name: On OD2 the outpatient department brings patient files 
for patients that will be admitted the next day. The head nurse (respondent n7) 
notices that two patients have the same surname and a similar age. On OD5 
patients with very similar (and foreign) surnames share the same room. On 
OD8 two patients with the same surname are on the operation theatre list. On 
OD10 two patients with same first and last name and the same birth year are on 
the operation theatre list.
Comment: In a conversation on OD8 with respondent d27, an anaesthetist that 
works at multiple other departments, he confirms that same patient names are 
indeed a frequent occurrence. According to respondent d27 it is not uncommon 
that two patients have the same first and last name, same birth year, are in the 
same department but in different areas, and may have a very similar patient 
record with only marginal differences. Mistaking one patient for another is a 
constant threat at the hospital. No information is provided of how often patients 
are actually mistaken. What becomes clear however is that there is no
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systematic procedure, let alone a digital patient identification (barcode) to 
prevent a mix up of patients, to issue a warning and raise alertness amongst 
staff that there are two patients that can be potentially mistaken. Some staff at 
the department try to work around this issue and recommend highlighting 
patients with same names with a marker. As a constant potential threat this 
could be reported on CIRS.
T46 wrong patient birth date through telephone: During an X-Ray meeting on 
OD4 it is found that one of the patient’s birth date is incorrect. Apparently this 
happened because the birth date had been given over the phone.
Comment: A lack of standardised communication, as is common practice for 
example in aviation where pilots use only standardised English terms in a 
command and control language, was a contributory factor to this incident. The 
observed senior doctor who is notified of this incident is already more than 
24hrs on duty. Although he describes this as a perfect example for a CIRS 
report, at the end of a long shift the incident goes unreported (at least for the 
time being, he might have reported the incident later on). The respondent also 
shows signs of fatigue, for example he accidentally and without noticing 
reopens and starts discussing a patient file that had just been discussed.
T55 high risk patient: On OD8 a C-section is done with a patient that has 
Hepatitis C. The doctor performing the intervention only finds out after the 
operation that he was operating a Hepatitis C patient. The doctor complains to 
the head midwife that he should have pointed out again that this was a high risk 
patient.
Comment: Although it was mentioned in the morning that the patient suffers 
from Hepatitis C the doctor overheard this. The doctor and the head midwife 
discuss how difficult it is to understand others during the meeting referring to 
colleagues who ‘mumble something in their hand’, ‘sit in a corner of the room
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where nobody can hear him’ or ‘somebody is telling a joke at the same time’. 
There is no standard procedure that would mark out high risk patients.
T24 department specific abbreviations: On OD10 the ward physician on the 
gynaecology ward (respondent d34) told the researcher how frustrated he was 
with the way junior doctors and ward physicians were introduced to their tasks 
at the department. Junior doctors usually only spend a couple of months at the 
department and they are not familiar with many of the terms and abbreviations 
used at the department (a problem the researcher can sympathise with due to 
the difficulties he experienced at the beginning of his observation). Therefore 
respondent d34 was in the process of putting together a list of abbreviations 
“that nobody knows, for example LN R -  German: Letzte Normale Regel -  which 
stands for ‘last regular period’” (respondent d34).
Comment: When reviewing archive material and folders in the preparation for 
the observation the researcher came across a list of abbreviations for the 
obstetric ward.25 This is another case where information desperately sought by 
one worker in the department already existed (at least in parts) in another part 
of the department. Imperfect communication (also from the ward physician who 
did not know who to approach with his problem) and imperfect sharing of 
information led to this situation. A standardised list that is easily visible, 
accessible or distributed to all could also be in the interest of other hospital staff 
that are not at the department on a permanent basis, such as paediatricians 
from other hospitals, anaesthetists, psychologists, pharmacologists, or 
radiologists. Respondent d34 could have shared the problem with abbreviations 
and possible implications on CIRS.
25 T he researcher g ave  respond en t d 3 4  a cop y  o f  h is list o f  abbreviations.
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7.3.3. Documentation issues
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with documentation issues at the department.
T31 editing of clinical report: On OD 1 respondent d2 notes, as he has noted 
previously, that some colleagues, especially new to the station or young 
colleagues, write (two specific elements of) the clinical report on separate 
sheets. However the house policy is to have all information on one single page 
as it is possible to overlook something with two pages. Familiar with the house 
rule a senior doctor who has to verify the report expects a one page report, 
reads the first page and verifies the entire report of what actually is a multiple 
page report. According to respondent d2 this is a reoccurring problem.
Comment: The colleague who wrote the multiple page report is currently on 
holiday. Respondent d2 leaves a handwritten note for this colleague. Although 
respondent d2 feels this would make an ideal CIRS report he does not, on this 
occasion, use CIRS. However, he states that he may report it later ‘if there is 
enough time’ (respondent d2).
T41 patient records not verified: Patient records need to be verified by senior 
physicians. On OD6 the head secretary (respondent 13) finds out that one 
senior physician had apparently forgotten to verify ‘his’ records, as there are 35 
records pending. The head secretary informs the senior physician so he can 
work through this before anyone else finds out.
Comment: What the head secretary does not mention is that one of the 
consequences of unverified (pending) records is that they cannot be transferred 
back to the outpatient department. All patient records of discharged patients 
should be transferred back to the outpatient department within 24 hours 
because of the possibility of re-admissions. In case of a re-admission the
immediate patient history from this hospital is highly relevant. The incident is not
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shared with anyone else and there is no investigation how ‘the system’ allows 
35 ‘pending’ records.
T40 patient file transfer: On OD2 the head nurse controls admissions and 
dismissals and finds that some patient files had not been transferred back to the 
outpatient department within 24 hours, sometimes with considerable delays.
Comment: Once a patient is dismissed the patient file is ‘closed’ by a doctor and 
should then be transferred back to the outpatient department within 24 hours in 
case of a re-admission. In practice however the head nurse finds a one week 
old file that the doctor has not yet closed. The head nurse says that he wants to 
write a note to all doctors to double check their dismissals at the end of their 
shift to prevent this from happening. As a reoccurring problem this could be 
anonymously shared on CIRS.
T58 birth register: On OD10 staff in the nursery are not sure whether to record 
the number of pregnancies or deliveries of a patient.
Comment: It is unclear if other staff and in other documents might also mix this 
up. At least for now the incident is not followed up any further by staff.
7.3.4. Other issues
T35 substantial cost increase of one drug: On OD8 In the morning meeting the 
ward physician (respondent d30) notifies staff of a certain frequently used 
product which price has, literally overnight, increased by 500 Euros. He 
suggests a cheaper alternative drug.
Comment: Sharing this on CIRS could disseminate this information further, 
warn other Women hospitals and help save costs across the entire hospital 
(network).
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T42 disposal of hazardous items: At the end of the observation on OD2 (it is 
already 2:30 pm, after the head nurse’s official shift end and already quiet at the 
department) the clerk passes by the open door of the head nurse. He assumes 
that a still originally packed 5kg container of soda lime26 had been accidentally 
binned and shows it to the head nurse. It turns out that the product is expired 
and had been binned (according to surgical staff correctly) by surgical support 
staff. However, soda lime consists of 75 percent calcium hydroxide which can 
cause skin irritations and blindness, so it is not completely unproblematic to just 
leave it on the hallway for the clerk to collect it. Especially considering, as the 
head nurse emphasises, previous events where individuals had been found 
searching the hospital waste. In another department one doctor was known to 
place expired eye drops visibly on the ward in a simple nylon bag “that was 
practically for the patients to take away, that was normal there” (respondent n7). 
The head nurse decides that this item should not end up in the domestic waste 
as it could cause harm. The incident worries the head nurse as only a little while 
ago there was a major clear out of the operation theatre area where this product 
(it can’t be used in any of the machines that are in use at the department) 
should have been detected. “Why did nobody find it then? This is what worries 
me!” (respondent n7) He composes a handwritten note to the chief surgical 
nurse to prevent this from happening again.
Comment: Although this incident is not reported in CIRS it is discussed the next 
day in the nurses’ morning meeting. The incident is further followed up on OD3 
and according to the pharmacy the correct handling for the soda lime is to (a) if 
originally packed send back to pharmacy, or otherwise (b) dispose of in the 
hospital’s special waste. Although the incident has been investigated and the 
correct handling is now known to the head nurse and the charge nurse, who
26 a chemical mixture used in anaesthesia to remove carbon dioxide from breathing gases to 
prevent C02 retention and carbon dioxide poisoning
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want to share it with other nurses in respective meetings, it could have further 
been shared on CIRS. A number of reports on expired drugs (soda lime, eye 
drops, etc.) could point to a management issue of drugs, questioning why 
expensive drugs are not used up before their due date, and this could 
potentially save costs.
7.4. Barriers to reporting
7.4.1. Little awareness of CIRS
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with little awareness of CIRS at the department.
T5 junior doctors and medical student apprentices don’t know CIRS: OD1 
Respondent d22 is a junior doctor27 who already had been at the department for 
several weeks. During this time respondent d22 had completed his introduction 
training and had already ‘made himself a name’ as someone who brings up 
issues and likes to call things by their name. Although the doctor responsible for 
the junior doctors’ training (respondent d20) may be considered ‘pro-CIRS’ the 
junior doctor (respondent d22) was completely unaware of the possibility to use 
CIRS at the department. CIRS hadn’t even been mentioned in the training. 
Respondent d22 also stated he had not heard about CIRS from anyone else at 
the department. He insisted that he had not received any kind of written 
information about CIRS, although he would be interested. When the researcher 
told him more about CIRS the junior doctor’s reaction was that “it can’t work 
when it is anonymous” (respondent d22). It wouldn’t be useful to do this 
anonymously as every patient is unique and has a unique problem that occurs
27 jun ior doctor or hou se  o ffice  refer to the sam e p o sition  o f  a doctor in m edical training
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only in a certain situation. An observed error is a subjective perception and 
therefore not a true assessment of right and wrong. In addition respondent d22 
stated he was convinced that he would not be allowed to use a CIRS and over 
the remaining two months of his service at the department.
The information given by the junior doctor (respondent d22) that CIRS had not 
been mentioned in their training was verified through interviewing other junior 
doctors. It turned out they all hadn’t heard about CIRS. This was equally true for 
medical student apprentices as for example respondent d41, a student 
apprentice from Germany, who had already been at the department for three 
weeks and was actively involved in many of the medical activities, something 
that cannot be taken for granted, verified on OD13. He had never heard about 
CIRS. It is unlikely that he did hear something about it in his remaining time at 
the department (apprentices usually spend one month at the department).
Comment: The researcher then asked the deputy head of the department 
(respondent d2) why junior doctors were not allowed to use CIRS. He replied: 
"Of course all junior doctors are trained. They receive a folder with information 
but they just don’t read it; it doesn’t matter if you put it on a piece of paper or a 
disk - in the end it is them who have to sit down and read it, they just don’t do it; 
also the four eye principle doesn’t work, it is a disaster" (respondent d2). 
However, the statement that junior doctors are trained on CIRS is an 
exaggeration in itself because basically training on CIRS does not exist in the 
department. A look at the file for newly appointed staff and junior doctors 
(accessed through the head secretary) revealed that indeed the junior doctor 
was right and that the information folder does not contain any information on 
CIRS - CIRS it not mentioned in even one word. It is not clear where the 
mistake is and who would be responsible for informing them about CIRS. As a 
matter of fact junior staff and medical student apprentices do not know about 
CIRS.
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T65 interdisciplinary ward team doesn’t know CIRS: On another occasion on 
OD13 the gynaecology ward, a joint coffee break and loose discussion, an 
entire interdisciplinary team, consisting of ward physician, nurses and nurse 
trainees, was found not to know anything about CIRS.
Comment: It appears as if the previous charge nurse of this particular ward had 
actively suppressed and not passed on information about CIRS (see also T12 
‘information about CIRS deliberately not shared’).
T7 interdisciplinary weekend ward team can’t find info about CIRS: Upon 
request of the researcher (it is a quiet evening during a weekend shift on OD5) 
a senior physician (respondent d25) together with nurses from the checkpoint 
try to find information about CIRS or risk management in the hospital. Together 
they search the electronic information system and can’t find anything, no 
information about CIRSmedical or any other information on CIRS.
Comment: The researcher already knows that there is some general information 
about CIRS on the system. It appears as if they have never searched for this 
information, or used it, before.
T6 head nurse has no info on CIRS and T66 charge nurse has no info on CIRS: 
That there was little documentation of CIRS was further verified on OD3. When 
observing the head nurse (respondent n7) it became apparent that although he 
appeared generally very well organised (everything was neatly arranged in 
folders that occupied the entire wall of the office) and seemed to have a folder 
or document about almost anything he did not have a specific CIRS folder or 
even any kind of information on CIRS. There was also nothing such as a ‘quality 
management folder’. It was a similar experience when inquiring information 
about CIRS from the charge nurse of the obstetric ward, who is also the deputy 
head nurse of the department (respondent n9) (T66 charge nurse has no info 
on CIRS, OD3). He too seemed to have a folder for about everything and when
230
Chapter 7: Research F indings and Analysis 2
asked about CIRS literally jumped off his feet, looking through the folders, only 
not finding anything, saying “ah, it must be somewhere here, below there; 
maybe someone took the folder away, everything is open here” (respondent n9). 
He promises the researcher to look for it. In the end he finds something about 
the WKAV system, not the OEGGG project (also not noting a difference), in the 
PC. It appears as if he saw this for the first time and is clearly not familiar with it. 
It is somewhat surprising that he doesn’t even know whether or not there is 
some information about CIRS.
Comment: Surprisingly it was found on that the young ward secretaries 
(respondent 35), compared to clinical front line staff and the head secretary, 
knew comparatively much about CIRS (OD10). As they are familiar with the in- 
house computer system and always searched for new things they knew there 
was (some basic) information about the WKAV CIRS (not the OEGGG project) 
on the system. However, they had never been asked about it nor did they have 
to provide any of this information about CIRS to clinical staff. On the other hand 
one of the senior physicians (respondent d25) who officially holds the title 
‘quality delegate’ from WKAV is not involved in CIRS and doesn’t have this 
information.
T10 knowledge of password: Fundamental for using CIRS is knowledge of 
username and password. It was observed that many of the staff who had at 
least heard about CIRS did not know the password. The obstetric ward tried to 
counter that by placing a small sticker on the PC which had the username and 
password on it. Still however staff were observed not making a connection 
between CIRS and this little sticker. Staff from the obstetric ward repeatedly 
stated they wouldn’t know the password.
Comment: While the idea of a sticker with username and password may be 
considered a good idea, especially given the general lack of information about
CIRS, there was in impression that staff who claimed they didn’t know the
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password expected a more formal presentation of username and password, not 
just being expected to obtain this information by themselves from the sticker. As 
it is a shared computer at the ward checkpoint it was not clear who had left the 
sticker there and who was supposed (allowed) using it. The perception was that 
the sticker better should have been accompanied by a more formal and 
personal introduction. Other than that it was observed that the PC at the 
obstetric ward checkpoint was the only one with such a sticker and that other 
PCs could have been labelled, especially in the senior physicians’ rooms. 
Senior physicians spend a lot of time there when not on the ward, for example 
when writing patient records, sleeping or resting during the night shift. These 
rooms provide the desirable privacy when reporting in CIRS. The sticker may 
work as a reminder for staff to use CIRS. Another potential candidate for a 
CIRS sticker is the computer in the outpatient physician’s office as the room 
provides some privacy (OD13).
T12 information about CIRS deliberately not shared: During the observation it 
appears as if more staff on the obstetric ward have at least heard about the 
OEGGG project (although they generally don’t know anything about CIRS itself) 
than on the gynaecology ward. One of the nurses on the obstetric ward, 
respondent n12, for example says that: “All I know about CIRS is that I got this 
little card with a username and password, I have that in my files, but that’s all I 
know.” It seems that someone in the department has taken the initiative and 
printed little (credit card size) cards with username and password information. 
On the obstetric ward these cards had actually reached frontline staff, for 
example respondent n12. On the gynaecology ward however, which recently 
had a new charge nurse, the researcher doesn’t see any of those cards and 
staff in general appear to know less about the project (for example that it had 
already started, username and password, etc.). Inquiring about it from the new 
charge nurse on the gynaecology ward he starts to look for it. It turns out that 
those cards do exist but had (the new charge nurse supposes deliberately)
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been locked away by the old charge nurse who was known to be anti CIRS. 
When the new charge nurse finds those cards, now long after the project had 
started, he gets angry about it as he had specifically asked the previous charge 
nurse if there was any information available on CIRS.
Comment: This incident points out a potential disadvantage of the top down 
pyramid approach in sharing information about CIRS. If one of the charge 
nurses (high up in the pyramid) is not interested in CIRS and ‘prefers’ his 
nurses not to use CIRS he can effectively block out an entire ward from 
receiving information about and consequently using CIRS. As there was no 
direct CIRS person at the department to follow this up and the dissemination of 
information on CIRS was dependent on trust and goodwill of the upper ranks in 
the department this situation could prevail until it was discovered by chance.
Disseminating information about CIRS using the pyramid system seemed to be 
not very effective. Over the entire observation period at the department the 
researcher did not once see this or any other method being used to spread 
information about CIRS. There was very little written information available on 
CIRS and no one person overlooking the implementation.
7.4.2. Low priority of CIRS
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with the low priority given to CIRS at the department.
T69 other projects: Largely due to their relative independence and 
fragmentation into medical specialties staff can instigate or participate in almost 
any (medical) study they want. Fieldwork observation allowed seeing CIRS in 
relation to other projects at the department. On OD4 during the nightshift 
respondent d8, a senior physician, called a 24 hour telephone line (Cyrosafe, it 
is 4:56 in the morning) to transmit data about the newborn baby. He does that
out of his own initiative. He had heard that they were looking for participants
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and decided to support the program. The ward physician on the other hand 
shows little interest and leaves. Observation on OD9 shows the ignition of 
another project by the charge nurse on the gynaecology ward (respondent n10) 
who is running, out of his own initiative, a ‘fast track’ project to better and faster 
mobilise patients after an operation. However, projects do not always have to 
be related to clinical matters. On OD5 for example information about the 
department’s ‘activity day’, which was announced only the previous day, was 
already posted in the nurses’ meeting and social rooms, which had not been the 
case over the 18 months that CIRS had already been in use at the department.
Comment: The above observations suggest that some staff are highly motivated 
and interested in improving medical safety and put in a lot of personal effort in 
setting up projects. It is likely that those staff can also be motivated for other, 
probably more complex, initiatives such as CIRS. However, it also becomes 
apparent that participation in any of those projects is voluntary and not 
documented. In many cases colleagues may not even know about the existence 
of a project or who is participating in which one. In theory the overall 
responsibility for participation in these projects lies with the head of department 
but he does not have the time to overview, coordinate or document them. This 
may result in redundancies and doesn’t seem to make full use of the inherent 
learning potential within the department that could be achieved with a better 
information exchange about these projects. CIRS seems to be a similar ‘victim’ 
of a lack of an ‘overhead’ and staff are found not to identify with CIRS as much 
as they do with some of the other projects.
T70 investigation of thefts: OD7 Recently there are increasing thefts at the 
department. One of the department’s digital cameras had been stolen from one 
of the senior physicians’ office, a small amount of money, as well as food and 
drinks were missing in the secretaries’ office. This is discussed during the 
morning meeting and the head of department says: “I don’t want to shout it out
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loud but time has come to hand this over to the professionals [i.e. the police]” 
(respondent d1).
Comment: It seems very clear here that this isn’t something the department can 
handle on its own and that external professional help is required. It may be 
argued that this is equally true in regards to patient safety and CIRS. However, 
this doesn’t seem so clear to the department. The thefts present a threat that 
everyone can directly relate to. Thefts are discussed on at least three of the 
observation days, far more often and intensely than CIRS. Why hasn’t CIRS 
been followed up so persistently? Is it just because getting help from the police 
is for free?
T59 technical support and T71 services with feedback are used: Staff, 
especially nurses, have been observed frequently using the technical support 
team. Everybody from the nursing team knows the extension and consults their 
service, whether it is with computer issues, a faulty patient bed alarm or a 
dripping water tab (OD5 and OD8). Feedback is prompt and the service good. 
For example during the weekend shift the electrician came quickly to fix the 
patient bed alarm which the nurse just noticed earlier does not work and also 
leaves a spare part on the ward checkpoint in case it should fail again.
Comment: The whole work environment seems to be very ad-hoc, with many 
unplanned events unfolding over the day, asking improvisation from staff and 
prompt support services. In that light it seems that important issues are 
associated with prompt feedback. A dripping water tab is undesirable but 
doesn’t fall exactly under the responsibilities of a nurse. Despite that, and 
probably due to its good prompt feedback, the technical support service was 
frequently used. In contrast CIRSmedical did basically not provide any feedback 
over the past 18 months. It might therefore have been associated with a lower 
importance and was not frequently used.
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T23 willingness to report: Some of the senior physicians, although overtly not 
against CIRS, seem to have very modest interest reporting in CIRS. They 
appear quite ‘laid back’ to ‘change that will never happen’ (respondent d17 and 
d38). They have seen many programs come and go without having any (lasting) 
effect, so they also ‘take it easy’ on CIRS (ibid). Asked if he would probably use 
CIRS from home a senior physician is almost insulted, responding “now that 
would be something; I have never done that and I think it is not even 
possible28...” (respondent d38). One of his colleagues (respondent d17) has a 
case for CIRS but says “no, I won’t report this now; and I have forgotten how to 
use it, I will just tell it to the deputy head of department and he will put it in”. 
Doctoral staff generally seem to lack information about and knowledge of CIRS, 
coupled with a lack of awareness of what kind of events may be reported to 
CIRS. Respondent d17 for example states (the very unlikely) that “in the past 
six to nine months there was nothing I could have reported on CIRS”.
Comment: That many of the doctor staff seem unwilling to report directly in 
CIRS may also be related to other habits, one may say the culture (see also 
section 7.5.4), at the department. For example it was observed that one senior 
physician makes all the itemisation of services (i.e. which procedures had been 
performed on a patient -  for the finance department) for the entire department. 
In theory every doctor should do this by himself and immediately following an 
operation but that’s not the case. Maybe this contributed to a perception 
amongst staff that as long as one person ‘does it’ nobody else has to care 
anymore. This could explain why CIRS is not indoctrinated into everyone’s 
everyday activities but more seen as ‘the thing of the deputy head of 
department’ (respondents d17 and d38).
2 C IR S can be used from  any com puter w ith an internet con n ection
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T21 time windows not used for reporting in CIRS: While staff are generally were 
busy during the morning hours especially in the afternoon there are sometimes 
time windows where ‘there is nothing to do’. Time that may be used for 
composing CIRS reports (it takes about 10-15 minutes to report).
Comment: Where these time windows occurred time was used for other things 
than reporting, an informal chat with a colleague, a coffee break, or searching 
five minutes for a candle for the birthday surprise cake of another staff member. 
Although breaks and social contacts are important it shows that CIRS in the 
department does not have as high a status as acclaimed in the patient safety 
literature. That more of these time windows were observed in nursing personnel 
than amongst doctors might be related to the patient safety literature which 
states that in general nurses report more than doctors.
T33 theatre nurses don’t use CIRS: At the end of OD2 the researcher overhears 
a lively conversation between the theatre nurses. They are talking loud and full 
of emotions: “This was clearly a communication error! It’s ok you know, but then 
talking a lot of bullshit...about it and not admitting that there has been a mistake 
is absolute bollocks.” (respondent n24)
Comment: This incident is an example of ‘healthy discussions’ at the 
department. However, this group in particular was not involved very much in 
CIRS and it is unlikely that this incident was shared any further in CIRSmedical, 
although it seemed predestined for it.29
7.4.3. Other barriers to reporting
This section presents other contextual codes that are associated as barriers to 
reporting at the department.
29 this incident could have been put in the above category little awareness but is put here as a 
consequence of the little awareness
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The CIRS trustee: The anonymity of the system bears in it that somebody has 
to de-identify reports. The design of the input mask can already prevent 
obtaining information that would lead to identification (i.e. not asking for details 
that could lead to reporter identification). However the free text passage that 
describes the event and the circumstances under which it occurred in the 
reporter’s own words, arguably the key part of the report (for example Expert 1, 
IOM, 2000), still needs to be checked for anonymity. This requires the role of 
the CIRS trustee, for checking the narrative on details that may lead to 
identification of any of the parties involved.
Comment: The fact that an internal CIRS trustee (i.e. someone from the 
department) was required for CIRS to be operational presented a, probably the, 
major barrier. This was evident by the number of questions and comments 
concerning the CIRS trustee during the training session (section 6.3) and the 
fact that nobody in the department volunteered to become the CIRS trustee, not 
at the beginning of the project and not during the course of the observation until 
leaving the field. Expert 1 had to ‘volunteer’ to become the department’s CIRS 
trustee. The same was observed in three out of four hospitals that had been 
observed at the beginning of the study. Only one hospital elected a CIRS 
trustee. There are many potential reasons why staff members did not want to 
become CIRS trustees, such as confidentiality, liability, or fear of rejection by 
peers. It may also be seen as just additional workload that staff do not really 
have time for. The department leadership did not clearly position itself on this 
matter and never communicated if extra time could be made available for 
executing the role of a CIRS trustee.
Apart from trust and time factors concerning the role of an internal trustee, and 
considering the (lack of) knowledge staff had about CIRS and patient safety, it 
is questionable if just any member of staff could have actually stood up to the 
requirements to this job. Furthermore the observation suggests that there would
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need to be at least two trustees, one for reports from medics and one for reports 
from nurses.
T13 time to report: On a normal dayshift from 8am until 1:25pm on OD1 with the 
deputy head of the department (respondent d2) the researcher wondered when 
respondent d2 would have had time to use CIRS. He was busy every single 
moment of the shift and worked without a break. Also OD11 showed how busy 
(this time nursing-) staff are, especially during the morning hours. The observed 
nurse (respondent n37) worked through her entire shift without taking a single 
break, only rushing to the toilet once, a stopped 1 minute and 30 seconds. 
Another nurse, respondent n32, when asked if anything could be improved at 
the department in terms of quality he responded: “Ah, for that I would need 
three days! Somebody should just explain to me how they can expect one 
single person to make three patient admissions, to give out food to everyone on 
the ward, and to make the requested blood tests, and all this between 8am and 
9am. Can you (addressing the researcher) change that?” (respondent n32)
Comment: Both doctors and nurses have been observed to be extremely busy 
during the morning shift. Just from a time factor it seems unlikely that anyone 
will report use CIRS in this time period. In general it is considered that reporting 
an incident in CIRS takes about 10 to 15 minutes, depending on the familiarity 
of the reporter with the reporting procedure, the complexity of the incident, and 
his ability to formulate the free text passage (Expert 1). 10 to 15 minutes might 
not sound very long to ‘outsiders’ but seems very long in the context of the 
everyday work at the hospital. The time task protocol that was taken throughout 
observation reveals that physicians spend on average less than two minutes 
with one patient. Even if reporting one incident would take ten minutes this is 
already the equivalent to seeing five patients. With the above described low 
status of CIRS it seems highly unlikely that staff would choose CIRS over the 
opportunity of spending more time with patients. In addition the time that it takes
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to report an incident also has to be seen in context for the very department and 
in connection with the availability of computers. This suggests that much more 
time is needed. This discussed in the next code T67.
T67 availability of computers to report: PCs are something precious in the 
department and especially during the mornings constantly occupied, resulting in 
other staff and patients having to wait. This is especially a problem on the ward 
checkpoint when nurses have to put new admissions on the hospital system 
and doctors want to use the computer at the same time.
Comment: Although CIRS can be used from any computer with an internet 
connection i.e. also from home, using CIRS in their spare time doesn’t seem to 
be a popular option amongst staff (for example respondents d38 and d17), and 
one may add ‘why should it be’? But also using CIRS during staff hours seems 
to be an issue that needs addressing. Little time, coupled with lack of computers 
and an unawareness of the importance of near misses and no harm events 
does not exactly present an environment that fosters reporting. The previously 
described incident T13 with the deputy head of department (respondent d2) 
showed that, although as deputy head he probably had more privileges in using 
a computer, he still only used two computers over the entire shift. One of which, 
the PC in the operation theatre area, was not connected to CIRS, and the other 
one was the very crowded PC on the nurse checkpoint with no privacy and 
literally 4-5 staff and patients constantly around, with direct view of the 
computer screen. Using the staff computer at the checkpoint would be too 
obvious as both staff and patients can observe it (they might even start to 
speculate what and about whom he is reporting30). It is more than likely that he
30 T he researcher constan tly  to o k  fie ld n o tes during the observation . S ta ff w ere gen era lly  ‘n o s y ’ and 
w anted to lo o k  at the notes but d id n ’t seem  to bother too  m uch. On on e  o cca s io n  h o w ev er  a nursing  
apprentice approached the researcher w ith the w ords ‘w hat did you  ju st report about m e !’ and it to o k  quite  
som e c o n v in c in g  talk that noth ing negative  w as reported about her particularly on that in stan ce . On 
another o cca s io n  theatre personnel associa ted  the research er’s note taking w ith their im m ed ia te  a c tiv ities
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would be interrupted by others (staff or patients) who want to know something, 
need to ‘quickly use the computer themselves’, or that he’d be called away 
quickly (which means they would have to abort the message and start from 
scratch at a later point). If the deputy head of department already finds it difficult 
to find an appropriate environment for reporting this may be even more difficult 
for other staff lower down the hierarchy.
In addition it need be considered that is not possible to just ‘quickly use’ any 
computer at the department for reporting in CIRS. It has been observed (at least 
at some computers) that in order to report to CIRS staff have to log out of the 
hospital system first and then log on to the PC with personal username and 
password, which allows them to access the internet. Apart from the time loss 
this presents an unnecessary additional barrier and may also have an effect on 
the perceived anonymity or confidentiality of the system, giving a feeling that 
one’s report may be traced through the personal log in. Overall, and although 
the head of department stated in the interview (section 6.4.3) that there were 
enough computers for reporting, it seems that either there are not enough 
computers or that work processes need to be reorganised in a way not to allow 
bottlenecks when many people need to use the computer at the same time. As 
long as staff cannot fulfil their core duties as a result of this situation it is 
questionable how much computers will be used for reporting in CIRS (the new 
charge nurse at the gynaecology department, respondent n10, had inquired 
about an additional computer).
T18 litigation: OD8 During the morning meeting a patient case is discussed. The 
patient has been already at the department for two days, yet the head of 
department wants to wait with an operation and prefers trying a more 
conservative approach first. Another physician (not from the department) wants
(and p o ssib le  w rongd oin g).
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to get involved and operate the patient immediately, which creates a bit of a 
friction around the incident. The head of department mentions that over the 
course of his career he had been sued many times “once for operating too early, 
and once for not operating early enough...., however, I was never convicted” 
(respondent d1).
Comment: Although this is not directly related to CIRS the incident shows that 
doctors nowadays have to live with a constant fear of being sued (and that there 
is little emotional and professional support in that respect for them). The woolly 
statements about reporter protection regarding CIRS in Austria will not help or 
encourage staff to ‘trust the system’ and report in a carefree manner.
T 68 reporter protection: On OD8 a senior physician (respondent d28) who has 
experience with CIRS from another hospital attests to the above fears of 
litigation in connection to CIRS. “It is good to report but with one foot you are in 
prison. Patients expect us to be completely error free. I know the system but I 
have not used it myself.” (respondent d28)
Comment: In a press conference on CIRS in the Austrian Health Care System 
the president of the Austrian Medical Chamber (APM, 2009) listed as the 
principles of the Austrian government pilot CIRS: anonymity, impunity, learning 
and participation, suggesting that reporters are legally protected. However other 
sources (during the observation, especially Expert 1) contradict this and the 
question is if the president (APM, 2009) promised too much. The recent BMG31 
publication (BMG, 2011a) states that according to Austrian the Austrian Health 
Care act paragraph 54 reporters are under no legal protection when reporting, 
which is the case for example in Scandinavian health care reporting systems 
and is considered a key asset of any CIRS in high reliability industries. An 
attempt to conceal this apparent shortcoming is made by stressing that, despite
31 Federal M in istry o f  H ealth in A ustria
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a lack of impunity, according to paragraph 78 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure (StPO) the OQMed, which is the operator of CIRS, is not an 
institution with sovereign right and therefore has no explicit obligation to notify 
the authorities. Whether this assessment is thorough and reliable is 
questionable because the BMG as the contracting entity is authorized to issue 
directives to the OQMed and it may be argued that the OQMed is thus a 
subgroup of the BMG. What the exact juridical situation is can not be elaborated 
here. However, it must be stressed that juridical issues have not been 
addressed adequately by the parties involved in CIRS and that thus no 
documentation and reliable reference exists to this topic that would make it 
clear for potential users if they have or have not to fear litigation claims when 
using CIRS.
T19 online reporting: Some staff were observed to not even try to access CIRS 
because they ‘knew’ that they wouldn’t have access to the internet with their 
login. Older nursing staff have been observed having slight difficulties with and 
avoid using PCs. CIRSmedical is an online only system.
Comment: Some logins have restricted internet access. Although CIRSmedical 
is one of the few websites that can be accessed using those accounts many 
staff appeared not to be aware of this. In regards to anonymity it is also
questionable if staff would want to use CIRS using their personal account.
Considering the log on - log off issues it is also not possible to “just quickly use 
CIRS” as this is quite a cumbersome time consuming process that does not 
seem to fit the hectic and ad-hoc core daily (medical/nursing) procedures. In 
addition there is no alternative to reporting online. A study on improving
voluntary incident reporting by Evans et al. (2007) showed that improved
reporting rates were achieved in those hospitals where online reporting was not 
offered. Despite the discussions around the role of a CIRSmedical trustee staff 
have been observed to bypass the online reporting issue by just passing on
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information verbally to the deputy head of department (respondent d2) who 
would then put it on CIRS.
T26 CIRS input form: On OD 3 respondent n14, the head midwife, criticises that 
his profession does not appear in the CIRS dropdown menu. In general he 
seems unhappy with the lack of appreciation of this (new) profession. The only 
other direct ‘criticism’ of the input form was made by the head of department 
(respondent d1) when he tried out the system himself (together with the 
researcher following the interview, see section 6.4.3) for the first time and not 
everything appeared a 100 percent clear to him. He was puzzled for example 
whether or not the report he submitted had been accepted and why his report 
didn’t appear on the website (it first had to pass the CIRS trustee).
7.5. Organisational threats
7.5.1. Facilities
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with the term ‘facilities’.
T17 light management in operation theatre: On OD13 during the endoscopy the 
lights in the operation theatre are dimmed so that surgeons have good visibility 
of the screens. As the anaesthetist does not have a separate light he has to 
prepare the medication in semi-darkness (he tries to get more visibility by 
moving nearer the window, but this doesn’t help a lot). A few minutes later 
another theatre nurse joins the procedure and also has to work in semi­
darkness.
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Comment: The current lighting conditions foster errors due to bad visibility and 
are a potential latent threat. In a proactive stance to safety this need be 
addressed before something happens.
T44 design: On OD3 during the morning meeting the re-arrangement of some 
consultancy rooms is discussed. Nurses claim that it is necessary that the room 
will be adapted in a way that patients can be transferred into the consultancy 
room in their own bed (rather than in a wheelchair and having to be lifted into a 
consultancy bed). In this context the head of department makes everyone 
aware of one of the pitfalls inherent in the examination to be performed in this 
room, that patients should not be examined in a lying position as this results in 
an ‘allegedly correct but nevertheless false diagnosis’ (respondent d1).
Comment: This incident presents a risk that nurses may accidentally set up a 
trap for doctors when they position patients wrongly and not all staff are aware 
of it. The incident points to interface issues between doctors and nurses. The 
correct procedure for this kind of examination could be shared on CIRS.
T15 meeting room situation: On OD13, a physician (respondent 39), introduces 
a new therapy during the morning meeting. The current meeting room situation 
may be described as being less than optimal: 23 staff cramped together in a tiny 
room with staff sitting on sofa edges, tables, and most of them just leaning 
against the wall due to inadequate furniture arrangements. The meeting room is 
mostly devoid of meeting room amenities such as flipchart, blackboard, let 
alone a video beamer for presentations. Accordingly staff follow respondent’s 
39 presentation over two small PC screens. Although the researcher is 
comparatively good positioned he can barely see anything.
Comment: One of the implications a meeting room situation like this may have 
can be seen in T55 on OD8. A high risk patient (Hepatitis C) was announced in 
the morning meeting. It happened that the surgeon who was to perform the
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operation later that day, who was present in the morning meeting, did overhear 
this and operated the patient being unaware of the risk. There were other things 
that contributed to the situation, for example a changing operation schedule and 
shorthand changing of surgeons (which may be a result of T9 ‘surgeons late for 
operation’), no additional reminder to the surgeon that this was a high risk 
patient, but the meeting room situation was a contributing factor. The surgeon 
and the head midwife discussed that it was not uncommon that sometimes you 
just can’t understand others because of the built environment. It is likely that the 
meeting room situation (and in a wider sense the way meetings are held, people 
go in and out, no note taking, not adequate basic facilities) contributes to 
communication errors. Just how potentially severe this is shows OD8 ‘T54 
banked blood’. A patient schedule for operation was discussed in the morning 
meeting and the head of department stated that this patient would require 
special blood from a blood bank abroad if there were any complications during 
the operation. This blood needs to be ordered in advance. Due to the missing 
documentation and alert functions before an operation, as shown in the above 
incident T55 with the high risk patient, this may be simply ‘forgotten’ or just 
missed as part of the conversation in the morning meeting. These describe 
typical cases where nothing bad can happen but in case something goes wrong 
the consequences are potentially severe.
Adding to ‘facilities issues’ it has to be noted that staff in general complained to 
the researcher (and from the researcher’s lay perspective was confirmed) about 
a lack of space, for example to prepare medication, for patients’ admissions 
using the computer (privacy?), for face to face meetings with staff (employee 
talks), interviewing new staff, privacy with patient, or general staff meetings. If 
one can’t even have privacy for a patient or staff talk how realistic is it to expect 
privacy when reporting in CIRS?
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7.5 .2 .1.T.
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with ‘I.T.’.
T30 mobile phone settings: The next incident happened during the nightshift on 
OD4 with the two doctors on duty (respondents d2 and d8). It is customary that 
one of the two doctors on duty (usually the more senior one) can rest and is 
called in only as a back up or when otherwise needed. Exactly this is what 
respondent d8 wanted to do at around 9pm. He was consulting a new patient 
who had been at the hospital’s outpatient department earlier that day but 
returned to the hospital at night because of throwback pain. Respondent d8 
decided to call his more senior colleague, the deputy head of department 
respondent d2, for assistance. However, the staff mobile phones, the main 
mean of communication at the department, did not connect. By chance the 
researcher, who was also equipped with a staff mobile, pressed a key and the 
connection is established. It was pure coincidence and without it respondent d2 
could not have been reached (this all happened in front of the patient). That 
same night one of the midwives could not reach respondent d8, who was the 
main doctor on duty, for the same reason. During another observation on OD6, 
four days later, the same thing happened to the head nurse during the dayshift. 
This time the researcher could not ‘help’ as it was a different phone with a 
different setup.
Comment: It turned out that staff mobile phones have two frequencies but only 
work in one of them. It is not known why or how the frequencies had changed 
but it is found that different phones (of the same type though) have different 
settings of how to change back to the frequency that works, i.e. there is not one 
universal rule that can be applied to all phones (which would be useful as staff 
sometimes swap mobiles). Over the next days it becomes apparent that not
many people know about these technicalities or how to handle them. Staff that
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were directly affected were observed to consult the technical support team. 
However, the technical support team only provides symptomatic support and 
does not identify or remove the root cause of the problem, meaning that the 
same problem can reoccur and to different people. Sharing the incident on 
CIRS could either make more people aware of the problem or, through the 
incident being documented, instigate changes. The consequences of not being 
able to reach physicians, especially during night shifts where one cannot just 
leave his area to look for someone in person, are potentially severe.
T60 faulty blood pressure meter: On OD13 the ward physician on the 
gynaecology ward (respondent d42) tells the researcher about an incident that 
occurred a week ago with the electronic blood pressure meter. The physician 
suspected that the blood pressure meter measured incorrectly and double 
checked it with manually measuring the patient’s blood pressure. He suggested 
that the blood pressure meter was faulty or unreliable. He discussed the 
incident with one of the nurses but nothing has changed.
Comment: Electric blood pressure meters are sensitive to noise and it could be 
that this influenced the measurement. To find out the exact reason the blood 
pressure meter could have been checked by a technician and other possible 
reasons (for example the influence of noise on measurements) identified 
through sharing the incident on CIRS. Respondent d42 is not aware of the 
possibility to using CIRS at the department.
T61 ordering drugs using in-house computer network: On OD9 the charge 
nurse tries to order a certain drug via the in-house computer drug order system. 
Products are selected from a drop down menu and the product he wants is not 
on that list. Only when calling the pharmacy it becomes clear that the product is 
available but that the system does not list all available products for ease of 
navigation (listing all drugs would result in an ‘endless’ list).
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Comment: The list of products visible to staff could be amended to (all) those 
drugs relevant to gynaecology and obstetrics or staff using the system should 
be made aware of the fact that drugs that do not appear in the list might be still 
available through directly contacting the pharmacy. Possible consequences of 
the incident are delay, additional effort, possibly higher costs through using a 
more expensive alternative, or not using the product of choice. As not all 
frontline staff directly order through the system (usually nurses document what 
they need in a drug order book and the charge nurse then orders those drugs 
using the computer system) sharing this incident on CIRS could alert other 
charge nurses in the hospital.
T20 access to quality related information: On OD8 the head midwife 
(respondent n14), out of his own initiative, wanted to acquire information about 
hygiene in one of the nurses PC’s. However, he cannot due to access 
restrictions.
Comment: If general quality relevant information is already on the system there 
should be a way that all staff can access it. While this may present a problem 
that could be addressed in-house a related incident shows the wider dimension 
of access issues in health care. On another occasion during the nightshift on 
OD4 respondent d8, a senior physician, consults a patient who had previously 
been at another hospital and at this hospital’s outpatient department. 
Respondent d8 tries to access the electronic patient file online but is refused 
access. Access to patient data is a more general (and hot debated) issue but 
greater information sharing at least within the hospital or between inpatient and 
outpatient area is desirable and might be feasible. Access to general quality 
information, not patient data, seems to present an opportunity for change that 
should be relatively easy to bring about. As clinical staff do not have time to 
pursue this it is unlikely that it will soon change. Documenting it in CIRS would
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at least provide a statistic on how often staff experience this problem and might 
call someone with responsibility on duty to attend to this issue.
7.5.3. Processes
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with ‘processes’.
T29 actualisation of telephone numbers: Mobile phones are the main mean of 
communication at the department. Mobile phone numbers change frequently 
and the current process is not sufficient in keeping up to date, resulting in 
situations where staff cannot reach each other. One example where this 
happened is OD14. The patient was already ‘prepared’ (positioned, narcotised, 
etc. and on the operation table) and everyone was waiting for the surgeon. After 
five minutes the theatre nurse tried to call the surgeon but used the old 
telephone list that was still hanging in the operation theatre (the researcher was 
with the head secretary a few days prior to this event when the head secretary 
not only printed out the new list but personally brought it to the operation theatre; 
however, operation theatre staff have to put up the list themselves as the head 
secretary cannot enter the operation theatre himself). Staff cannot reach the 
surgeon and have to wait until he arrives in the operation theatre by himself.
Comment: As not one person is responsible for updating telephone numbers 
the researcher could observe the co-existence of multiple telephone number 
lists and with differing information on it. These lists are also devoid of a ‘last 
update’ date which sometimes results in up to date lists being replaced by older 
telephone lists. Moreover staff complained that even when the lists in the 
department are correct the electronic list in the hospital system (for other 
departments), which is run by the hospital directorate, is not updated. This was 
a problem that prevailed despite personal intervention of individual physicians. 
This creates potentially dangerous situations when staff members cannot be
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reached in an emergency. The initiative from the head secretary to print and 
manually distribute up to date telephone lists is desirable but was not appointed 
one of his core tasks and therefore probably not executed and followed up in 
the same way as he does with his core duties. The head of department showed 
a somewhat resigned attitude when the issue was brought up (once more) in 
the morning meeting. Jokingly he suggested to the physician who had 
intervened at the directorate: ‘try it once more, if nothing happens we send Mr. 
Weicht [i.e. the researcher]’ (respondent d1). The incident was not reported in 
CIRS. Again it is suggested that at least a documentation of the incident could 
help when discussing the issue with the directorate. It seems to be another 
issue that no one is ultimately responsible for.
T64 drugs not verified -  patient delay: Nurses can suggest certain drugs for 
patient treatment. These then need to be verified by one of the physicians. 
During the week this works fine but on weekends drugs are not verified and 
nurses have to wait until Monday morning for physicians to do so. As no extra 
time is calculated for the additional workload on Monday it happens that drugs 
are not verified by 8:30am. Drugs that are not verified and ordered by that time 
will only be available for the next day, causing delays in treatment and extra 
costs.
Comment: Reporting this in CIRS reporting could provide statistics on how often 
this happens.
T63 delayed patient discharge: On OD9 a patient discharge is delayed because 
the department cannot get an appointment for a final ultrasound examination (at 
that hospital). This delay means the patient has to stay an additional day at the 
department causing substantial additional costs and additional logistical effort 
(change food-order for the day, plan bed capacity etc), discomfort, and an 
additional infection risk for the patient because of the prolonged stay.
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Comment: Reporting this in CIRS reporting could provide statistics on how often 
this happens.
T62 missing patient consent inhibiting transfer: OD9 It does happen that 
patients are transferred to the department in a bad general state. Those 
patients often only require little medical attention and could then be transferred 
to a nursing home. For the transfer from the ward to the nursing home written 
consent from the patient is required and staff sometimes have difficulty 
acquiring it. According to staff there are cases where it is apparent that patients 
do not want to make ‘the final move’ to a nursing home and try to delay the 
transfer as long as possible by not giving consent (some patients pretend to be 
asleep, deaf, or act defiantly). This results in situations where patients stay on 
the ward for weeks (seven weeks in one recent instance), causing immense 
costs for the health system, and not receiving the best care.
Comment: The previous charge nurse at the gynaecology ward did not seem to 
bother too much about this and the new charge nurse now tries to acquire 
patient consent for a possible transfer to a nursing home right at the admission 
of those patients. Otherwise the charge nurse is faced with a prevailing problem 
of a patient not suitable for this ward and blocking a bed. Through using CIRS 
lessons may be learned how other departments deal with this issue in a 
meaningful and humane way.
T14 time, patient factors, and organisation -  known problem not solved: Section 
7.6.3 introduced the contextual code T13 ‘time to report’. How efficiently staff 
use time is closely linked to the processes in the department. One example is 
the incident on OD11. It happened that three patients came to the gynaecology 
ward with the same disease pattern (hence requiring the same examinations 
and possibly the same treatment). Because of the extent of this particular series 
of examinations it is important that they are done early in the morning so that all
of the possibly required tests can be performed on that same day. Nurses need
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to arrange appointments in different parts of the hospital (X-Ray department etc.) 
in time and also arrange hospitality services such as lunch or a daybed. The 
particular constellation of same disease pattern and that all three patients were 
sent to the gynaecology ward at the same time resulted in a disproportional 
workload, stress, and longer waiting times for patients. One of the patients, a 
private patient, complained to the head of department about the long wait.
Comment: This incident shows that ‘busyness’ at the department is often the 
consequence of a mix of patient factors and organisational factors. It is possible 
that patients have the same disease pattern but appointments could have been 
made for different times, not to have appoint them all on one and the same day. 
The head of department was furious that patients had to wait so long because 
he wanted patients to have a good first impression of the department. In the end 
it was the nurses, who already knew in the morning how this would end, that 
were told off. This is a re-occurring problem and although the situation could be 
improved through better interface management nobody seems to have time to 
really work on solving this problem. Translating this incident into the world of 
CIRS it is questionable whether incidents such as this boost staffs motivation to 
think in a systems concept and use CIRS. Front line staff knew already how this 
would end. The head of department is the only one with power to actively 
change this situation. Despite his inactivity, in the end it was the nurses who got 
the blame (a manifestation that a blame culture is emotionally more rewarding 
than identifying systemic causes). The negative outcome in this case was ‘only’ 
an increased waiting time for patients. However, parties involved were not able 
to discuss the incident constructively and the same incident may occur at any 
time in the future. How likely is it, in case the patient’s health is affected 
(however slightly that may be), that the incident will be documented, analysed, 
so that the underlying conditions are identified and systemic changes made to 
prevent this from happening again? It is suggested that in order to be credible 
known problems need to be addressed before staff can be encouraged to report
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about new problems (what’s the point of reporting something you know will not 
change?).
There were other problems with interface management, doctors waiting for 
other doctors, doctors waiting for patients, doctors waiting for patients to be 
narcotised, patients already narcotised and waiting for the surgeon. However, 
these were not followed up. They might be recorded in a CIRS (a waiting 
person should have time to report) to determine and document how often such 
events occur and can lead to evidence-based discussions on the need to 
change ‘the system’.
7.5.4. Culture
This section presents the category with contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with ‘culture’.
T50 bypassing procedure / normalisation of deviance: Nurses in Austria are 
legally not allowed to administer infusions. The lawful procedure is for nurses to 
prepare infusions and then for physicians to administer them. In reality however 
this procedure is often bypassed due to staff shortages. For example during a 
weekend shift there was only one doctor on the ward and he was too busy to 
attend to all patients in a timely manner. As a consequence the nurse both 
prepared and administered the drug, thus bypassing the official procedure. This 
is against the law and also breaches the four eye principle (one member of staff 
double checking with the other if it is the right drug, dose, and patient).
Comment: The situation is not uncommon and although perceived undesirable 
by staff (because of time constraints, stress, against the law) at the same time 
there is also at least a feeling amongst some staff (doctors and nurses alike) 
that this is not something a nurse couldn’t do and therefore should also be 
allowed to do. It regards a wider health policy issue that allows comparison with
Germany where nurses are allowed to administer infusions. Because in Austria
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this is not so 1junior doctors, who should learn something in the three months 
they are at the department, become infusion idiots’, administering one infusion 
after another that nurses have prepared. In the described incident the doctor in 
charge just happened to come into the room the moment the infusion was 
connected. The infusion that was connected was one in a row of many (i.e. the 
nurse was not ‘prescribing’ a new drug but continuing the treatment). The 
incident happened on a weekend shift with lower staff capacity. However, as 
long as this procedure is frequently bypassed this presents another 
‘normalisation of deviance’ (one of the contributing factors leading to the 
Challenger disaster) and may extend to other areas and procedures. Reporting 
the incident on CIRS could again provide statistics on the consequences of staff 
shortage and policy regulation.
In discussion with one of the senior physicians about this study he attests to the 
concept of ‘normalisation of deviance’ in that in the first few weeks, when he 
was still new at the department, he noticed a lot of things for improvement. Over 
time his sensibility for things that might be potentially improved had decreased. 
7 don’t see these things anymore; I suppose I just got used to it’ (respondent 
d25). His comment is interesting in relation to T5 (see section 7.6.1) and 
suggests even more that junior doctors and medical student apprentices, who 
spend just a few weeks or months at the department, should be actively 
included in CIRS.
T51 bypassing of house rules: The bypassing of official procedures is observed 
on several occasions. These are not always about clinical procedures (which 
the observer can only detect to a very limited extent) but more humane things 
such as smoking on the ward toilet and in the physicians’ room, eating 
uncollected patient food instead of sending it back (which is a reason to get 
fired), or parking a bicycle in the office. The bicycle and smoking story was quite 
amusing as this was actually a deal between three physicians who shared one
255
C hagte t_£JZesearcfiJ^^
office. The two smokers ‘allowed’ the cycling one to park his (rather expensive) 
bicycle in the office. In exchange the cyclist tolerated the other two would 
smoke in their shared room, which was a real privilege as there was a smoking 
ban for the entire house (OD13, respondents d17, d38 and d40).
T52 bypassing procedures / pharmacy control: On OD3 the assistant head 
nurse and charge nurse of the obstetric ward (respondent n9) receives a call 
informing her about the exact time and date of the annual control of the 
department’s pharmacy. He passes on this information to nurses on the ward. 
This control is actually labelled as “the annual unannounced control” and one of 
the nurses on the ward says that “officially I don’t know about it, just vaguely, 
because it’s about the same time each year” (respondent 11). On a later 
observation day, OD 10, the nurse on the ward then prepares for this annual 
control, sorting out all expired drugs before the control takes place. A few items 
are found and disposed of.
Comment: As this happens somewhat secretly the causes of the problem are 
not identified, for example why drugs have not been disposed of in time, or why 
they were prepared in a way that they do not have a use by date on them (it 
turns out that nurses often cut off the required amount of pills from a stripe, thus 
cutting off the use by date which is imprinted on one end of the stripe). It 
appears as if not a single error should leak out of the department. By the time of 
the unannounced annual control the ward pharmacy is in an ‘impeccable state’. 
It presents an environment where the examiner cannot find anything wrong, 
thus cannot instigate investigations into the root causes and cannot instigate 
any systemic changes. Possible lessons learnt cannot be shared on a CIRS. 
This represents a symptomatic (person) approach rather than an root cause 
identifying (systems) approach to error.
T53 work schedule and shift times: There was an incident where one doctor
took a day off with very short notice, scheduling a colleague to cover his shift
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but overlooking that this colleague had already been scheduled for this time to 
work in the outpatient department. As a result there was a shortage of one 
doctor for that day. As it happens this particular day was an extremely busy day 
and staff struggled to get through the day. This incident resulted in a heated 
discussion between the people involved. As a consequence it was decided by 
the head of department that the weekly work schedule, which so far had been 
arranged just before the weekend started (with some people already leaving for 
the weekend and assuming they don’t have to come in for work on Monday -  
only to be scheduled by someone else for Monday, should be ready by 
Wednesday. The head secretary comments that this new procedure was 
‘desirable but completely unrealistic’ as 1doctors always change everything a 
hundred times’ (respondent 13).
Comment: What added to the confusion was the large number of different types 
of shifts. Doctors and nurses for example have different shift times and also 
start their shifts at different times of the day. Some shifts start or end 15 minutes 
earlier or later than other shifts. For an outsider it is difficult to comprehend why 
this is so and nobody in the department could tell the researcher why so many 
different shift times co-existed. That it doesn’t make perfect sense seemed to 
also appear to others, for example the deputy head of department (respondent 
d2). Although his shift starts with the doctors’ morning meeting at 7:45 he 
already came in at 6:45am in order to attend the nurses’ morning meeting too. 
“This is probably the most useful meeting for me to get information about my 
patients. Not in the morning meeting with the medical doctors.” (respondent d2)
A comment need also be made regarding the length of shifts. It is common 
practice at the department to have 24 hour shifts and sometimes even 48 hour 
shifts. In regards to the known correlation between fatigue and performance 
impairment (Dawson and Reid, 1997) this presents a severe threat to safety. 
Some staff complained about this, for example respondent d29 who said: “I
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have been working for 25hrs in a row now and I have two kids waiting for me at 
home. This is how this hospital works!” (respondent d29)
One last note on the shift times, the fact that doctors did indeed change their 
shifts many times and with very short notice also made it difficult at times for the 
researcher to prepare for the next observation (for example which staff can be 
expected to be around for respondent validation).
7.6. Practical implications
7.6.1 Integration of existing documentation
This section presents the category of contextual codes that were most closely 
associated with the ‘integration of existing documentation’.
T3 dictaphone: In the entire department doctors use dictaphones (rather than 
paper forms) to document the patients’ history. This is then word processed by 
one of the secretaries before it is printed, verified and signed again by doctors, 
and filed.
Comment: This procedure actually has in it an interface, the secretaries, who 
are not intensively interested about medical/clinical intricacies but have the 
required vocabulary to document everything like a doctor. It may be worth 
considering if the existing dictaphone procedure could be used for reporting 
incidents in CIRS. Secretaries already use a number of templates for 
composing clinical reports. A similar template could be set up for CIRS reports. 
When recording a CIRS message in their dictaphone doctors could use a 
codeword (for example CIRS) to alert the word processing secretary that what 
is about to follow is a CIRS report. Secretaries could then forward this separate 
message, devoid of any staff or patient identification, directly to CIRS (or still
258
C h a £ te r2 j_ ^£ s e a rc ^^ in d in ^a r id A n a l^s is ^
another CIRS trustee). Potentially this would save doctors valuable time, it 
would solve the problem with lack of computers, the problem with privacy (it is 
easier to find a quiet place with your personal dictaphone), doctors would not 
have to get used to a new procedure or technique, and as everyone uses 
dictaphones it would not be obvious for others that someone is actually ‘talking 
(reporting) to CIRS’. To some extent this could solve the problem of the CIRS 
trustee as the CIRS trustee would only have to verify the content of the report 
but would not have to anonymise it. It could be done without additional 
resources save for the extra time required by secretaries, a template guiding 
sheet in the form of a quick checklist (what basic information should be reported 
and in what order, profession, patient’s age etc.) in every paper patient file, on 
several places in the department, or as personal handouts. This method could 
especially be used for no harm events and near misses. In a further stage 
secretaries may be sent on ‘CIRS categorisation’ training.
T1 and T34 book in operation theatre and incorrect sampling method: An 
incident on OD14 regarding an incorrect sampling method (see T34 in section 
7.5.1) was only communicated internally. However, the theatre nurse involved, 
respondent 43, also mentioned “a (theatre) book where I can document this” 
(respondent 43).
Comment: The book mentioned by the theatre nurse could probably be used for 
CIRS, i.e. events already reported in the book could be anonymised and then 
put on CIRS and thus shared with a wider community. While the incident may 
have potentially been communicated amongst the theatre nurse work group it 
seems as if theatre nurses are the only ones who know about and share 
information in this book. This is similar to other observations, for example T32 
(wrong patient instruction, see section 7.5.1), where information was shared but 
only on a very small scale.
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T2 documentation of speciality council: The department holds weekly oncology 
councils. These are inter-professional meetings that include staff from in and 
outside the department and hospital and they last about one hour. The feeling in 
this meeting is very different to many of the other observed meetings. The 
meeting room is adequate in size, the atmosphere is very professional (nobody 
late, no interruptions), everyone takes notes and everything is documented 
using the dictaphone and another ‘council book’.
Comment: As the meetings mainly discuss what went good and bad in certain 
cases, and do so from a systems (medical) perspective with different 
professionals involved, possible incidents in those documented cases could be 
anonymised and shared on CIRS.
7.6.2. Integration of staff
This section presents the category of observations most closely associated with 
‘integration of staff’.
Integration of junior doctors and medical student apprentices: The observation 
showed that with the junior doctors and medical student apprentices two 
relatively large and highly fluctuating groups of staff were completely unaware 
of CIRS.
Comment: It is usual that junior doctors come to the gynaecology and obstetric 
department at the very end of their two year housemanship32. Junior doctors 
have the latest medical knowledge and have very recent first hand experience 
of working and learning in many different departments and hospitals. Like the 
senior doctor (respondent d25) and the ward nurse (respondent n12) mentioned 
on OD5, amongst others (for example physician respondent d2 and d8),
32 hou sem ansh ip  and internship refer to the sam e period o f  training that is required by ju n io r  d octors in 
A ustria
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attesting to their own experience externals or outsiders have the potential to 
“see” things that internals do not see anymore because they got used to it 
(related to the concept of ‘normalisation of deviance’, see section 3.4.4). The 
comparative insight of junior doctors bears potential and could lift their status 
from ‘syringe idiots' (respondent d34) to more valuable members of the 
department. Junior doctors are often naturally curious and inquire about things. 
As they are at the department only for a predefined period of time it is possible 
that they would act more fearless in criticising peers as they would not have to 
live with (fear of possible negative) consequences for their career for very long. 
This is a point that has been especially mentioned in a comment during the 
CIRS feedback meeting where respondent d26 stressed that it is especially 
junior doctors who should be encouraged to report as ‘they are the ones who 
are still motivated and still think that something can be changed’ (respondent 
d26).
Medical student apprentices should get to know CIRS and the underlying 
systems concept early on in their education and this includes the practical 
training they receive during their time at the department. As the CIRS trustee 
acts as a controlling interface there is no danger that possibly wrong reports 
from medical student apprentices (due to their yet incomplete ability of 
comprehending medical incidents) would end up on CIRS.
There were other groups of staff that potentially could be integrated (better) into 
CIRS. One of them is the hospital-external paediatrician (see T57 vacuum birth 
under suboptimal conditions in section 7.5.1). Again, being external he could 
potentially see what departmental staff already got blind to. The same applies to 
anaesthetic staff (they don’t belong to one department) or any other visiting staff 
to the department. In addition it was found that the department secretaries had 
comparatively good technical knowledge of CIRS and how to access
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information and clinical staff could make better use of these secretaries’ hidden 
skills.
7.6.3. Integration of organisational issues into CIRS
This section presents the category of observations most closely associated with 
the ‘integration of organisational issues into CIRSmedical’.
Organisational issues: In addition to observations at the department the website 
of the reporting system was searched for reports, comments, and statistics. 
After reports had started coming in from the various participating hospitals the 
research took note of a message that appeared when visiting the website and 
which concerned the kind of ‘incidents’ staff reported. It appeared that a 
proportion of reports were non-clinical in nature, for example: “there is so much 
negative communication between different groups of professionals” 33, “I am 
constantly so tired, soon something will happen”, “constantly the telephone 
rings and disturbs me at a task that requires concentration”, “every time when I 
want to calculate chemo-therapy doses I get called to a patient”, “where I work it 
is so noisy that I cannot concentrate”. Reporters were asked not to report these 
incidents but to refer those kind of organisational issues to their superiors 
directly. Expert 1, who was running the system, stated that “...of course they 
are related to risk and safety, these are the classical contributing factors. 
However, they can’t be dealt with through this means/system. We need 
concrete incidents or almost-incidents” (Expert 1).
Comment: This message shows that there are a number of non-clinical 
incidents reported in CIRS and suggests that these sorts of incidents appear to 
staff as important incidents that are relevant to safety. Expert 1 principally 
agreed but stated that ‘while contributing factors are important’ that limited
33 Source: a ccessed  on 0 3 .0 3 .2 0 0 9 ;  retrieved from  C IR S2  
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funds, at the start up of his business, and the lack of understanding amongst 
stakeholders of the importance of contributing factors he could, for the time 
being, only ‘self real [clinical] incidents that happened (or almost happened) at 
the sharp end and that were more closely related to clinical events, such as the 
misadministration of drugs. Under the current management these 
‘organisational threats’ as the researcher calls it are not included in CIRS, i.e. 
they are not being analysed or followed up.
These findings also bear an interesting correlation with another observation 
made at a NHS Women Hospital in England34. During the course of the present 
study the researcher gauged the possibilities for conducting a comparative 
study between an Austrian and a NHS Women hospital, an idea that was later 
put down because of the great differences in ethical requirements in those two 
countries (this will be elaborated further in the conclusion chapter). During that 
process the researcher had the opportunity to interview the risk manager and 
the nursing director of a Women hospital that had been using the NHS National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) for some time and had a constant 
reporting frequency of about 200 reports per month. This risk manager had the 
overall responsibility for the hospital’s risk issues. Reports were submitted non- 
anonymous and paper based, collected in the in-house database, before being 
submitted to the NRLS on a weekly basis. In comparison to the CIRS in the 
study (section 6.2.1) the process of submitting a report involved the following 
steps: After an incident had occurred a member of staff would complete the 
incident reporting form, submit it to the ward sister, who passes it on to the 
matron (overlooking a number of wards), who passes it on to a full time risk lead 
which could be one person from a group of people bearing titles such as clinical 
governance manager, risk advisor, risk manager, or risk officer. In addition 
these people possessed special medical or nursing knowledge of a particular
34 observation  by author
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medical/clinical area, for example plastic surgery, orthopaedics, or pharmacy, 
and would be from different ranks in the hospital organisation, such as director, 
matron, charge nurse, ward sister, laboratory manager, or support worker. In 
this particular NHS hospital trust the hospital employed a total of 14 such full 
time risk leads that held monthly inter-professional meetings with each other 
and reported to the trust’s two risk managers. These risk leads therefore were 
analysts with content experts who can understand and interpret reports (Billings, 
1998; IOM, 2000). Although this gave interesting insight on what a budgeted 
CIRS (as compared to the OEGGG project in the study) can look like there was 
another interesting correlation in regards to ‘organisational incidents’.
When asked about ‘organisational incidents’ the hospital’s risk manager had to 
admit that about 50 percent of all submitted reports were non clinical and 
organisational issues and that those could not be delegated to one of the 
appointed risk leads, because they were all from the existing ‘clinical 
organisational structure’. This means that reported contributing factors to patient 
safety, like in the present study, are not acted upon. This points to a mismatch 
between patient safety endeavours based on an existing organisational 
structure and requirements to safety that call for an ‘organisational risk lead’ 
who can take on those ‘contributing factors’. Without this it seems an important 
piece of the puzzle is missing in a systemic approach to patient safety. Apart 
from the perpetuated risk not responding to organisational incident reports may 
have other untoward effects. Staff who report organisational incidents on CIRS 
may be discouraged when their non-clinical reports are left unattended and no 
feedback is provided. It may well be that when time comes for them to report a 
medical incident they will not report it (at least through this system) because of 
a negative association with the system.
These observations suggest that CIRS has unrecognised potential for 
identifying organisational issues. It may be worth investigating if there is a
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possible correlation between reporting organisational incidents in CIRS and 
staffs’ willingness to reporting (the originally sought after) medical incidents to 
CIRS. It may be that staff find it helpful to report organisational issues first, 
receiving feedback, experiencing the anonymity and confidentiality of the 
system, and thus building up trust which is necessary for reporting more 
sensitive incidents that are more closely related to the clinical core issues at the 
hospital.
In conclusion it seems as if current risk procedures, in both the Austrian and the 
UK hospital, are set up in a way to fit existing thinking of the medical/hospital 
system and do not sufficiently reflect system thinking as brought forward in the 
high reliability and patient safety literature.
7.7. Results
7.7.1. CIRS feedback meeting
A feedback session to be held by Expert 1 was initially planned to take place 
soon after the project had started. However it was some 22 months into the 
project when the first feedback meeting took place. The feedback session was a 
dedicated ‘CIRS feedback’ meeting with extra time allocated and this time at a 
more appropriate venue (than morning meetings or the earlier training session), 
a meeting room in another part of the hospital. The initiators of the project had 
made some effort, in their own verbal and mostly undocumented way, to 
promote the event. The deputy head of department (respondent d2) had 
conversed about it with colleagues. In addition the observer spotted out an A4 
computer print-out at one of the nurse checkpoints announcing the event. Work 
in the operation theatre was put on hold until 10am to allow all staff to attend the 
meeting. Prior to the feedback meeting was the daily morning meeting at the
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department, which had 19 attendees, the lowest attendance in all the 
observation. Before and after the morning meeting staff rumoured about the 
feedback meeting “do you know where this is?”, “is this today?” and the meeting 
was not especially announced in the morning meeting, probably the head of the 
department just forgot to remind everyone again. As people were leaving the 
meeting room he remembered and shouted “everyone can come with us” but it 
seemed too late, a bit like a teacher trying to give out homework after the bell 
had rung. Some people wandered off, while the researcher joined a group of 
physicians, led by the head of department, and walked to the meeting room. 
Upon arrival the head of department (respondent d1), realising that all the 
nurses had disappeared, said: “I am really annoyed now that all the nurses are 
gone” (respondent d1), although some of them should reappear later.
The meeting was attended by 23 staff, including the head of department and his 
deputy, the head nurse, four out of the five charge nurses, 13 physicians, two 
surgical nurses, and the hospital’s risk manager (two physicians, respondents 
d25 and d26, only joined for the very last few minutes). The hospital directorate 
had been invited and agreed to come but had to cancel just a few minutes prior 
to the meeting. The meeting lasted 1 1/2 hrs (08:15 - 09:45), with half the time 
taken by the presentation and half the time for discussion. The head of 
department started the meeting, shortly reflecting on the project, before leaving 
the stage for Expert 1.
Expert 1 started off with an important change that had been made. He had 
found that the CIRSmedical entry mask was too complicated. Therefore his 
company had created a new and simpler online ‘CIRS 2’. All reports had 
already been transferred onto the new system with username and password for 
users remaining the same. He gave a short reminder of the purposes of CIRS, 
using the ‘Heinrich ratio’ which asserts that there is a fixed ratio between major 
accidents, minor incidents, and no harm incidents (see section 4.3.1) and
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stressing the two most important elements of the report: what could have 
happened and why did it not happen. He stressed the importance of external 
data management, the anonymity of reporters, that it was not a system for 
complaints (“those are for the complaints box’), as well as giving more general 
reference to the need for safe system design in health care, stressing that 
hospitals should have forcing functions, like a cast in medicine to prevent 
motion, to prevent people from doing wrong things and to make it easier for 
them to do the right things.
The presentation then turned to the reports that had been submitted from the 
department onto CIRS. Over the past 22 months Expert 1 had received a total 
of 48 reports from the department. These were clustered into:
•  areas where they occurred (26 at the ward, seven in the nursery, seven in 
the outpatient department, six in the operation room, and two in other
areas);
•  types of error (28 skill based, 12 rule based, four knowledge based, four 
other), and were
•  nature, concerning medication (14), documentation (6), patient records (4), 
operation theatre order (4), referral (3), patient call (2), additional 
examination (2), and other (13x1).
Expert 1 admitted that this was not very much and hence that the analysis was 
not very significant, but that the number of reports was congruent with the 
literature, emphasising that underreporting is a known problem of any CIRS. It 
appeared to the researcher that Expert 1 attempted to stick to a CIRS analysis 
although this might have been questionable considering the (small) amount of 
reports from this department. The consultant was probably aware that the 
department was in need of management support and additional risk related
training. However, he mostly referred to this in conjunction with a need to
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consult his services, which the hospital would have to pay for. Expert 1 
recommended conducting a risk training for all staff, introducing special 
communication techniques, toolkits, and risk manuals in an additional one or 
two day training session to boost reporting, giving reference to one of his client 
hospitals where increased reporting had been observed following additional 
training. According to Expert 1 the cost for this training would amount to roughly 
3.000 Euro.
The contribution in the discussion was good (compared to the training session) 
with a total of 24 comments being made by eight different staff. Some of the 
comments were directed towards Expert 1 and other comments were directed 
towards the head of department or were responses to previous comments. 
However, in general more staff could have attended. The still relatively low 
attendance, with one representative for each group - the ‘usual suspects’ one 
might say, showing not more than a very minimum of commitment - seems to 
suggest that the project was perceived as either ‘another administrative burden’ 
where one just had to attend or as something that was more for the higher 
ranked staff. The low attendance may also be related to time and date of the 
feedback event. Observations showed that the time of the meeting, 8:00 until 
9:30, is the busiest time in the department and difficult to attend for all “normal” 
front line staff, in particular nurses and more junior staff such as ward 
physicians, junior doctors, or medical student apprentices.
For example one of these front line staff, a nurse on the gynaecology ward 
respondent n46, would have liked to join the meeting but did not know that she 
had been ‘invited’, or who could have covered for her shift. Moreover the event 
took place a few days before Christmas and key people in the department, for 
example the charge nurse from the gynaecology ward (respondent n10) and the 
assistant head nurse (respondent n9) were away on holiday. It might have been 
possible to arrange the meeting at a different time, given that this was the first
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(and as yet only) feedback session in two years. On the other hand this date 
probably tells something about the low priority of CIRS at the department, or 
even meeting situations more generally, that it cannot be expected to have a 
large number of staffs and all key people together in a meeting. But it was also 
apparent that other staff could have attended the meeting but didn’t. As 
mentioned above the operation theatre had been put on hold until after the 
meeting. Despite this there was only one representative for all operation theatre 
staff present in the meeting, the head surgical nurse respondent n21, 
reinforcing a lack of involvement in CIRS by theatre personnel. It was 
ostentatious that the discussion was held exclusively amongst physicians. Not 
one comment was made by the head nurse, charge nurses, theatre nurse, or 
the hospital’s risk manager.
The discussion itself showed that staff wanted to see some action following the 
reports and analysis, and the ‘so what’ question dominated the first minutes of 
the discussion. ‘What do we have to do now, where do we start? I need 
something [more] concrete’ (respondent d20). ‘We have the analysis, but what 
can we do with the data now? (respondent d25). Some also suggested why it 
didn’t work, for example respondent d26, a senior physician, added: ‘CIRS only 
works when all public hospitals participate’ (respondent d26). Another 
respondent asked for more external support (respondent d20). However, at 
times the discussion drifted away from CIRS and moved to more general 
problems, probably because it presented a rare occasion for staff to air some of 
their problems and concerns. Respondent d47 for example addressed the head 
of department with his ‘feeling’ that there were ‘comparatively few procedures, 
regulations or checklists at the department’. For work in some sensitive areas, 
for example the outpatient department, there was basically no information 
(respondent d47). Hence the ‘organisation’ of the hospital /department and the 
‘structure’ of and processes was questioned. One respondent asked ‘how safe 
is good enough’, referring to certain medical procedures that ‘can either be
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done in ten minutes when there is time, if you are alone and it is busy you do it 
in three minutes’ (respondent d26). While participants made interesting remarks 
the discussion seemed to turn into an endless quest with participants finding all 
kinds of ‘reasons’ why things didn’t work. The head of department was thankful 
for comments and suggestions but didn’t know ‘where to take the time to 
implement any of these suggestions for changes’ (respondent d1).
The meeting ended at the scheduled time because everyone had to return to 
their ‘core commitments’. Many questions, whether or not, and under which 
conditions to continue with CIRS were kept pending. The department still had 
not appointed an internal CIRS trustee (Expert 1 had voluntarily continued to 
fulfil this function). The head of department arranged to keep in touch with 
Expert 1. In the daily lunchtime shift handover meeting later that day it was 
unusual that only eight people attended. It might be that staff were busy 
catching up with the 90 minutes they had ‘lost’ in the morning. The CIRS 
feedback session was not mentioned in one word.
7.7.2. Consequences
The meeting provided a first feedback on the OEGGG CIRS project at the 
department. In addition it presented staff with the rare opportunity to voice their 
concerns on quality in the department more generally. However due to the 
unclear funding situation, the small number of reports and, inherent with the 
lack of CIRS training, lack of knowledge about CIRS and patient safety the 
meeting did not sufficiently focus on strategy improvements and did not present 
any constructive steps on how to continue with CIRS (the new CIRS2) or patient 
safety more generally. The head nurse (respondent n7), who was not 
proactively involved in the project, commented later: ‘If that is all the feedback 
we get then I am not surprised nobody is using it [CIRS] (respondent n7).
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Chapter 7: Research Findings and Analysis 2
One of the practical outcomes of the meeting was that the head of department 
and the hospital’s risk manager met for the first time and arranged to meet in 
the near future. The researcher joined this meeting between the head of 
department (respondent d1), his deputy (respondent d2), the new head nurse 
(respondent n33) and the hospital’s risk manager (respondent 19), as well as 
one other follow up meeting, both of which took place within four weeks of the 
CIRS feedback meeting.
These meetings gave opportunity to get to know each other and to exchange 
perspectives. The head of department started addressing the risk manager: 
‘Who are you, I don’t know you or anything about what you do. Are you from the 
Vienna City Hospital Association, from the Directorate, in-house?’ (respondent 
d1) After a first introduction the head of department then described how the 
department had come to start the OEGG project, the progress so far, and that 
he definitely wanted to continue with CIRS. He only was not sure how to bring 
this about. He also appeared to grasp the wider context of CIRS and hence the 
need to document processes in building a risk management strategy for the 
department. The head of department emphasised again his perception that 
work at the department was ‘good, very good, in many areas; we just need to 
write down what we are doing; ideally we should be in a position where, when 
we hit a problem, we can say -  this is how we did it last time and this is how we 
can approach this problem now’ (respondent d1). The head of department 
appeared to understand the cause of problems at the department but admitted 
he continually got stuck in the implementation due to a lack of time and 
resources. ‘The current solutions are not systemic, only symptomatic, and we 
would need time for each work group to sit down for 1 1/2 hours without any 
interruptions, no operations, no interruptions, no mobiles, and to talk about how 
to document our processes. At the moment when we find a solution...once 
everything works fine again everybody just forgets about it within three weeks’ 
(respondent d1).
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The risk manager, not a common position in pubic hospitals in Austria, who was 
not involved in the CIRS project talked about his work and that he had been 
conceptualising his own risk management model over the past two years. He 
informed the meeting about the (theoretical) possibility of joining the Vienna City 
Hospital Association (WKAV) pilot CIRS, which was being tested at another 
department of the hospital and which the head of department did not know 
about. At the same time he stated that the resources were very limited and the 
chances of being included in the pilot were very little. The pilot CIRS was 
estimated to need about three years to work. The risk manager then moved 
away from CIRS specifically and started to introduce his own wider risk 
management model. Although the model was still in its conceptualisation phase 
it was principally agreed between the risk manager and the head of department 
that this model could be tested at the gynaecology and obstetric department. 
The risk manager would provide a layout for describing the core processes at 
the department and the department would have to invest staff time in 
documenting those core processes.
While the risk manager and the head of department appeared to find some 
synergies and common interests in their conceptualisations this did not seem to 
fit the expectations of the other two participants. The deputy head of department 
wanted to pursue the OEGGG CIRS project, stating that ‘we should stick with 
what we have and not start all over again’ (respondent d2), believing that the 
CIRS with Expert 1 was ‘the only truly anonymous CIRS available’ (respondent 
d2). This however did not fit with the head of department’s considerations that 
‘while reporting in CIRS with Expert 1 is for free we need the feedback and this 
is not for free’ (respondent d1). The new head nurse (respondent n33), which 
was overlooking a number of departments, had ideas with another external 
expert who would ‘provide an analysis of all processes, which could be used as 
a basis for process management’ (respondent n33).
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The parties involved in the discussion appeared to have substantial conceptual 
differences of how quality and safety at the department may be achieved. 
Although the talks between risk manager and head of department were 
promising an incident35 involving the researcher should reveal how difficult 
collaboration between the two potentially is, and also partly explain why the risk 
manager and the department have not had collaborated on earlier occasions. In 
addition, as two risk meetings within four weeks of the CIRS feedback 
meeting -  unseen before - may appear as ‘the start of a new chapter in patient 
safety at the department’, this also has to be put into perspective. These 
meetings were still a resemblance of the ‘rather chaotic’ or ad-hoc ways of how 
non-clinical activities unfold at the department and which had been observed 
throughout the observation period (the head of department for example, 
although his secretary had scheduled the meeting for him, had ‘forgotten’ about 
the meeting; the deputy head of department joined the meeting ad-hoc, so did 
the new head nurse who just happened to be around when the meeting was 
about to start and was spontaneously invited by the head of department to join). 
The funding possibilities for any of the ideas mentioned in these meetings, 
including the continuation (i.e. active support) of the OEGGG CIRS project at 
the department were also unclear and the head of department wanted to 
address this with the hospital directorate at a suitable opportunity.
It was therefore assumed that no immediate major changes were about to take 
place at the department and that hence data collection could be considered as
35 T he researcher had com m u n icated  per em ail w ith the risk m anager. In order to keep  the m ain contact 
person, the deputy head o f  departm ent respondent d2, in the lo o p  respondent d2 w as c o p ied  into an em ail 
to inform  the risk m anager about the research er’s study at the departm ent and that co n ta in ed  the blank  
questionnaire w h ich  researcher had used earlier at the departm ent. R espondent d2 , apparently w ithout 
ch eck in g  the conten t o f  the attachm ent, assum ed that the researcher had forw arded the fin d in g s o f  the 
questionnaire, w h ich  w ere agreed to be kept confidentia l. R esp ond en t d2 saw  that as a breach o f  
agreem ent and v io lation  o f  the so  im portant e x c lu s iv ity  o f  the project, not in v o lv in g  a n y o n e  from  the  
hospita l directorate or W KAV. A lth ou gh  the m isunderstand ing w as qu ick ly  reso lv ed  it le ft a ‘bad ta ste ’ 
and sh o w ed  h ow  im portant it w as for respondent d2 as the initiator o f  the project to k eep  it e x c lu s iv e .
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saturated, resulting in the researcher leaving the field and moving to final data 
analysis and writing up the thesis. Contact with the hospital was maintained for 
verification of data.
7.8. Discussion
This chapter presented findings from the fieldwork observation of CIRS in use at 
the department. The chapter set out with information about the reporting 
frequency, stating that CIRSmedical had barely been used at the department. 
This was not just a start-up problem as underreporting was evident over the 18 
months since the CIRSmedical training session and until the start of fieldwork 
observation. Going into the field gave the opportunity to gain insight into why 
staff were not using CIRS, if and how they found alternative ways of 
communicating incidents, and how they were making sense of patient safety 
more generally. Ethnographic studies usually result in a lot of data and this also 
applied to the fieldwork observation that stretched over five months at the 
department. Data collected had to be transposed into meaningful sequences 
that could communicate ‘what was going on’ to a wider audience and this 
resulted in 134 descriptive codes, 71 contextual codes, 14 categories, and four 
themes. These codes, categories, and themes also provided the main structural 
framework for the presentation of this chapter.
CIRSmedical appears to be a platform that provides free access to users. 
Hospitals deciding to use CIRSmedical should however consider what action 
they want following the submission of reports. Analysing reports is costly, at the 
same time it is this analysis of reports that leads to meaningful insight that can 
guide improvements. In that light reports are of great value to an organisation 
and health care organisations need to consider how much control they want to 
have about their own reports and how dependent they want to be from the
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operator of the reporting system. As the head of department rightly concluded at 
the first CIRSmedical feedback session using CIRSmedical is for free, but the 
important part, the analysis and feedback are not. This should be considered at 
the very beginning of a project. Otherwise reporting organisations might end up 
having to ‘buy back’ (analysis of) their own reports. To run a CIRS merely for 
personal reflective purposes of the reporter [which was one of the original 
intentions of the group around CIRSmedical at the University Clinic in Basel 
(Kaufmann et al., 2002) but has lacked international support from the 
international patient safety community] seems little meaningful. In addition, 
although ten minutes for reporting might seem little, in comparison with the 
average less than two minutes doctors spend with patients this is a lot of time 
and probably asking too much for too little feedback in exchange.
Although CIRS was provided to the department at no cost, except for support 
costs, it appeared that the hospital’s collegial leadership and the hospital’s risk 
management department did not really understand where or how the OEGGG 
project should fit within their own priorities and plans, including the development 
of their own risk management programme. The ‘chaotic’ hospital and 
department environment seemed to foster, allow, and in some way even to 
require prioritising ad-hoc activities and the serving of immediate needs over 
other (more strategic) goals with the potential of making a more efficient and 
long(er) term contribution to safety. It also appeared that the relationship 
between the department’s medical lead, the new head nurse (which was not 
placed at the department directly anymore but overlooking a number of 
departments), and the hospital’s risk manager was such that each wished to 
develop their own ideas and hence following different paths in quality 
management and patient safety. At the conclusion of the research it was not 
clear if and how any funding would be secured from the trust to support the 
OEGGG CIRSmedical project and in case funding could be secured if this 
would be channelled towards Expert 1 or elsewhere. Towards the end of the
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fieldwork it appeared that the relationship between Expert 1 and the hospital 
may have been complicated by the lack of progress and (financial) investment 
in additional training sessions. Expert 1 had made attempts to promote his 
services commercially and had run several private sessions for paying 
customers at other hospitals.
It was not a primary goal of this study to do an assessment of the reporting 
system CIRSmedical itself. However a few things can be said about 
CIRSmedical. The information provided by Expert 1 that CIRSmedical fulfilled 
the basic requirements of a CIRS in terms of anonymity, confidentiality and 
extramural data management and that the reporting form was designed with 
appreciation of current patient safety knowledge was mostly verified. From a 
practical perspective though, considering the little knowledge and training staff 
at the department had, it may be noted that the CIRSmedical reporting form 
contains two free text passages. This requires from the potential reporter an 
ability to structure the event in a meaningful way, which requires trained staff, 
and this did not happen. The free text passage also seems to complicate the 
anonymisation and analysis process and hence increases the resources 
needed for running the system and providing feedback. It may therefore be 
worth considering if low budget projects such as the OEGGG CIRS should 
include such a free text passage or not. It is probable that a simpler and faster 
to fill in reporting form would be used more frequently and be more meaningful 
in creating rough statistics on incident occurrence. These statistics may liken 
payout of additional funds that could be used for sophisticating CIRS - creating 
a better reporting environment and using a more complex reporting form.
Finally, a few last comments on the OEGGG. The OEGGG could not provide 
accurate information on how many Women Hospitals exist in Austria (the email 
respond read “about 100 departments”, this imprecision may be caused by 
definitional issues where it is not entirely clear if an institution counts as a
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Women Clinic or just part of another department) and how many of them had 
replied to the OEGGG round letter that had motivated hospitals to use 
CIRSmedical. This might have to do with the fact that hospitals were asked to 
direct any queries directly to Expert 1, thus also leaving all responsibility with 
him. Regarding the relatively low response rate, somewhere between 10 to 15 
hospitals out of approximately 100, the OEGGG could have probably followed 
this up further, sending another reminder or an additional invitation, which to the 
knowledge of the researcher has not happened. It might be pure coincidence 
but the round letter was sent out around Christmas, a quiet time, and this might 
have affected the low response rate. Hence, the overall role of the OEGGG in 
this project has to be seen in relation to its limited funds and more as a kind of 
moral support, taking a stance for this project, and notifying and encouraging 
Women Hospitals in Austria to use CIRSmedical. The unfolding of events in the 
present study suggests that the OEGGG is a representative body and not in a 
position to financially or otherwise directly support individual hospitals in their 
use of CIRSmedical.
In summary findings from the fieldwork observation found little empirical 
evidence of supportive measures to CIRS and other non-clinical issues with 
relevance to safety of staff and patients. While CIRS, in line with other safety 
relevant activities, may have been perceived by the majority of staff as a 
sensible or ‘good’ thing to do they did not find a meaningful way to incorporate 
CIRS into their daily agenda. The OEGGG CIRS project has thus initiated some 
discussion on patient safety, especially towards the end of the observation 
some 22 months into the project, but has so far not turned out any tangible 
results that would have improved safety.
The next and final chapter will draw conclusions to this research.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
8.1. Introduction
This final chapter discusses the findings emanating from this research and 
conclusions drawn. Section 8.2 provides a critical perspective on management 
responsibilities in patient safety in Austria. In eight subsections it discusses 
conclusions to patient safety literature in Austria (8.2.1), error rates in health 
care (8.2.2), error rates in Austria (8.2.3), Heinrich’s ratio (8.2.4), the value of 
critical ethnography in health care related research (8.2.5), CIRS in Austria 
(8.2.6), the clinical / non -  clinical continuum (8.2.7), and finally the question if it 
was ethically and morally right to implement CIRS (8.2.8). Section 8.3 presents 
a summary of the contributions to knowledge and considers the potential of the 
research from the perspectives of three main interest groups; managers, policy 
makers and researchers. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this study 
before section 8.5 points out areas for future research. This chapter closes with 
some reflections in section 8.6.
8.2. A critical perspective on management responsibilities in 
patient safety in Austria
8.2.1 Patient safety literature in Austria
Whereas finding out about the “written rules” of a health system and its 
endeavours in patient safety can be a rather straight forward task in some 
countries, for example in the UK through one of the many DOH, NHS, NPSA 
and NRLS reports, or in the United States through government white papers, 
AHRQ, NPSF, IOM, IHI, this turned out quite a different and challenging task for
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Austria (but also for EU and WHO data in general, which are a lot less 
extensive than those national and independent reports from the US and the UK). 
This is mostly due to a lack of in-depth government reports and/or a general 
lack of independent and academic publications about patient safety and incident 
reporting in the Austrian health system.
A good general independent source of reference in Austria is usually the 
Supreme Audit Institution of Austria (German: Rechnungshof), an independent 
government institution of the National Council (German: Nationalrat), which 
performs financial and/or legal audits on the executive branch of power. 
However, their last report on the Viennese health system (WKAV) dates back to 
the year 1998, which was a first evaluation of the then newly (1992) founded 
WKAV. Back then the Supreme Audit Institution of Austria (Rechnungshof, 1998) 
mentioned the inception of a pilot project in 1994 for the development of an 
executive support unit for quality management within WKAV. It criticized the 
lack of a standardized or unitary approach to quality management, with a lack of 
differentiation between quality assurance and quality management, and lack of 
reference towards an entire hospital or specific areas of medical expertise in the 
hospital. The report especially criticized a lack of documentary evidence and 
reports accompanying any such efforts. The quality endeavours were therefore 
not possible to be traced down. As a consequence WKAV hospitals did/do not 
fulfil the requirements of the Viennese hospital act of creating the conditions for 
comparative analysis and assessment of quality assurance between hospitals 
(Rechnungshof, 1998). Since then and until publication of this thesis there has 
been no further assessment report of the WKAV by the Supreme Audit 
Institution of Austria or another independent body.
In this light it might not come as a big surprise not to find much information on 
the health system in Austria in general and the documentation of quality 
endeavours and the safety of patients in particular. Austria does have its share
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of preventable adverse events leading to death. The problem with these few 
events of medical malpractice and iatrogenic injury in hospitals in Austria that 
come to light is that they are only publicised through the media. Any other 
investigations, if any have been undertaken, are literally impossible to get 
access to. This manifests a cover up mentality where errors in the Austrian 
health care system are not properly investigated, root causes not identified, and 
hence no systematic changes are initiated (Langbein, 2009; Pateisky, 2008).
This stands in contrast to developments in the US and the UK where errors are 
increasingly discussed more openly. One significant example from the UK is the 
‘Kennedy Report’, officially The Report of the Public Inquiry into children’s heart 
surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: Learning from Bristol’ 
(Kennedy, 2001), which was a major step forward in understanding events that 
allow major disasters in health care to happen and how they may be prevented. 
The Kennedy report presented the results of a thorough investigation on 540 
pages. In comparison for example a big murder scandal in the 1980’s in a public 
hospital in Vienna that caused hundreds of deaths. In fairness it has to be said 
that the Austrian cases involved negligence and criminal acts. However, it is 
likely that a number of contributing factors, for example regarding the culture of 
the organisation, work procedures, protocols and the like, played an important 
role in this. Unlike in the UK there is no public report about the causes and 
circumstances of those events in Austria. This sheds a bad light on 
transparency in patient safety endeavours in Austria. Incidents in the Austrian 
health system, whether or not they led to harm, are often covered up rather than 
investigated (Pateisky, 2008). At the conclusion of this thesis a series of deaths 
at the University children’s clinic in Innsbruck, Austria makes news, where 
probably seven children have died due to allegeable medical errors 
(www.oe24.at). Although it is desirable, it is questionable that there will be an 
‘Austrian Kennedy report’ anytime soon.
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8.2.2. Error rates in health care
From an international perspective patient safety has become a much more 
prominent topic with increasing attention given to error. The past decade has 
seen numerous patient safety initiatives, accompanied by an avalanche of 
publications. Despite this patient safety is still a relatively immature agenda and 
little is known whether initiatives have worked or not and if health care has 
become any safer. Moreover, a lack of systematic measurement and evaluation 
in health care was (and is) hindering understanding the extent of error in health 
care. It is believed that this is hindering improvement in health care safety 
across the world.
Throughout the period of study and in an attempt to find out more about the 
error rate in Austria the issue of ‘the scope of the problem’ continuously 
reappeared in patient safety publications, almost exclusively citing the IOM 
numbers or derivatives of it. The first contribution of this thesis stems from a 
critical assessment of this literature on the error occurrence and provides a 
possible explanation to why progress in patient safety is so seemingly slow, and 
difficult to measure. The author found a number of controversies and 
inconsistencies in current estimations regarding screening and sampling 
methods, limitation of retrospective reviews, causal relationships, preventability 
of adverse events, immediate and short term survival of patients experiencing 
adverse events, the reproducibility of number of patient deaths, terminology, 
and general accuracy issues of studies. While building this argument consisted 
mostly of drawing together the handful of critical studies (McDonald et al, 2000; 
Brennan, 2000; Sox and Woloshin, 2000; Hayward and Hofer, 2001; Gray, 2003) 
that were published shortly following the IOM report into one coherent account 
this thesis points to additional areas that appear inconclusive either in the report 
itself, the scientific work underlying it, or in published work rejecting criticism 
and aiming to add to the IOM report’s credibility.
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Despite early calls for reliable and representative studies on the occurrence of 
preventable adverse events (for example Vincent et al., 2001) such studies 
have never come forward, commissioned, nor can they be expected to come 
forth any time soon (Vincent, 2010 and 2011 personal email conversation). On 
the contrary, those IOM numbers, or extrapolations based on IOM methods and 
numbers, have spread throughout the international patient safety literature and 
found their way into major government, WHO, and EU reports and 
recommendations on patient safety. These reports seem to be caught in a 
“triangulation of error” with one report referring to another about the supposedly 
high number of preventable deaths. Accordingly extrapolations must be 
considered incorrect. As yet there is no reliable and representative data 
available on the extent of errors which result in patient harm and how many of 
those might be preventable. Until today it cannot be said with any certainty how 
many adverse events occur in hospitals, and what effect they may have on 
patients and staff.
It is somewhat uncomforting to know that unsubstantiated data occur in what 
became a prestigious report, and that the report as a whole, data from the 
report, and methods for adverse event estimations has been cited and or been 
used uncritically, and been used in major reports of the DOH, the European 
Union, and the World Health Organization, rather than those institutions 
investing in and conducting original research themselves in order to fulfil their 
proclaimed goal of building a strong foundation for patient safety. These 
numbers are not plainly incorrect but may have a number of untoward 
implications. First of all those numbers may contribute to fear amongst patients 
and staff, opening the doors to litigation claims, and creating a culture of blame, 
the very thing they subscribe themselves to fight against. Secondly, 
governments and institutions may be motivated to engage in or recommend 
particular patient safety initiatives based on wrong grounds. Organisations may 
‘rush’ into projects unprepared, not understanding the severity of the problem,
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unaware of the intricacies of existing data and how to interpret it in a given 
(national) context. Thirdly, it shades the need for new and reliable data on error 
occurrence and the enormous amount of resources that is required to making a 
worthwhile contribution to safety that is similar to high reliability industries and 
which would require involvement of a high number of stakeholders, including 
hurt patients and their relatives, health care personnel, lawyers, insurers, 
experts from other high risk non medical industries, funders, and politicians.
It has been argued that the currency of patient safety can only be measured in 
terms of prevented harm and saved lives (WHO, 2005a). If the numbers against 
which progress should be measured are incorrect this will thwart results. If for 
example the actual adverse event rate is much higher than currently estimated 
then later and more reliable assessments will not show the expected success. It 
need also be considered that patient safety organisations are up against a very 
disciplined, hard working, and most of all critical bunch of front line staff, the 
clinical experts on which running any such initiative is dependent on. Some of 
these might be eager to discovering and feeding into a ‘credibility gap’ (Handy, 
1999), pointing to unreliable and hence easily rejectable statements and 
generalisations, which may well contaminate future attempts of ‘external 
involvement’ in this matter and overthrowing an entire patient safety concept. 
This gap presents an opportunity for any country with an interest in patient 
safety to become the first nation with reliable and representative data on error 
occurrence. On a more operational level organisations and decision makers 
concerned with health care need to develop a more critical and reflective 
attitude - as the study shows - even when data comes from apparently reliable 
sources, and assess if supposed shortcomings in safety and possible solutions 
that come with it would also apply to their specific context.
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8.2.3. Error rates in Austria
How often adverse events occur in general in Austria cannot be said with any 
certainty due to a lack of systematic data collection and interpretation. Those 
publications that refer to an adverse event rate cite numbers suggested by the 
IOM (2000), may it be reports in the local media, statements from politicians, or 
books on patient safety (for example Langbein, 2009; Pateisky, 2005). Langbein 
(2009), a journalist in Austria, even made extrapolations for the adverse event 
rate in Austria. Based on the German APS study (2007) that 4 percent of 
hospital inpatients suffer from preventable adverse events, 1 percent from 
medical malpractice, and that 0.1 percent of all cases result in preventable 
deaths he calculates that in 2.5 million hospital inpatients in Austria 100.000 
patients suffer from preventable adverse events, 25.000 from medical 
malpractice, and that every year 2.500 hospital inpatients die in Austria as a 
result. However, the formula for his calculation itself presents a chain of error as 
it is derived from the IOM report, trough to the UK DOH report, through to EC 
and WHO publications, and the German APS study, before it ended up in the 
local media in Austria, which persists that preventable adverse events in health 
care leading to death occur frequently.
As yet there is no clear epidemiological and statistical data in Austria to either 
very or reject this claim. The fact that comparatively little data exists about 
errors in health care must allow the conclusion that either health care in Austria 
is exceptionally good or that many cases go unnoticed (Paula et al., 2011) and 
that the problem of preventable adverse events leading to death in the health 
system in Austria might indeed be as severe as referrals to IOM data suggests. 
While the extent of adverse event rates in Austrian hospitals is unknown 
international literature clearly indicates that they present a serious problem in 
health systems in developed countries. Considering that with regard to the 
number of in-patient stays Austria ranks first in Europe, with 27.9 inpatient-stays
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per 100 inhabitants (average length of stay 5.7 days) registered in 2007 
compared to an EU-average of 17.2 inpatient-stays (average length of stay 6.1 
days) (BMG, 2010), and leaving out other factors, the risk of experiencing an 
adverse event might indeed be high for Austrians.
8.2.4. Heinrich’s ratio
In addition to the controversies surrounding the scope of the problem of 
preventable errors in health care it became apparent that another often used 
source (various IOM, DOH, NPSA reports) might be not as credible as it first 
appears, and this concerns one of the key arguments for using CIRS more 
generally - the Heinrich ratio or iceberg model (see section 4.3.1 and figure 4.1). 
Similar to the IOM numbers the iceberg model continuously reappeared during 
the study. It is often referred to in papers and presentations on patient safety, 
however, often without using any citation. The iceberg model is based on 
Heinrich’s ratio, which is from the year 1941, and asserts a relatively fixed ratio 
between the incidence of no-harm incidents, minor incidents and major 
incidents (Gallivan et al., 2008). The author could not get hold of the original 
work of Heinrich and referred to the ratio as described in the patient safety 
literature and giving reference to it by using the model as presented in a DOH 
NPSA (NPSA, 2005c) presentation, nevertheless being puzzled if a study from 
1941 would still apply in today’s modern context of health care delivery and if 
there was any up to date work. The only such piece of research could be found 
in Gallivan et al (2008:637), who claim to have invalidated Heinrich’s ratio, 
revealing a “hitherto unrecognised systematic pattern of change that contradicts 
the principle of the Heinrich ratio”. Their study suggests that introducing 
measures to reduce the occurrence of minor incidents will not inevitably reduce 
the incidence of major incidents pro rata and they conclude that any safety 
policies based on the Heinrich ratio needs to be rethought (Gallivan et al., 2008). 
This presents an interesting comment on a relatively dated study that had little
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criticism or verification over the years. Future research could investigate further 
if indeed Heinrich’s findings still apply to today’s organisational settings or not. 
Any programs based on Heinrich’s ratio, such as the wide scale enrolment of 
CIRS in health care, need to be reconsidered in the light of these new findings.
8.2.5. The value of critical ethnography in health care related 
research
In relation to the scarce information on CIRS and patient safety in Austria the 
philosophical and methodological approaches of this study shed a new light on 
patient safety. This section briefly discusses the value of critical ethnography in 
patient safety research.
Ethnographic accounts about the managerial aspects of a CIRS during the 
implementation phase and use are extremely rare, both in Austria and 
internationally. This approach to studying the phenomenon is not seen as 
superior compared to other approaches but as adding value and “meaning” to 
those studies conducted in more “traditional” and positivistic ways. The 
European Union Network for Patient Safety (EUNetPas, 2011), the newly 
installed Federal Institute for Quality in the Health Care System (BIQG; see 
BMG, 2010, 2011a and b), and the Austrian association of resident doctors 
(OAK) seem to all rely on self-evaluation sheets in assessing CIRS in Austria. 
The EUNetPas (2011) for example, based on a three page self-evaluation 
questionnaire sent to hospital (association) directors, states that Austria has two 
CIRS already in place. One of which was described as the WKAV CIRS system 
“Working with CIRS”, a governmental run voluntary and confidential near miss 
reporting system, launched in 2006, on a regional level for hospitals of the 
Vienna City Hospital Association (WKAV), for all health care workers, with no 
public disclosure of individual reports (EUNetPas, 2011), which actually is the 
WKAV pilot CIRS that was run as a pilot project in only a few departments of
the entire hospital network and saw little acceptance (BMG, 2011a).
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Recent attempts by the newly installed Federal Institute for Quality in the Health 
Care System (BIQG; see BMG, 2010, 2011a and b) so far suggest that they too 
rely on self-evaluation data. The Austrian association of resident doctors (OAK) 
too mainly “evaluates” quality and safety through a one page self-evaluation 
sheet that is sent out to doctors every couple of years (and reminds the author 
of the immigration form passengers have to fill in when flying into America, 
asking passengers if they were a terrorist). Basically it is impossible to fail this 
self-evaluation safety test. Accordingly information obtained through these 
means of self-evaluation might not always result in very reliable and in-depth 
information about CIRS and might lead to misinterpretation of data. The study 
site hospital for example appears in those statistics as a forerunner in safety 
and forward thinking hospital as it “uses” two CIRS, the one studied in this 
thesis and the WKAV pilot CIRS. That both systems are barely used and that 
they (currently) do not lead to any meaningful action improving safety is not 
mentioned. It may therefore create a false impression that CIRS are already 
operational in Austrian hospitals, which findings in this study suggest otherwise, 
and probably a feeling of safety and security in patients who decide to consult 
this hospital for health services.
The critical approach adopted in this study has helped to pause on those 
occasions where the study hit controversies, regardless if they were considered 
at the outset of the study or not, and allowed to uncover and identify flaws in the 
patient safety discourse. The most apparent outcome of this is chapter 2 in this 
thesis which rejects the popular notion of the IOM report and subsequent 
publications, including those in Austria. However, one must ask "how is it 
possible for this to remain undiscovered and/or not acknowledged for so long?" 
The suggested answer is that first and foremost the "organisation of health care 
organisations" is to be blamed as it currently does not allow staff to take a 
critical stance towards their work. This may include various clinical things but 
most certainly includes a critical, and probably as much an informed, stance
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towards various patient safety initiatives. This study shows how overwhelmed 
clinicians are in dealing with these things. A conclusion from this study is that 
'somebody' in the health care organisation and on department level should have 
as its job 'being critical'.
The amount of "organisational threats" identified in this research (section 7.5), 
together with the absolute lack of management knowledge in the 
implementation of CIRS (compared for example to writers such as Handy, 1999) 
call for 'a manager' in the department who can take a critical stance. However, 
looking at theory and practice in other organisations immediately stifles hopes 
of such a manager and rather poses a question to the general organisation and 
management discourse. If concepts such as "systems thinking" and the 
"learning organisation" solve problems then why don’t organisations as a rule 
have "systems’ managers", "directors of learning", or "director of internal 
communication"? Instead common practice is to shift this on staff as "it is the 
task of everyone" -which, surprisingly, is also a common notion in patient safety. 
Even if the author tends to agree with this statement the findings in this study 
suggest that involvement of everybody in patient safety will still need ‘a 
someone’ to instigate and lead through change. Although ultimately responsible 
it is unlikely that the CEO or department leader has time for it.
8.2.6. CIRS in Austria
CIRS was an initiative by enthusiasts within the gynaecology and obstetric 
departments in Austria. It was ignited by Expert 1 and the OEGGG and was 
picked up by the medical department leaders in the study site department. The 
origins and development of CIRSmedical at the department suggest that the 
initiative was the product of enthusiastic professionals with an interest and belief 
in current patient safety initiatives and a desire to promote change from with the 
health care profession and from within front line practitioners. They appeared as
maverick leaders who resisted a lack of action from the hospital’s collegial
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leadership and the Vienna City Hospital Association (WKAV), knowing that their 
action could be restricting on their relationships with the hospital’s collegial 
leadership. The project developed and progressed independently from the 
hospital leadership and was the only operational CIRS in the hospital. Despite 
the efforts and enthusiasm of Expert 1 and the department leaders to introduce 
CIRS at the department this study finds that the project contains significant 
conceptual weaknesses. While Expert 1 used his expert knowledge to provide 
rich theoretical and empirical foundations to the initiative during the one CIRS 
training session the detail and volume of information may be too great to be 
effectively delivered within a single event. Expert 1’s involvement was largely 
restricted due to financial constraints of the department.
The projects stated objectives were to foster a risk conscious culture through 
providing staff with a new way to anonymously report critical incidents. Given 
the lack of financial aids for the project, additional training and information 
sessions (lack of understanding what a critical incident is; lack of understanding 
how incidents contribute to adverse outcomes; lack off “emotional” support from 
hospital leadership thus the danger to “get into trouble”; lack of policy bringing 
clarity about legal protection for reporters; lack of feedback), coupled with the 
constraints put on the system through current working conditions at the 
department (such as the small number of computers available to staff for their 
core duties, a problem that affects potential reporters as they do not have a free 
computer to write a report; lack of privacy for reporting; no internal CIRS trustee; 
lack of time to report), the fact that staff rarely used CIRSmedical, and the lack 
of agreement between hospital’s collegial leadership, risk management, 
department’s medical leadership and the new head nurse on the nature of risk 
and error and the efficacy of measures intended to improve safety it seems 
unlikely that the department’s current efforts will make great progress in 
fostering a culture of safety within the department. It is probable that the 
CIRSmedical initiative becomes one in a list of projects that are “a great idea,
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but lack of support and hence practical value”. More importantly, it seems 
unlikely that the department and/or hospital learn from this project as to why it 
was not as successful as its initiators first anticipated. Another enthusiast, 
another project will come, and can fail in the same way, further lowering the 
morale of staff to participate in “non-core” projects and wasting scarce 
resources that are much needed to improve work for staff and safety for 
patients.
The CIRS initiative at the study site showed that existing recommendations on 
the implementation and use of CIRS had not been acknowledged at the study 
hospital, apparently because those involved in the implementation process were 
not aware of those recommendations. Medical and nursing staff probably 
underestimated the complexity of and were overwhelmed by the task of 
implementing and meaningfully using CIRS, despite their good intentions. 
However, the review in chapter four has shown that establishing a 
comprehensive voluntary CIRS requires an enormous investment of time and 
resources. Serious involvement in patient safety will require strong leadership 
and accountability and cannot be expected to emerge out of good will of 
individual practitioners who are both ill-resourced to do so and predestined to 
be rejected by their peers (i.e. doctors versus nurses; department external risk 
manager versus department physicians). It should not be the task of busy 
health care professionals to manage a CIRS.
If success of a CIRS may be measured by the frequency of reports, staff’s 
knowledge and awareness of CIRS, and actions as a result of reports that 
improve safety then the OEGGG initiative at this department was not a success. 
Nevertheless, feedback from the department indicates how it might work better 
and suggests that a CIRS project may consist of three phases: (1) 
implementation, (2) use, and (3) analysis and feedback; and that each of these 
three phases should have a manager accountable for progress. The first
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‘implementation phase’ should for example explain operation, purpose and 
expected outcome of CIRS to all staff and from all levels, provide initial training 
and take-away information, or identify department specific barriers and 
incentives (such as the possibility of integrating existing documentation and 
staff into CIRS, see sections 7.6.1. and 7.6.2) to reporting (at a later stage this 
implementation phase is repeated with implementing action from the analysis of 
reports). The second ‘use phase’ should present an overhead that staff can turn 
to with questions and concerns, identify possible additional local barriers to 
reporting, keep CIRS operational and running, and introduce tangible measures 
to development and progress. The third ‘analysis and feedback’ phase should 
analyse reports, provide regular feedback to reporters (even if only little reports 
have been coming forth), and instigate action following the feedback. These 
three phases are not sequential and run in parallel, with the managers for each 
phase corresponding with each other and guiding the overall project. This 
concept loosely corresponds with developments in aviation where the 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST, 2011), a public-private-partnership 
that has been credited with reducing the commercial aviation fatality rate in the 
US by 83 percent over the past decade, is made up of three core teams (CAST, 
2011): a joint safety analysis teams (perform data analyses), joint safety 
implementation teams develop safety enhancements), and a joint 
implementation measurement team (develops a master safety plan, measures 
effectiveness and identifies future areas of study). The strength of CAST lies in 
its extensive membership, its proactive commitment to safety, and its ability to 
design and broadly implement strong system changes (Pronovost et al., 2008). 
The cost of implementing the safety enhancements was projected to be USD 
500 million, spread out over 10 years, with the safety enhancements put in 
place by the CAST Safety Plan predicted to save the industry more than USD 
600 million each year (CAST, 2011). If patient safety wants be serious it will 
need serious funding.
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If CIRS is implemented and run in a way such as in the study site hospital there 
is an inherent danger that while it is “officially implemented and used” it actually 
does not work, is not used, and takes time off the few people who do spend 
time with it. If however a severe error would occur at that hospital the 
organisation could still ‘use’ CIRS in order to defend themselves by stating that 
“we did everything we could, we even have a CIRS”. With hindsight of the 
findings the OEGGG recommendation for hospitals to ‘participate in 
CIRSmedical as hospitals would otherwise run danger having superimposed on 
them other reporting systems and procedures, which would inhibit the 
meaningful handling of incidents’ (OEGGG, 2005) has to be seen more critically. 
The findings suggest that the OEGGG CIRSmedical project, under current 
conditions and with the current lack of resources, is in itself not a meaningful 
way of managing error. This calls again the governing body into responsibility to 
take honest, credible and resourced actions in patient safety that include 
regulations and assessments that no one can ‘escape’.
In order to undertake systemic changes in the health care system in Austria it is 
necessary to identify what kinds of local incident reporting systems are in use 
across the nine states of Austria, what experience organizations have with it, 
and how those experiences can be shared. This might also involve investigating 
how advanced non-health care organisations in Austria are in their use of 
incident reporting systems. Experiences could be bundled and shared amongst 
umbrella organisations and professional societies in order to set up a concept 
for nationwide incident reporting systems in Austrian health care institutions. 
Existing resources can be used to promote collaborative patient safety 
programs that involve (as) many stakeholders (as possible), from agency 
constituents, the health professionals community, academia and the public, and 
this should be done from a more critical and in-depth perspective than the 
current self-evaluation procedures. This would also incorporate addressing 
other shortcomings, for example the need for standardisation of terms and
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definitions. Staff need to know the correct terminology in order to know what to 
report, and where to report it to. Without clear definitions findings will be difficult 
to compare, for example if adverse events are defined differently in different 
reporting systems and those reports are then merged in a shared database this 
would distort results (it would eventually result in similar ‘findings’ to the IOM 
report, see the discussion throughout Chapter 2). This is an important and 
challenging task as was discussed in section 4.3.3 the WHO World Alliance for 
Patient Safety (WAPS) and the European Union Network for Patient Safety 
(EUNetPas) do not have German amongst their output languages. It is not clear 
how Austria and other German speaking countries will overcome this problem. 
None of the above discussed issues is explicitly addressed in any of the recent 
government publications on patient safety developments in Austria, such as 
BMG (2010) and BMG (2011a and 2011b).
8.2.7. The clinical /  non-clinical patient safety continuum
Probably stating the obvious this study stresses that the implementation of a 
CIRS is a non-clinical task and suggests a principal separation of clinical and 
non-clinical tasks at the department. Proper patient safety is a complex task that 
requires experts. While medics and nurses should be involved in the process it 
seems unrealistic to expect them to manage a CIRS “just along the way” and on 
top of their clinical duties. Similar to the non-clinical task of implementing and 
running a CIRS this study identified latent managerial factors that complicate 
the performance of health care professionals and can potentially contribute to 
adverse outcomes / events. During the observation a number of situations came 
up that revealed managerial demands on the clinical team that can potentially 
compromise patient safety. These were often quite simple non-clinical problems 
that occurred in the daily operations at a hospital in and outpatient department. 
While medical error is an important issue, as the literature frequently points out, 
this study suggests that in order to apply the systems concept of organisational
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error in health care efforts have to go beyond an exclusivity of clinical incidents 
and seriously consider the role that non-clinical issues play in the organisation 
and delivery of health care services. According to the systems theory in error 
science any one failure in the system may contribute or trigger an adverse 
event.
This study provided evidence that situations can arise where managerial 
demands are recognised but left unattended as attention is given to core clinical 
tasks (see ‘organisational threats’ throughout section 7.5, as well as section 
7.6.3). Those managerial tasks are left unattended and therefore pose latent 
threats in the system that have the potential to contribute to adverse outcomes 
and potentially impact patient safety. In addition these latent conditions are 
suspected to have a negative impact on staff motivation, staff communication, 
and efficient use of hospital resources. Moreover this study points out a system 
that not only makes it easy for individuals to err, but also for the health care 
organisation, due to its (lack of) allocation of management responsibilities, to 
leave known errors and system deficiencies unattended. It makes it easy for 
them to engage in patient safety initiatives without adequate knowledge and 
resources for handling them, and even allows the organisation to apparently 
‘get away’ with an unsuccessful implementation and appear as a forward 
thinking and leading organisation in patient safety. It is believed that the critical 
ethnography approach in this study in particular allowed sufficient investigation 
and subsequently uncovering of these issues.
The themes and categories identified in this study (see section 5.6.5 and figure 
5.4) may be related to one or another patient safety event taxonomy. However, 
as has been discussed earlier (in section 1.3 and in section 4.3.3) the 
international efforts to establishing a standard taxonomy for patient safety 
events, even if one of them should become a standard, do not apply to German 
speaking countries for semantic reasons. Moreover, Tamuz et al’s (2004)
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comments on defining and classifying incident reports need to be kept in mind 
(Tamuz et al., 2004:19): ‘‘How does the definition of events channel managers’ 
attention? How does the classification of events into one category or another 
trigger organizational routines for gathering and analyzing information? How do 
definitions channel the attention of providers and managers? How does event 
classification influence data gathering and analysis? Patient safety events may 
be categorised and classified in many ways, if they do not trigger action 
because an event might not fall into one of these categories this becomes 
meaningless. That this is a real danger has not just become evident in the 
present study, but there are indications that this might be a real threat in other, 
more sophisticated CIRS such as the NHS NRLS (see section 7.6.3). 
Consequently it seems as if current risk procedures, in both the Austrian and 
the UK hospital, are set up in a way to fit existing thinking of the 
medical/hospital system and do not sufficiently reflect the error models that 
explain organisational error.
It may therefore be concluded that (1) a principal and first level distinction 
should be made between clinical on one hand and non-clinical tasks and quality 
problems on the other hand. This concept is oriented towards the facilities 
management discourse (see section 5.2.4) and Barrett’s (1995) core / non-core 
business continuum in facilities management. This is exemplified in figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: The clinical / non-clinical patient safety continuum
<----------------  Clinical A c t iv it ie s ------------------------------------------------------- ►
<-----------------------------------  Non-C lin ical Activ ities  ►
-  Raiso 7 d'etre
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Business Functions ■■ ►
Source: based on Barrett (1995)
In figure 8.1 an arbitrary interface between clinical and non-clinical activities is 
used. The key is that this interface is not shown as a vertical divide but that it 
accommodates the notion that an activity in the hospital can be (a) wholly 
clinical, (d) wholly non-clinical, or (b and c) part clinical, part non-clinical. Wholly 
clinical activities can be seen as the raison d’etre functions of a health care 
organisation. The function shown at point (a) in figure 8.1 could be any of the 
clinical issues identified in section 7.3.1. Incidents, such as the communication 
issues identified in section 7.3.2 would be placed on point (b) or (c) in figure 8.1 
as they are closely associated with clinical work but contain non-clinical 
elements (i.e. the ‘system’ that provides unsafe means of communication and 
lacks standard procedures for safe communication). The organisational threats 
identified in section 7.5 would be placed on point (d) in the continuum in figure 
8.1. The amount of non-clinical events that were observed affecting the daily 
operations at the department call for dedicated accountability of those 
management issues. It is suggested that the principal separation between
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clinical and non-clinical incidents could be placed in front of existing 
organisational error models, such as Van der Schaaf’s incident causation model 
(Schaaf, 1992), as technical, human, or organisational error can occur in either 
purely clinical as well as non-clinical activities. The system approach to patient 
safety, when put into practice, appears to currently cover only parts of a range 
and scope of issues (the clinical activities). These issues seem to reflect the fact 
that compared to other domains and industries ‘systems thinking’ in patient 
safety is a relatively new approach with a degree of confusion and ambiguity 
amongst its constructs, concepts and methods (Waterson, 2009).
In relation to CIRS it appears that this split between clinical and non-clinical 
events is an issue that reporting systems in non-health care organisations do 
not have to face. They can run a “universal” CIRS. A future study could 
investigate the consequences of this and find out how applicable findings about 
CIRS in organisations outside health care really are, and how much discipline 
specific issues will play a role. By allowing to report non-medical reports, 
analysing them, and providing feedback and taking appropriate actions it could 
be investigated if this correlates, i.e. boosts reporting of medical incidents (i.e. 
staff get used to the reporting procedure; if one is observed by peers when 
using a CIRS, which in this study was inevitable, this does not automatically 
mean that one is reporting a medical incident as CIRS would not be exclusively 
for medical incidents; staff learn to trust the system; staff see the purpose of 
reporting and find it meaningful to use the system -  like they used the technical 
support team function). A system inclusive of all incidents (this of course shall 
include analysis of and response to all incidents) may serve not only to reduce 
error but also to foster a systems culture that, by moving away the focus from 
medical events only, encourages reporting relevant to whole system 
improvements.
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Concerning the complexity of tightly coupled healthcare organisations, where 
practically everything can have an impact on patient safety, starting from the 
temperature of tap water to logistics of meals, from floor tiles to education and 
training, health professionals can feel overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of 
the problem (Leistikow et al., 2011). Staff might think it useless to improve one 
aspect of care when the problem can just strike elsewhere. In addition staff can 
end up in heated discussions about which safety problem is the most urgent, 
often with both sides being right (Leistikow et al, 2011). A working universal 
CIRS could fulfil an important purpose in documenting these various quality and 
safety problems, concerns and suggestions for improvement. In this way it 
could aid in prioritising safety problems and channelling efforts to where they 
are most needed, at the same time giving the “runner-up” a perspective of when 
he can expect constructive comments and support regarding the safety 
problems he feels are important. This of course requires an environment where 
it is safe, easy, and worthwhile to report.
Secondly it should be the declared goal of the organisation that those non- 
clinical tasks and quality problems are equally managed and attended to as are 
clinical matters. However, it is suggested that this is not done by doctors and 
nurses but by a professional manager. The methods and findings of this study 
cannot point to any specific requirements of this manager but, as general 
management thinking seemed to be absent from the department and in the 
OEGGG CIRS implementation, a general management approach could make a 
promising start. A future investigation could focus on the requirements of such a 
role. The findings in this particular hospital suggest though that this individual 
should not be from within the hospital directorate, such as the hospital’s risk 
manager, but either a new post in the department or someone independent 
from the hospital directorate, i.e. not a superior to the staff he aims to help (the 
above raised point that this individual should be a manager rather than a health
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professional inherits that he doesn’t come from either doctors or nurses, as this 
is likely to cause resentment from either one of the two groups).
Patient safety seems to consist of several components, medical, nursing, 
technical, and managerial components. Currently there seems to be an 
imbalance amongst those and tasks being committed to medical and nursing 
personnel only. The findings in this study suggest that patient safety is probably 
best described as a problem of management AND medicine, and ways have to 
be found how organisation and management experts can work together with 
clinical “core” personnel in order to provide safe and efficient services to 
patients and staff.
8.2.8. Was it ethically and morally right to implement CIRS?
The discourse on organisational change distinguishes between change and 
innovation and holds the popular notion that while all innovation is considered 
change, not all change is innovation (for example Hernandez and Kaluzny, 
1997). Although the OEGGG project resulted in some discussions on patient 
safety at the department it would be too early to call this an innovative change. 
Before CIRS implementation the department could not know with certainty if this 
change will result in an innovation or not. However, given the limited resources 
of any hospital, considering that with any project comes at least the costs of 
staff involvement and possible staff (de)sensitisation to a subject, as well as the 
numerous ethical considerations around conducting the study, this thesis wants 
to address one last question: Was the decision to implement CIRS under the 
given conditions ethically and morally right? The findings of this study suggest 
that a principal differentiation should be made in all hospital operations between 
clinical and non-clinical operations. Accordingly two perspectives, a clinical and 
a non-clinical, will be consulted to answer this question.
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First, people involved in the decision to implement CIRS were mostly physicians. 
To some extend these physicians may, or at least should have been influenced 
in their decision by the Hippocratic principle “first do no harm”, as this serves as 
one of the principal precepts of medical ethics. Accordingly physicians are 
aware that in some situations it may be better to do nothing rather than risking 
to cause more harm than good. This is a fine line that physicians have to cross 
and refers to what Davidoff (2011) calls the ‘snail’ or the ‘evangelist’ perspective. 
One can either become a celebrated pioneer of medical innovation or loose his 
reputation and job. More often than not was and is the medical elite divided over 
this question. The history of medicine, and innovations in medicine, provides 
examples where doctors did cross this line successfully. For example the 
pioneering work of Blalock, Thomas and Taussig (Thomas, 1998) broke the 
taboo in medicine of operating on the heart. When they decided to cross the line, 
against resistance from their medical peers, they made possible the first 
successful open heart surgery in 1944. What was unthinkable during their time 
has now become acceptable medical practice, standard, and best practice in 
medicine. As of 2004, in the United States alone, more than 1.75 million heart 
operations are performed every year. Progress in medicine is thus likely to be 
dependent to some extent on trial and error.
However, it is not known to what extent physicians involved in the decision to 
implement CIRS perceived it to be a “medical decision”, hence a decision that 
would underlie the rules of medical ethics. The physicians’ involvement in the 
decision making process indicates that, to some extent, they perceived it as one 
of their responsibilities, notwithstanding that they are trained medics and not 
trained managers. Therefore it may be argued that they perceived the CIRS 
implementation as something “medical”; or otherwise, perceive management 
tasks, such as the decision to implement CIRS, as something they are largely 
responsible for, and at the same time feel adequately equipped to do so. This
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goes in line with the tradition in the medical profession which, over history, has 
strongly objected any involvement of a third party (Coburn and Willis, 2000).
Secondly, from a management perspective, a manager with knowledge of the 
complexity of patient safety interventions and with responsibility for the outcome 
of such an intervention would probably have consulted the literature on CIRS 
implementation and other patient safety interventions. This would have provided 
insight into the complexity of the matter as well as possible and probably more 
urgent alternatives. Before implementing CIRS he could have assessed the 
safety culture at the department, find out about the environment in which CIRS 
is expected to grow, and allocate resources to prepare the department for an 
implementation. In this way a decision for or against CIRS implementation could 
have been based on insightful data from the very department.
Accordingly from a medical perspective the decision to implement CIRS was 
ethically justifiable. On one hand because clinical staff did not know better, on 
the other hand, with the benefit of doubt and from an ‘evangelist perspective’, 
because clinical decision makers at the department may learn their lesson and 
do it better next time. As there was no manager to offer a critical perspective the 
implementation was, under current conditions, right. From a management 
perspective, or a patient safety perspective, considering the (lack of) an 
evidence base and the situation at the department a more ethical decision 
would have probably been to postpone implementation and to do more 
preparatory work that would facilitate a successful use of CIRS. The question is 
therefore rephrased if current conditions at the department are ethical and 
moral. This may be addressed in future research and by using phronetic 
research, asking four value-rational questions: Where are we going? Who gains 
and who looses, and by which mechanisms of power? Is this development 
desirable? and what, if anything, should we do about it? This is strikingly similar 
to Drucker's (2003, oriented on Hammer's work, 1990) questions about the
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profession of management and ways to 'work smarter'. These questions were 
"What is the task?", "What are we trying to accomplish?", "Why do it at all?" 
resulting in eliminating those things that do not need to be done.
This is a valid question in patient safety because hospitals operate on limited 
budgets. It may be argued that implementing CIRS in the way observed at the 
hospital is threatening safety itself because it unnecessarily occupies staff who 
could otherwise use their time more usefully. Contrary to CIRS in health care 
there is evidence, in particular from the ‘lean discourse’ that eliminating 
unnecessary processes in hospitals increases safety. Hospitals should take a 
more critical approach to what they are and what they are not doing, in clinical 
as much as in non-clinical agendas.
8.3. Summary of contribution to knowledge
This section shortly summarises the six main contributions to knowledge 
emanating from this present study. It will conclude with a consideration of the 
potential of these contributions from the perspectives of three main interest 
groups managers, policy makers and researchers.
1. Clinical / non-clinical patient safety continuum model: The first contribution 
relates to a principal classification of hospital activities. Findings suggest that 
the current organisation of public hospitals (in Vienna) is ill resourced to 
implementing new patient safety strategies and effectively identifying and 
addressing critical incidents. The ‘systems approach’ to error in health care 
currently focuses too much on core medical tasks. The study identified latent 
managerial factors that complicate the performance of health care 
professionals and potentially contribute to adverse outcomes. As a 
consequence this study suggests a principal and first level separation of
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clinical and non clinical aspects of service provision. This has resulted in a 
clinical / non-clinical continuum model that accommodates the notion that an 
activity in a hospital can be wholly clinical, partly clinical / non- clinical, or 
wholly non-clinical. The amount of non-clinical events that were observed 
affecting the daily operations at the department call for dedicated 
accountability of those managerial issues. This is illustrated in figure 8.2 
below, which is an amended form of the clinical / non-clinical patient safety 
continuum model as presented in figure 8.1. It shows the current focus of 
WHO, DOH, and AHRQ on clinical aspects of patient safety and gives 
examples of other (partly) non-clinical activities in the continuum.
Figure 8.2: Amended clinical / non-clinical patient safety continuum model
Clinical Activities
■4- Non-C'linical Activities
WHO, DOH, 
AHRQ
Raison d'etre
actualising telephone 
numbers, light management 
in theatre, meeting room 
situation, known problems 
not solved
(a) (b) <c) (d )
Business Functions
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2. Patient safety framework: The second contribution emanating from this 
study is the patient safety framework as presented in figure 5.4. The 14 
categories and four themes (possible reports, barriers, organisational threats, 
and practical implications) identified in this study present a framework that 
subsequent researchers in patient safety may want to consider using to 
structure their inquiries. It may in particular present a framework for larger 
scale and more positivistic studies. The fragmentation into categories and 
themes may be helpful in conceptualising (also other more qualitative) 
studies at an early stage when they have to pass detailed ethical approval 
processes.
Figure 8.3: CIRS Patient safety framework
Integration of existing 
documentation; 
Integration of staff; 
Integration of organisational 
issues
Facilities;Clinical issues; 
Communication issues; 
Documentation issues; 
Other issues
Little awareness; 
Low priority; 
Other barriers
Processes;
Culture
BARRIERS
ORGANISATIONAL
THREATS
POSSIBLE
REPORTS
PRACTICAL • 
IMPLICATIONS
3. Phases of CIRS: The third contribution relates to the use of CIRS at a 
hospital department. This study suggests that there are three stages for a 
meaningful operation of CIRS: implementation, use, and analysis and 
feedback. The findings in this study call for a clear accountability and 
investment in each of these three stages. Without adequate monitoring and 
support a CIRS may be a barrier to improvement and may present in itself a 
threat to safety. This study provides insight into real world as well as 
conceptual problems pertaining to CIRS and an efficient and safe health 
care service.
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4. Method: The fourth contribution of this thesis is to be seen in the 
methodological approach chosen for this study. The study shows that this 
type of research can contribute to the growth of knowledge on managerial 
aspects of patient safety. Observational studies can serve to identify latent 
managerial system vulnerabilities and leverage points that can aid the 
identification, development and implementation of system improvements. 
These studies can also generate empirically grounded hypotheses, 
“discoveries” (Roth et al., 2004), that can be tested using more traditional, 
controlled experimental methods. Moreover, as the currently predominant 
self-evaluation assessments of patient safety in Austria may lead to 
misinterpretations of the performance and workability of CIRS in Austria, the 
critical ethnography in-depth approach adds meaning to these statistics. It is 
suggested that critical ethnography is sufficiently capable of conceptualising 
the many different elements pertaining to the complex entity patient safety.
5. Research ethics: The fifth contribution relates to research ethics in health 
care related research. This study found substantial differences in ethical 
requirements to management studies in the Austrian and the UK national 
health systems. These differing requirements and the effect it has on design 
and execution of studies need to be considered when interpreting studies 
from different health systems. Outcomes of ethnographic studies in Austria 
and the UK (and possibly any other health system) may differ due to being 
subjected to (more or less) substantial manipulation of different ethical 
bodies.
6. Incorrect error rate estimations: The sixth contribution of this thesis stems 
from a critical assessment of the literature on error occurrence. Current 
estimations about the occurrence of preventable adverse events leading to 
death are incorrect. Despite this they are still widely used in the patient 
safety literature and from reputable institutions like the WHO, EU, or the
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DOH. Currently there is no reliable data of a representative scale on the 
actual occurrence of preventable error in health care contributing to death. 
This is critical as it does not allow channelling limited resources to where 
they are most needed and might rush health care organisations into patient 
safety projects which they are ill-resourced to execute. A correct estimate of 
the occurrence of adverse events in health care is needed as it presents a 
prerequisite for measuring progress in patient safety.
The findings from this research have implications for various stakeholders in 
patient safety. This section will now conclude with a brief consideration of those 
implications from the perspectives of three main interest groups: managers, 
policy makers, and researchers.
Management perspective: From a management perspective it seems important 
to take a more critical stance towards the various available patient safety 
initiatives and not to hook on any trend that may come along. Effective patient 
safety requires an understanding of organisational settlements, a theoretical 
understanding of improvement initiatives, and a spirit of reflexivity and learning 
to enable and facilitate change in a particular national and organisational 
context. Those responsible for patient safety should first develop an 
understanding of their own core processes and then look at various approaches 
for identifying and tackling risks. Any approach to improving safety needs to be 
adequately costed and budgeted. Running into a “ready made solution CIRS” 
can be perceived meaningless by employees when they are first encouraged to 
reporting incidents but not all reports do trigger managerial action because 
limited funds do not allow for adequate analysis and action following those 
reports. “Half baked solutions” may have a long term negative impact on the 
relationship between clinical staff and management. Discouraged staff may
cease support for future projects. In this respect it seems important for
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managers to create some kind of evidence base at the outset of a project 
against which progress can be measured and communicated to the rest of the 
organisation.
If the decision is made for a CIRS management should consider the three 
stages for its meaningful operation: implementation, use, and analysis and 
feedback. In each of these stages it is important that all staff are adequately 
informed about CIRS and its implications. Important barriers for the use of CIRS 
have to be, as much as possible, obtained beforehand from the literature. 
These barriers need to be adequately considered and additional barriers in the 
project need to be identified and addressed. The findings in this thesis suggest 
that staff prefer to use CIRS as a holistic system that includes organisational 
and non-clinical threats. This preference may relate to litigation issues and staff 
wanting to get used to CIRS with less sensitive issues. However, it also points 
to the relevance of non-clinical and apparently simple threats, which have so far 
been largely unaddressed in the patient safety discourse. In a system approach 
to safety these reports must not be ignored.
Local applications of CIRS may create different practical implications for its 
successful use. Findings in this thesis especially point to stronger integration of 
various staff and synergy effects with already existing documentation. It is the 
task of a manager to identify those opportunities and to integrate CIRS into the 
rest of the organisational processes. The various managerial demands for CIRS, 
any other patient safety initiative, and the high number of organisational and 
non-clinical threats call for dedicated accountability by a non-clinical manager to 
facilitate and support core clinical processes. The three phases of CIRS, the 
clinical / non-clinical patient safety continuum model, and the patient safety 
framework developed in this thesis can be used for conceptualising a safety 
framework for organisation.
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Policy makers: Policy makers: The most immediate implication for policy 
makers comes from the critique of the patient safety literature and the incorrect 
error rate estimations. Like managers in health care organisations policy 
makers need to take a more critical stance towards error rate estimations, 
check their reliability, and consider if and how they apply to a national context. 
This should also include under which ethical regulations studies have been 
conducted and how this may have influenced research outcomes. As yet there 
is no reliable data of a representative scale on the actual occurrence of 
preventable error in health care. The critique in this thesis comes as a call to 
policy makers worldwide, who can take a forerunning role if they are to provide 
accurate and representative data on preventable error occurrence. On one 
hand this would allow channelling limited resources to where they are most 
needed. On the other hand this would present a prerequisite for measuring 
progress in patient safety; a measure that has been absent for the past decade 
of patient safety endeavours and which has left everyone in the dark how 
efficient these endeavours have been and if and how much progress has been 
made.
As a consequence of the various shortcomings presented in this thesis it is 
suggested that a share of patient safety funds should go into the design of 
health care processes and the organisation and management of non-core and 
supportive agendas. In a systems concept these non-clinical issues are as 
viable a part as other, probably more complex and clinical agendas. This calls 
for dedicated non-clinical managers at the frontline. It should be the task of 
these managers, not clinicians, to assess, implement and facilitate patient 
safety initiatives. In this respect policy makers should also reconsider the entry 
requirements for academic researchers into the field and re-assess their ethical 
approval strategies; many of which seem to favour positivistic approaches over 
qualitative ones, and discourage or render ethnographic and more action 
orientated research approaches impossible. Furthermore assessment
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procedures in patient safety need to move on from self-assessment exercises to 
more independent, thorough and reliable assessments, and should develop key 
indicators of safety than can be used for national and international comparison. 
Here special attention should be given to the development of a German patient 
safety taxonomy similar to the developing English taxonomy used by the WHO 
and JCAHO.
Researchers: The critique of the patient safety literature and in particular of the 
incorrect error rate estimations should on one hand alert researchers when 
using and interpreting those studies. On the other hand the identified 
shortcomings open new areas for research, most apparently in adequately 
determining how big a problem preventable error in health care really is. 
Identifying the correct scope of the problem will present patient safety 
organisations with a rigorous and systematic evidence base against which 
progress can be measured.
The high occurrence of non-clinical reports presents the opportunity for further 
investigation and if allowing staff to report non-clinical events could be used to 
desensitising staff toward CIRS. Although the literature at current does not 
provide accounts of cross professional executives who would give 
organisational threats the attention they deserve future researchers may be 
able to identify such individuals. A study could look into what kind of 
organisation behaviour and culture fosters the implementation of such hybrid 
managers. On the other hand it may be possible for researchers, to a certain 
extent, to take on this role themselves, to identify its role and responsibilities, to 
investigate its acceptance, and to study the impact it may have on safety.
As this thesis studied CIRS under budgetary pressures future researchers may 
want to study CIRS in a higher budget research environment. This could test 
the hypothesis if more funding will also result in more reports, and investigate 
wider system pressures on organisation behaviour and its impact on patient
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safety. Furthermore researchers need to consider the ethical requirements 
under which studies were conducted and how this may have had an impact on 
the research outcomes. It seems that more careful attention needs to be given 
in the formulation of research hypotheses and problems when using studies 
from different backgrounds. This study also makes apparent that the patient 
safety discourse in general, and the discourse in German speaking countries in 
particular, lack of a patient safety taxonomy. Future researchers will need to 
address this issue.
In regard to the methods used the author can only encourage fellow 
researchers to using qualitative methods and ethnography to study organisation 
development and patient safety in health care organisations. The overwhelming 
impression was that, after a first phase of scepticism towards the researcher 
and his intentions, staff were generally very interested in and supportive of his 
work. Probably because they themselves see the need for change and are 
‘stuck’ in a gridlock system that doesn’t allow very much time for doing things 
differently. The experiences from this research, together with the models that 
evolved from the study, present future researchers with a framework they may 
want to consider when structuring their own enquiries.
8.4. Limitations
The limitations of this study relate predominantly to the research method 
employed and the scope of data collection and analysis.
This thesis used one hospital as a study site. It adopted a critical realist stance, 
which presupposes that the social world is made up of open systems in which 
individuals respond differently in similar situations and on different occasions. 
Hence, generalising the results of this study to other groups of buildings should
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be done with caution because conditions and relationships might differ. A larger 
study examining more than one site would allow for the theories and 
explanations generated in this research to be tested more widely. It might have 
been interesting to compare the study site hospital with another hospital in 
Vienna that participated in the OEGGG CIRS project. However, the decision 
was made against it in order to provide a rare in-depth account of CIRS.
Another limitation relates to the comparability of findings from this study to other 
health care systems. Different health care systems in different countries provide 
different conditions, which may present other barriers or opportunities than 
those identified in this study. This also applies, although to a lesser extend, to 
hospitals from different regions in Austria. Although Austria is a small country, 
the health system reflects the bureaucratisation of the state and is divided into 
nine states, each of which is responsible for the public hospitals within that state. 
This study acknowledged this issue through including the top layer ‘filters’ in the 
conceptual framework (figure 1.1). As has been discussed earlier different 
ethical requirements will also need to be considered when comparing this study 
with others.
Another limitation relates to the research context. The study was very much 
dependent on the state of patient safety in Austria, the investigated organisation, 
and the (lack of) action of the department. It may be argued that observing the 
implementation of a resourced CIRS such as the UK NRLS might have 
produced results that could be more easily related to the international patient 
safety literature. Nevertheless it was important to document the current state of 
patient safety and CIRS at hospitals in Vienna, regardless of whether or not 
those hospitals make progress in patient safety.
Last but not least it is important to reiterate the systemic nature of error in health 
care and hence the need for a systems approach to patient safety. This
research has focused on non-clinical elements in patient safety. While this study
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stresses the impact of organisational issues on patient safety in a systems 
approach and points to the current under-representation of those in the patient 
safety literature, organisational issues present only one element of patient 
safety and need to be seen in co-existence rather than competition to more 
traditional and clinical approaches to patient safety.
8.5. Future Research
In addition to testing the findings presented in this research and the practical 
implications as presented throughout section 7.6 of this thesis the following 
areas for future research are suggested:
Reliable data on error occurrence: All nations face the same essential challenge 
of how to improve quality, foster innovation, and ensure value for money spent 
on health care. This study has shown that current estimations on the extent of 
error in health care are incorrect. Identifying the correct scope of the problem 
will present patient safety organisations with a rigorous and systematic 
evidence base against which progress in patient safety can be measured. 
Furthermore, and considering finite resources, identifying the most serious 
threats would allow principle causes to be explored, specific risk reduction 
strategies to be identified and costed, and would allow channelling of limited 
resources to where they are most needed.
German patient safety taxonomy: Another important barrier related to progress 
in patient safety and CIRS is terminology. The English patient safety literature 
provides the opportunity for health care and patient safety organisations to 
using a (proposed) standard patient safety event taxonomy, either from the 
JCAHO or the WHO. However, neither the JCAHO nor the WHO have German 
as an output language. It is not clear at the moment what effect this will have on
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patient safety developments in German speaking countries, such as Germany, 
Austria, or Switzerland, and how operators of incident reporting systems that 
are run in German will address this problem of a lack of a standard terminology. 
The JCAHO classification implies that classifying of events is a highly structured 
process and therefore will need a strategic overhead. At current it is not 
foreseeable which body in any of the German speaking countries might take on 
this substantial task. Future research might investigate the feasibility of 
translating the English taxonomy into German.
More funding -  more reports: This study found wider systems factors 
influencing the implementation of CIRS. For example budgetary pressures 
restricted access to patient safety training, dedicated (i.e. paid work-) time to 
meaningfully use CIRS, or more equipment (for example more computers for 
reporting and better special arrangements to allow privacy for reporting). Future 
research may investigate the impact wider system pressures have on 
behaviours in hospitals in regard to CIRS and find out if more funding will also 
result in more reports.
Inclusion of non-clinical reports to boost reporting of clinical incidents: 
Considering that underreporting is a common occurrence in many CIRS and 
that many of the reports submitted to CIRS were identified by the system 
administrator as not CIRS-classifiable (see section 7.6.3) it might be interesting 
to investigate if staff could be desensitised towards CIRS by allowing them to 
report non-clinical incidents on CIRS. It is conceivable that, through using CIRS 
also for non-clinical issues, staff may become familiar with the system and 
reporting procedure and may find it meaningful, as feedback is provided, and 
trust the system so that they may also be increasingly willing to report clinical 
incidents.
Role and responsibilities of a non-clinical manager: The amount of non-clinical
events that were observed affecting daily operations at the department call for
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dedicated accountability of those managerial issues. This is in line with, for 
example, Kaluzny and Shortell’s (1997) notion of a ‘physician executive’. They 
(ibid, 1997) predicted a redefinition of the role of physicians, based on changing 
demographics and epidemiology, new technologies and their emphasis on 
assessment and outcomes, as well as fundamental changes in the configuration 
of health services. They argued that this would include greater involvement of 
physicians in managerial activities, coupled with a requirement for physicians to 
become increasingly knowledgeable about the organisational and managerial 
environment in which they work in (Kaluzny and Shortell, 1997). Kaluzny and 
Shortell (1997) call those professionals who are trained in both administration 
and medicine ‘physician executives’.
However a role such as the physician executive as predicted by Kaluzny and 
Shortell (1997) who would possess the skills and resources to manage CIRS 
was not evident in the department. They role as such may exist in theory, as the 
department leaders (respondents d1 and d2) were both responsible for 
managerial tasks but at the same time occupied with clinical core 
responsibilities. It happened more often than once that the head of department 
was required in his role as department leader but was unavailable because he 
was operating in the operating theatre. If they had been less occupied with 
clinical work they could have probably spent more time on CIRS. However, it is 
questionable if it would indeed be desirable to have medics performing more 
non-medical tasks. A management executive, who would possess managerial 
skills and resources to run a CIRS, and at the same time have sufficient insight 
into the clinical environment, was similarly not evident.
Currently the literature does not provide accounts of any such cross­
professional executives. At the same time it is difficult to imagine that none such 
persons exist, only that not much is known about their work. This provides an
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opportunity for future investigation, to identify positions in an organisation where 
managerial work and clinical work overlap and are successfully managed.
Another investigation could install and explore the role of a non-clinical manager 
who would oversee the organisational threats as identified in this study. The 
investigation could address acceptance of such an individual at the department 
and, most importantly, the impact he has on safety at the department. Until such 
a role is introduced at hospitals independent researchers could make a useful 
contribution through, for example, action research or soft systems methodology. 
This is discussed further in the following section.
More actionable research: Contrary to the many warnings the researcher 
received prior to entering the field the research experience was such as that the 
‘researcher as an outsider’ was warmly welcomed (with a few exceptions) and 
that staff would have been thankful for more direction and information about 
CIRS and other non-clinical issues. A conclusion from the fieldwork is that 
clinicians, while they wish to preserve their autonomy in clinical matters, long for 
and indeed are in need of support in managerial and non-clinical matters. Who 
is and who isn’t an outsider is up to interpretation. For a nurse a student of 
organisation and management may be as much an outsider as a physician. A 
doctor may regard anyone who does not possess the exact domain specific 
medical knowledge as an outsider. This could include anyone, even the head of 
department who, for example, isn’t an expert in endocrinology. Nurses and 
doctors may regard anyone an outsider who does not belong to their particular 
department, even if he belongs to the same hospital and is in some way 
“responsible” for them. This was the case for example with the hospital’s risk 
manager who was not from the department and many staff were apparently 
reluctant to share information with him (see footnote 35 in section 7.7.2).
On the other hand the researcher was often approached by staff asking for
more information and advice both on CIRS (for example regarding reporting
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issues, expected feedback, progress of other hospitals using CIRS) and on 
general patient safety questions. It is suggested that support of this kind can be 
offered but it needs to comply with the philosophical and methodological 
underpinnings of the study. This was not the case in this study where the aim 
was to be an independent observer with as little as possible direct influence on 
the activities at the department. Given that budgetary constraints of health care 
organisations are not likely to change dramatically any time soon and that a 
non-clinical manager be introduced at the department this might present 
interesting opportunities for more actionable research that would benefit from 
high staff interest and input, for example by using soft systems methodology, 
action research, ethnography and phronesis.
Comparing the effect of different ethical requirements on ethnographic studies 
in different health systems: An initial aim at the outset of this study was to 
compare CIRS in Austrian and NHS hospitals. The preliminary work that had 
been done, and which eventually led to the decision not to pursue the 
comparative approach, points to considerable differences in ethical 
requirements pertaining to research in health care organisations in Austria and 
in the UK. Non clinical studies in Austria currently do not require ethical 
clearance from an overseeing special ethics body and are granted locally, as 
has been the case in this study (see Appendix B). In contrast any study in the 
NHS requires ethical clearance from the NHS NPSA National Research Ethics 
Service36 (formerly through the NHS Research Ethics Committee), which can 
be a lengthy and possibly constraining process. The procedures in place for 
granting ethical approval in the UK seem to generally operate on a more 
medical model of research. Completing the NHS ethics form it becomes
36 some o f this is based on the author’s own experience and some on reflections the University o f 
Sheffield (unknown) document “ Reflective Summary: Application for NHS ethical approval”  which can 
be found here
http://www.shef.ac.Uk/content/l/c6/09/90/45/NHS%20Case%20Study%20Reflective%20Summary.pdf
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apparent that it is not designed for someone planning to undertake 
ethnographic research as it often asks the applicant to state in advance and in 
detail the number of participants, the length of time to be spent with each, and 
the specific date for completing the fieldwork.
Future research may address if and how this quite rigid approach to research 
design has repercussions in the field where the ethnographer is often driven by 
spontaneity and flexibility, and where responsiveness to what occurs in a 
particular context and setting, which includes unexpected and unplanned twists 
and turns, marks an elementary characteristic of his ethnographic endeavour.
If what and how something can or cannot be studied is dependent on a 
particular ethical body then this needs to be taken stronger into consideration in 
the international patient safety literature, which constantly draws together and 
compares contributions from all different kinds of health care systems, hence 
studies that have been subjected to different ethical regulations. To what extent 
this will be feasible is questionable. If at all it is suggested these differences 
might be documented in a direct comparative approach where the researcher 
(possibly the same individual or at least member of a group that closely 
communicates) investigates a setting that is most similar but for the ethical 
requirements (due to different national regulations). Changes, differences, and 
inhibiting factors that are caused by different ethical regulations should be 
documented as they appear before it is considered what implications this has 
on the research.
From the researcher’s point of view it may be added that ethical considerations 
are important but they need to be put into perspective. It is questionable if a 
student of organisation and management should have to go through a lengthy 
national ethical approval process on top of the ethical approval from both study 
site and the University. More flexibility in this respect would make health care
organisations much more attractive to researchers of organisation and
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management. To close with a note on the UK context it might be said that 
ethnography originally evolved during the colonial period of the British Empire 
(although some elements may date back to antiquity) and largely thanks due to 
anthropological studies the British undertook in order to gain understanding of 
unfamiliar cultures (Fielding, 2008). As outriders in ethnography on foreign 
grounds the British could pay tribute to their very own tradition and adapt ethical 
requirements for organisation and management studies in the NHS. Doing so 
ethnographic studies would have the potential to add (more) meaning to the 
hundreds of thousands of reports currently collected in the NHS NRLS (National 
Reporting and Learning System).
8.6. Reflections
There are certainly many important aspects related to patient safety that do not 
yet get addressed and that were beyond the scope of this study. Key 
controversies, methodological, political, financial, and ethical issues in patient 
safety research became manifest in the case study. This adds to Bates’ (2008) 
thought whether patient safety is sufficiently distinctive to represent its own 
discipline. More work on these issues is important to further understanding of 
patient safety and to map its topography. Critical ethnography potentially offers 
a perspective that is sufficiently capable of conceptualising patient safety in all 
its facets.
Nothing in the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis should be taken to 
suggest that effective patient safety is not a realistic expectation. Rather, it is 
arguing that effective patient safety requires (on top of substantial funds) an 
understanding of existing organisational settlements at a local level (for 
example a department or hospital), a theoretical understanding of current 
procedures for improvement in health care and non health care organisation, as
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well as a ‘spirit of reflexivity and learning’ (Peck, 2005) to inform the ways in 
which changes may be brought about in a particular national and cultural 
context. A reporting system that not only allows but also analyses organisational 
and non-clinical incidents may provide a valuable information channel across 
multiple stakeholders. Even if non-clinical issues are not reported other 
strategies have to be found to identify and manage them. Otherwise they 
continue to present latent threats in the health system, threats that presumably 
would often be rather straight forward and inexpensive to overcome.
Carrying out this study has underlined some of the practical problems in 
conducting research on patient safety more generally and ethnographic 
research in this subject area in particular, such as access to good quality data, 
as well as different ethical considerations in different health systems. Work in 
the clinical professions can be both physically and psychologically demanding, 
and so is undertaking research in this area. For it to be carried out the 
researcher has to have patience, perseverance, be flexible, and probably most 
important of all, have an honest interest in serving those who are in need. 
Finally, the author hopes that the findings and conclusions emanating from this 
study will provide the foundation for further research in the subject area and 
contribute to helping those many courageous individuals at the sharp end of 
patient care in their effort to providing safe, efficient, and affordable services.
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Faculty of Organisation and Management Research Ethics Checklist
This form is designed to help students and staff complete an ethical scrutiny of their 
proposed research. It also enables the University and Faculty to keep a record of research 
conducted that has been subjected to ethical scrutiny.
While it is not possible to provide definitive guidelines, by answering the questions below 
will help decide whether your research proposal requires ethical review by the Faculty 
Research Ethics Committee (FREC). In cases of uncertainty members of the FREC can be 
approached for advice, alternatively students and staff can refer to the O&M Research 
Ethics Policy. The large majority of research proposals will not need further scrutiny after 
completion of this form.
This form should be completed by the principal investigator for staff research. For student 
projects it may be completed by the student or the supervisor. In all cases it should be 
counter signed by the supervisor and kept as a record that ethical scrutiny has occurred 
and a full review by the FREC is unnecessary. Please note it may still be necessary to 
conduct a risk assessment for the proposal -  for information contact the Faculty Safety Co­
ordinator.
Name of student or principal Konstantin Weicht
investigator
Name of supervisor (if applicable)
Title of research proposal Incident Report on Critical Incident Reporting
for Gynaecology and Obstetrics in Austria -  
Exploratory Study
Outline of methodology* The exploratory study will define the participant
hospitals and the research will be conducted 
under their respective ethical requirements.
*lf the research may have a number of phases where the full methodology 
or research subjects are not clear at the outset, a separate ethical approval 
is needed for each phase. In this case, the research title must make clear if 
approval is only being sought for an initial phase of work -  e.g. "XYZ Study 
-  Phase 1 -  Initial exploration"
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Question Yes/No
1. Does the research involve human participants?____________________ YES
If NO please go to question No. 6.
If YES, then please answer the following questions No. 2 - 5:
2. Will any of the participants be vulnerable? NO
(E.g. Young people under 18, people with learning disabilities,
people who may be limited by age or sickness or disability from 
understanding the research, etc.)
3. Is there any reasonable and foreseeable risk of physical or NO
emotional harm to any of the participants? (E.g. Distressing
interview questions, experiments involving participants, asking 
 participants to consume samples etc.)_______________________________
4. Will anyone be taking part without giving their informed consent? NO
(E.g. Research involving covert study, coercion of subjects, where
 subjects have not properly understood the research etc.)_______________
5. Will the research output allow identification of any individual who NO
 has not given express consent to be identified?_______________________
If the answer to any of the questions 2 - 5 is YES then the research 
proposal must be submitted to the FREC for approval unless it falls 
into a category/programme of research that has already received 
category approval.
6. Does the research involve the use of live animals? NO
If the answer to questions 6 is YES then the research proposal 
must be submitted to the FREC for approval unless it falls into a 
category/programme of research that has already received category 
approval.
7. Does the research require approval from any external ethics YES
committee, e.g. the NHS? For NHS research, this includes any 
work using NHS Patients (incl tissues, organs, or data), NHS staff,
 volunteers, carers, NHS premises or facilities._________________________'
If the answer to question 7 is YES then the research proposal must 
be submitted to the relevant external body. For NHS Research 
Ethics Committees please refer to http://www.corec.org.uk
If the research proposal does not require submission to either the FREC or an 
NHS or other external REC then standard approval applies.
If the research proposal requires submission to the FREC please refer to the 
Faculty Research Ethics Policy, or contact a member of the committee for more 
information. Approval awaited applies until the proposal has been considered by 
the FREC.
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ETHICAL APPROVAL (please tick):
□ (Standard approval) This project does not require specific ethical approval.
□ (Category approval) In my opinion this work falls within the category
o f ..............................................projects which has been previously approved by
the FREC and it does not therefore need individual approval.
□ (Approval awaited) This project must be referred to the FREC for individual
consideration -  the work must not proceed unless and until the FREC gives 
approval.
I can confirm that I have read the Sheffield Hallam University Research Ethics Policy 
and Procedures document and agree to abide by its principles (please tick). □
S igned.............................................  Name..................................D a te ............................
Student / Researcher/Principal Investigator (as applicable)
S igned.............................................  Name..................................D a te .............................
Supervisor or other person giving ethical sign-off (as defined by O&M Research 
Ethics Procedures)
Note: University Research Ethics policy available from the following web link:
h ttp : //w w w .s h u .a c .u k /r e s e a r c h /r e s e a r c h h a l la m .h tm l
Students - If standard approval applies, please return this form at the same time you 
submit your research project proposal form to your supervisor.
Staff - If standard approval applies, please keep this form for your own records.
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Accompanying Social Science Research Study on the 
Implementation of CIRSmedical
Sozialwissenschafliche Studie zur Implementierung 
von CIRSmedical
am:
Student:
Konstantin Weicht, MRes 
Sheffield Hallam University,
Fakultat fiir Organisation und Management, 
City Campus, Sheffield SI 1WB, UK
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English Version:
The implementation of CIRSmedical at the Department for Gynecology and Obstetrics,
will be accompanied by Konstantin W eicht in form of a doctorate in social sciences.
The implementation of CIRSmedical is part of the project “Doctors learn from pilots”, 
initiated by the Austrian Federation for Gynecology and Obstetrics (OEGGG). The 
student will be introduced to staff in the department as a social science researcher.
The aim of the study is the documentation of the implementation of CIRSmedical and 
the analysis of its impact on the organizational culture of the department. The research 
findings will be fed back into the project and should support a successful 
implementation of CIRSmedical.
The research methods include:
• Attendance at CIRSmedical introduction sessions
• Staff mapping with job descriptions
• Access to existing quality assurance guidelines and regulations
• Questionnaire on situation analysis and acceptance of CIRSmedical
• Observation of human factors in staff interpersonal communication
• Interviews with management and clinical staff
• Access to the user report rates of CIRSmedical but not to the confidential 
content of the reports
• Feedback event
For this study, no patient files will be accessed, nor will any patient data be researched. 
The student will be informed about the number of messages reported in CIRSmedical, 
but has no access to the confidential content of the reports.
This social science research will be conducted observing all rules of medical 
confidentiality and with the agreement of both the hospital director and the head of 
department. The study fulfills all ethical requirements of the hospital.
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German Version:
Die Einfuehrung von CIRSmedical
M i ,  wird in Form einer Doktorarbeit von Konstantin W eicht wissenschaftlich 
begleitet.
Die Einfuhrung von CIRSmedical geschieht im Rahmen des Projektes „Aerzte lernen 
von Piloten“ der Oesterreichischen Gesellschaft fuer Gynaekologie und Geburtshilfe 
(OEGGG). Der Student wird dem Personal der Abteilung vorgestellt und ist
als Sozialwissenschaftler zu erkennen.
Ziel der begleitenden Studie ist es, die Einfuehrung von CIRSmedical zu dokumentieren 
und den Einfluss auf die Unternehmenskultur der Abteilung zu analysieren. Die 
Erkenntnisse der Studie werden der Abteilung zur Verfuegung gestellt und sollen eine 
erfolgreiche Einfuehrung des Systems unterstuetzen.
Die Forschungsmethoden umfassen:
Erfassung der Mitarbeiter und ihrer Funktionen 
Interviews mit Management und klinischem Personal 
Beobachtung 
Fragebogen
Einsicht in Leit- und Richtlinien fuer Qualitaetssicherung 
Teilnahme an der CIRSmedical Einschulungsveranstaltung 
Einsicht in die Anzahl der Meldungen in CIRSmedical 
Feedback Veranstaltung
Die sozialwissenschaftliche Arbeit des Doktoranden geschieht in Abstimmung mit der 
Abteilungs- und Krankenhausleitung unter Beruecksichtigung der ethischen 
Erfordernisse des Krankenhauses und unter Einhaltung der aerztlichen Schweigepflicht.
Konstantin Weicht, MRes 
Sheffield Hallam University Datum: Unterschrift:
Trustee CIRSmedical Datum: Unterschrift:
Head of the Department for 
Gynaecology and Obstetrics
Medical Director
Datum: Unterschrift:
Datum: Unterschrift:
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Leadership Interview Guiding Sheet
No.37 Questions
1 Does your hospital have a dedicated department for Quality
(C.1) Management?
2 Does your department have a quality manager?
(C.2)
3 When did you fist hear about CIRSmedical?
(C.21)
4 Which other CIRS in health care do you know of?
5 Why have you decided to introduce CIRS at your department?
6 Who in the department is the initiator of the CIRS project?
7 Why has the product CIRSmedical been chosen?
(0.25)
8 Will CIRS be implemented in your department only or also at other 
departments in this hospital?
9 Do staff in your department have experience with CIRS or have had any
(C.16) training on error management?
10 Please give your opinion on the safety culture in your department.
(C.10) Critical Incidents are:
□ Mentioned and cause is identified
□ Mentioned but cause not identified
□ Often not mentioned
□ Not recognised
11 Would you describe your department as change friendly or rather
(C.12) change avers?
12 Have you ever caused or witnessed a critical incident?
(C.17)
13 Please describe how the situation was dealt with at the time (for example 
was one individual punished or was there a wider investigation into
37 numbers in brackets refer to the occurrence of this same question in the staff questionnaire
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(C.18) underlying causes that might have contributed to the event).
14 Do you think that reporting this particular event with an anonymous 
(C.19) reporting system would have been of advantage / disadvantage?
15 Have you ever logged on to CIRSmedical or looked at the demo 
(C.23) version?
16 Was the decision to implement CIRS a top-down approach or was this 
(C.24) more of a democratic process involving front line staff?
17 What do you expect in general from the anonymous reporting system in 
(C.31) your department?
18 Experience with other IR systems shows that there are disincentives to 
(C.35) reporting. CIRSmedical is designed with consideration given to known
factors (for example it is anonymous, data is managed externally). 
However, what do you think could still prevent staff in your department 
from reporting?
19 Who in the department will be responsible for CIRS?
20 What activities are/were planned to prepare and train staff before the 
CIRS implementation?
21 What activities are planned to motivate staff to use CIRS following the 
implementation?
22 Do you think that these activities are/will be sufficient?
23 Against what criteria do you consider to measure this project? When is it 
(0.33) a success?
24 How long will CIRS be tested at your department?
25 Please estimate how many reports will be submitted to CIRSmedical 
(0.34) from your department each week.
26 Please estimate the costs that occur due to medical errors made at your 
(0.40) department.
27 What is the budget for this project?
28 How do you see the role of OEGGG as the project initiator? Do you 
(0.38) expect any more support from them?
29 Do you expect support for the implementation of CIRS at your 
(C.39) department from any external body (for example WKAV), as it was the
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30
(C.15)
case for example during the digitalisation of patient data?
What do you personally consider most important in regards to Quality 
Management. Are there other projects you would like to see prioritised 
over CIRS and that might be ‘simpler’ (for example improving hand 
washing)?
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Appendix D: Questionnaire
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Please consider that the original questionnaire was in German and that hence 
formatting of the original questionnaire is different to this translated version.
1. Does your hospital have a dedicated department for Quality 
Management?
□ Yes □ No □ Don’t know
2. Do you know whom to approach within your department regarding 
quality issues?
□ Yes □ No
3. Do you feel that your suggestions in regard to Quality 
Management are heard and considered from management?
□ Yes □ No □ Not applicable
4. Do you feel that your suggestions in regard to Quality 
Management are heard and considered within your work area?
□ Yes □ No □ Not applicable
5. Do you use the Quality Management guidelines and standards 
folder that are available in your department?
□ Yes □ No □ Not applicable
6. How would you estimate the information provided in these folders?
□ Good □ Could be better □ Bad □ Don’t know
□ Not applicable
7. How would you estimate the general information on quality and 
safety in your department?
□ Very good □ Too much and not to the point
□ Sufficient □ Not sufficient □ Not existent
□ Not applicable
8. How would you describe the work climate in your department?
□ Good □ Could be better □ Bad
9. How would you describe the work climate in your working area?
□ Good □ Could be better □ Bad
10. Please give your opinion on the safety culture in your department. 
Critical Incidents are:
□ Mentioned and cause is identified
□ Mentioned but cause not identified
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□ Often not mentioned
□ Not recognised
11. Please give your opinion on the safety culture in your working 
area. Critical Incidents are:
□ Mentioned and cause is identified
□ Mentioned but cause not identified
□ Often not mentioned
□ Not recognised
12. Would you describe your department as change friendly or rather 
change avers?
□ change friendly □ change avers
13. Do you feel that your work environment encourages you to apply 
your theoretical Quality Management knowledge into practice?
□ Yes
□ No, because
□ Hierarchical problem □ Lack of resources
□ Not relevant
□ Other
14. Do you think that Quality Management in this department should 
be the predominant task of
□ Every individual working here
□ Head of department
□ Internal department for Quality Management
□ External manager
15. What do you personally consider most important in regards to 
Quality Management. Are there other projects you would like to 
see prioritised over CIRS and that might be ‘simpler’ (for example 
improving hand washing)?
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16. Do you have experience with...
□ Local incident reporting systems
□ Error management
□ Human factors training
□ No answer appropriate
17. Have you ever caused or observed a critical incident?
□ Caused □ Observed □ Caused and observed
□ No □ Don’t want to answer
18. Please describe how the situation was dealt with at the time (for 
example was one individual punished or was there a wider 
investigation into underlying causes that might have contributed 
to the event).
19. Do you think that reporting this particular event with an 
anonymous reporting system would have been of advantage / 
disadvantage?
□ More advantages □ More disadvantages
□ No advantages or disadvantages
20. Please give your opinion why the anonymous incident reporting 
system will be implemented in your department.
21. When did you fist hear about CIRSmedical?
□ CIRSmedical Introduction session
□ I haven’t heard about it yet
□ Other
22. Do you have access to a computer in order to use CIRSmedical?
□ At work □ Private □ No
23. Have you ever logged on to CIRSmedical or looked at the demo 
version?
□ CIRSmedical □ No
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24. Did you contribute to the decision if and which reporting system 
will be implemented?
□ I had the opportunity and did contribute
□ I had the opportunity but didn’t contribute
□ Management inhibited a contribution from my side
□ I didn’t know about the upcoming implementation
25. Why do you think has management chosen the product 
CIRSmedical?
26. In general, do you welcome and support the CIRSmedical project 
in your department?
□ Yes □ No □ No answer
27. Do you have enough information and trust in CIRSmedical to 
report incidents?
□ Yes □ No
28. Do you wish to have ongoing support for using CIRSmedical?
□ Yes □ No
29. Do you trust the CIRSmedical trustee in our department?
□ Yes □ No □ Not applicable
30. Do you have concerns to give Quality Management data, even 
anonymous, to someone external?
□ Data should be kept internal
□ I don’t have any concerns as long as the data is anonymous
31. What do you expect in general from the anonymous reporting 
system in your department?
32. What feedback do you expect when summiting a report in 
CIRSmedical?
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33. Against what criteria do you consider to measure this project? 
When is it a success?
34. Please estimate how many reports will be submitted to 
CIRSmedical from your department each week.
35. Experience with other IR systems shows that there are 
disincentives to reporting. CIRSmedical is designed with 
consideration given to known factors (for example it is 
anonymous, data is managed externally). However, what do you 
think could still prevent staff in your department from reporting?
36. Do you have experience in using a computer?
□ Yes □ No
37. Do you have experience with data safety on the internet (for 
example using online banking or “e-bay”)?
□ Yes □ No
38. How do you see the role of OEGGG as the project initiator? Do 
you expect any more support from them?
39. Do you expect support for the implementation of CIRS at your 
department from any external body (for example WKAV), as it 
was the case for example during the digitalisation of patient data?
□ Yes, in form o f________________________________
□ No
40. Please estimate the costs that occur due to medical errors made 
at your department:
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In order to provide some background information on the study this section 
introduces the OEGGG (Austrian Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics) 
CIRS project, introducing the reporting system CIRSmedical that has been used 
at the study site, the gatekeepers to the project, how the project was initiated by 
the OEGGG, as well as how the researcher familiarised with the project in order 
to develop an interview guiding sheet and a staff self administered 
questionnaire (6.3.4).
CIRSmedical: This section introduces the CIRS that has been used in the 
study site hospital, namely CIRSmedical. CIRSmedical is a worldwide voluntary 
anonymous online critical incident reporting system for all areas in medicine and 
all members of the health care system. A critical incident is described by 
CIRSmedical as (2006): “An event which had the potential to lead to an 
undesirable outcome if left to progress.” Or otherwise, a critical incident is “...an 
event* which could have/has resulted (without/despite intervention) in an 
undesirable outcome for a patient, i.e. a physical or psychological damage 
(*event as a result of patient treatment and not as a result of patient condition 
per se)" (CIRSmedical, 2006a). In the critical incident technique information is 
collected on incidents that have or could have a crucial role, positive or negative, 
in the behaviour of a system. Critical thus does not imply that the incident itself 
was an emergency or a matter of life and death (CIRSmedical, 2006b).
CIRSmedical was originally developed in 1996 from the “Perioperative Patient 
Safety Group” at the department of Anaesthesia at the University of Basel in 
Switzerland (CIRSmedical, 2006c) in collaboration with psychologists from 
NASA and is largely based on the Australian Incident Monitoring Study
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(Runciman et al., 1993)39. This makes it one of the first incident reporting 
systems in health care (CIRSmedical, 2006a, b, c). CIRSmedical describes 
itself as an international forum where critical incidents that happen daily in 
health care are collected and distributed. Reporting is voluntary and anonymous 
and works with username and password protection.
The online reporting form consists of a minimum data set that takes users 
through four categories reporter, patient, incident, and evaluation. This 
minimum data set should ensure a basic analysis as well as, to some extent, 
comparison of data between different reporting systems. A standardised data 
set also facilitates anonymity in reports. The first category (reporter) inquires the 
professional category of the reporter and his relation to the incident. The 
category patient asks about patient age and the mode of treatment. Category 
three identifies the type of incident, workload, time, educational status of 
responsible person, location and the like through the use of drop down menus 
or tick boxes. In addition this category offers the reporter to describe the 
incident in his own words in a free text form, as well as the management and 
consequences of the situation, which is followed by the outcome of the event (if 
already known) and whether or not the incident was preventable. Category four 
evaluates the incident, again through the use of tick boxes, in regard to 
personal factors, team factors, and system factors in order to identify the cause 
of and a possible recovery from the incident. A template reporting form is 
attached in Appendix H. The form however is ‘live’, i.e. if a certain box is ticked 
other options might become unavailable or new boxes may come up.
As a fully online system it does not require any installation or additional hard- 
and software. As soon as staff are issued with a password they can start
39 for m ore inform ation on A IM S see  R uncim an et al 1993
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reporting, either from a computer in their hospital or from any other computer 
with an Internet connection. CIRSmedical offers four different applications:
• A local application for a single department;
• A network application to use in the hospital intranet;
• A closed user group application within a particular medical area;
• An “open application” with a secure connection over the Internet 
with a password.
Those hospitals taking part in the OEGGG initiative all use the open application. 
Hospitals in an open application anonymously share their experiences. It is not 
possible to identify whether a particular event happened in a hospital in Basel, 
in Vienna, Munich, Berlin or in any other city with a participating hospital. The 
following figure E.1 demonstrates what happens after the submission of a 
critical incident.
• H1: An employee in hospital 1 submits a report.
• T1: The elected CIRSmedical trustee ensures that the report does 
not contain any data that could identify the reporting person, a 
patient, or the institution where the event occurred.
• Data Pool: After the report has been anonymised it comes 
together with all other submitted reports in Austria. In a further 
step, this data is shared with the German and Swiss colleagues.
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Figure E.1: Reporting of an Incident with CIRSmedical (own source)
H2 
Employee 
hospital 2
Employee 
hospital 1
H3 
Employee 
hospital 3
Hn 
Employee 
hospital n
T3 
T rustee 
hospital 3 
checks report
T rustee 
hospital 1 
checks report
T2 
Trustee 
hospital 2 
checks report
Tn 
Trustee 
hospital n 
checks report
Data-Pool Austria, Switzerland, Germany
Data-Pool Austria
Because CIRSmedical is an anonymous reporting system users do not receive 
personal feedback. Feedback in CIRSmedical is provided through means of 
comments on the website, which can come from experts or other users. 
CIRSmedical (2006) also invites users to share possible additional sources, for 
example links to websites, journal papers and the like, if they are relevant to a 
report. The CIRSmedical website also provides statistics on incoming reports, 
for example which profession or in which setting it was reported. This data is 
generated from the minimum data set on the online reporting form. The report 
collecting institution can also issue alerts, for example on the website or through
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email alerts to participating hospitals. The system therefore lives from active 
contribution of users, in form of reading and writing comments, as well as 
visiting the website to check for alerts or any other information.
Gatekeepers: In this study there were two key people, or gatekeepers, for the 
researcher. Expert 1, who provided background information and initiated 
contact with organisations and respondent d2, the deputy head of the 
department where the study was conducted. Expert 1 is a gynaecologist and 
obstetrician, University Professor at a large public teaching hospital in Austria, 
and former president for the Austrian Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
(OEGGG), the representing body for gynaecologists and obstetricians in Austria, 
which oversees the about 100 departments in public hospitals. He is the leader 
of one of the hospital’s (not the study site) department for quality management 
and a renowned critic, author and speaker on patient safety in Austria. Like 
most hospital doctors in Austria Expert 1 works mornings in the hospital and 
afternoons in his private practice. This has become a common practice amongst 
hospital doctors and many of them argue they couldn’t “survive” with just one of 
the two jobs. In addition to these two jobs Expert 1 is an associate of a private 
patient safety consultancy which he founded, “not to get rich” (Expert 1), but out 
of a frustration in his various roles in the public health service over the years 
about the constraints put on him by “the system” and the subsequent ‘lack of 
progress in patient safety’ (Expert 1). Engaging in patient safety through a 
private consultancy gives him the freedom to apply his expert (patient safety) 
knowledge and making a practical contribution to patient safety in Austria, thus 
standing up and fulfilling ethical and moral standards in medicine. He is not just 
a receiver of commands, he wants to make an active contribution to safety and 
sees this as an inherent responsibility of a medical doctor. Expert 1 is the 
initiator of the OEGGG CIRSmedical project that provides all Women Hospitals
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in Austria with access to an operative CIRS and holds the CIRSmedical 
introduction sessions at participating hospitals.
The researcher first met Expert 1 at a presentation on error in health care where 
Expert 1 was the keynote speaker. In an informal conversation after the 
presentation between Expert 1 and the researcher the benefits and feasibility 
for an academic study on critical incident reporting systems at gynaecology and 
obstetric departments in Austria were discussed and Expert 1 agreed to act as 
a gatekeeper. In this role he provided information about the project as well as 
access to hospitals who participated in the OEGGG project.
Respondent d2 is the deputy head of department where CIRS had been 
investigated for this present thesis and is the second important gatekeeper. 
Respondent d2 has a long standing professional relationship with Expert 1 and 
is the key initiator of CIRS at the department and the researcher was introduced 
to respondent d2 by Expert 1 as an independent researcher. Respondent d2 
served as the main point of contact at the study site, helped with the formalities 
and in establishing access to respondents.
Initiation of Project: As described above Austria did (and does) not have a 
national CIRS. Not only was it that Expert 1 was frustrated with the situation, 
according to him this was a general perception amongst his colleagues, an 
impression that was verified in a number of informal talks with professionals in 
Women Hospitals. Considering that a CIRS, CIRSmedical, had already been 
developed at the University Clinic in Basel there was an attitude that the Vienna 
City Hospital Association (WKAV) didn’t need to ‘reinvent the wheel and waste 
more time’. Conversations with several other clinical staff brought up the 
concern that from a government side nothing will happen anytime in the near 
future (a period of five years was mentioned). In addition a CIRS run by the
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Vienna City Hospital Association seems problematic as staff would have to, 
anonymously or not, report directly to superiors which according to the literature 
is one of the main barriers to reporting. Respondents were quite emotional 
when they talked about the lack of action and rumours of the governing body. 
As a physician in one of the participating hospitals said:
“Oh, they [the Vienna City Hospital Association] are just bullshitting! Nobody 
really wants to do anything for staff. This is all just a political decision.” 
(respondent d45)
At about that time the Vienna City Hospital Association (WKAV) held a 
conference on quality management in health care, which the researcher 
attempted to attend. This however was turned down by WKAV (over the 
telephone) with a short comment that ‘outsiders are unwanted and no detailed 
information can be shared on this sensitive subject. As leadership of all hospital 
departments had been invited the researcher took the opportunity, when he - in 
order to familiarise with the project - visited CIRSmedical information sessions 
that Expert 1 held at some of the Women Hospitals, and asked department 
leaders about content and nature of the WKAV event. Their unanimous 
response was that it was ‘more like a social event’ with ‘no hope for any 
concrete actions or real in form ationor as respondent 1 said “this is just a blah- 
blah, and it is always like this, this is why we start with CIRSmedical”.40
On the other hand Expert 1 had been promoting CIRS for Women Hospitals at 
various national and international profession specific conferences and it was at 
one of those conferences in 2005 that many of the department leaders first 
heard about CIRS. As a consequence of the inaction of the governing body
4(lT his w as further verified  in a m ore general sen se  in Inform al talks w ith other sen ior m ed ica l sta ff  w h o  
w ere not con n ected  to the O E G G G  in itia tive  in any w ay (resp ond en ts 4 ,5  and 6 ) and gen era lly  fe lt that 
m uch m ore cou ld  and sh ould  be don e regarding sa fety  and that there w as no overall strategy for quality  
and safety  in public h osp ita ls in A ustria.
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Expert 1 together with the Austrian Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
(OEGGG) initiated the incident reporting project. In his role as the then acting 
president of the OEGGG Expert 1 arranged with the presidents of the German 
and Swiss Societies for Gynaecology and Obstetrics to all use one and the 
same CIRS, namely CIRSmedical, and to share anonymised data amongst 
each other. With the joint CIRSmedical application CIRSmedical becomes a 
reporting system for an entire German-speaking region stretching across 
Central Europe. As the data pool grows so does the opportunity for learning 
from incidents and near misses. In addition this joint application contributes to 
the anonymity as reports can come from organisations in any of the three 
countries.
The OEGGG promoted the project in a letter to all Women Hospitals in Austria 
encouraging them to join CIRSmedical. In this three-pages round letter, 
attached with an article about CIRSmedical, the president of the Austrian 
Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics (at that time not Expert 1) explained the 
need for and benefits of using a CIRS. In line with their year long efforts of 
promoting quality and avoiding errors the OEGGG offers Austrian Women 
Hospitals access to CIRSmedical and encourages their timely participation in 
order to establish a large profession specific database in German. This is 
necessary as Women Hospitals otherwise run danger of having an externally 
run CIRS (i.e. by the Vienna City Hospital Association or another governing 
body in other states respectively) superimposed on them ‘ which could hinder a 
meaningful engagement’ with CIRS (OEGGG, 2005). The conditions for 
participation in the OEGGG project were as follows (OEGGG, 2005):
•  obtain permission from the hospital’s collegial leadership for participation in 
CIRSmedical (contract templates regarding confidentiality and anonymity of 
data being provided by OEGGG)
•  requesting CIRS password from OEGGG via email
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•  data contract with OEGGG and a private patient safety consultancy (Expert 
1)
•  annual administration fee of 350 Euro to OEGGG
•  acquiring CIRS password from the data managing company in Switzerland
•  training session held by private patient safety consultancy (Expert 1)
The OEGGG provided a further incentive in offering the first ten hospitals to join 
a waver of the fees, which are Euro 1.000 (exclusive of taxes) per training 
session and exempt travel expenses (OEGGG, 2005).
Unfortunately no accurate data was available on how many hospitals had been 
addressed by the OEGGG and how many had responded. As responses were 
addressed directly at Expert 1 information was obtained from him and according 
to Expert 1 somewhere about 10 to 15 hospitals expressed their interest and 
the training sessions were scheduled.
Further familiarisation: To further familiarise with the project and with the 
environment in which the study was about to take place the researcher joined 
some of these ‘training sessions’ (4 in total and exempt of the actual study site), 
which were half-hour presentations by Expert 1, followed by a question and 
answer session. The visited sites were all gynaecology and obstetric 
departments in public hospitals in Austria. Typically those departments consist 
of the five inpatient areas: labour room/ward; operation theatre; gynaecology 
(and possibly an oncology) ward; obstetric ward; nursery, as well as an 
outpatient department for gynaecology, pregnancy, and hormone treatment. 
Departments usually employ around 100 staff. The departments are lead by the 
head of department and his deputy (two medics) and a head nurse and her
deputy (two nurses). The role of obstetric nurses in the hierarchy of the
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departments is not entirely clear as from 2001 onwards they are a dedicated 
profession of their own and do not belong to the nursing profession anymore. 
The leadership team reports to the hospital leadership team called “Kollegiale 
Fuhrung” (German for “collegial leadership”) which typically consists of four 
people: medical director; nursing director; technical director; administrative 
director. The medical department leaders report to the medical director and the 
head nurse reports to the nursing director respectively.
In each of the five departments Expert 1 and the medical leaders already knew 
each other from various other profession specific seminars and meetings. 
Following a number of emails and telephone calls Expert 1 was then formally 
invited to give a presentation about CIRS to all staff. In all cases Expert 1 was 
invited by the medical leaders of the department, i.e. it was a medical (medics 
who also hold a managerial position) rather than a nursing initiative. The 
training sessions took place at departments and during the daily morning 
meetings. Some departments hold their morning meetings together with nurses, 
some do separate meetings. Accordingly attendance at meetings was either 
around 30 people (nurses and doctors together) or about half of it (only doctors). 
In those cases where only doctors were present there was no separate event 
for nurses, but information from the session communicated through the head 
nurse (who, as part of the department’s leadership team, attends the doctors’ 
meeting).
Visiting training sessions and having informal conversations with staff added to 
information gathered in the literature and aided in the development of a guiding 
sheet for semi-structured interviews with leadership and the development of a 
questionnaire. The interview guiding sheet and the questionnaire, as well as 
interview techniques (recording) were tested with volunteers at these 
departments. The final questionnaire to be distributed at the training session at 
the study site consisted of 40 questions. The final guiding sheet for semi-
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structured interviews with department leaders at the study site consisted of 30 
questions. With this the engagement with other hospitals ended and the study 
was continued as a single site in depth investigation, although the text will 
continue to occasionally make references to these other hospitals (for example 
in the next section on the training session, which was observed to have followed 
a common scheme all five observed hospitals). The next section describes the 
training session at the study site.
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Appendix F: CIRSmedical demo reporting form
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This section presents findings from the questionnaire providing more details.
Safety attitude: Questions 1 to 15 were aimed at getting an understanding of 
the general safety attitude in the department, finding out how much staff were 
currently reaching out or being reached by existing patient safety measures. 
Questions concerned issues like accountability (1 and 2), how staff were 
already involved and/or encouraged to participate in patient safety (3, 4, 14, 15), 
how this might relate to their work environment (8, 9, 12, 13), if the were using 
existing patient safety material at the department (5, 6, 7), and how they 
perceived the current handling of critical incidents at the department (10 and 11).
Question C.1 “Does your hospital have a dedicated department for Quality 
Management?’’ wanted to find out if staff knew about the quality/risk manager in 
the hospital and hence if they were being reached or could reach out to him. 60 
percent (23 respondents) answered “yes”, while 24 percent (9 respondents) 
didn’t know if there was a quality management department, 13 percent (5 
respondents) explicitly stated that there was no quality management 
department, and 3 percent (1 respondent) gave no answer. This means that 37 
percent (14 respondents) either didn’t know or were convinced that there was 
no quality manager at the hospital. The data does not allow interpretation if the 
60 percent (23 respondents) who answered “yes” all referred to the same 
department or person. Question 2 “Do you know whom to approach within your 
department regarding quality issues?” was targeted at the situation directly at 
the department. 60 percent (23) of respondents stated that they did not know 
who to approach regarding quality issues in the department. This makes it likely 
that many questions staff may have regarding CIRS will remain unheard. In a 
very optimistic light one may also assume that CIRS would present a channel 
for these voices to be heard. However, as an anonymous CIRS does not allow
department specific feedback (nobody knows from which department reports
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are coming) any significant contribution from a CIRS in this matter seems 
unlikely.
That so many staff did not know who to approach regarding quality in the 
department may be related to their perception that quality management should 
be the predominant task of every individual working at the department (66 
percent, question 14). What specifically these quality endeavours were and how 
CIRS was to be seen in relation to them was asked of respondents in the open 
question 015. Possible improvement efforts other than CIRS that were 
mentioned include ‘more personnel’ and ‘more time with the patient’, as well as 
preparing for and obtaining first, or at least second, hand information about 
patients (questionnaire 5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 22, 23, 34, 27), increasing 
standardisation of processes and compliance with those standards 
(questionnaire 5, 15, 18, 19, 22, 34), and better hygiene through increasing use 
of gloves and better hand-washing (questionnaire 3, 7, 17, 25, 35). However, 
many of these potential areas for improvement may not be acted upon as staff 
do not communicate their concerns to management (42 percent, question 3), in 
their work area (32 percent, question 4), or because suggestions are “not heard 
and considered” by management (16 percent, question 3) or in the work area (8 
percent, question 4). On the other hand 37 percent (question 3) and 52 percent 
(question 4) respectively stated that their suggestions regarding quality 
management were heard and considered. This may be interpreted, also 
considering answers to question 2, that staff feel more comfortable discussing 
issues in a small group and with people they regularly work with, i.e. in their 
work group. In regard to CIRS these answers suggest that CIRS is seen as one 
of many equally important improvement efforts and that staff do not specifically 
perceive CIRS as something that may lead to or foster implementation of other 
improvements (question 0.15).
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50 percent of staff (question 13) felt that their work environment was supportive 
in applying staffs’ knowledge regarding quality management, with resource 
issues (13 percent), hierarchical issues (8 percent), and ‘other issues’ (11 
percent) being the main inhibitors of applying knowledge into practice. This 
largely corresponded with staffs’ perception of the work climate in the 
department (50 percent ‘good’, question 8) and the work group (63 percent 
‘good’, question 9). Respectively 42 percent (question 8) felt that the work 
environment in the department ‘could be better’ or was ‘not good’, and 34 
percent (question 9) said the same about the work group. 72 percent attested 
the department to be ‘change friendly’, while 26 percent described it as ‘change 
averse’.
In terms of general information provided on quality and safety at the department 
(question 7) 44 percent thought that information was ‘sufficient’. While 26 
percent attested it to be ‘very good’ 15 percent thought it was ‘not sufficient’, 
with 7 percent even stating that it was not existent. 66 percent of respondents 
stated that they were using quality guidelines and standards folder (question 5) 
and that the information contained was good (74 percent, question 6). 16 
percent did not know about and 13 percent stated they were not using those 
folders (question 5).
Questions 10 and 11 asked respondents about their opinion on the safety 
culture in regards to critical incidents at the department and in the work group 
respectively. Possible answers were that critical incidents are ‘mentioned and 
causes identified’, ‘mentioned but causes not identified’, ‘often not mentioned’, 
and ‘not recognised’ and multiple answers were possible. The majority of staff 
thought that critical incidents were already being mentioned and causes 
identified (71 percent at department, 66 percent in work group). 18 percent 
thought that critical incidents were mentioned but not identified (for both areas), 
not mentioned (18 percent in department, 11 percent in work group), and not
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recognised (5 percent work department, 3 percent work group). When added up 
this means that staff think that in 41 percent the cause for a critical incident is 
not identified at department level and in 32 percent at work group level.
CIRS perception: While the above section concerned general safety attitude 
questions the second part of the questionnaire (questions 16 to 40) aimed to 
identify issues directly related to the implementation and peoples’ individual 
perception of CIRS at the department. Topics covered include experience staff 
may have with CIRS or other patient safety related topics (16), their experience 
with critical incidents and how CIRS may help approach these issues in the 
future (17, 18, 19), their involvement in and perception of the implementation of 
CIRS (20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26), trust, confidentiality and anonymity (27, 29, 30, 
37), expectations and feedback (31, 32, 33, 34, 40), support (22, 28, 38,39), as 
well as possible barriers to reporting (35). Many of these CIRS questions can be 
used to compare or verify information from the leadership interviews (16, 18, 
20-22. 24, 28, 31, 33-35).
This second section sets out with question 16 if staff had any experience with a 
CIRS, error management, or human factors training. While two respondents did 
not answer and one respondent stated he had had human factors training all 
remaining respondents (92 percent) stated they had no experience with a CIRS, 
error management, or human factors training. Question 17 asked respondents if 
they had ever caused or witnessed a critical incident. 50 percent stated that 
they had either caused or witnessed a critical incident, while 32 percent stated 
explicitly that they had not caused or witnessed a critical incident, with 
remaining respondents choosing not to answer. 13 percent stated that they had 
caused and witnessed a critical incident, and 5 percent stated that they had only 
caused a critical incident but not witnessed one. The open question 18 then
asked of respondents how the incident had been dealt with. The majority of the
39 8
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16 answers provided stated that the incident had been talked about and that 
nobody in particular had been blamed. Four respondents mentioned negative 
feedback, a ‘mischievous reaction of some colleagues’ (questionnaire 9), that 
other colleagues didn’t feel they had also contributed to an error, causing 
‘frustration and capitulation’ in the individual who had committed the active error 
(questionnaire 13), that errors were being perceived as ‘personal failure’ 
(questionnaire 28), and in one case that the employee had been sacked 
(questionnaire 18). Only two respondents (questionnaire 17 and 31) stated that 
the cause of the incident had been removed following its discovery. Other 
responses stated that while the incident was communicated, sometimes just in 
the work group and ‘due to lack of time not discussed in the staff meeting’ 
(questionnaire 8), ‘nothing had really changed’ (questionnaire 10), the cause 
hadn’t always been removed (questionnaire 14), or that only informal 
recommendations had been issued (questionnaire 7, 8, 10, 27). Two 
respondents explicitly stated that the incident had been documented 
(questionnaire 10, 14) and one respondent (questionnaire 27) stated that the 
incident was followed by a series of talks with the patient concerned, the 
superior, and the interdisciplinary team (questionnaire 27).
The next questions concerned issues around the implementation of CIRS. 24 
percent of staff had first heard about CIRSmedical at the training session (see 
section 6.3.5), 50 percent had heard about it at another occasion (which could 
have been before or after the training session), and 10 percent had never heard 
about CIRSmedical (question 21). While 63 percent didn’t know about the 
upcoming implementation 26 percent stated that they had contributed to the 
decision making process leading to the implementation (question 24). One 
respondent stated that his involvement was inhibited by management. 24 
respondents answered the open question 20 why a CIRS was being 
implemented at the department. Answers provided were positive throughout 
and stated that ‘it would make a long term contribution in avoiding errors and
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critical incidents’ (questionnaire 1, 5, 19, 28, 34, 35), to ‘improve or assure 
quality’ (questionnaire 1, 2, 6, 20, 27, 30, 31), ‘because it makes sense’ (15 and 
17), ‘because it is in fashion and due to public pressure’ (questionnaire 7), ‘to 
analyse root causes and think about the entire hospital system’ (questionnaire 
4), ‘because it provides the opportunity to make changes’ (questionnaire 28)‘, 
‘so that everyone can be honest’ (questionnaire 23), ‘because everyone suffers 
from error but the fear of image loss keeps people silent (questionnaire 8), and 
because ‘people would use it’ (questionnaire 25).
According to these answers staff did not fear that the implementation was some 
sort of control organ superimposed- on them. While there was a ‘canon of 
improvement’ in answers to questions 20 the 21 answers given to the open 
question 25 why in particular the system CIRSmedical was being implemented 
were more diverse. 4 respondents could not say why (questionnaire 23, 25, 28,
35), four respondents knew of no alternative system (questionnaire 5, 6, 8, 9), 
two stated that CIRSmedical was used because it was really anonymous 
(questionnaire 4 and 7) and one stated that the Vienna City Hospital 
Association (WKAV) did not offer a CIRS (questionnaire 18). One respondent 
stated ‘because of personal contacts’ (questionnaire 1) and that ‘the offer was 
probably good, but is it useful?’ (questionnaire 22). The open answers also 
suggested that at least two respondents (questionnaire 19 and 34) seemed to 
had confused this OEGGG initiative as a Vienna City Hospital Association 
(WKAV) project. Overall 89 percent of respondents welcomed the 
implementation of CIRSmedical at the department (question 26). The remaining 
11 percent were ‘no answers’. No one stated explicitly that he wouldn’t welcome 
the implementation.
The next set of questions (27, 29, 30, 37) regarded trust, confidentiality and 
anonymity. 55 percent of respondents stated that they had not enough trust in 
the system to report incidents, while 37 percent stated that they had (question
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27). Question 29 asked respondents if they trusted the CIRStrustee. 42 percent 
answered no, 24 percent stated that the CIRStrustee had not yet been elected, 
and 13 percent stated they trusted the CIRStrustee. These answers suggest 
that some of those who responded ‘no’ may have done so out of a principal 
aversion against the role of a CIRStrustee (similar to the discussion in the 
training session where some marked out the position of a CIRStrustee as the 
weak spot of the system, see section 6.2.5) and that those who answered ‘not 
yet elected’, which was an answer ‘option’ added by respondents themselves, 
may have in principal agreed with the necessity of a CIRStrustee but made it a 
person related matter, i.e. if they were to trust one particular person in the role 
as CIRStrustee. 68 percent had no problem sharing data with a third party if the 
data was anonymous, while 21 percent did not want to share data even if it was 
anonymous (question 30). Question 37 was added to find a possible correlation 
between trust in CIRS and previous experience with other online services that 
require trust, such as online banking or use of eBay. 50 percent of respondents 
had and 50 percent had no experience with online security (question 37).
Questions 31, 32, 33, 34 and 40 were concerned with expectations and 
feedback and were all open questions. Question 31 asked staff about their 
general expectation of a CIRS at the department. Many of the 25 respondents 
explicitly stated that they expected a reduction of error occurrence at the 
department (questionnaire 1, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 23, 25, 32, 34, 35, 37). 
Others expected more discussion and analysis of critical incidents (2, 4, 7, 8, 15, 
28, 34, 35) and that improvement efforts would be based on real data (10, 15), 
‘not just criticising and talking about it, but that changes would actually be 
forthcoming’ (questionnaire 23). The general expectation was that with 
increased information would come increased analysis, followed by action based 
on evidence, reducing both risk and actual occurrence of critical incidents at the 
department. One respondent stressed that his only expectation was that ‘it was 
really kept anonymous’ (questionnaire 21) and another (questionnaire 24)
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stated he would probably only study reports but not submit reports himself. The 
respondent in questionnaire 5 saw CIRS as a way around the fact that usually 
only harmful events give rise to analysis, action and improvement and that 
lessons could be learned from no harm events and without the need for 
tragedies.
22 respondents answered the open question 32 “What feedback do you expect 
when submitting a report?”. Nine respondents (questionnaire 1, 5, 15, 17, 18, 
21, 23, 28, 36) stated they did not expect any specific feedback or did not know 
what kind of feedback to expect. While some respondents may have not 
expected any feedback at all others (for example questionnaire 18) may have 
wished feedback but did not expect it stating that ‘as long as no institution 
processes data there will be no feedback’. Other respondents expected some 
action, 11 (questionnaire 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 22, 27, 37) in regard to safety 
and in form of recommendations, analyses and implementations, or in regard to 
‘reporting’ in form of a feedback that the report had actually been accepted, 
been put on the system without alterations, and quickly processed 
(questionnaire 1, 25, 37). One respondent (questionnaire 5), although not 
expecting any immediate feedback, hoped that ‘colleagues would read reports 
and, based on those reports, develop a strategy how they could deal with 
similar events’. There was one respondent (questionnaire 32) who expected 
‘negative feedback’.
26 replies were made to the open question 33 against what criteria CIRS could 
be measured and when the CIRSmedical project would mean a success to 
them. ‘Reduction of error’ was the most prominent answer (questionnaire 1, 7, 
10, 26, 37) although one respondent (questionnaire 21) wondered if a reduction 
of error would be measurable. Another respondent (questionnaire 1) wondered 
if an improvement could be at all related to CIRS due to its anonymity. Others 
pointed out improved communication as a success factor, as in ‘more
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discussion’, ‘the possibility of unbiased discussions about error and quality 
deficiencies’, or ‘positive feedback from patients and staff’ (questionnaire 2, 7, 
8,). Many respondents suggested that for CIRS to be a success it needed to 
produce some ‘visible’ results, for example ‘more information about what kind of 
errors also happen at other departments’ (questionnaire 35), ‘changes in the 
system’ (questionnaire 4), ‘better error management’ (questionnaire 6), 
‘reduction of infection rate’ (questionnaire 7), provision of statistics showing the 
frequency of errors, leading to solutions, and publicised (questionnaire 15, 17, 
18, 19), cost savings (questionnaire 26) and that reports needed to be 
processed (questionnaire 34). One respondent stressed that CIRS should not 
mean additional work load for staff (questionnaire 27) and the respondent in 
questionnaire 28 stated that reporting itself would mean a success to him if it 
was ‘reflective’. Three respondents answered that they wouldn’t know how to 
measure success of the project (questionnaire 13, 14, 36).
Expectations or estimations regarding the reporting frequency at the department 
were addressed in the open question 34. This seemed to proof difficult to 
answer as 24 respondents did not give an answer. The remaining respondents 
though that either no report (questionnaire 2), one report per week 
(questionnaire 6, 7, 22, 35), two reports per week (questionnaire 5, 9, 10, 27,
36), or four to five reports (questionnaire 9, 11, 25, 28) would be submitted each 
week. Similarly respondents found it difficult to answer question 40 about the 
costs that occur at the department due to medical error. This question wanted to 
test if staff made any relation between medical error and additional costs to the 
department. From the 30 replies 25 respondents stated that an estimation was 
just not possible; one (questionnaire 25) thought that costs were around 3.000 
Euro, another one (questionnaire 6) that costs were around 40.000 Euro, and 
two respondents (questionnaire 36 and 37) thought that costs were around 
1.000.000 Euro.
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Questions 22, 28, 38 and 39 regarded support, either technical support through 
provision of enough computers for reporting, ongoing general support and 
training, or support from the OEGGG as initiating organisation or any other 
related organisation. 76 percent of staff stated that they had access to a 
computer at work, 32 percent stated that they had access to a computer at 
home, and 21 percent stated that they had no access to a computer for 
reporting whatsoever (question22). 74 percent of staff explicitly stated that they 
wanted ongoing support in the project and 13 percent did not want any ongoing 
support (question 28). Staff did not expect any particular support from the 
OEGGG or another related organisation but wished to have ‘more information 
whether or not the project was budgeted’ (questions 38 and 39).
In the open question 035 staff were asked what they perceived as possible 
barriers to reporting. From the 30 replies 15 respondents (questionnaire 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22, 24, 25, 34, 35, 37) named concerns about the anonymity as 
a barrier to reporting, sometimes relating it to concerns in use of a computer, 
the internet, or the internal CIRS trustee. Respondents made frequent use of 
the word fear (questionnaire 1, 5, 8, 15, 21, 22, 24) and mistrust (questionnaire 
2, 4, 7).Time (questionnaire 18, 19, 26, 34) and problems with formulation/too 
complicated input (questionnaire 7, 18, 19, 22, 34) were other popular answers. 
Other possible barriers were named once: false shame (questionnaire 17), a 
lack of experience with the system (questionnaire 25), a perception that the 
incident was not ‘important’ (questionnaire 27), fear of technique and media 
(questionnaire 15), and laziness (questionnaire 9). One respondent 
(questionnaire 3) thought that the external data management might be a barrier. 
Three respondents thought that there wouldn’t be any barriers to reporting 
(questionnaire 10, 13, 14).
Similar to interviews with the leadership it also became apparent that 
respondents had not used CIRSmedical before. 97 percent of respondents had
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never logged on to CIRSmedical (or the online demo version that didn’t require 
a password) and only one respondent stated he had already logged on 
(question 23). Nevertheless 26 percent stated that they had contributed to the 
decision making process leading to the implementation (question 24).
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